On a subject of deep concern to all americans and many people in all parts of the world. The war in vietnam. One of the reasons for the deep division about vietnam is that Many Americans have lost confidence in what their government has told them about our policy. The American People cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overall issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, i would like to answer some of the questions that i know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did america get involved in vietnam in the first place . How has this administration changed the policy of the Previous Administration . What has really happened in the negotiations in paris and on the battlefront in vietnam . What choices do we have if we were to end the war . What are the prospects for peace . Let me begin by describing the situation i found when i was inaugurated on january 20th. The war had been going on for four years. 31,000 americans have been killed in action. The Training Program for the South Vietnamese was beyond schedule. 540,000 americans were in vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in paris, and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad. In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that i end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American Forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly. This was the only way to avoid becomeg johnsons war to nixons war. But i had a greater obligation then to only think of the years of my administration and the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation. And, on the future of peace and freedom in america and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some americans are for peace and some americans are against peace, the question at issue is not whether johnsons war becomes nixons war, the great question is how we can win americas peace . Let us turn to the fundamental issue, why and how did the United States become involved in vietnam in the first place . 15 years ago, North Vietnam, with the support of china and the soviet union, launched a campaign to impose a communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the government of South Vietnam, president eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a communist take over. Seven years ago, president kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to vietnam as combat advisors. Four years ago, president johnson sent american combat forces to South Vietnam. Many believe that president johnsons decision to send american combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. Many others, i among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But, the question facing us today is, now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it . In january, i could only conclude that the withdrawal of all American Forces from vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam, but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnamese, our withdrawal would inevitably allow the communists to repeat the massacres that followed their takeover in the north 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam with a communist city last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves. With this sudden collapse of our support, this would become the nightmare of the entire nation. And, particularly for the 1. 5 million catholic refugees that fled to South Vietnam when the communists took over in the north. For the United States, this first defeat in our nations history would result in a collapse of confidence in american leadership. Not only in asia but throughout the world. Three american president s have recognized the great steaks stakes of vietnam and understood what had been done. In 1963, president kennedy with his eloquence and clarity, said we want to see a stable government there. Carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse of not only South Vietnam but southeast asia, so we are going to stay there. President eisenhower and president johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam, without question, would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace. In the middle east, in berlin, eventually, even in the western hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war. For these reasons, i have rejected the recommendation that i should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change american policy on both the negotiating front and the battlefront. In order to end the war fought on many fronts, i initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on may 14 and in a speech before the united nations, and number of other occasions, i set forth our peace proposals in greater detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal of outside forces within one year. We have proposed a ceasefire. We have offered free elections with the communists are just waiting in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force, and the saigon government has pledged to accept the results of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a take it or leave it basis. We have indicated we are willing to discuss the proposals put forth by the other side. We have declared anything is negotiable, except for the rights of people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the paris peace conference, an ambassador expressed our flexibility in good faith in 40 Public Meetings. Hanoi has refused to discuss our proposals. They demand the unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdrawal of American Forces and overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave. We have not limited our peace initiatives to Public Forums and public statements. I recognize like a long and i recognized that a long and bitter war like this could not be settled usually in a public forum. Thats why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, i have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. Tonight, i am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace. Initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door, which, publicly, would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, i made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanois replies called for our surrender before negotiations. Since the soviet union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, we have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the soviet government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward the same end with representatives of other governments which have depomed diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid july, i became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the paris talks. I spoke directly, in this office where im now sitting, with an individual who had known ho chi minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him, i sent a letter to ho chi minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope of making statements with propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress for bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now. Dear mr. President , i realize it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But, precisely because of this gulf, i wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe the war in vietnam has gone on too long. Delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table towards an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and openminded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the great people of vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned towards peace rather than towards conflict and war. I received ho chi minhs reply three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken in paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the Public Meetings i referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with vietnams chief negotiator in paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives that must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications, which may still prove to be productive. But the effect of all of the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since a year ago, and since this administration came into office on january 20, can be summed up in one sentence. No progress what ever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well, now who is at fault . It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating the end of the war is not the president of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese government. The obstacle is the other sides absolute refusal to show the least willingness in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession. And our next concession after that one. Until it gets everything it wants. There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on hanoi deciding to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American People. But the American People are entitled to know the truth, the bad news as well as the good news, when the lives of our young men are involved. Let me turn to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, i recognized we might not succeed in bringing the end of the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace. A plan which will bring the war to an end, regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift in u. S. Foreignpolicy, which i described in my press conference in guam on july 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the nixon doctrine. A policy which not only will help end the war in vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future vietnams. We americans are a doityourself people and impatient people, and instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried into our foreign policy. In korea and again in vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, the arms, and the the men to help those countries defend their freedom against communist aggression. Before any american troops were committed to vietnam, the leader of another asian country expressed this opinion to me when i was traveling in asia as a private citizen. He said, when you are assisting another nation to defend its freedom, u. S. Policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them. In accordance with this wise counsel, i laid down in guam three principles as guidelines to future american policy towards asia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a Nuclear Power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments, but we should look for the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. After i announced this policy, i found the leaders of the philippines, thailand, vietnam and other countries which might be threatened by communist aggression welcomed this new direction in American Foreign policy. The defense of freedom is everybodys business, not just americas business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the Previous Administration, we americanized the war in vietnam. In this administration, we are vietnamizing the search for peace. The policy of the Previous Administration not only assumed primary responsibility for fighting the war more significant, did not adequately express the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The plan was launched following secretary layered the secretaries visit to vietnam in march. Under the plan, i ordered a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In july, on my visit to vietnam, i changed general abrams orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policy. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 , and now, we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in american policy in vietnam. After five years of americans going into vietnam, we are finally bringing american men home. By december 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our troops. Two other Significant Developments have occurred since this administration took office. Enemy infiltration, which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last three months, is less than 20 of what it was over the same period last year. Most important, the United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years. Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan, which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all u. S. Combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly, scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of american withdrawal can become greater. I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision, which im sure you will understand. On several occasions, the rate as i have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on several fronts. One of these is the progress that can be or might be made in the paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces have withdrawn and move in. The other factors is the progress of the Training Programs of southern vietnamese forces. And im glad to be able to report tonight, progress on both fronts has been greater than we in june when we started the program for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable is more