And the interviews that are underlying factor of the base of this project and how it worked. I thank you for that. I turn the mic over to you. Thank you very much, i am honored to be moderating this panel here with for dear friends and valued colleagues. There is a concern a foot that as a moderator i might let it go to my head and try to interject myself too much, so i will be sitting down there while they make their presentations. And then i will come back up here during the question time. You have the detailed bias of our speakers, so i wont repeat them, but a few highlights. First here is professor richard h. Immerman, his bio says he retired from temple university, but he does not know the meaning of the word retired. We are Close Friends and collaborators and her historical advisors. Hes very active as a scholar and a mentor. Next to him is professor melvyn p. Leffler of the university of virginia, a titan in the field of diplomatic history. I read his book as an undergrad, as a graduate student, i continue to benefit from his books today. He is the only one of our for who does not technically have a chapter in this edited collection, but without giving too much of the peer review process, he played a very Important Role in improving all the products seeing that it came to print. Our interloper on this panel of historians is for kori schake who is a political scientists, and protegee of nobel prize winner, shes a longtime dear friend and colleague from the Bush Administration. Choose had many Important Roles in academia and think tanks. And is frankly a better historian that a lot of cardcarrying historians. So we are honored you are here. And finally professor andrew preston, who is a canadian by birth, but took much of his education in the United States now is a professor at cambridge youve diversity. Also dear friend and contributor to the book. With that we are going to turn it over to our panel, each one will be reading his or her comments. And then we will have a cue in a time. Join me in welcoming our panel. applause it is good that the podium is set up like it is otherwise i am sure that they would have moved the mic up to his level. And i wouldve had to jump up and down to reach it. Let me begin by saying how thrilled i was to join this project, to accept jeffs invitation. The cost of the controversy and ongoing implications that attended the Bush Administration decision to surge and iraq, for any historian of u. S. Foreign relations, this subject is really irresistible. Making it that much more attractive was the chance to contribute to what really is a first cut of history. As we discussed this morning, both sessions, the archival evidence is still classified most of it. And will remain so at least a decade and probably more. In fact if i have one thing to all of you who participated, do everything you can to do they get this material released. I spent a lot of time with archives and it is increasingly difficult to get any material released in any president ial administration. And that is a problem for the future. But in lieu of that, we do have access to the oral testimony of a remarkable number of contributors of all different levels, which really is unprecedented for this type of project. I also have a more personal interest, i have been studying National Security decisionmaking and policymaking for some decades. It began back in the 1970s when i started to explore the foreign policies of the Eisenhower Administration which has come up several times, largely because those processes have become legendary, even though the assessments of them can often be diametrically opposed. I will come back to that in a moment, you can understand why a project aimed at drilling down into a momentous yet complicated decision, held such great appeal for someone like myself. You can also understand easily why this group became greater as a poor through the interviews. It consensus quickly emerged, resurfaced among the contributor, regardless of their position or perspective that the process was outstanding. That should be reinforced today. The adjectives ran from textbook to model to highly effective, and in fact the worst that can be released out of them was that they were good. Indeed except for a few who lamented that the process took longer and even then there is an upside to the length that that took. There is really only one dissent. That was described the process as strange. Even in that case, it worked in the sense that it enabled president bush to make a courageous decision. I think theres ample evidence that that was the case. Though courageous does not necessarily mean wiser right, it was better than the alternative perhaps. Granted in a number of respects is consensus was predictable given the nature and conception of the project. There is the famous old adage, history is written by the victors, attributed to winston churchill, but we dont know in fact if he said it. One could make sense that applies to oral histories. And most oral histories. The judgments in this case of those who were interviewed, and i think again this could be read force today and im not in any way suggesting it was wrong, is that the decision to surge was a good one largely because, that the outcome was good. It was the right one. This seemed true even to those who were not on board at least early on, like conte race would be an example of that. She is not come on board till the end, but she was very proud of how the whole process unfolded conversely, those who might be called the losers, Donald Rumsfeld for example in terms of miss context, not through the fault of the project, but they were silent. They were not interviewed or agreed to be interviewed. And so is the same case with george casey and many of the other military greeters. Dont get me wrong in any way, what we learned from the oral history is originally, original highly affirmative and fascinating. It is terrific grift for any student of National Security decisionmaking. It provides us with a history of the surge beyond anything that we were privy to before. That in mind in pinion that book should be use an any course that anyone teaches on u. S. Foreign policy or International Relations. Original, it is the first cut and keep that in mind. In many ways it met wets her appetite for more of the story, more of the analysis, and more documents. I do hope, this came up briefly, there will be more pertaining to what scholars often called missing dimension of the history of International Relations, which is intelligence. That was mentioned there. I have a personal interest in this, i very much like to know the correlation between intelligence and the decisions, and what kind of input it was, but really what is a fascinating question, is whether the reforms took place, between 2004 in 2005, made any effects in terms of how the consumers of that and still gents did so. I was particularly interested in peters comment for which he said in terms of 2007, that intelligence could not guarantee. Of course it can never guarantee. All i can do is inform and reduce uncertainty, but one of the reforms which is near and dear to my heart, was that the intelligence would have different types of scenarios. Which wasnt always easy for the intelligence or the consumer, but it was pivotal as a last stop. That is a whole other story, a parallel story which i would love to explore. Again i dont know how or when it might be. Anyway, let me circle back to the process itself. And to reiterate it was my study of eisenhowers foreign National Security policies in the 19 fifties, and the architecture that generated them that was the initial spark of my interest. In many ways, and while im reluctant to use eisenhower as a model, i and i sort of did, and when will read my essay he blasted me for doing it. And im ready to sort of get it again but, i am not suggesting in any way, that all administrations should mimic that architecture, or would i suggest that administrations do not have to adapt their processes to the demand of the contemporary environment. What today we conventionally were referred to as the inter agency process, is much broader, and much more complex than it was back in the 19 fifties, and for that matter through the end of the cold war. For example today is National Security council it worse in size and scope authority, anything that eisenhower put together an institutionalized in the 19 fifties. Conversely i would argue, and i think this might be something that would be interesting to explore in the second volume were the third or fourth volume, but the power of the state department. Which under eisenhower, remain the core of the Foreign Policy process, and who secretary of state, was the unparalleled leader and spokesman of the Foreign Policy community, and got four mid anybody tried to cross him back in the 19 fifties. What he does with that authority and power but now it is receded steadily. Even that that the pentagon has has increased. I have to stop pointing now sorry. Anyway, and there is the situation which is also important and the personalities have come up in seventh of several different that different context in terms of the conversations that no president , since eisenhower, with the perhaps the exception of george w. H. Brush, none of the present came any where close to his reputation, stature, or experience or political capital. And because of his military authority, i think there is no one in his class. So that was very important. But nevertheless, i think the fundamental pillars of his process, are as applicable today as they were then. And i will just mention very quickly, you know a couple of them, including which would engage the right, people at the right level the right time and providing an environment conducive to evoking constructive debate. Cuts across agency line, and to which the president is an eyewitness, success for which acquires a custodial manager. National security adviser, who is or should walk the fine line, between honest broker, and policy entrepreneur. And finally, some sort of mechanism that ensures that once a decision is made, and implementation begun, that monitors the progress to decide whether or not some sort of change is necessary. The gop, im not claiming that that process, or architecture, or models i am historian, and not a political scientist, but that every president must be able to devise and architecture that he or she is comfortable with. But i will argue that all of those elements, should be present in one form or another. And now i will quickly go over my criticism, which will limit how much i can be criticized for. I will be happy to discuss it further, during the question ensure period. So to begin with, it there was no mechanism to trigger a review, or a monitor, and to trigger eisenhower, had an appendage of the National Security council, many of you know, this call the operation coordinating it, it never worked as well as it was intended to work, but it did assure, that an execution of a policy, could not continue indefinitely. Without some kind of appraisal of that policy. Periodically not continually, but it would be at various intervals. In this case, there was no mechanism, to trigger that review. Sort of automatically, and even though from late 2005, to 2006, many National Security officials, and entities at different levels, expressed profound concern, with u. S. Policy that there was not a review. There are meetings, many many meetings, referred to in interviews as a stylized, but they didnt necessarily get them to to where they needed to go, finally the nsc itself, or elements of the nfc, really forced to review, and yet it took place covertly, clandestinely i dont know what words you want to include, in which it basically cut out the secretary of defense, and many of the services, so you uniformed military. Again, that really could not have happened, and then that leads to what was mentioned, what i consider one of the stranger or the strangest episodes in decisionmaking history, is one that was around the camp david meeting, in june, and that the meeting never really got off the ground again for a variety of different reasons. Im just going to quickly summarize, but my general point is that, even though well let me just add one thing, he first there is the issue also that comes at clearly, that the nsc does conduct basically its own kind of informal review, you have other ones going on, but then its the nsc that really develops a preference if that would be the word, but least puts on the table the notion of having a double down type of strategy, which ultimately comes with the surge, it is not generated by one of the agencies so it is difficult again, that would be and that would be in violation of the eisenhower model, where would have been or wouldve had to have been mentioned, unless no one thought about it at all. This to the credit, of the nsc and the staff, and particularly the credit of steve happily, and many of those who are here, attesting to the eisenhower principle, if the organization no matter how good it is, its only as good as the individuals who are part of it. So in this case, it really was the individuals, that you can negate everything i said, because they compensated for what i consider really flaws in the structure, but relying on sort of extra governmental inputs, officials outside the formal chain of command, concealing some of the deliberations from others or whatever, the nsc did ultimately arrive, and a recommendation that enabled president bush to make this courageous decision, a decision that the nsc wanted it to make, and clearly president bush wanted to make, at least for the second half of 2006. It surely was a courageous decision, and i will leave it to history as to whether or not it was a wise decision, or the right one but the question is whether the system worked. Maybe it did, if the fact that the barometer is that the policy, ending up where they wanted to be. But i dont think thats the right question, so i mean i would like to ask those who were involved in, it if they were writing a textbook, on decisionmaking process, is whether this would be the pathway they would recommend to get from point a to point b. And i think not. And actually i sort of hope not. Thanks very much this. First of all i want to begin by thanking the organizers, for asking me to attend today, i think that it was really inspiring this morning, and earlier this afternoon, theyre inspiring both as a scholar, and even more importantly, inspiring as an american citizen. To listen to the thoughtful reassessment of the decisionmaking, that went into the search. I think its incredibly impressive, for us as americans, to think that we have had such people, whether we agree with their decisions, or disagree with their decisions, making policy, in the highest excellence of the white house, the state department, and the pentagon and elsewhere, and i think it behooves us all of us, as americans to think how Different Things are today. And how consequential, it is that we do not have serious thoughtful minded people engaged in the process, comparable to the ones that weve heard today. There i also want to, preface my remarks, by saying that i dont have a stake in this volume, i have no you know i was not interviewed for it, i didnt do nsa for, it i wasnt outside and outside referee, but id also hope that peter fever will take my comments thoughtfully, as an objective scholar, because i did not sign the letter as an academic in 2002, opposing the war. And i would like to think that ive come to whatever views ive had, which are pretty complex and textured, about the decision to go to war. And about the aftermath and just because, i am an academic, doesnt mean i have vested opinions, politically inspired. Youre on probation. Yes im on probation i know, ten minutes from now i think i will probably not get your approbation. But at least some on probation right now there. But i want to say, i was asked to make some comment, overall comments about the book and serge and i think its a wonderful book. The interviews, are really illuminating, the volume is seamlessly edited, the interviews are, brought together in a very very effective way. So that they provide, an excellent really excellent chronological overview of the decision to search to surge troops in iraq. I also very much admire the essays, i admired them because they offer such different perspectives there is an essay by three of the key policy makers, steve had lee, and megan osullivan, and peter one essay, by them, and then six or seven other essays, by very renowned scholars. Three of them who appear on the stage. And, what is significant about all the essays, is that they make you think, really deeply about process, strategy and president bush is overall decision making. Im what i want to do in the ten minutes or so that i have, is to talk a little bit about these three matters. Process, strategy and overall decisionmaking. So first of all, in terms of process, richard you just heard who you just heard hes very critical of the process. Some are some of the former policy makers like philip salika. Nonetheless in my judgment, steve had lee and peter fever and meghan, offer a compelling defense of the process, in their essay. They make to really important points, they say that the process gave the president most of all, the option that he wanted. And secondly, the big point that they make, is that even more importantly, the process enabled the president to forge a consensus among top officials. Which was no easy accomplishment. Of course as you heard, richard is not convinced, and what he does in the volume, in a very systematic way, is to compare pushes National Security council, to the process, and richard claims to be succinct, richard claims that president bush, was not sufficiently involved in the inception of the process, that the process was belated, that it was stovepipe, or siloed, until dearly the nearly the very end, and that the outcome was predetermined. What is interesting is that steve hardly and peter and megan do not really direct those criticisms. And they dont say that there process is a model, that it is textbook model, they clearly dont make the claim that they were trying to emulate eisenhowers process, the process that i somehow implored so in effectively. That was not what was on their minds. They make the larger point throughout their interviews and throughout their vine, they make the larger point that we heard this morning, that the process worked. That is what counts, the process worked. The word is used over and over again. I would say that this assertion that the process worked invites examination of strategy, not simply process but strategy, what does it really meme to say that it worked . Win in the volume we, the most renowned scholar of International Relations and decisionmaking in the whole world knows that there is much dispute among experts from about whether the surge actually made any lasting difference or whether it was even decisive in the short run. And in part from underscore that today and there were many other ingredients that made the surge work rather than simply the deployment of american troops. Concurrent development says some, like the Sunni Awakening may well have contributed more to the outcome, more to making the surge work than the deployment of additional troops from. I personally believe that gervais is far too skeptical for the Short Term Impact of the surge. In my opinion this surge did work in the following way, the surge worked significance mitigated sectarian killings and insurgent attacks. In fact according to the newly published history, the official history of the army in the diary while iraq war, 1300 pages long, it points out that not only did civilian casualties and deaths significantly to climb after the search and afterwards that insurgents attacks declined from about 140 pertain, in early 2007, to virtually numb on a routine day in 2009. That to me suggests when it worked, at least tactically. Win but along with bob gervais and richard and other scholars we, i am inclined to question him whether the surge, albeit a tactical success from, was a strategics success. In supporting the surge, steve had lee and peter and megan do a truly wonderful job in their interviews and in the essay explaining how changing assumptions them that motivate them, we they explain the changing assumptions, that motivated the search team. They illuminate how from interrogated previous assumptions and reconfigure them. But what is interesting, both have essay in interviews is that they actually same rather little about overall strategic goals them. They often alluded to the mission. Win but they dont specify the missions goals win. In 2002 and 2003 them, when they administration invaded iraq them, the goals win were to rig iraq of weapons of mass destruction them and bring about regime change. From the goal was to make sure that the Iraqi Government would not hand off weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups with global ambitions him. The goal in 2003 was to make certain that iraq would not be in threat to its neighbors. Those were the goals. Those goals, him however win, had been achieved by the end of 2003. Mostly by confirmation that iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction and that iraq was far weaker than anyone had in the administration had imagined. Building democracy and undertaking nation building were embraced them as goals some after it became clear that iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. By 2006 and 2007, when the search took place team, it seems that the new goal him was to bring about a democratic iraq that could govern itself, defend itself from, and sustain itself from. Yet in the interviews coated in this book when, and in essays theres little discussion of how democracy the and nation building related to overall u. S. Capabilities and strategic inch stressed. Them at one point megan says to steven, in the decisionmaking process, i cant write a paper about an emerging consensus because quote actually nobody agrees with anybody them about even foundational issues and quote win. I do not see the Foundation Issues elucidated in a satisfactory way from now perhaps they were addressed, perhaps they were addressed in the actual memos, perhaps they were addressed in the position papers written for the them nsc principles. But those documents have not been declassified. That is a real shame, it constitutes a real obstacle to any final conclusion about both the strategy and the process behind the surge. Some the absence of such documents, when does not deter some scholars and some policy makers from calling for more favorable overall assessment of president bush as a decisionmaker. Indeed, from the interviews and several essays suggest that the surge was a courageous choice for president bush win he went against public opinion. He went against his secretary of defense team, he went against his secretary of state when, he went against the joint chiefs of staff. Yes he went against condoleezza rice, rumsfeld win, general pace, all of them were initially against the surge. Them with the talented assistance, some of steve had lee and his staff, president bush orchestrated a decision that everyone eventually agreed upon them, over the next home, the search did produce violence. It did reduce secretary or killings. My question is should these generalization inspire reinterpretation for bush i dont think so. By mid 2006 team, the prevailing policy was failing them. The joyce was doubled down with the surge, reposition and or carefully withdraw. Nobody around president bush them, even the opponents of the surge them could face a pull out win and acknowledge defeat, whatever that might meme. The only option them was the last part, the search him. This is explained in terms of some prospect theory, prospect theory says that people, we all people from our most inclined to be a big risk takers when they face defeat. Im in my opinion, you dont need prospect theory to explain this decision, you only need to know the personality and character of george w. Bush from. He was a proud, confident, intelligent them, stubborn maam, who believed that his credibility and reputation as president would be forever blemished if he lost the war in iraq. He believed that the credibility and reputation of the United States would be forever blemished if the country sum lost the war room. What i want to hear from you win, bush allegedly said the joint chiefs, what i want to hear from you is how we are going to win. Not how we are going to leave. Some president bush received some evidence that the search could work some, he found out that some five big rates could be made available, he was informed that he could be used in effective manner, in and around baghdad, he learned around the socalled Sunni Awakening, he met with morality, and he felt that he could work with the iraqi leader. Him the odds however were still low, everyone seems to have thought it was a real gamble him. It was really gutsy, thats why the book is called the last card. So a key question is, when odds are low when does it make sense to take such a risk . This is a significant issue all the time. When odds are low, how do you know that you should take a risk . In retrospect it seems like of course it worked out. But the odds going into it, we are perceived as rather low. When did it make sense to take such a risk. Bush thought so when, he felt it was a disastrous outcome stemming from withdrawing defeat was far more consequential sum than the chips he was about to invest. The surge might not work but if it failed, his reputation and record would not be much worse than it already was, the surge might not work but if it failed, the reputation and record of the United States would not be so much worse than it already was as a result of the sum war in iraq. Im so then, a decision reveal, does the decision reveal a skilled policy maker rather than a lucky one . Some i dont think so. For the following reasons i dont think so, president bushes actions were terribly belated him, since the fall of 2003, if not in may 2003, observe has grasped that the security situation in iraq was perilous, there were 12,000 civilians deaths in 2003 them. That was almost the same number as 2004, over 16,000 in five, and about 29,000 and 2006 team. From the onset local commanders and civilian officials win, as well as pentagon leaders like the army vice chief of staff. They all warrant that they were in adequate forces them. President bush was slow to deliver those forces. Now president bush was hamstrung by dialed rumsfeld, his secretary of defense team, rams ills
vimarsana.com © 2020. All Rights Reserved.