Destructiveness, a weapon bordering on the absolute. In the blast, thousands died instantly. 70,000 persons were killed or listed as missing. 140,000 persons were injured. Of these, 43,000 were badly hurt. The city was unbelievably crushed. Of its 90,000 buildings, over 60,000 were demolished. D the desolate remains were aptly. Described as paper and ashes. Man had torn from nature one of her inner most secrets, and with his newfound knowledge had fashioned an instrument of annihilation. Menacing implication of this t extraordinary weapon were frightening to everyday people. Well, what did you think of that bomb we dropped on the japs, mrs. Glen . Isnt it terrible, all thoseo people vedkilled . Three days later, another b29 dropped an improved bomb on the major japanese sea port of nagasaki, a highly congested industrialized city boasting the best natural harbor, and extensive naval facilities. 42,0 this bomb exploding over the north factory district took the lives of 42,000 persons and injured 40,000 more. It destroyed 39 of all of the buildings standing in nagasaki before the calamity. Grave the japanese described their bleak, mutilated city as a graveyard with not a tombstone f standing. These two terrifying blows were of struck at japan only after profound consideration of all the human bombs w and military involved. The atomic bombs were dropped to end the war quickly, and they did end the war quickly. Richard frank is author of downfall, the end of the Imperial Japanese empire. Here to talk to us further about the 75th anniversary of the drop of the atomic bombs on japan. Thank you for joining us. Thank you for having me. In that last clip that we just heard, the military film from 1946, it said pretty definitively that the atomic bombs were dropped to end the war quickly, and they did end the war quickly. First of all, was this the right decision to make . And were those bombs the reasons for the end of the war . The short answer is yes and yes. They were dropped overwhelmingly, the primary reason was to end the war as quickly as possible. Save lives, both american and japanese. One thing i think is really critical that we get to right at the start is to understand the context of this. And from my study y have two basic principles we have to follow. One is to count all the dead, and second is to treat all the dead by showing humanity. I mean the japanese as well. And basically, the asia pacific war which ran from 37 to 45 resulted in the death by conservative count of about 19 million noncombatants. Of the number, the number of japanese noncombatants was maybe a million, 1. 2 million. About 25 were due to the atomic bombs. More than that were due to soviet intervention. That math tells you immediately that for every japanese noncom battant who died in the whole war, between 17 and 18 other noncombatants died. Theyre overwhelming the other asians and about 12 million are chinese. Most of the 17 or 18 million noncombatants who were not japanese were already dead and dying at a rate of 8,000 to 14,000 a day, about 240,000 to 400,000 per month. Thats the context in which all this takes place. Its important that we not overlook or diminish or dehumanize the japanese, but its equally important we understand the total context of this and where the deaths are taking place. And theyre primarily not japanese. Richard frank is with us for a half hour as we look back further on the 75th anniversary of the u. S. Atomic bomb drops on hiroshima and nagasaki. We will take your calls. After a couple minutes of conversation, but well put the phone numbers on the screen. If you liver in the eastern and central time zones, 2027488000 is your number. West, mountain and pacific, 2027488001. We have two separate special lines. One for world war ii veterans and their families. 2027488002. And for japanese americans, 2027488003. We look forward to talking with you and you talking to our guests, richard frank. Richard frank, more perspective here. How widespread in 1945 was the support for president truman and his decision to use atomic weapons . And has that changed much over time . Yeah, well, the support for truman in 45 and for some time ther afterwards was extremely high. Youre looking at numbers, i eah have seenav punching up above 8. Its changed because of the e ot narratives that have been employed over the years have changed very much. One of the things that really concerns me about this is i dont question that we should talk about this. It should be controversial, but i find it astonishing that this conversation takes place in which various alternatives are advances in lieu of the atomic bombs. And what is conspicuous about that discussion is they never talk about the cost of the alternatives. And when you actually get down and start doing the cost of the alternatives, you understand why mr. Truman in his decision didnt make a good choice. He basically had choices between the astonishingly awful to had horrendously his lly horrific, chose what secretary stimson called the least horrific choice. This is the 75th anniversary of the nagasaki bombing, the second bombing. August 6th being the first one. Hiroshima. Richard frank, what was the difference between those three days and what the Truman Administration was looking at . The destruction in hiroshima, what made them decide to drop a second bomb three days later . Well, there was no specific decision on the second bomb. Mr. Truman, the authorization order released the people, as it were, to start dropping bombs and keep dropping bombs. There was no further check back. When we talk about the two bombs. This is another aspect about the controversy that people i think dont understand. The problem with the notion that one bomb would have done it or a demonstration would have done it is this. You have to look at the japanese side. Their reaction to this was based upon the fact that they had an Atomic Bomb Program which had not produced a bomb, but it had educated the top levels of japanese leadership in producing material to build a bomb was stupendously difficult. When news of hiroshima came and mr. Trumans announcement it was an atomic bomb, the Imperial Army responded, we wont concede they have one bomb until we have an investigation. The Imperial Navy said they could have one bomb, but they cant have that many, they cant be that powerful. Basically, what the japanese leadership was looking at was not fear of one bomb. It was that the u. S. Had an arsenal of powerful nuclear weapons. Thats exactly what the nocsoan bomb. It convinced them we didnt just have a bomb. We had an arsenal of atomic bombs. The war minister, the second most powerful man in japan, he had been adamant for continuing the war after the hiroshima bomb. After the nagasaki bomb, hes going around telling members of the leadertium, the americans have 100 atomic bombs and the next target is tokyo. Thats an amazing argument to make to continue to war. How far along was the u. S. At the type of the dropping of the bombs in its planning of an invasion of japan, the main island of japan . Very good question. And very different from what is usually presented. There had been a plan to start invading japan on november 1st. Operation olympic. And mr. Truman approved that on the 18th of june, 1945. At that time, he was quite relucta reluctant, but he was presented with a scenario in which we would have overwhelming superior going in, and therefore american casualties would be acceptable, not pleasant but acceptable. And what we now know was really only released decades after the war. Radio intelligence had uncovered the fact the japanese had exactly anticipated that the First American invasion was going to take place on southern ceushue. And they built this huge buildup of ground and air forces. Over 10,000 aircraft, half of them kamikazes. 700,000 troops. Instead of us going in with this overwhelming superiority, our assault would face 700,000 japanese, and we now know also, the senior naval officer had never wanted to invade japan and he had been biding his time to bring on a showdown over whether an invasion should take place, and by the 9thbrin ofg august, w the intelligence he was preparey to bring on this huge showdown with an army over whether there should be any invasion of japan, and only the japanese surunder cut it off before it reached the level of mr. Truman having another review. Lets talk a call from tom from west virginia. Youre on with richard frank. Were talking about the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of japan. Go ahead, tom. Caller good morning. Im age 60. And i remember the howard zinn lectures of my college years. Of how history is being rewritten so much right now by people with agendas. And im hearing on talk radio that the only reason why we bombed progressive talk radio, e that is, the only reason why we, bombed japan, because they were not europeans. In other words, they were people of color, which is germa nonsen because we bombed dresden over g in t germany. That was a purpose of demoralizing the german people, for them to surrender. Its unfortunate what happened with the dropping of the two bombs. It did open up pandoras box, but on the other hand, it saved millions of japanese lives who would have been caught in the cross fire. As well as american lives and casualties. Am i wrong on that, professor . No. You know, basically, you have to bear in mind that right up until the end, it was assumed the bombs were going to be used against germany. As soon as they were available. It turned out from a tactical standpoint, they didnt have bombs ready in time to use against germany. Germany surrendered in may. The first bomb, which was a test bomb, was detonated in july, 1945. Let me come back again to a really basic point. Its not that the argument im advancing says we dont care about the japanese. The japanese who died. I wrote very graphically about that in my book, both the fire raid and tokyo in march of 45 and also hiroshima. But what i have been going over these many years now is the fact that our narratives that we have been using on this simply talk about japanese deaths, the fact that the japanese were asians. They dont mention we were in the war basically because we wouldnt abandon china. Our American People at that time who were reading the New York Times, reading it day by day, through the whole war, they were well aware of how horrific the war was in asia. And we have completely blotted that out. Thats why parts of those narratives are so powerful, because people simply do not realize how horrific the asia pacific war was. Richard frank, how have japanese textbooks for a young student portray the war, and has that approach changed over the years . Thats sort of a complex question. The larger question or larger issue i think for japan was the whole period of world war ii was an area that was not really forthrightly discussed, still not forthrightly discussed. There clearly is a tendency in japan, and i can understand this, to view themselves as the greatest victims of the war. And if you have been dealing with historians and people from other asian nations, you really get a full flavor of how infuriated that makes people in china and elsewhere. I was sitting at a conference once with a historian from the peoples republic of china, and a presentation was made, very much along the typical lines of what i would call the critical literature there. As hes sitting there, i see him going from bafflement to fury as he realizes this narrative entirely omits, it does not count and doesnt treat chinese, vietnamese, indonesians, koreans as showing a common humanity with japanese civilians in two cities. And let me add further a point i alluded to earlier. Basically, whether the soviet union enters the war, according to john dower in his embracing defeat, a classic book about the occupation of japan, they capture between 1. 6 and 1. 7 million japanese nationals, mainly in manchuria, north korea. When the repatriation prosis over, they only return 1. 2 million, which shows you between 400,000 and 500,000 japanese either died or disappeared in soviet captivity. We know from soviet archival documents about 61,000 of them were japanese soldiers. That tells you basically between 340,000 and 440,000 japanese noncombatants died in soviet captivity after the formal end of hostilities. Those are higher numbers than died in the two atomic bomb attacks including the latent deaths. We have rick in phoenix. Good morning. Caller good morning. Just want to add my voice. Not sure what had been discussed earlier. My father, who barely survived the war in europe, was being prepared to transfer to japan. That would have eliminated my brothers life after that date. And many other mens lives. Also, it would have been criminal when you add everything up here, it would have been criminal for truman not to drop that bomb. Not just the hundreds of thousands of chinese massacred in a horrible way. There were, as you just mentioned, the russian threat that would have taken japanese territory and greatly complicated the postwar era. Theres so many reasons why truman had to do that. And what was the alternative . I heard generals saying they dr were going to blockade japan pt until they gave up. What . Nk y couldou you address those point that you havent yet . Thank you, rick. Richard frank. Thats a really excellent point. On the american side, there was basically an unstable compromise between the army and navy over a strategy to end the war and unconditional surrender. The army thought the critical issue was time, and therefore, they advocated invasion because they believed invasion would be the swiftest way to end the war. The navy had studied war with japan literally for decades and one of the fundamental premises of the study was that invading the japanese home islands would produce politically unacceptable casualties. The navys alternative was blockade. What doesnt get mentioned in these discussions as it should, and this was basically the policy, all the Navy Officers lined up behind it, talked about it as the alternative to the bomb. This gets back to the very basic point i made about counting all the dead. Blockade was bluntly aimed to end the war by starving to death millions of japanese, mostly noncombatants. Thats what blockade was about. In view of the limited power of the atomic weapons and other conventional weapons at that time compared to what we have today, a blockade was actually the most ruthless strategy the u. S. Was prepared to employ against japan, and that was the direction we were going in august 1945, because if the invasion is off, and king gets his way, then we do blockade, and we do try to kill millions of japanese noncombatants, and oh, by the way, those asians who are not japanese, who are dying every single day, add their deaths on top of the japanese dying. The death tolls for these alternatives when you actually sit down and contemplate them, are just sickening. Mind boggling. We have len on the line from west virginia. Hello, len. Caller good morning, cspan and mr. Frank. Im the son of an okinawa veteran who was training to go to japan in the invasion, and they never had to go because president truman had the common sense to do what he did. For those who criticize truman and the army, im going to tell you what my dad said. Every one of those critics go to the families of people, american gis who were saved from invading japan and certain death, and tell them that truman did the wrong thing. And i know you dont have the guts to do that. Thank you, mr. Frank, for your books. Very informative. Len, thank you for calling. Richard frank, has history been fair to president truman regarding his decisions . My view, no. Let me add another dimension to this. Over t mr. Truman, you know, post war,o he famously said he didnt lose any sleep over the decision and various comments like that. If you really go through everything he actually said, in his mind, he had sort of the whole area in sort of two me . Compartments. One compart was, didhe alway i t best decision of what was presented to me . And he always believed that if you really understood all the alternatives, he made what secretary stimson called the least abhorrent choice. As bad as the bombs and those choices, the alternatives were worse. On a personal level, truman was never indifferent to the deaths of the japanese that his order had caused. In fact, very shortly after hiroshima, we intercept this message from the Japanese Navy reporting that 100,000 japanese had died add hiroshima. And mr. Truman clearly was reading that because he talked in a Cabinet Meeting or just before a Cabinet Meeting to other government officials and says, well, the hiroshima bomb killed 100,000 people. He didnt pull the number out of the air, and he said and all those kids. And he has various other comments hes making about the fact that this was horrendous, the consequences of the decision. The decision may have been right, but the consequences were horrendous, and he recognized it and felt it very deeply. You know, once again, when you deal with people from other asianinati nations who were tra in japans empire or americans are saying were two bombs necessary, a common comment from them was why only two . From their perspective, the death rate is so incomparable between the japanese and these other peoples that they find the american struggle over this to be baffling. Richard frank, a little more of the history of the end of the war and the pacific, 1945, so hiroshima happens on august 6th. On august 9th, as we talked about, the u. S. Drops the atomic bomb on nagasaki. Same day, soviets declare war on japan. They invade manchuria. Then six days go. The emperor announced japans unconditional surunder. Walk us through the six days to get the emperor to the point of surrender. A little context here. Basically, what you have to understand is to get japan to surrender was really two steps. Someone with legitimate authority had to decide that japan as a nation state would surrender, and then japans armed forces had to complysurre of those were a certainty. The emperor makes the critical decision. He maked it in the afternoon of august 8th, 1945, when he says the war must end now. This is after hiroshima, before soviet intervention. There were other factors that were on his mind, including his loss of faith in the strategy to meet the invasion. The concern about the japanese people reaching revolutionary state some time probably in the fall. These all played into his mind. He announces that decision before the inner circle of leadership in the Early Morning hours of august 10th. And we have the diary entry of the number two man in the Imperial Army, who he learns of the emperors decision, and one of the other officers in imperial headquarters comes to them and says i dont think the overseas commanders will comply even with an order from the emperor. And right on cue, two of the three overseas commanders say theyre not going to comply with the surrender order, even from the emperor