Transcripts For CSPAN3 Joint House Hearing On Biological Sec

CSPAN3 Joint House Hearing On Biological Security July 12, 2024

A hearing jointly mosted by Foreign Affairs committee, Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats in capabilities. In a moment mute all participan other than chairman bar a. All participants are asked to keep themselves muted when not actively engaging in the discussion which should help limit echoes or other disruptions. Do not remember to remute themselves, the host will do so to limit background audio. Members and witnesses are responsible for unmuting themselves any time they wish to be heard. It may take a few seconds for your microphone to unmute. Please keep that in mind when speaking. A timekeeper will monitor the time for this hearing. If you are on the computer, review the time by switching your personal view in the upper right corner of your screen to grid or active speaker and thumbnail view. You can also pan the timer by right clicking or hovering you cursor ore the timer and pressing the thumb tack icon. With that, we are ready to begin. Chairman barra, please count down from five so that the system dis plays your video, then please paugs for five additional seconds. Then start the proceeding. Five, four, three, two, one. This joint subcommittee meeting with the house Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats and capabilities will come to order hchlt without objection the chair is authorized to declare a ve success of the committee of the committee at any point and all members will have five days to submit statements, extraneous materials and questions for the record, subject to the length, limitation in the rules. To insert something into the record please have your staff email either subcommittee clerk. As a reminder to members, please keep your video function on at all times, even when youre not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with 965 and the accompanying regulations staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise. We have a quorum and we will now recognize myself for opening remarks. I will then be followed by the acting Ranking Member, mr. Perry, chairman langevin, and then Ranking Member ste phonic. I will then recognize members in order of seniority, alternating between democrats and republicans, and Foreign Affairs and Armed Services members. You know, before we get started and before i do my Opening Statement i think it would be remiss for us not to, you know, mention the president and the first lady and, you know, know that theyre in our thoughts and prayers and, you know, hope for a speedy recovery. And also the tens of thousands of americans that test positive every day for this virus. You know, theyre in our thoughts and, you know, it does underscore that this is a virus. This is a viral threat. It doesnt know if were democrat or republican, dont know what god we worship, what our country of origin is, its a virus. And it does underscore, you know, the importance of this topic that were talking about today. It does underscore that this is naturally occurring event. But what bad actors may see as they see a threat like this that really has brought the entire world to its knees and certainly has wreaked economic havoc domestically and internationally. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and both having the department of defense and the state department again underscores the importance of this. And my focus as subcommittee chairman under the guise of nonproliferation, we spend a lot of time talking about Nuclear Threats what were seeing is the real vulnerability to buy logic threats and to put that into context. Weve not had an Aircraft Carrier brought to its knee by a kinetic force, a missile or anything like that but we saw in this past year an Aircraft Carrier brought to port because of a virus. And that really does underscore what i worry about. And when i think about this, i think about it, you know, in a couple different ways. Its very difficult to obtain Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Technology. Yet we dedicate hundreds of personnel and International Organizations like the iea and others to reduce that nuclear threat. Thats totally appropriate. You know, we want to make sure Nuclear Technology and weaponry doesnt end up in the hands of bad actors but if i put any doctor scientist hat on the availability of technologies to alter viruss and do genetic editing, the know how and the capabilities are rapidly increasing and that is something that keeps me awake at night. Again, we know there are bad actors out there, certainly post 9 11, many of us prepared we saw anthrax and other threats, we worried about smallpox and so forth and that is something that i think in a bipartisan way, you know, Congress Working with the administration, should really think about, you know, what are the things that we have to do to move ahead . I look forward to the witness testimony, and, you know, theres several areas that i think about and, you know, going to be curious about from the witnesses, you know, as we defeat covid19, and spend the billions of dollars and build the infrastructure to defeat this virus i also think we should strategically be thinking about how we use those resources to also prepare for bio surveillance to be ready for the next whether its a naturally occurring virus, or biologic threat but also think about how we have those dual use capabilities, to for manmade threats. As we move forward, weve got the biological, the bwc, but i think we need stronger multilateral organizations with like minded allies that we can work with. And, again, id be curious how dod and state are thinking about creating those multilevel institutions and then lastly, you know, when i think about the ethics of gene editing and where thats going and the technology, we really havent created the standards and norms that say, you know, this is appropriate for advancing of science but this really is a little bit dangerous and you probably ought not to be playing around with genes in this particular way and creating those standards and norms and what that would look like. Again, i think thats an appropriate place where, you know, the scientific community, congress, again working with the administration, ought to put those standards in place, not just for the United States, but for the International Community. So, you know, again our thoughts and prayers are with the president and first lady and those thousands of americans and, you know, id be remiss if i didnt just put my doctor hat on for a second as we enter the fall and winter, lets do what we can to keep everyone safe. Lets wear face coverings. Lets continue to practice physical distancing. Lets continue to wash our hands and practice good hygiene. Lets avoid large indoor gatherings that we have seen really act as superspreading events. And the most important thing that we can do right now as we enter the fall is everyone go out there and get your flu shot. Please get your flu shot. So with that, let me recognize the Ranking Member, mr. Perry, for five minutes of Opening Statements. Thank you, chairman bera, and thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your counsel today. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for increased bio security threats and what can happen when irresponsible actors disregard International Agreements for the sake of selfprevention. A Strong International biosecurity regime only works when its constituents agree to make it work. We need to assess the shortcomings of multilateral engagements and determine where improvements need to be made. The 2005 International Health regulations went into force in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012. However, by 2012 only about 20 of all countries were compliant and even today most countries have still not complied with the 2005 regulations. ThiS Administration has taken a significant amount of criticism for questioning u. S. Engagement in institutions like the world health organization. Let me be clear about this. The World Health Organizations complicity in spreading the coronavirus should not be rewarded with the United States indifference to its failures. The w. H. O. s strong affiliation with the Global Health security agenda also raises significant questions about ghsas longterm efficacy. There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the International Community. Different levels of investment in biosecurity lends itself to a permanent condition of moral hazard where select communities like the United States are compensating for the lack of investment from other states. Despite our best efforts to stymie the spread of biothreat theres only so much we can do alone, key programs like the state departments Biosecurity Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like china, cuba, iran, north korea, sudan or syria, despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with biological weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses, countries like north korea have a clearly offensive biological Weapons Program with no end in sight. How do we confront the fact that we have a biological weapons control regime. More importantly in measuring success against the spread of biothreats what exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions . As it stands china has provided a gift to nonstate actors that wish us harm. Theyve shown us and the world the impact that a potential bioweapon can have on the American Economy as well as our society. Threats to our way of life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the coronavirus. And this timely hearing will be confronting that uncomfortable truth. I am also grateful to have our witnesses before us today as they speak more about Synthetic Biology, and gene manipulation. We need to find out more about the National Security implications that Synthetic Biology can pose to the United States, especially in light of the fact that several countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens and subpar laboratory settings. All that being said i do also offer my prayers and best wishes to the first family, to hope hicks and to anybody thats been affected by the virus, whether theyve contracted it or whether it has occurred in their family members, loved ones and community, were all dealing with it one way or the other. I thank the chairman for the time and i yield the balance. Thank you, mr. Perry. Let me now recognize the chairman of the intelligence and emerging threats and capabilities subcommittee, chairman langevin. Thank you, chairman bera. I want to begin by also acknowledging and saying that the president and the first lady and the first family are in my thoughts and prayers. I know theyre all in our thoughts and prayers right now and the people around the president S Administration who may also be experiencing effects of the virus. We pray that they all have a quick and a full recovery. Mr. Chairman i want to thank my colleagues, the house Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asia, the pacific and nonproliferation. And particularly you, chairman bera, and Ranking Member yoho and i know mr. Perry is standing in for the Ranking Member right now. I want to thank you all for hosting this timely joint hearing on biosecurity. I recognize Ranking Member this is a topic which as we have seen of late is vital to our nations security and im very pleased were holding this very important joint hearing. Emergi emerging biological techniques, gene editing and Synthetic Biology are changing the scope and scale of biological threats and could lead to an increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge biological threats are easier to create than other weapons of mass destruction used in concert, cyberweapons and biological weapons enable a rogue actor to inflict major damage on a military power. Just last month the republic of Georgias Health ministry suffered a cyberattack from abroad on the database that stores medical documents and national covid19 Pandemic Management information. We know Russian Hackers have targeted organizations involved in covid19 research and vaccine development, including those in the u. S. , the uk and canada. So these attacks and the current Global Pandemic underscore the import of collective Scientific Research preparedness and security across the interagency. And with our allies. And for national and economic security. In a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a novel, highly infectious pathogen we must ensure the interagency is working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective effort to strengthen biological security across the range of threats. The defense Threat Reduction agency, through its execution of the department of defenses cooperative Threat Reduction, biological Threat Reduction program, and its technical reachback analysis, has been receiving foreign partner requests for preparedness and detection, including providing biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance support in aid to aid detection. Diagnosis, reporting and modeling related to the covid19 outbreak. There have been many good examples of the btrp trained local professionals in countries like guinea, liberia, cape verd, jordan and thailand. They diagnose and confirm the first cases of covid19 in their countries. Yet, in the face of known and emerging biological threats and the impact it could have on our National Security and economy, and as a pandemic that could arguably present the single biggest threat to our country, were starting to spread across the globe, the president s budget request was delivered to the hill in february with a 36 cut to the cooperative Threat Reduction programs funding from last years enacted level. At a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a highly infectious new virus we are alarmed by the departments significant reduction in the budget request for a mission of detecting and confronting biological threats to the United States. Thankfully the house has acted in our fiscal year 2021 National Defense act, hr 360 added back money, 89 million for additional fund. The department of defenses chemical and biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in the fight against covid19. Its medical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop medical, countermeasures, vaccines, therapeutics, and pretreatments. Its physical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection technologies. Diagnostics, personal protective equipment, and decontamination systems. To prepare against potential unknown threats cbdp build expertise and capabilities to address novel pathogens making it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of Novel Coronavirus. We are interested in hearing today whether the program was quickly and efficiently directed to participate in the National Response to the covid19 pandemic. So these are obviously challenging times and we need to double down on these programs and we need to make sure that we are, in fact, prepared for the next biological or chemical event that could affect the country and make sure that we have all the tools and resources in place to respond effectively to keep our country and perhaps the world safe. We look forward to hearing more about the many efforts of both the departments today, what we can do to help ensure your organizations have the authorities and resources needed to prepare for the emerging threats both today and tomorrow and how we can ensure that your departments are ready and able to act swiftly and decisively in the next crisis. I join the host in thanking all of you, especially our witnesses, for joining us today and i now yield back to chairman bera. Thank you, chairman. Let me recognize the Ranking Member of emerging threats Armed Services committee Ranking Member stefonik . I want to echo my colleagues, our thoughts and prayers with the first family, the white house staff and all the American People<

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