Video. Prof. Little this is our final presentation. It is titled shifting horizons. The subtitle, eons or wounded beyond wounded knee, should be familiar in one sense, because we have discussed the ways in which that engagement between American Forces and residents of pine ridge indian reservation were engaged in events specific to the age that resonates far beyond in the spirit of the oppression of certain peoples by federal troops. Wounded knee occurred in 1890, and the trueblue saloon we will encounter today, it is the name of a particular bar at which american sailors were assaulted in the country of chile. Portfically at a major along the Pacific Coast of chile. I want us to consider the ways in which the United States army and navy were envisioning their future. We were already considering the past presentations the ways in which the armed forces, especially certain elements of the officer corps, were anticipating great power conflict. A fair degree of anxiety infused their beliefs. Historians dont have any radically or persuasively clear understanding of exactly why americans of this age were so anxietyridden, and at the same time there was a lot of optimism about prosperity and increasing productivity and benefits for american power. There were other americans who were deeply worried that the extension of American Interest globally would implement the implicate the United States and traditional rivalries and regional aspirants for power such as japan. As much as opportunity presented the world at the end of the long 19th century, as its often called, it provided an opportunity, and an urgent one, for american strategists and thinkers, especially those in uniform but not exclusively so, when we consider Teddy Roosevelt members of the navy league, to grapple with what the uncertain future meant. That is the thrust of our presentation today. We are navigating the images on slide one and we see buttons for the abcd ships constructed in the 1880s. These were seen as the first elements of the new steel navy, as it was often called. Steel hull warships, and you get the sense that they were a blend of traditional age of sail and new steam technologies. , as well as the smoke stacks, you can get a sense that the United States was undertaking to construct what was in many ways modern technological marvels. But if we take that young officers critique the heart, we will appreciate that despite the fact that the United States was modernizing, it was modernizing and building new ships without much understanding of exactly how to do it well. Sims and others would take the United States navy to task internally, informing an insurgency of sorts among junior officers. To challenge the status quo, to challenge complacency, and also to challenge the new, and to argue that simply because it is new does not mean it is good. How would you know . Moreover, if you were a member of congress, whether on the House Armed Services committee or Naval Affairs committee or just a Voting Member of the appropriations committees . How would you know that what the navy was presenting you was either sensible or not . It is a real challenge to cultivate defense expertise in civilian legislative bodies and policymaking bodies. The United States was no exception in this era. If anything, it seems that congress was more than willing to appropriate lots of money to build things, and less concerned with the specifics of how well things were made, how well they were trained and operated, and frankly, the internal dynamics of Naval Administration and the School Systems the navy would create to educate and develop proficiency in operating these complex marvels. The image to the right depicts sort of a jackinthebox type of character. You turn the handcrank and out pops this frightening monster. It is probably hard to say, but the diminutive fellow at the bottom has a ribbon saying egan, who was the american minister to chile. We had few embassies, so the ranking diplomat was not an ambassador but a minister. This is not a confessional issue, this is not a faithbased issue, it is just a title. He is not a religious man, but he is an american diplomat. In this particular case, egan proves to be a firebrand and good fun and a lot of ways, as the story will tell. What we see is the fellow who has popped up, a clawlike figure, is about to swing his favor. A saber that says chilean war scare. If i was to tell you in 1891 in 1892, the u. S. Came very close to warring with the country of chile in south america, you might be surprised. You might be even more surprised if i told you that had the United States declared war on chile, we would have lost. We have to figure out how that happened. I wish to shift our horizons beyond the boundaries of the continental United States, and also far overseas, as elements of the u. S. Army were considering possibilities conflict. Slide two. To wouldfigure as what i categorize as the armys flow strategic reorientation was a fellow named arthur wagoner. Wagner was a scholar in many respects. He was a student of war. He would author this particular study, which was an examination of the austro prussian conflict, what we would call the german wars of unification in the 1860s, at the precise time of the American Civil War. Wagner would publish this volume about two decades later in 1889. He would also write the First American military theory text, the theory of war from an American Perspective called organization and tactics. This was a few years later in 1894. He is associated most often with the idea of officer education and not just the mechanics of how you organize your forces but thinking through strategy, harmonizing policy and strategy and tactics, and the ways force can optimally be used. As a soldier, he was chiefly concerned with the affairs of land warfare. Much of the u. S. Army was contented with thinking about the prospect of warfare in the future in the era of reconstruction and indian fighting on the frontier. It was pretty much a domestic continental influence. And process emphasis. If it were to fight, it would be on the home turf of the continental United States. The army in this era or very few i should say, entertain the idea that the u. S. Army would be deployed along the idea of the mexicanamerican war or assaults on coastal fortress cities that dotted the confederacy coastline. The army was by and large a land force and did not think it was necessary to do much more. Wagner is one of the few people that appreciate great power conflict and part of that study was a function of having firsthand observation of foreign militaries. We will see a pattern here, that william sims and wagner and others in this era were tasked by their respective military departments, the war department, the Navy Department, with Foreign Military observation duties. They were accredited jobs, they did not function as spies or anything like that. They were known to their companions. Many of these foreign wars, such as the japanese war or the prussian war, choose your favorite, americans were neutral in the conflicts. So they have the ability often to travel to both sides of the warring lines, make notes and observations, and report home about the stateoftheart of warfare in other lands. It was on the basis of these firsthand observations that wagner and others were able to make assessments of other countries military abilities, and also you could say mentalities that undergirded military conscription and the power of other countriesmilitary leadership. And we should appreciate that, in the United States the tradition was that military thinkers, military officers of even the highest rank were generally not considered very important in american society. They were often aristocrats, at least in the navy. Treated well in certain circles social circles, but they were not particularly political influential. Very few people ever thought much about the United States navy or army. This notion of a slow strategic reorientation is one that i am making a case, an argument, that the United States army, or elements within the army were arguing that in order to prepare for the possibilities of future war, the United States army needed to be more diligent and meticulous in its study for conflict of contemporaneous concern. As much as the civil war had recently engulfed the United States, it was more tempting to look at the Foreign Military for shining possibilities, rapid campaigns, decisive victories and the like. And it so happens that the germans or the prussians in these conflicts unifying germany in the 1860s, then in the 18 17 1870s was france, was a key demonstration of amazing abilities organizationally and on the battlefield, what becomes germany, what was then called prussia, it was a force to be reckoned with. Was industrial industrially organized, made good use of the rails, and displayed a host of other strategic inspirations that impressed american officers. So much so that wagner, if you read the text, and i encourage you to study it, wagner was critical of this group of officers who were enchanted by european models of recent warfare. Not so much the napoleonic, but the ones in the mid 19th century. There is a small class among professional soldiers, he writes, that are wont to the still admiration on recent bestow on admiration in the military operations in military wars. This is where he gets critical, not because they were excellent, but because they were european. He is making a case that the exoticism of Foreign Military potential obscured what the u. S. And the American Civil War had accomplished in terms of developing military expertise. Of he makes a critical point elevating the professionalism of the American Military institution. Now, wagners lament was that this had atrophied in the immediate aftermath of the war. The structures had been dissolved and dismantled. Per military american demands that budgets be shrunk, the size of the military be shrunk, and sometimes the enlistments of temporary soldiers to fight during the civil war were expired, so they went home. At the end of the second paragraph, he would argue that the art of war had reached a Higher Development in america then it attained in europe in 1866, and in some respects, higher than in 1870. He is making a case that for all of the Amazing Things pressure was able to accomplish on the battlefields of europe, the United States actually displayed far greater abilities, and so he does make a case moreover that europeans had failed to learn much, if anything, from the American Military experience, and had the austrians, for example, paid more attention to interior lines and the effective use of defensive fortifications such as were erected around petersburg or federick spur or fredericksburg or vicksburg, they could have inflicted far more casualties on the prussians and perhaps have actually won the war that they lost. Is a mind, in intellect an intellect in this era. He graduated 40th out of 43 cadets at west point in his graduating class, so he was kind of bottom of the barrel academically, but nevertheless, one of the few who shined. There are a host of individuals like this historically who did not perform particularly well at the military academies but demonstrated through the course of their career that they were far more cerebral and more capable than the class rosters suggested. Of 4045ison, a class officers was the extent of a graduating class at the military academy in the late 19th century. Today, the numbers are somewhere in the realm of 900 cadets graduating from west point on an annual basis. So you have some sense of the enlargement, dramatic enlargement of the American Military in the modern age in contrast to what was in the 19th century. Lets turn to slide three. In continuation of wagners experience, lets focus on john schofield. He was a u. S. Military academy graduate, he graduated seventh out of a class of 52, so substantially better in terms of academic performance. His career stretched from 1853 to 1895. A lengthy career. He was the recipient a medal of honor and had served in the civil war and attained the rank of Major General. He would subsequently be the secretary for president johnson. And culminate in the final position of commanding general of the u. S. Army. He had a very distinct military career. Near the end of his career, he was sent on a secretary of war survey of france, he went to the hawaiian islands, he traveled a good portion of the world. At west point, he was a philosophy instructor among other topics. Math and physics. In this regard, schofield demonstrated a variety of abilities. It is here, in particular in his memoir, he emphasized the armys role in a number of important facets of American Life. He makes an argument in the upper paragraph about Coastal Defense and atrophying defenses of American Force designed to protect american ports, chiefly. The wooden carriages had gone to decay, the guns lying on the ground. In essence, he is making a case that naval technology, especially with metal warships were going to far outstrip american defenses along americas coast. He does make another case that the navy, the second paragraph, was the aggressive and defensive arm of National Military power. Not the first line of defense, the first line of offense. What is the point of the army, then . It is defense. It is a defensive orientation for the purposes of the army. And he also speaks about wounded knee in the paragraph to the right. And made a case that a fellow named nelson miles, who would have a lengthy career in the u. S. Army in indian wars and the spanishamerican war, but he would make a case that basically wounded knee was an accident, an accident rather than by design a mistake. That the sioux would not pursue a general war with the u. S. Army or United States government because of the negotiations of general miles. The sioux had no general intention to go to war, he writes, if they could go without starvation. Again, speaking to meeting the needs of native americans and fulfilling treaty obligations the u. S. Had established. Just by looking at schofield, this was not an era where you could serve in uniform and have a beard to your belly. This was prespecial forces in inspiration. If we turn to slide four. This is the cover of a particular book. He finishes as lieutenant general, but 46 years in the army suggests a lengthy tenure. His suggestions moreover, related to those of Teddy Roosevelt. Will he argues that members of congress should have military service. Is he writes in the upper left, no man is fit for a seat in Congress Unless he has had such a an education as to be in will uniform. Moreover, the first thing members of congress should learn is that the only way to carry war economically is to make it will short, sharp and decisive. How would you do that . Perhaps by winning in impressive an impressive battle. You could help the results would be durable. Perhaps like the prussians against the austrians or french in the wars in the 1860s and 1870s. With regard to preparation, and that is a major theme, will preparedness for war among those like wagner, hahn, and to dole out military preparations in triplets is to invite will in triplets is to invite disaster and ultimate bankruptcy. No man is wise enough to tell when war will come. If hundreds of millions are needed and youve only spent 50, you might as will have thrown your 50 millions into the sea. There is no such thing as partial defense in modern word. War. Schofield is offering a powerful critique to a century of schofield is offering a powerful critique to come up by this time, more than a century of American Military decisions, which was comfortable in conscripting groups and raising the means of fighting once war began. Once war began. He is saying that this is folly, and his peers in the navy share this perspective. You also argue that the United States ought to undertake something much like the prussians had, which is universal military training for its male population. Basically to put all men into some form of military service, and that they would drill as reservists and be led by a smaller, fulltime professional force. He thought this was an ideal balance to ensure there was a sufficient pool, a National Pool , not just a small dribble it of militia, but by and large, half the population would have received military training, and could be called on in times of big power war. This is one in the bottom right paragraph block, schofield is critical of Abraham Lincoln. The one lesson of reason and experience i would impress on my countrymen in every possible way is when war or insurrection comes or is threatened in other words, when the civil war is occurring in 1860, 1861 do not invoke judicial proceedings or call for 75,000 men as lincoln did in his initial call for volunteers to fight the confederacy after the attack on fort sumter. But call for men, that is the emphasis, and let them come as many as they will put if the army is configured properly, it could accommodate this massive upsurge in people along the lines of th