Afternoon or good evening, depending on wherever you are sitting right now and joining us for this session. May peace be upon you. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the second event of the embassy of afghanistans listen and peace series. We are glad to be hosting this event on lebanons agreement and partnership with the Atlantic Council. A wonderful partner of the embassy in washington, i want to offer a very warm thank you to the Atlantic Council for their help in organizing this very important discussion. And all the great work that they are continuously doing. Furthermore, i would like to express my gratitude to doctor patricia, and doctor daniel. For taking this time to share their knowledge and insight with us today. , and busted or i think you not just for joining us today but for all of the great work you have done in afghanistan over the years. Its an honor to have you with us today, thank you for moderating and guiding us through this conversation. For those of you who are not able to join us for our listen and peace event with the United States, we focused on columbias havanas process so far. I want to take a moment to reflect on some of the most Critical Incidents we have learned so far. As we continue our journey to learn more about the priest process all around the world. The first main lesson has been how critical consensus building is for securing lasting peace. We know that piece cannot just be crafted between those who hold guns. Peace nest dates all of Society Coming together and working in harmony. This means involving women not just as an issue on the table but as a party to the negotiations. This means involving youth in the future of our nations who must have a stake in the piece that we are forging. This means including people from all backgrounds from every social economic level from every ethnic group and from all corners of the country. Inclusivity it is critical to durable peace. This is not just in line with our democratic values, it is a National Security imperative. It is the only path to lasting security, the second main lesson is that Peace Process sees our core process east because they are just that, a process. Securing a feasible settlement is just the beginning. We need to ensure we create an environment where the culture of peace can be nurtured, and the agreement achieved can be implemented. Negotiations may have begun ten weeks ago, but we have been working to build peace on multiple fronts for over the past 20 years. From building up our democratic institutions, to promoting economic development, to increasing access to health and education. Although theres an urgent need for secession of violence, on a national ceasefire. We know that the rest of the process cannot be rushed. We know that there were hard work that it requires. And we are ready for it. We have been seeking peace for a long time. We have yearned for it, planned for it, and fought for it. With the type of commitment that comes from knowing what is it like to live without it. The each flower signaling a change. The start of the school year, exams, summer vacation, and so on. Its my hope that one day the scent of fear will not overpower everything else. And we will gain we will once again have the freedom to, as the american say, stop and smell the roses. Soon under the healing light of compassion and perseverance, peace will bloom. And i am sure that nothing could ever smell more sweet. It is my absolute pleasure to pass this off to todays wonderful panel. So that they so that we can begin to learn about the lessons within the type of agreement, and how we can apply them to make sure that peace is no longer just a dream for lessons like todays, will be bringing us one step closer to making that dream a reality. I thank you all. Thank you so much ambassador, for the warm introduction. Ambassador, it is a true honor to collaborate with you and to join jointly host this event with you as well as the embassy of afghanistan and washington d. C. During such a crucial moment for afghanistan and the Peace Process. I am the assistant director of the counselor southeast center, i would like to welcome our viewers in the United States and around the world to this conversation about lessons that can be learned from the 1989 agreement. Which ended 15 years of civil war in lebanon, and how they can be applied to the ongoing Peace Process between the Afghan Government and the taliban. Joining us today is an esteemed panel of experts, among his many shots is the former arab league such special envoy for lebanon, and former un special and envoy for afghanistan. Doctor patricia, the regional director of the middle east and north Africa Division at the International Republican institute. And doctor daniel, associate professor of Political Science and of International Public affairs at columbia university. We thank you all for lending us your time and expertise today. Just to give a quick run down for our viewers of how this conversation is structured, we will start by discussing some general lessons that we can take away from the agreement. Regarding the field of conflict resolution more generally, then we will discuss how these lessons both can and cannot be applied to the ongoing Peace Process in doha. Then we will move on to some questions from the audience. So for our audience, please summit your questions through the queue and a box, and we will try to get to as many as we can. To get a started the agreement instituted a number of religious grounded power sharing mandates. That said the documents states that these structures were intended to be an interim arrangements of sorts. Supported by the mandate that legislation would be passed down the road to amend and eventually remove the religious spaces for power sharing in the government entirely. As it is well documented, this never ended up happening, and the agreement makes no explicit mention of when or by what point these reforms should occur. Given that these open ended and original temporary arrangement soon became permanent features of the lebanese government, how might this case inform our thinking about power sharing agreements in general . As a long term method of conflict resolution. Hello, thank you very much indeed for inviting me to participate in this discussion. Like everybody who got involved in afghanistan, i have a lasting really lifelong interest and what happens in that country. And keeping my fingers crossed like everybody else, to see that these negotiations have started a few weeks ago. Which succeed where others have not. Im a little bit surprised looking at the ties agreement. I think there is very little to learn from it. Because it is very very specific to what in lebanon where. The thing which is important to understand, for any Peace Process, the best conditions for Peace Process to get somewhere is for the people who are doing the writing and the respective sponsors. To agree that they havent won, that they cannot win, and did that they are generally looking on compromise. And an agreement. That is what happened in lebanon in 1988, in 1989. Why 1988, why 1989 . Because it was very clear that the cold war was ending, and everybody was trying to get ready for the post cold war period. The parties in lebanon and also their sponsors. All from the factions inside lebanon, they were ready to deal. I was lucky enough, to be directly involved in the process at that time. Because a lot of much much better reform, dealt with this process before and didnt get anywhere. So the circumstances were ready for us to make. We made a deal, and also, the other thing thats different from afghanistan is that we actually return to that is what we did, there was a big hope, and also a commitment by the agreement, that while going back to it existed before the syria war. As you said, as a temporary measure, and then we will have we will end these systems that existed since 1943. Which is the independence of lebanon. We never got that, and ever since lebanese have been extremely critical of the fact. Now they havent been able to work out something different, and better. Perhaps this is enough for the beginning. Certainly, thank you. I know you had some thoughts on those questions, if you care to jump in. Taking into account, he talked about theres little to learn, but i do want to sort of Say Something about the principle of the approach, an approach that is based on power sharing. And my reaction is just that you know while it is ideal to have a political system thats inclusive insensitive, to the diversity of a country, like afghanistan. Efforts in my view may exacerbate and perpetuate division. So i just wanted to think about that, from a procedural perspective in particular, i think enshrining divisions and power sharing structures is somewhat counterproductive to state building efforts. Again, trying to learn from the experience of lebanon. Also, counterproductive to the states survival in some way. Once you set a structure in motion, i think it becomes the norm, the reference, the even if its intended to be temporary or interim. By default would perpetuate itself. So for me, rather than a temporary solution, there should be Building Elements that are part of the ultimate concept or the solution. Conceptually speaking, rather than procedure, i think interim range meant tend to satisfy the factional interests and mindset when they tend to satisfy them, tend to reinforce them. I think im not just lebanon, but iraq in particular. When you think of a setup that was supposed to be inclusive, but in reality, and ended up catering to the factional, and the moment you have an arrangement that breaks down the composition of a nation, a national identity, into identifiable groups. Like sunni arabs, kurds, i think you have effectively rather than empower them, disempowered those who arent included. I say this because in iraq in particular, a good third for example of a population in baghdad. Were mixed marriages, and represented sort of the creative progressive core of the middle class and the cosmopolitan cost. In some ways we shouldnt really confuse that upper city with problems. So i will leave it at that, i had much more to say but i will leave it at that. May i jump in with a comment. One of the things we have noticed a lot in the case of lebanon, one of the complaints is often that the attempt to formalize different obstructions, will essentially keep those in place. And it will make people think of themselves as one particular thing amongst all the other things they happen to be at the same time. This is more comment of the lebanese system. The idea that christians have to think of themselves as christians, sunnis have to think of themselves as sunnis, and so forth. In some sense it is almost obligatory since people had to think of themselves when theyre coming to the table. The challenge is that, it keeps people in that mold and makes it more difficult at any rate to think of themselves other than something us such such group. Sometimes the challenges we have to think of, formalizing these differences makes it more perpetuate themselves in the future. At least in part because the people writing the rules will themselves if you think about, sometimes we call them ethnic entrepreneurs, the politicians that we empower on the basis of the rules of the time or going to want to perpetuate the rules that keep them in power. To the degree that you wish to make this a more open system, a system that can adapt to changing realities and demographics, it is useful to perhaps think about building those sorts of rules at the same time that you are building the groups that are relevant at the time of the agreement. Thank you. I think that is a good segue into the next question which is more focused on the Civil Society post east and, subsequent to 1989, there remains a Civil Society watchdog that is working to obtain justice in lebanon for crimes committed during the war. Doctor, could you speak to the development of the civil sector, and how it has or has not fulfilled some of the gaps in Transitional Justice and accountability after 1989. And secondarily, what lessons can Civil Society generally take away from the lebanese case then supporting the Transitional Justice in post conflict setting . Patricia, by the way, i want to say that the first thing is i want to say, you know, more than 20 years after militias laid down their arms, the lebanese today live in a sort of officially sanctioned museum. Its discourage them from looking back. The only official initiative that was conducted to establish what happened after 1975 was a government report that was released in 1992 that estimated the number of victims of the war. Without a more comprehensive to seeking process, there was no meaningful reparations program, no updated history curriculum, preventing even schoolkids, which is the new generation, from engaging in Critical Thinking of the multiple narratives and that are in circulation. As well as that potential for radicalization which remains in an environment that is here. Secondly, there has been, as a result there has been very little public debate, about its origins, consequences, even the syrian occupation, many of the same leaders remain in power thanks to a sweeping amnesty law that was passed at the end of the war which prevents prosecuting ordinary militia members and politicians. My second point is that one of the most devastating consequences of this 1991 amnesty has really been perpetuation of culture of impunity that permeates all aspects of life in lebanon, the absence of accountability for gross violations and the selective approach to criminal justice, much of which is the result of political power sharing agreements. This has really robbed the victims of justice, the failure to hold perpetrators accountable has really eradicated civil trust. I say this because, i will explain in a bit. As a result the militias that fought and remained themselves of Political Parties continue to rule and ruin the country. As a for profit elite that operates a system that abuses every system. The most tragic thing about the civil war in itself is that it is not a tragedy in the consciousness of the lebanese, and then there is the current context which is after banking crisis, economic collapse, mismanaged pandemics, impunity of the political class, the context is deadlocked. It is dominated by one Political Force which is the main power broker, iran and his boa. That is leading the this creates a cement ceiling in terms of the potential action of Civil Society in regard. In both cases, because of the limits of the states and this has to do with the control that the war lords have and that hezbollah has that they exert over the states, the accountability drive is limited to what is permissible. Or at least within the bounds of acceptable. You have examples as well, one that comes to mind was the former vp and his return. Describe discreet efforts of brave groups who are defying this status quo as well as those are documenting that missing and disappeared, Civil Society is really has not been capable of holding those responsible for civil war abuses accountable. Because they are part of the post war arrangement. The only thing that Civil Society can do is investigate, document and wait. Research and advocacy work is being carried out by a number of Civil Society groups, including victims groups, researchers, academics on issues of justice. They have mapped violations that happened, mass killings, forced disappearances, to indicate a pattern of violence. And theyre doing analysis for humanitarian law. In terms of lessons, there needs to be recognition in some ways of limitations that are in place. Have the tools that are used to perpetuate them, much of Transitional Justice, this is going back to my original point, it depends on the existence of civic trust which is absent. I would like to make a final point to compare the two civil societies, they are often accused of being a Foreign Agent. Either of being a Foreign Agent or departing from social religious norms. In lebanon the former is more prevalent if in afghanistan the latter. In the case of afghanistan, what needs to happen is to underline and integrate more rights based activism. Even among solidarity groups, especially where some of this work like on women and children can be leverage. In some ways experience of to the zika is very instructive. Theres also the issue of coordination of monks and jews doing the same work but not doing the Work Together because of difference between religious or political belief. Where right spaced culture is happening, we should enhance it and that should be the foundation. Thank you for that. Given this context where there is this concrete ceiling of how much Civil Society can do and they being in a role where they should be holding people, institutions and groups accountable but then paradoxically they are also a part of the system which may involve some of these groups. I think that it would be interesting to hear a little bit about your research on the political participation and what lessons more generally we can take away from your research on the collaboration and peace by the sectarian conflict. A little bit of background for those who dont know my research, a lot of this work deals with Public Opinion, a lot of surveys and experiments in lebanon but also a syrians which is interesting side. One of the core takeaways i have in this research is that fundamentally theres a lot of lebanese underlying a lot of lebanese political behavior. A lot is over shouted by the discourse and the sectarian practice as well as holistic practices. People seem quite cont