Transcripts For SFGTV Government Access Programming 20171228

Senior director of gas Asset Management and system operations to talk further about the details of the incident that happened november 27th. First of all, i would like to thank our First Responders including the San Francisco Fire Department, the San Francisco department of Emergency Management who worked with our crews to safely secure the area on the day of the incident. We understand that this emergency deeply you know, deeply affects the families if the neighborhood and we are fully here and committed to provide any assistance. Were here to take any questions. Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to speak. At pg e safety is our top priority. Were grateful for the collaboration and hard work of the San Francisco Fire Department, Police Department, San Francisco department of Emergency Management and San Francisco Human Services agency during and after the incident. On monday november 27th just after 10 00 a. M. Pg e crews reported to a gas odor on mission street. While on the way to the scene we received the report of the explosion. Between 10 20 and 10 35 crews arrived on scene and more dispatched to help and we worked with the San Francisco Fire Department to make the area safe. There was a high concentration of gas in the area. We assessed the situation and came up with the plan to stop the flow of gas. We came up the strategy of digging up concrete to physically squeeze the pipe in the area to shut off the gas. Since pg es gas system is connected grids, it often requires more than two squeeze points to stop the flow of gas at a location. Once the flow stopped, we started the process of excavation, performing pressure tests on the pipelines in the area, determining the location of the leak and then making repairs. Crews completed this work on tuesday. As our crews worked, our Customer Care representatives started to support our customers impacted. Customer care representatives canvassed the area to make sure the immediate feeds of the customers of apartments damaged and those temporarily without gas service were taken care of. Shutting in the gas impacted 470 customers and by tuesday night, gas was safely restored to all who were able to receive service. Pg e called in other services from the bay area. For the residents of the building damaged, our report has temporary housing, Financial Assistance through claims and more to address a more permanent solution. We have engaged a specialized Third Party Engineering firm to help determine the cause of the incident. These type of investigations typically require researching records, testing evidence and other steps. We have noticed the cpnc of the incident and support their investigation as well. As we do with all incidents of the nature, we worked closely with First Responders, including the San Francisco Fire Department to make the area safe and with the Emergency Management of response and recommendation. We coordinated with the San Francisco red cross. I wanted to talk about the work we do to ensure the safety and integrity of gas lines. Our program governs the approach we take for knowing our assets and the condition of our assets, what threats and risks the assets pose and then developing mitigation strategies to address the risk. Through that program, were constantly rooking at the pipeline to reduce risk. Enforcing quality standards and conducting leak surveys on a frequent basis. In fact it was surveyed in july of this year and none were found. For us its having trained and confident personnel, best in class tools and proper procedures in place. When something goes wrong, we figure out why and how to prevent something similar from happening again. Well continue to support our customers. Thank you for providing us to present and im happy to answer questions. So, you dont have a preliminary theory of the cause of the explosion . Not at this time. Its under investigation with exponent and we expect to have that investigation completed over the course of the next month or two. And so when you arrived on site there wasnt anything that was obvious to the crews that might have caused this rather dangerous incident . That we can know youre taking steps to make sure it doesnt happen anywhere else in San Francisco . So in determining the source of the leak, we were able to determine that the leak was coming from an offshoot of one of the six inch mains that runs down mission street. The main is a six inch steel Line Installed in 1992 and the source of the leak was actually from a plastic off take from that line. We do know where the leak occurred but in terms of cause, that aspect is what is under investigation from exponent. So the steel pipes have off shoots and thats where the leak occurred . Yes. And the explosion occurred when someone in the home then tried to light their stove or i dont have any information on that aspect of the investigation. I would think the Fire Department would be investigating that. But i dont know for certain. How common is it that you when an explosion occurs or when theres a danger, a leak is identified that you couldnt turnoff the gas using a value, that you actually have to dig up the asphalt in the street . We frequently have to dig up asphalt to squeeze our pipelines to make an area safe. Based on the configuration of the distribution network, we look at multiple different alternatives every time we have to shut in gas due to a leak. We evaluate options that are squeezing pipes, isolating values, larger zones of our system to determine which one could be executed most quickly and while preserving customer service, while also preserving the safety of our public and employees. So in this particular case, the initial isolation strategy that we developed couldnt be executed because of the fact that our employees couldnt safely access the area because of the gas in the area. Thats why we had to step back and develop alternative strategies and the one we selected was two value and two squeeze points . Do you have statistics about the average time it takes to turnoff the gas when theres an explosion. Is this an unusual case or par for the course . We do track that information, i dont have the numbers with me. We could certainly have that discussion with you about average time for shutting in the gas. This was not extremely extensive because of the access to the area and having to shift our isolation strategies, it did take a little longer than typical. But not significantly extended. Was there a Warning System that the leak was happening in the first place before the point of explosion . Or did that notify them there was a situation . We had an employee on the way to the site when the explosion happened. So how was the Fire Department aware . Did they get a call, that someone smelled gas, is that what it was . Yeah. Theres no alarm system in place. It would trigger someone to investigate. That didnt happen in this incident. There was no alarm in the control center, it was triggered by a phone call. Thats really worrying, that there was a gas leak large enough to cause an explosion and that damaged several houses but pg e wasnt aware of a major leak in the system until it was reported. That is not comforting to residents of San Francisco. I would appreciate if you could follow up with me, im surprised you didnt come prepared with that information. I think supervisor sheehy hit it on the head, the biggest concern to us other than the wellbeing of our constituents that were impacted is three hours is unacceptable time to shut off the gas when theres a leak that caused an explosion. You know, were lucky no one was injured here. But it certainly is not comforting to us. We dont know the cause but we know where the leak came from. We know it wasnt possible to cut the gas off quickly. Our decision to ask for residential review, a pipeline on a development on a steep hill was absolutely the right thing to do given that these circumstances exist with the company. I hope you will work with a project sponsor because i know the project sponsor has had a very difficult time getting pg e to work with him to get him the data he needs to come up with a true safety plan in the unfortunate event that any gas line is disrupted when the project is built. And im looking at both of you and asking you with that homeowner who wants to build a house. That you work closely. Im not going to green light this project especially after this incident until we have a safety plan in place. Leading from the big pipe to the building or was that connected to several buildings . That was a section of pipe leading off of the main pipeline. It wasnt actually connected. It was a separate piece of pipeline. What did that lead to . Nothing, cut off. A natural leak took place. Just a pipe to nowhere . As it exists now, yes. So, seems pretty clear to me that that wouldnt be the building owners responsibility, right . I i mean this is its our assets. Its your assets. Its pg e assets. What happens to the families who have been displaced. Are you taking responsibility and making sure theyre housed . Absolutely. Our Customer Care team has worked to place them in temporary housing providing Financial Assistance and currently working through making sure they have what they need, at this point in time and for Permanent Solutions Going Forward. Youll make a permanent solution for them. How many of these pipes to nowhere do you have in the city that might potentially blow up a house . So its part of the investigation thats underway. Theyll look for what actually caused the event and the next step after that is for us to look more broadly at where else might we have a similar situation in our system and to remedy that across our service territory. Whenever we do a causele investigation or incident investigation of something that happens on our system or in the industry, we take that and apply it apply the learnings to our entire system. The result of the investigation we received from exponent, well do an extended condition analysis, to allow us to evaluate our system for that particular issue and then go through and do whatever action is necessary to address that issue. So plastic pipes, i mean, carrying gas, was that Industry Standard . Yes. Really . Underground plastic pipes that dont link to anything i mean, im just trying to understand so i think the results of the investigation will help us really understand what led to the incident and what the corrective actions need to be. I think there still needs to be a lot of information gathered before well be able to really say what caused this event. And to know what needs to be done to remedy it Going Forward. So, obviously this i know, its happened and i kind of mentioned this, theres been pipe replacement, repairing the infrastructure that makes a lot of sense. This obviously hasnt been part of the process or has it . The pipeline was installed in 1992. In the new pipelines that youre laying, do we have plastic pipes to nowhere . The new pipelines that were laying are mains and services to customers homes. Are they plastic . Plastic and steel depending on the environmental conditions. Are they easier to shut off . Theyre shut off via values or squeeze points similar to theres no process improvements it sounds like its fairly standard you have to dig up the street to shut off after a gas leak. It is a Standard Practice that is part of our Emergency Response. We shut values or dig them up. This is not something you remedy when you put in new pipes in San Francisco. We install values, using values is not necessarily faster in every case for shutting in gas than digging up the street and squeezing the pipe. Im trying to understand, we were changing all the pipes in the city, block by block. I will say you guys are incredibly professional when you did it. I dont see cause for complaint. It seems theres a weakness in the system, at least from my point of view, if you have gas leaking for three hours, that you may want you know, you may want to address when youre laying new pipes to make it easier to shut off pipes, were if an earthquake zone, so i would have thought that might have been considered as you lay new pipes to make it easier to access to shut them off when theres a leak. Its certainly considered as the way we design the systems and install new systems. However, we do still view digging and squeezing as one of the tools in our tool kit as we look at how we isolate a system when an emergency happens. This will be the last i have one more after this. Perhaps you could follow up on us the types of measures for resilience are being built in in a city like San Francisco thats dense and prone to earthquakes, three hours of gas leaking is a challenge. And given that you still have more to replace obviously because this block has to be replaced. So Going Forward, if theres a way to strengthen the system so we dont end up in a scenario of three hours of gas leaking, that would be good. I want to check on the notification process, who is in charge, how long did it take. Were people notified quickly . What was the surrounding area, were you certain when you made the notifications that you had you notified enough area that people could get out, there was no i dont know the detail of the customer notification that took place. I cant thats fine. Thank you. Okay. We might have additional questions after hearing from other speakers and Public Comment. Thank you. So next i wanted to call up sorry, im looking for my list here. Well start with the captain. Jack hart, if you want to make any statements . Thank you for your time. Im the captain of engelside police service. My officers were involved assisting with evacuations. Listening to the comments, one of the concerns is not just the three hours it took to turn it off, but the three hours it took for the gas to dissipate. Pg e was great being embedded with the Fire Department to go and measure block by block and area by area to determine the concentration of the gas, to determine if additional evacuations needed to take place but this is a great reminder to me, i have been in the events before, large scale events requiring evacuations in a short amount of time and confusing situations. I wanted to say the department of Emergency Management did an excellent job of sheltering in place and evacuation stuff. But its a reminder to us as well to be more proactive, just the basic neighborhood. Several of my School Resource officers got phone calls from area schools. Not that they were within the immediate area of it but hearing the helicopter overhead brings concern wondering what the situation was. Its a repineder to me and my team to be more vigilant to push out notifications to as many people as possible in short element of time as possible and overlapping with the Fire Department and in the Police Department. I also want to make a shameless plug for the Neighborhood Empowerment Network and block champion programs. One of the heroic actions of the Fire Department, they assisted with the evacuation of an elderly gentleman that was blind and deaf. And the ability to track that person down was difficult. We werent sure how many people were hearing the messages to leave. You know, dm blasts out evacuation orders in different languages which is great, but what about the folks we dont know about, that are trapped in and reminds me of your first item on the agenda. I would be concerned about folks without the where with all. I i think it helps the Fire Department, that would have helped us on the 4000 block of mission and the areas in between. I know a learning thing for me is going to be to push the Program Block by block to help us do quicker evacuations in any of these situations. How many people were evacuated due to the incident . Do you know . I dont have the exact numbers. I know the ymca had opened their doors. Dem worked with the Fire Department to get a space for people so they would be able to convene, have a place to rest and a cup of coffee and figure out the next steps from representatives at pg e. Thank you so much. Any other questions . No. Thank you captain. And next well hear from the department of Emergency Management. Thank you. San Francisco Department of Emergency Management, im the Public Relations officer. The role of department of Emergency Management is to support the responding agencies, maintain Situational Awareness and give information to the public and stakeholders. The dem learns about it two ways, 911 call or pg e notifies us. Upon receiving the report Public Safety disp