Multiply indicted the last few minutes. First of all, before we do anything else, im going to ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate in the hearing. After all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions, is there any objection . If not, so ordered. So subcommittee nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for five minutes. Welcome to our hearing and thank you, witnesses, for being here. We have mr. John hill, the Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for space and Missile Defense policy. Joining him Lieutenant General thomas james, the Deputy Commander of the u. S. Space command. Lieutenant general heath kohler, of the Missile Defense agency and sean gainey, commander of u. S. Army space and missiles command. And meeting to review the fiscal year, and i have concerns, the overall level of funding is inadequate given the threat environment. The fiscal year 25 budget asks 10. 4 billion dollars for the Missile Defense agency. Thats more than 400 million less than last year. And almost a billion dollars below the level projected for fiscal year 25 and last years. I want to reiterate this point, the fiscal year 25 budget request for the Missile Defense agency 960 million, almost a billion dollars below the level planned for in last years budget. Further, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal year 25. The outyear projections in the budget continued reductions in Missile Defense spending, compared to the spending plan in the budget submitted last year, this budget forecast cutting over 2. 6 billion in Missile Defense funding between fiscal year 25 and fiscal year 28. To achieve these cuts, this budget would make several concerning decisions, including terminating the production line for sm block 1b interceptor, and down to single contractors on both the next generation of interceptor and glide phase Interceptor Program. I know well get into the issues in greater detail, but in the case of the glide face interceptor, i think its important to note that this down selection is occurring five years earlier than planned and before the preliminary Design Review is even held. Im extremely concerned that we will simply not have enough sufficient technical data to make an informed choice between competing concepts for this program. The glide phase interceptor is the only capability in development specifically designed to combat the growing hypersonic threats we face. It is vitally important to our National Security that we get this program right. We should be investing in a Robust Program that delivers an effective capability to our war fighters on a schedule that meets the threat. That is why congressman dated in authorization bill that this budget would do the opposite. Overall im concerned that these decisions simply accept too much risk and that Missile Defense appears to have become a bill payer for other capabilities in this budget. This is difficult to understand given the growth in missile threats, the extremely high demand for Missile Defense capabilities from Combatant Commanders and the visible evidence of the value these capabilities bring to the fight on full display as we speak in the red sea. And in israel and ukraine. I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how this budget impacts their programs and their assessment of the risks contained in this budget. With that i turn to the Ranking Member for his opening remarks. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And ill just begin by echoing many of your concerns. This is obviously a time when Missile Defense is in use all around the globe, including by the United States, in great quantity. This is not a technology that seems to be fading away and i think my biggest concern is that i just dont understand the rational behind many of these cuts. Now, ive asked a lot of tough questions of leaders like yourself, mr. Hill in particular, about the purpose of hyper sonics. Its in that same vein, we dont understand what exactly the operational concept is to use hypersonics, that makes it hard to understand the money were spending on it. Likewise, as the chairman said if we dont understand why, dont understand the rationale behind the cuts, it becomes hard to support them especially in this environment. I want to welcome both Lieutenant General james and collins as its the first opportunity to testify in front of congress in your new roles. And in Space Command increasing in importance and consequence and Space Command was given responsibility for Department Level missile coordination, its critical that you and we understand the complex role that Missile Defense plays in our National Security. Youre the first army space operator to reach the rank of Lieutenant General so you must be doing something right. Fa40s have been exemplars in the department and this milestone is well overdue. So congratulations. Lieutenant general collins, youre unique background across the spectrum of strategic programs, space, Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defense makes you wellprepared to be the director of the Missile Defense agency. And our initial discussions that its imperative that we understand the larger policy implications of what mdaa is developing before we blindly build new systems that could inadvertently lead to proliferation, or in the worse ask case, destabilization, miscalculation to nuclear war. As i shift to the topic of the hearing. I want to remind the subcommittee, theres a mixed legacy and difficult questions what its purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually makes us safer and how much and what kind we need. Thats why the questions, including what the chairman started with are so important. As i laid out last year, there are five basic scenarios or levels at which we consider using or not using Missile Defense. Im use ago graphic depicting these levels which i will use to frame the rest of my remarks. The highest level of misdefense, longstanding policy across every administration that we are not and will not pursue Missile Defense for a nuclear attack, despite the attempt to change u. S. Policy during last years cycle to specifically do so, going down this road would be destabilizing, prohibitively expensive. Until we can rid the world of all nuclear wednesday which believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of humanity itself. We can neither unilaterally disarm nor unilaterally render useless our arsenal. If we were to try to render our missiles incapable through increased Missile Defenses they would do what theyre already gone, develop new, more complex missiles to defeat the systems. And it sounds like a crazy concept when you first read about it, but its fundamentally kept us safe. The fourth level of Missile Defense is the area where theres the most debate where we can argue our advancement in Missile Defense in the last two decades since pulling out the treaty has against aspiring Nuclear Powers like north korea and iran. We must continually evaluate when we view them as more of a strategic level threat and therefore, rely on a policy of Nuclear Deterrents instead of simply trying to outnumber icbms with interceptors which the program intends to do. Missile expansion, the question, how do russia and china respond . I argue theyll certainly see that growth directly affecting the credibility of their Nuclear Forces which may have dire consequences. I hope in todays discussion, mr. Hill, you can help us understand how to continue to weigh those questions in that balance. As they look at the budget request and the Missile Defense policy and posture of the United States, we must ensure the strategic ability of america and the world for decades to come. Now, level three is a nuance that i think is important to distinguish from a rogue nation, besides the system to deal with it is different, but continue to have some capability to defend against a small and accidental launch should be maintained. At level two, the tactical level, the incredible support ukraine has received from allies and partners from air and Missile Defense enabled them to fight against near nonstop russian attacks in the last few years. If they cant get past that languishing supplemental, this is the area where ukraine will suffer the most and have direct impacts on their ability to maintain their sovereign country and territory. In the red sea were seeing what many thought was not possible. National coordinated Missile Defense and obviously use ago lot of missiles, which is one of the questions we have about reducing the budget. While u. S. Navy ships have been at the center of defending missiles, and the missile threats, they have been working across the Multinational Task force. The french, u. K. , navies have intercepted targets in the red sea. We need to move towards nonconnect, which flips the cost curve the Missile Defense, something the chairman and i have have been pursuing aggressively, no one can with the impact. Simply defecting the threats, we have work to do. However, this past year has marked many successes in the main awareness. In february, mdaa hypersonics were launched and budget supports the ongoing testing through 2027. The Space Development agency also launched their wide field of use centers which will be a key components of the next generation of Missile Warning and architecture replacing the legacy big juicy satellites currently on order. As we evaluate the fy25 request for Missile Defense program i will continue to ask the following questions, how will expanding Missile Defense today impact strategic ability tomorrow. Were already in an arms race, will it make our world more safe. Does each investment stabilize or destabilize our strategic National Security . These are the questions we must have ourselves on this subcommittee not just with an eye to this years budget and ndaa, but in determining how our decisions will impact the world we leave for our children. Thanks, mr. Chairman. I yield back. Okay, thank you, well now move to Opening Statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record, but youll each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. Mr. Hill, lets begin with you. Thank you, chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members. Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. Thank as well for including my full statement in the record. In brief, my written statement surveys threat developments in a deteriorating security environment. It stresses the unmistakable centrality of missiles of all types, including uncrewed aerial systems or uas in modern warfare and underscores the disexpensability of missile defeat capabilities to deterring aggression and defending our homeland, our forces deployed around the world and our allies and partners. It highlights how those allies and partners can have come to similar conclusions and increasing that i remember own investments and working with us to meet these challenges together. The administrations Defense Budget request for fiscal year 2025 includes 28. 4 billion dollars for Missile Defense and missile defeat programs. I want to acknowledge at the out set of hearing, the strong support this subcommittee has consistently shown for Missile Defense and missile defeat efforts for many years. And i stand ready to work with you, to pass Defense Authorization legislation for fiscal year 2025 the 64th Consecutive Year and with all of congress to pass on time defense appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2025. Today i must also emphasize, perhaps more than anything else, the critical urgency of passing the National Security supplemental request which congress has now had for nearly six months. That request includes desperately needed funding. Funding to support ukraine in defending its democratic sovereignty and its very existence against russias illegal and ruthless invasion and relentless barrages of missiles and attacks. And funding israel in funding itself against the continued missile uas and rocket attacks by hamas and other groups aligned with iran. Funding to provide critical humanitarian assistance in ukraine, israel and gaza where innocent civilians are dying every day. Funding to support our indopacific partners in deterring aggression by the peoples republic of china. Funding to replenish our own military supplies of munitions and material that weve had to draw down to meet the urgent needs of allies and partners and funding to invest in the capacity of the American Industrial base with these munitions systems and including Missile Defense systems violent vital. Theres simply no time for delay. The time to act is now, i cannot overemphasize said as the general said the other day, i cannot overemphasize of congress coming together in common purpose and acting with urgency to pass the National Security supplemental request. And the operators of the system all key partners in this mission. As you mentioned, chairman, where requesting 10. 4 billion to develop and deploy homing Missile Defenses and improve regional Missile Defenses against increasingly diverse and dangerous missile threats. Our. Our prioritization of decisions will maximize missiledefense system capability capacity and writing this. We continue to work closely with our Combatant Commanders and services to prepare them to fight for the fight of today and tomorrow. To defend our homeland for Ballistic Missile attack the groundbased midcourse defense or gb system remains our nations soul protection from limited attacks with a primary focus being the advancing norsk better north greene frederick ongoing groundbased interceptor Service Life Extension program will continue to improve the gpi reliability about mitigate risk until the nextgen interceptor is fielded by the end of 2028. After 20 years we stand ready as shown in december of 2023 when we successfully executed and intercept flight test using the two, three state selectable groundbased interceptor into backstage mode, first victim is pretty increasing to mobile space. We planted a poisonous capability to the by the end of this year. The ngas Program Remains on track. Both contractors and successfully execute bulimic Design Reviews and mtas preparing it in your future to complete a best value determination and select a Single Company to continue ngas developer testing protection and fielding. Soon the plan to add the longrange discrimination radar to the Operational Capability baseline by december of this year. Lrd are delivered to the government last month will enhance tracking discrimination and hit assessment against longrange missile threats. The space force are in the process of formally declaring lrdr ready for detection later this month. For Regional Defense we can to design improvements to the aegis ballistic Missile Defense capability and procure the standard missile three block missiles. Fy 2025 we will also test and deliver greater upgrades and support the navy in future space domain awareness demonstrations. We will continue u. S. Terminal High Altitude area defense or thaad interceptor procurement fielding a training support along with reliability and cybersecurity improvements. In collaboration with the u. S. Army we fielded thaad 4. 0 capability to batters in korea and on guam and in the process of fielding 4. 0 to the alban thaad batteries by the end of 2025. Thaad 4. 0 integrates patriot capabilities with thaad to increase hatred defended his engagement opportunities. We will begin design work to improve the thaad system to take on ever advancing regional threats. The department continued velvet of a 360 layered Missile Defense capability for guam. We after construction of the joint command center six radar site and launch site will begin in