Escalate to the point of violen violence. One of the things that makes this particular crisis different, and there have been three others of this sort during, since xi has been in office. This one is different because it has done violent. Which is concerning because it suggests that those agreements and protocols are no longer working. It also tells you what the triggers could be, which is that they were supposed to be in the process of disengagement. They had met on june 6th to actually disengage and on june 15th, something went wrong during the process. Both sides accuse d the other o instigating the clash, but what essentially resulted in deaths as chairman schiff mentioned, for the first time in a number of years, and that suggests they both first need to get back to what they were doing. Theyre in dialogue with both the military and diplomatic levels to at least disengage. The problem might be in where the triggers might be if either theres a misunderstanding or not respecting the agreements that are reached during these talks. All frankly accidents. This is area that is rough terrain, High Altitude, not great weather. And troops deployed from both sides deployed at a high number of in strength than they have been in decades. So theres always the potential for accident, but the two sides are at the negotiating table even as they have kept this build up and in some cases, are increasing it. So i think the situation remains serious. There is, i cannot rule out the potential for escalation. Having said that, they both have clearly shown a desire to at least stem the escalation for now. Whether or not we can actually resolve it in the near term is questionable because the two sides seem to want very different things. The indians want the chinese to move back to positions as they were in late april. It is not clear that the chinese would be willing to do that or that india has the leverage to make that happen. I thank you. Your testimony is very helpful. Thank you. Mr. Swawell. Thank you to our panelists. If there was a playground choose up basketball and we get four other countries to pick to be on our side to counter china, who are the four that you would pick and sounds like india is one of them. Let me jump in here. One of the most striking things to me in the last year or so is the way that china has succeeded in alienating some of the most, you might say, these were almost nonaligned countries like sweden, canada, india. These are the old classic 1950s nonaligned countries. Australia. I think that the landscape is ripe for the picking, if you will. To regather up countries that were in a state of ambiguity or greater ambiguity, if there was some American Leadership to do it. Now i know secretary pompeo has been talking with you, but even in europe, we just released a report two days ago on the state of sort of the atmosphere in europe. Its radically different now than it was just a few months ago in regard to china. So i think that youre asking which of the main players, well, certainly the eu as one player, is i think very ready to reengage with the United States in some posture towards china. I think definitely australia, which is in a state of rather high alienation. And india, very, very striking whats happened just in a matter of weeks there. So its a moment thats very propitious with the United States, but at the same time, that we have that situation, we seem to be focusing on alienate ing our allies, rather than uniting with them. Thank you for that answer, and chairman, ill defer to other members so we can get more questions in. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Heck. Mr. Quigley asked the exactly the question. So i pass, mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. And my thanks to the panelists. Fascinating, provocative, important conversation. Thank you, mr. Heck. Mr. Welch. Sorry, muting. You hear me now . Yep. Thank you very much. Professor shell, its very good to see you again. Thank you. You talked about the implicit and actually explicit premise that guided our policy for years and that was the engagement with china changed, it turns out they havent. First question i have, was that a naive assumption or the failure to materialize be attributable to the current leader of china . Thats a can you hear me . Yes. Thats a good question. I think, you all can hear me, cant you u . Yes. Good. Was it naive. My only estimation is that it was not to presume that with some leadership, it was possible to engage china as it emerged from its malice revolution and slowly help you know, guide it in a temperate and patient way into some different form. That was the presumption and indeed, during the 1980s, there were many, many reasons to believe that that was actually happening. And was successful. Then 1989 and the beijing massacre came, you know what happened, and that threw things off track. And yet naud the trip president clinton made to beijing in 1988, that was very striking to see how president clinton and the men. They were actually friendly and enjoyed each Others Company and we had reforged a relationship. Was a hope that was restored. And then of course, we had another interim then you know whats whats happened with xi. We have changed, i think help change, catalyze, many aspects of china through educational exchange. Im going to interrupt one second because i only have five minutes. Thats very helpful. I was interested in all of your testimony, but basically, the way i understand it, is that the best thing for us now would be to rebuild, would be to approach countries with whom chinas trying to compete with us and say how can we help. But a total focus on the Economic Issues because youve outlined what a savage future is in store as a result of covid. Is that a fair characterization of your testimony . Thank you, congressman. I would say not a total focus on the economic. What i would say is to balance out our approach so were not overprioritizing National Security arguments for government leaders who are consumed with economic recovery and are looking for lifelines to be able to provide for their own people. Okay, thank you. And professor, you mentioned right now, we dont want to get sboo sb into a competition about supply chains thats going to jeopardize our citizens, that makes total sense. But going back to what mr. Hines asked, do we have to begin strategic decoupling to have maximum flexibility to assert u. S. Interest and to protect ourselves against the chinese activity . So, congressman, thanks for the question. Its a big strategy question because it really comes down to whether or not the american people, american businesses, american political leaders, want to pay higher costs for everything. So, sure, if you want to decouple, thats something that the u. S. Could start to do. But it would have a major longterm Economic Impact on the United States. Right. Theres a reason why theres such economic interdependence. Because it serves the economic interest of u. S. Businesses, u. S. Consumers. And u. S. Workers. Right . And so the question becomes you know, from my perspective, you know, at what cost are we really willing to engage this economic decouple iing . Is it really many the economic interest of the United States . And my view is where there are National Security risks, we need and we need to identify those and i know there are some studies going on right now, that theres probably some you know, limited focus, economic decoupling that needs to occur to make sure that we dont rely on suppliersa. Z in china for ke technologies, key widgets that are necessary for security. The question becomes do you want the u. S. Government to begin getting involved in shaping International Economics in a way that is not clear really gives us that much leverage. So i think it begins with what is it the United States wants to accomplish and how is it that decoupling is the right tool as opposed to other tools . Thank you very much. I yield back, mr. Chairman. We will now go to mr. Maloney. Thank you, mr. Chairman, and to the panel for a fascinating discussion. My question is for mr. Shell. Youre welcome to answer. I had an opportunity to be in the region right before the pandemic and one thing thats fascinating is how some of our partners seem to be shifting in a region. We seem to be exploring interesting opportunities with vietnam. Singapore has become increasingly important to us. Philippines tend to be receding. Had an opportunity to be in taiwan and to spend some time with wen, who is a remarkable person and partner and who very successfully stood up to an onslaugt of efforts by the chinese to undermine her election. Who are our most important partners in the region and can you say a word about taiwan, how much threat you see it being under . The temptation that might exist for president xi with the u. S. Distracted with the pandemic . Could you say a a word about our partners, in particular, taiwan, and where they fit in this con ver sags . Well, i think with hong kong as of last night, really being moved into the column of being absorbed essentially in new ways into the, into the, what we could try to, taiwan will be the next on beijings sight, so its extremely worrisome. And the South China Sea is also very worrisome. You ask who are the logical partners we should pay most attention to. We have an alliance with korea, japan. Neither one would have to move out of china nor can they economically. But that takes some very delicate diplomacy to reaffirm that, which is very, very strong. What do you do about philippines . Its an alliance partner. Then there are these other countries like vietnam, singapore, india. That are definitely in play. So we have some very good ally and partners if we treat them well. China has none. Doesnt even have a friend. Except north korea has treaty obligations, but thats not much of a friend. So, you know, theres plenty of resources. The question is does the u. S. Have the leadership capacity and the vision to reweave that fabric in a way which is, will be in our National Interest enough. Thank you. Congressman, may i jump in as well . Please. Just to align with my colleagues comments, you said china doesnt have any friends and in a sense, its true, but if you look at how other countries assess their interests with regard to china, its a sea of red in terms of disinterest. With the exception of economic growth. And then the its a column of green across the line with these countries who see china as an important economic partner. So on the one hand, the United States coming in saying you have to choose between us or china, its just not going to work for these country governments who want to prioritize choice to build Economic Resiliency when they are in such a fragile economic state. I want to quickly go back to congressman swawells question about the Basketball Team. On this, im going to take a slightly different take in that im assume iing japan might be our deputy coach, but i would prioritize countries that are critically important within their region and some of them may not be fully aligned with u. S. And western sbrinterests, if they fully align, that would certainly be to our benefit, and i would include in that a Basketball Team india, germany, if an individual country, if not the eu. Brazil for latin america. Then importantly for broader asia, indonesia, which is sort of the Sleeping Giant of the region. But certainly one geo politically that china does quietly pay a lot of attention to. If we can press on something for just one second. Obviously, we have nothing at the scale of the one belt one road initiative. Any amount of time spent with it, its hard not to be impressed with the scope, scale and ambitious of that effort. Its alarming how closely tied it is to the strategic interest and colocated with the assets of ours. What should we do doing about that and what would an Effective Response to address that green column look like in terms of the United States . What level would we have to engage at . Is it possible . Is it necessary . My comments, im really taking a hard look at what our economic strengths are and how were using them to build prosperity both at home, but with our partners abroad. Theres a narrative chinas been trying to take. Their model, i believe, doesnt work as efficiently or as well as ours and building that shared prosperity, i think thats something we should be focusing on. In terms of the infrastructure in bri, it is critically important. And the Digital Infrastructure and now the trade and financial infrastructure that beijing is trying to overlay on it. If you are an emerging market economy, that is in desperate need of funds to build out an infrastructure to connect your economies to others and your underbanked and the Traditional International institutions arent going to fund you, youre going to take the money. Youre going to take the investment, but you dont want to only have one choice. You want to have options. Thats why the japanese have been try iing to build out thei own infrastructure offerings. I think critical here, congressman, is rather than say, its a competition between u. S. Or japan, supported infrastructure and china supported infrastructure, what would really be powerful is to take the example from u. S. Companies who are currently in china, who are certainly taking steps to diversify their supply chains, but even with all of this talk of decoupling about the increasing protectionism and tech pressure, theyre not leading china. Theyre working to develop models that would allow them to bridge these two Worlds Largest economies and likewise, as beijing has already built out this pretty impressive infrastructure system, which is not without fault and is not without issue, notably, we should be finding ways to rather than forcing these countries to choose, china or a non china option, we should be finding ways to compliment that infrastructure where appropriate. Provide Better Options where we can. And really focus in on how our actions are viably allowing that country government to build connectivity and to realize the growth they are going to need to be able to serve the needs of their constituents. Thank you. Thank you. Well go to now mr. Murphy, then miss demingings then mr. Castro. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Can you hear me . I can. Great. Well, you know, i want to direct my first question to dr. Madon. As you had talked about, it seems like china is throwing its elbows in the neighborhood. Its throwing its elbows in the South China Sea. Its throwing its elbows with regard to taiwan. Of course hong kong. And now on the border with india. And i wanted to ask you, you know, without taking steps that would escalate the crisis, what can we do, the United States, to assist india with regard to productively responding to this situation and more broadly, you know, getting china to comply to a rules based order . Thank you, congressman. In previous crisis and even in the last one in 2017, which involved the chinese and indian militaries standing off on the eastern side of the border, which was in a clean difference between china, you saw the u. S. Supporting through diplomatic support, and weve seen statements supportive, and i think theyve been appreciated in india from both the administration but also members of congress and both sides of the aisle to india, which is always concerned about external partners reliability. This is a consistent and bipartisan support for countries who are facing this kind of pressure from china. Theres also been american capabilities, for example, are being seen, already being used by india during this boundary crisis. So youve seene helicopters tha india required. Recognizance aircraft are operating as well. And youve seen indias Strategic Air lift capability, which has been enhanced considerab considerably. They really make a difference. Theyre supplying these troops in these High Altitude areas. So i think in terms of capabilities, weve also seen information sharing through this crisis and these, i think the ability for the u. S. And india and for the u. S. To be helpful to india, has been enhanced way number of agreements and dialogue mechanisms that have been set up over the last decade or so. And so i think that the structures in place, i think its helpful often because theres a concern that this doesnt become a geopolitical football between the u. S. And china, that the administration has taken the stance to let india set the pace of asking for that support. I think that is a good idea. And so i think there are a number of ways, some of which have already happened. I think the others, what ive heard, they have shown a desire to be supportive. I understand. Im going to switch topics briefly. Thank you. Dr. Sumter, one of the big kind of revelations from the recent john bolton book, which you may have heard about, was that President Trump talked to chairman xi about quote unquote lightning sanctions on zte, which had really been a bad actor in the telecommunications space. And according to bolton, President Trump said he was doing this as a quote unquote favor to chairman xi. I wanted to get your reaction on how ba how, based on your experience, the chinese would have viewed this type of offer, and how this type of interaction with chinese would either enhance or detract from u. S. National security . Thank you, congressman. Yes, i think whats interesting about that particular exchange is that i believe the president assessed that he could have the same effect by placing sanctions on huawei. A year later. As a means to pressure china to do more on the negotiations for the trade deal for that phase one trade deal. And actually, it backfired. So such a transactional approach to our relationship with the worlds second large economy is not helpful. It certainly didnt put our current government in the space that i thought it would when it tried to use that play again. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Miss evans. Thank you so much, mr. Chairman, and to everyone who is with us today. Dr. Sumter,