The event was hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. It runs just over one hour. Welcome and good morning to everyone assembled here, at csi s, and those watching online and tuned into cspan one. I am j stephen morrison, Senior Vice President and director of Global Health policy center at the center for strategic and international studies, csis , in washington. We are delighted to host this onehour session today and the release of the inaugural department of defense biodefense posture review. We do this today under the auspices of the csis bipartisan alliance cochaired by former cdc director Julie Gerberding and former senator richmond burr. Special thanks to my colleagues at csis, michaela, sophia, special thanks to the csis Production Team putting all this together, alex bruner, theo mitchell, as duane gladden. And from dod, special thanks especially to Jennifer Nicholson who has helped us over many weeks in planning this out and many others. There has been a lot of support from dod in putting this together. The biodefense posture review is very important, as we will hear. It has the potential, as we will hear, to bring about fundamental changes in how dod approaches biodefense. A few minutes ago, we published, here at csis, my colleague emily harding, Deputy Director of the International Security programs and i, published a critical questions piece on the release of the bpr. Michaela and i also recently published an essay entitled the worst is over. Now what . Examining this postcovid moment we have entered. It began by unpacking many of the factors that feed a pessimism that there will be little sustained progress in building prepared responsive to the police against future pathogenic threats. But it makes the case beyond that, that there really is reason for optimism and hope based on several factors. Survey work shows a strong american support for an active u. S. Government engagement in this area at home and abroad. The appointment of new Senior Leadership team at the white house, at cdc, nih, and elsewhere. New capacities at the department of state at the white house, cdc, and elsewhere. And a de facto bipartisan consensus, despite the rancor and the noise in our country, to better protect americans through investing in new technology and better biosafety and bio security. Most importantly, in our deliberations today and in the paper michaela and i published, we make the case that the wheels of government continue to turn in generating new Security Strategies and new analyses like the bpr for improving the performance of the u. S. Government. These vitally important efforts lay down potentially new hardwiring for how the u. S. Departments and agencies perform , what the expectations as targets are, the budgetary needs, and the oversight to ensure accountability. Special congratulations to assistant secretary Deborah Rosenblum and her many colleagues who worked long and hard to generate this important work. A certain urgency surrounds strengthening biodefense at dod and elsewhere in government, but it did take 21 months to complete the bpr. These delays, i think, reflected the complexity of the threats and the science, the array of dod institutions involved, the desire to achieve consensus across these institutions, the inevitable turf conflict and bureaucratic politics. But we are now at this point where it is out, and the moment has arrived to accelerate implementation. The review is driven by the consensus, we will hear that the world of biodefense has changed profoundly, and dod needs to change accordingly. The bpr lays down a new paradigm around bio threats from multiple directions, including natural, manmade, and accidental, from china, russia, iran, as north korea, from accelerating changes in science its self that creates new opportunities and new acute dangers, and from the massive proliferation of laboratories where biosafety and biosecurity are often weak. We will hear more in this discussion around china, the question of what exactly is the threat that is posed. The bpr is careful in how it couches this. I think we will expect greater clarification in the future as to whether it is in compliance or not. Is it engaged in bio weapons programs . There are other questions that emerge out of this that we will also have to think about, such as china larger environment is one where there are lots of active Research Partnerships with american universities, american industry and others that are vitally important to the life sciences. What becomes of them . Also, what about our Bilateral Dialogue between the u. S. And china on these critical strategic threat from future pandemics . Is that dialogue to be destroyed . Is there space for that in the midst of this competition . The bpr we will hear today creates a new bio defense counsel to be headed by assistant secretary rosenblum. That institution is to bring about greater accountability, and unity of effort, begins its work in the next couple days. It is charged with preparing an action plan in the next 12 months. The speed and quality of its performance will really be a critical test of the longterm value of the bpr. Whether it becomes authoritative, not just in coordinating and sharing information, but in making decisions and shaping budgets. The bpr is linked to the proposal in the president s budget request for new money, around 12 million. We will hear more on that, that is a bit of a down payment in beginning to scale up the response. And it will require bipartisan consensus and action from congress. I believe that, in fact, that is all possible. Fortunately, dods bio Defense Activities continue to enjoy strong bipartisan support. They did not become overly politicized or toxic international debates. It is my pleasure to introduce assistant secretary rosenblum to open our discussion with prepared remarks. She is a longstanding friend and colleague, a generous support of wisdom and expertise across many fields related to this broad enterprise, and has made an exceptional professional commitment to strengthening americas defenses. She currently serves as assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. Earlier, from november of 2021 to april 2023, she also performed the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for industrialbased policy before joining the biden administration, deborah was executive Vice President of Nuclear Threat initiative. After a year from her in these remarks, admiral tom collison will moderate a roundtable with deborah, richard johnson, and astrid george. We will include time to hear from the audience, here. So lets get moving. Please join me in welcoming assistant secretary Deborah Rosenblum. Good morning and thank you very much for that wonderful introduction. I want to thank csis for hosting us today. I am really pleased and frankly relieved that i am here today, because that means we have successfully completed the first inaugural bio posture review, and have made it available for public release. I also want to thank csis for your collective Team Patients as we, as steve mentioned, almost 24 months later, we are here to discuss the results of the bio posture review, and how our work at the Department Also fits well into the work of the National Security council and the white house under previously dr. Beth cameron, dr. Raj punjabi, and now dr. Paul friedrich who is with us today in updating the National Biodefense strategy, as well as developing the Implementation Plan where dod plays a significant role. As we begin our discussion of the bioposture review, i want to share with you my vivid memory of the deputy secretary of defense asking me and my policy colleagues on day two following my confirmation to take on this daunting task. The good news was i was never alone in completing this task. I had wonderful partners throughout the department of defense, both within osd and the military departments, along with the joint staff, where dr. Friedrich was, wearing a different hat at the time. We also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the individuals who are here today who led the bioposture review on a daily basis. My wonderful deputy, dr. Brandy van, as well as d richard johnson, along with dr. Who is not here with us this morning. I also want to give a shout out to many of you here, in the room, as well as joining us virtually. Your intellectual work that you are doing, as well as the intellectual capital that you brought to the discussions that were hosted by Johns Hopkins center for Health Security as well as m. I. T. Lincoln lab were instrumental in the beginning phases of our bioposture review , in helping us to shape what were the key urgent issues we needed to get after, as well as providing us insight and perspectives on how to look at these things a different way. When you read the following words in the bpr report, you will hear us repeating them often, not only today, but in the days to come, the department of defense and the nation are at a Pivotal Moment in biodefense , as we face an unprecedented number of complex threats, as outlined in the National Defense strategy and the National Biodefense strategy. The secretary of defense charged the department with being prepared to operate in a biological threat environment and to support the National Biodefense enterprise , both at home and abroad. Dod must implement the significant reforms outlined in the bioposture review to enable a resilient total force that deters the use of bio weapons, responds rapidly to natural outbreaks, and maximizes biosafety and bio security for laboratories globally. We have no choice. If we are to effectively implement the National Security strategy and the National Defense strategy. The National Defense strategy speaks of the growing risks of chemical and biological threats in the context of the strategic competition with nearpeer competitors. But we are not only concerned about china and russia. We must remain focused on the potential impact of existing and emerging biotechnologies that could be incorporated into any biological Warfare Program for purposes inconsistent with obligations under the biological weapons convention, as well as actions of nonstate actors. The National Defense strategy also highlights significant transboundary challenges associated with pandemics and naturally occurring diseases. These threats certainly impact the readiness and resilience of our military forces. Biodefense is no longer only the purview of specialized units who have traditionally been worried about these threats. Integrated deterrence requires a combatcredible force. And to becomecredible, the entire joint force must be capable of fighting through biological threats and being resilient. As i noted, the bpr was built on the Foundation Laid out in the National Defense strategy, along with the National Biodefense strategy. But it was also greatly informed by a number of Lessons Learned from covid19 pandemic response. The bpr outlines reform initiatives along four key lines of effort, which i expect our panel to discuss today in greater detail. The first, enhancing Early Warning and our understanding of emerging biological threats, what we call understand. Second, improving the preparedness of the total force, otherwise known as repair and protect. Third, speeding the response to mitigate the impact on dod missions and the total force, otherwise labeled as mitigate. And finally, improving strategic coordination and collaboration to enhance biodefense. Today, i very much want to emphasize the coordination and collaboration line of effort. Even with the release of the bpr, much of our work is just beginning. While i am relinquishing my title as colead of the bpr, i am assuming a new one, as steve mentioned, as executive secretary of the Biodefense Council, chaired by my boss, the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, dr. Bill laplante. The Biodefense Council is charged with leading key bpr reforms and empowering the department to take this more collaborative approach to bio defense. We must continue to emphasize and maintain the energy of the bpr as the Council Takes on an authoritative strategic role, integrating numerous roles and responsibilities throughout the Department Without supplanting existing authorities, to serve as much more than an implementation committee. Even after the exhaustive 18 months, we know that there are significant topics that we still need to continue delving into, such as the medical readiness of the force. Although focused internally, i take as a key due out that the Biodefense Council must facilitate better communication and work with all of you as advocates for biodefense , whether that is between agencies, with allies and partners, in academia, industry, or among think tanks. As i have noted, we are at a Pivotal Point in biodefense. We must maintain our momentum to prepare for any number of complex potential biological threats. At dod, this means continuing our biodefense efforts to support the National Defense strategy with its three primary focuses on integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages. We must maintain this focus, we owe it to our total force, and to continue to advocate and defend the Critical Resources that the department is requesting. We also need to collaborate on improvements across the National Biodefense enterprise. This work is fundamental and critical to the National Defense and National Security. With that, again, i want to thank csis for giving us this wonderful opportunity not only today but in continued collaboration. With that, i look forward to our panel discussion. [ applause ] good morning and thank you for the opening comments. It is my pleasure to invite our panelists this good morning again, thank you for your opening comments. Im a Senior Fellowship associate here at csis. It is my pleasure to invite our panelists this morning, starting on the far end, dr. George, Bipartisan Commission on biodefense, which he founded in 2014 for current coaches, former senator Joe Lieberman and former governor tom ridge. And among the many distinguished commissioners are former congresswoman susan brooks and peggy hamburg, the former fda commissioner, who is also a commissioner on our Csis Commission, here. Usha used to be work for House Committee on homeland security, including broad background spirits as a Service Member in the u. S. Army, as an Intelligence Officer and paratrooper. She has engaged in public health. Brandy venice Principal Deputy fort defense for Nuclear Chemical and biological defense programs. She has held numerous senior federal government leadership positions, including chief of advanced and emergency threats at Threat Reduction agency, where she was awarded for innovations in detecting contaminated battlefields. Next is richard johnson, a Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy. He was previously at the Nuclear Threat initiative and also at the state department, where he was a deputy lead coordinator for rand nuclear if limitations are during the obama ministration, richard served as director of nonproliferation on National Security council. Welcome to all of you. Deborah, thank you for your opening comments. There is a lot to talk about. Lets take the history back a little bit. You mentioned that the u. S. Has been involved in conflict operations in every declared pandemic of the 20th and 21st century. So we have experience with operating in a biologically contaminated battlefields, one way or another. Lets go back to 9 11, the anthrax attacks around 9 11 really brought the specter of a bioweapon to the United States. That opened a lot of eyes. But i think that was sort of lost in the emphasis on the other things that happened there. Between anthrax attacks and the covid outbreak, asha georges commission was started, the Csis Commission was started here before covid. We were all looking at what would happen in the United States, should there be an outbreak of some bad disease, usually using an influenza as the model. Then covid happened. Relative