Of my friends have heard me give this origin story. This book came about because of the review i did that mention the series that was used biography to teach history. It would hit biographical topics or would you say representative biography to get at a broader subject of history. They had just published their first volume, it was on pocahontas because of the issues regarding native American History. They were looking for someone to do something on American Foreign relations. He offered me the opportunity to put together a perspective. These were supposed to be short and concise books. That was the idea. The topic i debated and consulted with some people about which biographical figure might serve that purpose in the american context. I kept coming back to Henry Kissinger. A man whos had such a long career of american and foreign relations. Though not born in the United States, his career really does represent something about 20thcentury american politics. When i did get the chance to tell kissinger this was the goal of the series, a short, concise book and using him as a prism through which to look at u. S. Relations. He looked at me and said and i dont cover everything. Its not as short and concise as i had hoped. It got longer. It was even longer when i submitted the manuscript. I have the custom 25 . There were a lot of things that had to be left out. Another question that i have heard, and i have two other kissinger books published this year, is why another book on Henry Kissinger . Thats a legitimate question. I think theres a scholarly contribution. I am trying to write the book to reach a broader audience, but also to reach scholars. The argument is to look at kissinger in a new way. Most accounts of kissinger look at him as a Foreign Policy intellectual. Whose advocacy of the realpolitik, the pursuit of a pragmatic or Foreign Policy that is disregarded more for ethical considerations, and that was geared towards the promotion of American Security and interest, with interest defined narrowly. That is the usual approach to kissinger. I think it is incomplete. What my book seeks to do is to look at kissingers as a political actor, even a politician. This is insight i got from the French Foreign minister, who commented that he thought kissinger was far more of a politician in the way he acted. I think the basis of this is to understand, and this is illuminated the history of American Foreign policy, the American Foreignpolicy is fundamentally shaped and determined by the struggles and battles of domestic politics. It determines the politics. This is the goal i want to convey in you in looking at Henry Kissinger. Kissinger always portrayed himself and very early. Some of you may have seen the interview he gave to mike wallace when he was talking about his book, even then he portrayed himself as someone above politics, independent and not partisan. The tv news of vanderbilt and it was a great source of studying kissinger at it recorded the 1972 Republican National convention. At one point during the national convention, dan rather comes up to kissinger, asked him about the vietnam peace settlement in august 1972, whether it will help president nixons chances in an election. Kissinger said, the president never talks to me about domestic politics. We know this is nonsense. They talked about domestic politics. They understood political importance of Foreign Policy. The tapes combined the television material and other material. It gives insight into how nixon and kissinger approach Foreign Policy. The book is essentially although there is one chapter that tries to give the essentials of kissingers career and to talk about his connection to political ideas and thoughts before he becomes National Security advisor the book is essentially focused on his governmental career lasting from january 1969 to january 1977. In the second chapter, after a rocky start, i titled you cant lose them all. Things did not go well the early period of the nixon presidency. They organize what they call the trifecta. They talked with the soviet union, the paris Peace Agreement and vietnam. Ultimately it would help contribute to the landslide electoral victory of Richard Nixon in 1972. There is a wonderful tape of a conversation when nixon calls kissinger up after kissinger has has given his pieces at hand press conference in october of 1972. Nixon calls kissinger up and says, henry, ive noticed on all three networks. The tape shows us how often they were watching the Television News as well. He remarked, on all three networks there is an interesting story. Kissinger says, we have wiped mcgovern out. There is this political sensibility about their understanding of Foreign Policy that i think is something that i think is a large part of the first nixon term. Is not to say that there arent other considerations, but it comes up in the discussion. But it certainly is there. The next part of the book gets into, you might say, the happy period of nixon, but a successful time for Henry Kissinger. Nixon wanted to keep kissinger doing the same thing for the second term, the watergate would destroy his political credibility and power, and effectively reverse the roles, kissinger became the in 19731974, he was the most admired american, particularly for his role in the middle east, where he would play a role for settling the yom kippur war, but also in developing and negotiating the first agreements between israel and egypt and israel and syria. He would be pursuing his own goals. Richard nixon had different views, but Henry Kissinger could manipulate and avoid what nixon was talking about as he negotiated this engagement. Kissinger would become, after the syrian agreement would be on the cover of time and newsweek, and they put him in a superman outfit. Of course what goes up must come down. Kissinger had a much more difficult final few years and the administration dealing with a much more Hostile Congress an investigation. Certain events and not go very well. Frustrations in the middle east, the soviet involvement. Questions about the frustrations with the peace treaty. Much of this also let kissinger into thinking and arguing that Foreign Policy needed the domestic Foreign Policy needed to be different. I want to talk about a quote from him in 1975. When he argued, like most other nations in history we can either either escape from the world we are in or dominate it. We must conduct with flexibility, imagination in pursuit of our interest. We must be thoughtful and be prepared for the contingency. We must pursue limited objectives simultaneously. Kissinger, in some ways, in 1970 was attacked from the right and the left. From the right it was for insufficient anticommunism. From the left, insufficient attention to human rights issues. Kissinger, by the end of the time in office, is talking about about the limits of power and the limits of what the United States can do and the necessity to recognize that. At the same time it was in kissingers on makeup. In his role as secretary of state he is pursuing initiatives for certain powers of the United States and the world. Henry, for all of the sensible limits, having to assert that power. I have a last chapter, which talks about kissingers retirement. I dont think anyone thought that 53yearold Henry Kissinger would not be back in power in some form. But he wasnt. There was the fear of president s, that he would outshine them or preempt their own authority, as he seemed to have done with gerald ford. The interesting thing about that chapter is i cannot really use the types of sources a historian would like to. I had a moment when my copy editor said, there is another book in this last chapter. That may be, but it will come in 50 years and someone else will have to write it. Kissinger did become in those 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, a lead commentator. He became a symbol and exercise of American Power. I think i will close here and leave it open for comments. Thank you very much. We are very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel of experts, colleagues, friends to provide some initial comments and questions for tom. We want to set this up really interactively. I have asked our commentators to to be short on praise and short altogether, and to really focus on a couple of key questions that will draw tom out on the main arguments of the book. We will start with professor barbara keyes, who holds the chair in u. S. And International History at Durham University in the u. K. She received her degree from harvard university. She is the author editor of three books. It was published by harvard in 2014. In dozens of articles and book chapters, including one entitled Henry Kissinger the emotional statesman. And the second book was published in diplomatic history. After finishing a book manuscript, she is writing a book currently on the relationship between Henry Kissinger she is the most recent president the society of historians. Of American Foreign relations. We are delighted to have her with us. You have the floor. Thank you for having me. Let me congratulate tom, that was clearly a major achievement. It occurred to me last night that for the field of u. S. Foreign relations history, writing a book about Henry Kissinger is a bit like climbing mount everest. There is a small but sizable number of people who undertake the challenge because it is such a challenge. One of the things that makes it such a challenge is that there already is a large body of scholarship and kissinger. A number of things contribute with kissinger. I want to touch on a few things and post two questions. The two things that stand out about the book is, first, its quite brief. He manages to cover the nixon years in about 200 pages. That remedy is hard to do well. To condense a consequential time when there is so much going on in so many different parts of the world, and to do it without over Simple Flying it and losing nuance is a perfect achievement. The second thing i think is useful about toms book is the last chapter that he mentions kissinger after 1977. Tom covers that quite extensively, more so than any other works. I can only think of one other recent work that does that at all. I think it is an important part of kissingers career. One of the things that puzzles me is why it is that no enterprising journalist has as yet undertaken to write a book about kissinger after 1977. There is so much to say. Even though the sources are hard to find i think they are there. Its not that he is just a media talking head, but he is a businessman. I think the fact that we know so little about kissingers role as a businessman in the last 40 plus years as the head of of kissinger associates, is a major in our understanding of foreign relations, particularly in regards to china. I have two questions for time. They are very big questions. They are very big questions. I will let tom responds. The first is a very obvious question. Its about the relationship between nixon and kissinger. A big question for anybody who writes about kissinger is that when we accept his role we have to acknowledge it was nixon who was the president and who made the ultimate decisions. In your conclusions you write, kissinger was a dutiful agent of nixon. You suggest that kissingers role is really important, both in providing an intellectual framework, the realist framework, and in selling nixons policies. I think you did a really terrific job at outlining how well, how deftly kissinger cultivated the press to sell those policies. That suggests your position in close to when she wrote in 1994 when nixon reconsidered when it was written that kissinger was a geopolitical follower rather than a leader. Its a contrast to jeremys assessment in jeremys book, that kissinger was a genius as a strategist. Tom, you portrayed kissinger as a tactician. I want to press you on the points of what you covered. I think there are a number of interesting points you make. You suggest that kissinger triggered nixons reactions in ways that kissinger would then later regret. Kissinger played on nixons anxieties, often to enhance his own power. Well take the invasion of laos by south Vietnamese Forces where kissinger played a key role. The secretary of state, who i dont think anyone has ever written a single book on, but rogers opposed it in present ways. Its one example of the many times that kissinger pushed nixon in many directors. Typically, in many cases towards the use of force. Let me ask this question. Is it not that the polices are never just dutiful agents, but rather advisors of the perspective, analyses, support and opposition to various policies . It sometimes also gives them causal responsibility. At particular moments, are there not times when kissinger does have a high degree of personal responsibility, and was the decisive factor . I feel like you walked up to this conclusion a couple of times and always had a caveat. Like there was also a National Security reason for what kissinger was pushing. My second question is a very big picture. Im sure youve fielded many questions on these lines over the years. I think a lot about this quote that jeremy pulled out of kissinger during his book. Jeremy asked kissinger, what are your core moral principles . Kissinger answered, i am not prepared to share that yet. Which is pretty remarkable, considering that he is happy to share opinions about pretty much anything. Tom, in your conclusion, you do fault kissinger for working against democracy in chile, which you say undermined u. S. National interest in 1970 to 1973. And you fault him for what you described as ignorant about argentinas dirty war. You also defend the bombing of cambodia and even were default kissinger in the case of argentina, your language is tepid. You say its hard to justify. The defense that you offer seems to be in part that everyone did what nixon and kissinger did. Kennedy, eisenhower, was just what america did in the cold war. But you also said that the claim that everything is justified because it was a cold war necessity, which is the argument ferguson makes it he said the argument is not very persuasive. Im not suggesting that what you needed to do to satisfy me here is not to offer a more vigorous condemnation of kissinger or a more robust defense, because i can understand that you are trying not to do either. To the extent that you wade into the debate, i was left uncertain about your position. Let me frame this in terms of this question. Do you think that kissinger had a moral compass . And if he did not, or if it was not well articulated, shouldnt we expect statesmen to have well articulated moral principles . Prof. Schwartz thank you. Two really excellent questions, that also draw the setting of toms books. Tom, the floor is yours. [phone ringing] prof. Schwartz excuse me. Im sorry. Still have a landline. These are hard questions, needless to say, and i guess i expected that. The Nixon Kissinger relationship, i do use the term dutiful follower. In that sense, i do think the Foreign Policy in the first nixon years was nixons Foreign Policy. I think kissinger, to borrow the the William Saphire argument, i think he tuned himself into nixon and did often advocate more forceful measures, as he did on the shoot down of the north korean spy plane in 1969. I do think that is something about, particularly in the first years, in which kissinger did and often times to read nixon as a part of enhancing his own prestige and importance. The National Security advisor, unlike the secretary of state, is a constituency of one the president. I think kissinger was very aware of that. To a certain extent he did advocate policies that played into some of nixons own inclinations towards the use of force. Specifically on laos, i do think that was one where kissinger was persuaded that some type of use of force could strengthen the negotiating situation that was still and his memoirs was for that. How much responsibility . I think its there. I think that kissingers role on a number of these issues does give him a certain level of responsibility. In the end, its the president who makes those decisions. Kissinger learned not to doubt himself. Kissinger love to use the analogy of lots wife. Dont look back or turn into a pillar of salt. Kissinger learned to follow that and also came to enjoy it greater prestige and a better relationship with nixon because of that. Your other question, do i think kissinger had a moral compass. The older i get, the more reluctant i am to judge others moral compass in general. I am probably more reluctant to make that case. I think he did in some measure. I think it was one that he could could ignore at times, but one of the things that i think that did drive him was this notion of keeping the United States from nuclear destruction, and that one way that would be achieved would be a Foreign Policy. Preventing disasters that could lead to a situation where the United States might engage in such aggressive behavior. I think this meant that he was willing to make calculations about decisions such as chile and argentina that were wrong, and that ended up causing greater harm. I think it was in kissingers overal defense, one of the things that would lead to destruction. That was one of the things t