Is Many Americans lost confidence in what the government told them about our policy. Americans should not be asked to support a policy that involves overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefore, i would like to answer some of the questions that i know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did america get involved in vietnam in the first place . How has this administration changed the policy of the Previous Administration . What has really happened on negotiations in paris and on the battle front in vietnam . What choices do we have if we are to end the war . What are the prospects for peace . Now, let me begin by describing a situation i have found when i was inaugurated on january 20. The war had been going on for four years. 31,000 americans had been killed in action. The Training Program for the South Vietnam people. No progress had been made at the negotiations in paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad. In view of these circumstances, there were some who urge that i end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American Forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in a war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him, and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly, this was the only way to avoid allowing johnsons war from becoming nixons war. I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in america and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some americans are for peace and some americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether johnsons war becomes nixons war, the great question is how can we win americas peace. Let us turn now to the fundamental issue, why and how did the United States become involved in vietnam in the first place. Fifteen years ago North Vietnam with the Logistical Support of communist soviet union launched a campaign to impose a communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the question of the government of South Vietnam president eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a communist takeover. Seven years ago, president kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to vote as combat advisers. Four years ago, president johnson sent american combat forces to South Vietnam. Now many believe that president johnsons decision to send american combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong, and many others i among them had been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it . In january, i could only conclude that the precipitous withdrawal of all American Forces from vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnam, take over 54 years ago. They then murdered 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps. We saw a prelaid of South Vietnam when communists entered the city last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror, in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves. With this, it has become a nightmare for the nature and particularly a million and a half refugees who fled South Vietnam when communists took over in the north. For the United States, this first defeat in our nations history would result in a collapse of confidence in leadership, not only in asia but throughout the world. Three american president s have recognized the great stakes involved in vietnam and understo understood. In 1963 president kennedy with characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a struggle there to carry on independence, we believe strongly in that. Were not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion for us to withdraw from that effort would mean not only a collapse of South Vietnam but southeast asia, so were going to stay there. President eisenhower and president johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitous withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot become great if it betrace its allies and lets down its defense. Our defeat in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace. In the middle east, in berlin, eventually even in the western hemisphere. Ultimately this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war. For these reasons, i reject the recommendation that i should end the war by immediately with drawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change american policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front. In order to end the war fought on many front, i initiated a pursuit for appeals on many front. In a television speech may 14 and a speech before the United Nations on a number of other occasions i set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a ceasefire under international provisions. We have offered free elections under International Supervision with the communist participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. The saigon government has pledged to accept the results of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a take it or leave it basis. We have indicated were willing to discuss the proposals put forth for the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable accept the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the paris peace conference, demonstrated flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused to discuss our proposals. They demand unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American Forces immediately and unconditionally and overthrow the government of vietnam as we leave. We have not limited our peace initiatives to Public Forums and statements. I realize a long and bitter war like this usually cant be settled in a public forum. Thats why in addition to public statements and negotiations i have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. Tonight i am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace. Initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we there by might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after the election an individual directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, i made two private offers for a rapid comprehensive settlement. Hanois replies called, in effect for our surrenders. Secretary of state rogers, my assistant of National Security affairs mr. Kissinger Ambassador Lodge and i personally have met on a number of occasions with the representatives of the soviet government to get their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid july i became convinced it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the paris talks. I spoke directly in this office where i am sitting with an individual who had known who ch minh on a personal basis. Through him i sent a letter to ho chi minh. I did this throughout diplomatic channels with the hope for the making of statements fof propaganda, there might be constructive progress in making the war end. Let me read to you from that letter now. Dear mr. President , i realize it is difficult to communicate across the gulf of four years of war. Precisely because of this gulf, i wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war. I received ho chi minhs reply august 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken in paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. Ambassador lodge met with vietnams chief negotiator in paris in 11 private sessions and we have taken other significant initiatives, which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which might still prove to be productive. But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing a year ago and since this administration came into office january 20th can be summed up in one sentence, no progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Now who is at fault . Its become clear the obstacle in the end of the war is not the president of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese government. The least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace, and it will not do so while it is convinced all it has to do is await our next concession and next concession after that one until it gets everything it wants. There can now be no longer any question that progress and negotiation depends only on hanois deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American People but the American People are entitled to know the truth, the bad news as well as the good news, where the lives of our young men are involved. Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, i recognized we might not succeed in bringing the end of the war through negotiation. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace, a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift in u. S. Foreign policy which i described in my press conference at guam july 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the nixon doctrine, a policy which not only will help end the war in vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future vietnams. We americans are a do it yourself people. Were an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a be jo, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has been carried over to our foreign pol icy in korea the United States furnished most of the money, most of the men to help the people of those countries defend freedom against communist aggression. Before any american troops were committed to vietnam, a leader of another asian country expressed this opinion to me when i was traveling in asia as a private citizen. He said, when you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, u. S. Policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them. Well, in accordance with this wise council i laid down in guam three principles as guidelines for future american policy toward asia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a Nuclear Power threatens a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitment, but we shall look to the nation threatened to resume the primary responsibility for providing manpower for its defense. After i announced this policy i found leaders of pile peeps, thailand, vietnam, other nations that might be threatened with communist direction welcomed this new direction in American Foreign policy. The defense of freedom is everybodys business, not just americas business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the Previous Administration, we americanized the war in vietnam. In this administration, we are vietnamizing peace. Not only resulted in our assuming primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately express the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so they could defend themselves when they left. Vietnamization was launched after the secretarys visit in march. Under the plan i ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In july on the visit to vietnam i changed the orders so they were consistent with the objectives of our new policy. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 , and now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in american policy in vietnam. After five years of americans going into vietnam, we are finally bringing american men home. By december 15, over 60,000 machine will have been withdrawn from vietnam including 20 of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our american troops. Two other Significant Developments have occurred since this administration took office. Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months is less than 20 of what it was over the same period last year. And most important, the United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years. Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for complete withdrawal of all u. S. Combat Ground Forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly, scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness as South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of american withdrawal can become greater. I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision, which im sure you will understand. As ive indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three front. One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in. The other two factors in which we will base our withdrawal decisions the level of enemy activity and progress of Training Programs of South Vietnamese forces. And im glad to be able to report tonight, progress on both of these front has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in june for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in june. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, i must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, i want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of