Announcer ladies and gentlemen, welcome back. As we get into this next session, im sure you noticed on the official program that were one speaker short for this panel. Dr. Raymond callahan due to circumstances beyond his control could not be with us today so today. So, were sorry that we are missing him today, but, you know, his friends here in new orleans are certainly thinking about him. To lead this session, we have called on one of the most distinguished military historians that were very fortunate to have right up the road here at the university of new orleans, dr. Allan millett. His career has not only filled many bookshelves, but he has also fill the ranks of military history phds by overseeing the most doctoral candidates of anyone in the country. Its hard not to find one of his students around. To talk about one of the most important battles in june of 1944 and the war as a whole, its my pleasure to call on dr. Alan millett and Hiroyuki Shindo to discuss the battle in the chinaburmaindia theater. With that, allan, its all yours. [applause] prof. Millett im a pale substitute for ray callahan, i can assure you, when i wrote about the Burma Campaign in the book a war to be won which is on sale, right out here. I can assure you that i went to ray to critique it and did a superb job. The level of anticipation in the the level of american participation in the Burma Campaign is more considerable than you might imagine, in a historical sense, we think about Clint Corcoran and his daredevil special forces air force, meryls marauders. But thats a very small part of the picture. What characterizes the campaign in burma was in fact it was several wars, the United States interests was fundamentally and openly some kind of route of, from india to china to supply the Chinese Armed forces and the Expeditionary Air force that we put in china. That was the still well war aided and abetted by the chinese nationalists, some of whom would fight and some of whom were saving themselves for the campaign with the communists after the war ended. There is another war which is the wingatechindit war. It catches peoples imagination because the robust and flawed assumption about how one operates or does not operate in a very hostile physical environment. Burma is not a great place to wage war. I have not been there, but i have been to thailand, there certainly are some similarities. If ray were here, he would talk about the cohema and Fall Campaign as the birth of the modern indian army which is what his book is really about. I certainly recommend it for you who are interested. There are longer works on some official history by lewis allen, another somewhat shorter account by Major General julian popson , sponsored by the imperial war museum, my function, however, is to, at least when the q a starts to kind of handle the allied side, but the real important part of this presentation is Hiroyuki Shindos account of the japanese side of the campaign. However, i think its probably part of my role to make sure that he doesnt get too far from [laughter] prof. Millett an allied point of view. Whether youre curious or not, i dont know, this is native to maple leaves, burqa, and the blade is made from sheffield steel, which had once had had once been railroads in nepal. They have taken the Railroad Tracks and turned them into knives for tourists. On that high note, hiro, you have it. [applause] prof. Shindo good morning, everybody. I would like to thank the organizers of this conference for what is turning out to be a very, i think a very successful conference and a very rewarding experience and since we dont have a lot of time, i would like to get into my talk right away. I will be talking about the operation, but i will just say impal operation from the japanese perspective. And the operation lasted from march 8 to july 2, 1944. And it really stands out among the Japanese Armys operations because almost half of the 60,000 to 80,000 men committed died before the end of operation and most of these died because of disease and or starvation. And in the japanese literature, its been called the clearest example or maybe the worst example of a rash or a reckless or an imprudent operation because most of the problems that they ran into during the operation had been foreseen. There was a lot of objection to it before it even got underway and yet it was carried out anyway. So in my talk, i would like to talk about how this operation came to happen and then ill talk about the operation itself. The inpal operation began, took place in 1944. But to look at its genesis or its roots, you have to look back to 1942 when the pacific war began. The Japanese Army strategy in the burma area was defensive. In other words, they wanted the 15th army to capture burma in order to protect the rear of the 25th army which is driving down the Malay Peninsula toward singapore. So burma, the burma offensive started with the start of the war and by early may, they had occupied most of burma and completed their mission. And by occupying burma, what they also did was they cut the burma route that they call the burma route of supplies from the allies that went from northern burma into southern china. And so after this route was cut, the allies began flying air supplies over the himalayas, the the famous hump route. And anyway, after the 15th army finished its occupation of burma, the japanese switched to the Strategic Defensive not only in burma, but also for the entire Southeast Asia area. And after they had done this, they were making this transition, while they were making this transition, the Southern Expeditionary Army command which was in charge of all of the army units in Southeast Asia came up with a proposal to continue the offensive into india, into northeast india. The purpose of this operation to be to cut that airlift, to interdict the airlift that was going over the himalayas and do this while the japanese still had the initiative. This proposal offensive out of burma into india was proposed by the army general staff. And the reason they opposed it was basically the army after they had completed what they called the Southern Operations or the occupation of Southeast Asia, the army general staff wanted to shift to Strategic Defensive for the entire area, draw some of their forces down and refocus on the on going war in china and get back to their preparations for war against the soviet union, which was their traditional hypothetical enemy. So they were against any kind of continuation of the offensive into india. However, they couldnt completely rule it out either, and so although the general staff was reluctant about the idea, they did in august 1942 authorize Southern Expeditionary Army to study the issues and make preparations and continue to make plans for an operation. However, they said they would need the express approval of the general staff to actually carry out the operation, which they tentatively scheduled for maybe late october 1942. And they gave it the name operation number 21. Now, this proposal which of an offensive into india by Southern Expeditionary Army was opposed not only by the general staff but also by the combat advancement that would have to carry it out, the 15th army and the Division Commanders underneath it. The main reason they opposed it has to do with the geography of the area. And i dont know how familiar you are with a map of the area, but on the border between burma and india runs northsouth and also the major rivers and Mountain Ranges run essentially in a northsouth direction. As you can kind of picture, the japanese are in burma on the east and they have to cross over the river and this Mountain Range into india on the west. And the Mountain Range, its called the arakan Mountain Range. Spelled arakan. It consists of really high mountains, steep sides reaching up to 10,000 feet and equally steep and deep canyons. Its a really its a really large physical geographical obstacle to any offensive into india. And so the 15th army and the Division Commanders are all opposed to this operation. First of all, they say we dont have enough forces to do this. The Southern Expeditionary Army were thinking of doing this with about maybe four divisions and the 15th army and the Division Commanders say that is not enough. And even more importantly, they say you cannot pass that kind of force over the arakan mountains. And the next, even if you did get them over the mountains, you cant supply them with a line of communications through the mountains because there is almost virtually no developed road network crossing the mountains. Now, at this time one of the Division Commanders who opposed this especially strongly was a guy by the name of, let me see, Major General renya mutaguchi. He was the commander of the 18th division at the time. And he opposed the offensive into india for the reason i explained. Basically, you cant cross the Mountain Range and you cant supply them even if they did get across. Now, what happens to this operation 21, its postponed by the general staff after the japanese fail in their october offensive in guadalcanal to take henderson field. The situation in the South Pacific is much worse than they had imagined. So they postponed any offensive into india. However, they do say you may continue preparations and planning for it. Now, in march, 1943, the japanese reorganize the command structure in burma and sorry to keep going back and forth, but this is a very simple organizational chart of the new organization and what the japanese did in march 1943 was they inserted a Burma Area Army command between 15th army and Southern Expeditionary Army. I hope you can read it. The japanese did not have a core structure in their army, so their army command is actually about the same size of a corps in the u. S. Army and their area army is im getting that right, i have it written down. So they dont have a corps structure. The army corps is equal to an the army corps is equal to an american corps, and the Burma Area Army is not as grand as it sounds. They set up this new command structure. And at the same time another change they made was they promoted mutaguchi to commander of 15th army. Now, about the time mutaguchi was promoted to commander of 15th army, he did an absolute about face and he began to promote very strongly and forcefully and repeatedly the idea of an invasion into india. And mutaguchi was hoping to invade india and then go through nepal and maybe go all the way to the state of asam. I guess you cant see the laser pointer, im not going to try. Asam is kind of in the upper lefthand corner of this map just below the himalaya mountains. Which are the very lefthand, the upper lefthand corner of the map. Its fairly deep into india. Mutaguchi began promoting this idea of a major offensive all the way to assam. One of the big questions, why mutaguchi, a few months when he was Division Commander opposed this kind of idea, why he suddenly when he became army commander, why did he suddenly began calling, advocating for such a major offensive into india, not just in nepal but beyond to the state of assam . The first reason is that he, after he opposed operation 21, he came to regret his opposition. He saw that he had somehow let down his superior officers and commands by raising all of the negatives and not supporting what they wanted to do. And he vowed hence forth to be more positive and aggressive and try to realize the intentions and desires of his higher commands. And its kind of ironic because mutaguchi already had a reputation of being a very aggressive, strong, charismatic leader. Some would say he was arrogant and overly demanding. But he found that he needed to be more positive when it came to the planning and execution of operations. So that is one of the reasons that he suddenly came to favor invasion into india. And another reason is, mutaguchi had this he was overly selfconscious about his role in history. He had an exaggerated view of how he affected history and especially history of how japan came to find itself in this kind of war. And now mutaguchi in july, 1937, was commander of the first infantry regimen of the china garrison army, which is at the marco polo bridge. He was one of those that was among many that was responsible for this incident developing into something and going beyond a local resolution. And so mutaguchi came to feel that he was responsible for getting japan into the war and then he thought that he had, therefore that he had a moral responsibility to deliver a knockout blow against the british and bring and end to the war and get japan out of the war. Now, he didnt feel this because he regretted getting japan into the war. He just had this exaggerated view of his importance in all of these events. And in addition to these personal factors of why mutaguchi came to favor an offensive into india, there are also certainly military rationales. First of all was the win gate operation, the chindit operation from february to may 1943 which professor millett just mentioned. And as a result of that operation, mutaguchi, among others, drew a couple of conclusions. First of all, it convinced him that sizable ground force could be passed over the arakan mountains and could also be supplied over the mountains and second of all, mutaguchi came to feel that he had a lot of difficulty dealing with the win gate force and he came to feel that rather than fight the enemy after they had attacked japan, would be more advantageous for the japanese in burma to launch a preemptive offensive against the enemies bases of operation and deny them the chance to conduct an offensive. Now, and so mutaguchi came to favor an invasion of india for these reasons and once again, everybody above and below him opposed this idea. And first of all, i would like to look at the Division Commanders. Every one of them and their staff opposed mutaguchis proposal to invade india. The reasons are the same. Its the geographical reasons, its the arakan mountains that you cant cross and you cant maintain lines of communications over or through them. In addition, these commanders felt there wasnt enough motor transport on the japanese side and also by late, you know this debate goes on through 1943 and by late 1943, the Japanese Air Force has lost command of the air in the burma area. Thats another reason why the Division Commanders came to oppose or oppose mutaguchis concept. And against these, mutaguchi offers rebuttals or counterarguments. First of all, the Division Commanders say we dont have enough motor transport. In all fairness to mutaguchi and the 15th army, they did ask for reinforcement of transport companies and so on, but they didnt get all of those that they wanted. And so he said, ok, then we will use cattle and other animals to transport supplies over the mountains and then once we have gotten over the mountains, they can be eaten and that will solve our food problem as well. And another reason that the commanders opposed the proposal is, as i said, the japanese had no control of the air anymore. Mutaguchi said, well, control of the air wont be such a problem. It will only be a problem when we cross the chinwin river, its the major river they have to cross before they get into the mountains. Thats the only time when control of air is a problem. Once the japanese get in the mountains, they wont be able to see us from the air. So loss of command of air wont be a problem. And as for not being able to pass enough supplies over the mountains, mutaguchi says, first of all, we will capture british supplies and use those and also he says well rely on speed. He expects nepal and cohima to be occupied in three weeks, 20 days, so he says the lack of supplies wont be a problem. Our men will be able to do this with what they can carry on their backs. And finally, the commanders opposed this operation because of the concerns with the monsoon season, which lasts from about may to october every year and is characterized by very heavy torrential rains which wash out bridges and roads and they say, once we get into the monsoon season, all our problems will be multiplied. To that mutaguchi says, well, if we capture nepal and cohima before that, we can be sheltered in there. , just will rather be the british who will be impeded by these heavy rains when they try to counter attack. So he brushes these objections away. Underlying his position just a general dismissal. He looks down on the fighting abilities of the british. Experience ofe fighting on Singapore Island during the final stages of the campaign. He had a low opinion of british soldiers. He said they wont he a problem anyway so you do not have to worry but these other problems. He would heatedly tells his men, his commanders you only have to surround the british and fire into the air and the british will come out and surrender. Herall, lets another take, had this extreme over emphasis on the value or the importance in the faith of victory. The japanesein navy. Its extreme in his case. He believes that you may have all of these other problems, but having absolute faith and victory will enable you to overcome them off overcome them all. Another factor that multiplied all of these problems is he had very bad relationships with all of his commanders. They clearly have problems communicating with each other. I talked about how all of his divisional commanders and staff were against his proposal. And the general staff were opposed to his proposal to invade india. At best they were very reluctant about it. Especially in the latter half of 1943. The americans and the australians restart their offensive in the South Pacific. They are advancing in the solomons and in new guinea. The Japanese Army faces an increasingly serious situation there. Armyouthern expeditionary is concerned about the British Naval units. They will now be freed to be transferred into the indian ocean. One thing is the japanese desire on the political level to recognize indias independence. One of the reasons was to force britain to capitulate. Some sort of pressure against india could have that effect. But they hoped that by invading india they could foment the Independence Movement in india and india would detach itself from the british. , it is a kind of cobaltthat the operation even though it is materially relevant, the superior commanders, the commands also ok. The superior commanders were not on the same page concerning the purpose of the operation, what the purpose should be and where operationske of the should be. Its a very complex and detailed issue. I cant get into all of the details. But basically, there is a difference between the higher overnd and the taguchi what the operation should be. Mutaguchi should be mutaguchi over what the operation should be. They never tell him that they enhance theis to operation in burma. To deliver a knockout blow against the british. Related to that, where should they put the main weight of the task. In higher command, also, it a way, they see the operation is risky. They see that it might have a couldcal effect and it enhance japans defensive in burma. These Southern Expeditionary Army and the general staff come to have the view that the operation might be ok in terms of improving japans defensive position. And in that case they are concerned about a possible amphibious invasion in the south. The Burma Area Army says, ok, how about putting it on the left side . Thaturma operation says mutaguchi could use the 15th and the 33rd division it is hard to see. The 31st division in reserve. You have a song. And thats basically the only good road. Sendmeans that they cannot the attacking force. And they say that they should attack it for that purpose. Does, hemutaguchi so whatis eye on theoes is decides to commit area in the north. He decides that he wants to have the rest of the 15th division to so he proposes an operation where the offensive is on the right side. He suggests that you should do the left hook, but they never order him to. This is one of the excuses that he uses outdoors. They never ordered him not to carry out the operation. Reason thatr complicates all of this, in his relationships with his immediate superior. And btw really trust each other. Really trust each other. Mutaguchi says its his immediate superior had any reservations or objections about what he was trying to do, he would have said so and he never said so. The reason he does not a so they say, i understand what you are saying. Do we should let mutaguchi what he wants to. Argues fororcefully this operation through 1943. In the end, everybody gives in. There are reasons the operation could the a benefit. January 1944 the operation is ordered. The operation is carried out. We dont have a whole lot of time left. I will run through how the operation went. It starts on march 8 with the 33rd division in the south jumping off. They occupy and a little bit between cohuman it cuts off the ability of the british to reach the area. And they get bogged down, but by early may, they are threatening an important road junction just to the south. They are threatening it from the west. Midmay, the entire operation becomes stalemated. The japanese left all of the heavy equipment behind including most of their artillery. Difficulties began from late april through the end. F may these shortages of ammunition, medical supplies, food, rations. Theirpanese have reduced rations from the very beginning. It becomes acute and they go from half rations down to a third and often 16. And i will tell you some more. The tragic, human side of this operation. It demands an even grateful desk greater effort. But they cant move any further. It demands and even greater effort. They cant move any further. Mutaguchi in supper leaving all of his Division Commanders. They are relieved at the end of may for committee and lack up aggressiveness. 1, general sato, commander of the 31st division withdraws. Y to wherell read a ploy the supplies are and of course, he is incensed and says he is going to courtmartial sato because he can prove that mutaguchi is incompetence. O is insanethat sat and he was insane anyway. And hes to appeal that is put on the reserve list. Nothing comes of it. Anyone can end this. Came out clearly against the operation to mutaguchi before it began. Now no one can come out and say it should be ended here if there wherenow infamous meeting both sides, both men want to bring up the subject of terminating operations. Mutaguchi says that he wanted to bring it up, but could not bring him bring it up. Wanteder one into mutaguchi to bring it up. The conversation goes on before the general austria staff calls it off and the Southern Expeditionary Army calls it off. Then all of the Japanese Forces are in rich treat. It is a scene of incredible. Uman suffering theres a saying that he who cannot walk out on his own shall die. So, the operation was terminated in early july. The survivors trickle out. The records are incomplete. 30,000 are dead. Estimate, theye die of disease or starvation. They have about 10,000 men. By the end of the war, 185,000 are dead. Only 118,000 get back to japan alive. And i would like to end my talk here. I went on a bit longer than i hoped. Thank you for listening. [applause] thank you. Due to dr. Callahan us withdraw from the program, i appreciate you carrying the extra load. Well start to the front to your left. Gentleman. I wonder if either of you could comment on the american involvement with the special air group and the operational use of helicopters which is done in that theater. It is strange seeing the other theaters we were in. There was considerable american involvement, but not by combat troops. In north burma, they had the larger objective of opening the land route to india. And the u. S. Army air forces, they had a very sizable presence. They support the deployment of andfirst b29s in India Running the operations. Of airre questions support. Slim support for the army. Degree ism, to some the general sought his mission increase the chinese contribution to the war. First, maybe in burma and then later in china is ralph. Clearly there are strategic objectives. Slim made a decision, which i , which isretty smart you wouldnt fight for american air power. , he would notme collect the raf assets in a theater. There is no question the aerial resupply is very important to all of the operations. Its very difficult to take the supplies for everyone except by air. Ayres. Ported the war rudy accomplished by the raf. There are mostly missions up in support of american forces. It suggests the potential for integrating shortly in the short takeoff aircraft, including helicopters. They use it for reconnaissance and casualty evacuations. So there are people who know what happened. For the usecedence of air power. Next question is to the right at the front with connie please. I understand the weather was problems were high but the with the british. Roops have learned to fight the german troops, i think, may a role. Yed that is the role of the british army. The reformed British Indian army had been reforms in 1943. T definitely played a role and in fact, they did not expect that level of opposition. That was their first problem. The british were much stronger than they expect to. I dont know much about the british army after the involvement, but after the thelt as result of operation the 15th army was destroyed in that opened the way or made it much easier for the british to advance the 14th army into central burma. From late 1944 onwards. I dont know if that answers your question. One staff officer said at one heldmutaguchi repeatedly map exercises, but the one thing they never considered was the british might actually resent. That increased the problem. The gentleman in the center please . Justrt of my question was asked and answered, but who provided all of the material for the british forces. At was it british, some american and how were the numbers, the british allies, versus the japanese . How did the numbers and equipment how did those numbers play out . Question is where were the supplies coming from and what are the comparable numbers for the british and japanese. Will take the first one. Depended on heavy equipment which is largely brought in from the east. The african campaigns were winding down. Were redeployed. We think of them as going on. They participated in the Burma Campaign. It is a mix. The british troops fought with conventional british weapons. 25pound guns. Stuff they used for a generation. Issue is theeal division of the core commanders were white, british professional. Fficers i think they had some real doubts about the fighting. Accomplishment is to figure out how to make send mix in gurkhas, like ,attalions, the mixed brigades which seem to be the best formula. The british army did not get many british white replacements and 194445, so the indian army for a larger burden of the fighting. Not, the indian army, gurkhas or british troops. Much suppliedetty themselves and they had bases in india. They pretty much fought the war with what they have. They are ubiquitous american jeeps are ubiquitous throughout the theater. Some aircraft were transferred to the raf. There are transfers of capability. He insists that they are undependable. His division and a half, maybe , theivisions in 1944 british battalions and the girl battalions. Battalions. Its kind of a mixed picture and the numbers sometimes are misleading because you have lots but where you have tremendous logistical problems, you have a huge commitment of forces trying to keep the spear points supplied. Is the allies eventually involve a slight majority. Have one last question from the back. Campaign seems to to the codaities ifpaign and i am curious there might have been applied lessons to the campaign in india. Says but i dont think that they. Ade any secure adjustments i think the short answer is no. I will think they made any at adjustments. The japaneseoblems had, in every category they had less than the british. Were compounded because they were losing control of the city. The japanese, what little they do have cannot be transformed. Motility adds to their material in efficiency. Theonder the one of underappreciated aspects was the role of forces in stopping the deployment and redeployment of the Japanese Military forces. But if you take a look at any campaign and commanders are always complaining about the fact that they dont get the , equipment they mean simply because these transports are going down. Thank you to this great panel. [applause] this is American History tv, exploring our nations past. Next on our weekly series the author Jonathan White talks about how Abraham Lincoln interacted with African Americans he met during his time in office. He explained how explains how lincolns willingness to have African American guests at the white house and shake their hands was considered very liberal, even radical, at that time. This talk was part of a symposium held at the library of virginia in richmond. At 8 p. M. Eastern, it is lectures in history. We visit the virginia commonwealth classroom of professor Nicole Myers Turner who speaks about the lives of African Americans following emancipation. And then, a look back at the history of the United States a filmhealth service in that details
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