I think many of us could not agree more. And if the underlying facts that the Intelligence Community brings us are incorrect, we should call that out. I just have not seen any evidence indicating that in this case. Oftentimes we come to different strategic or policy points of view based on that information. But thats an entirely different thing. Director clapper, i want to go to a little bit more of not just the classified information, but the relevance of publicly available information, of the whole picture of russias activities within the context of this election. Can you talk a little bit about the activities of the russian governments english language propaganda outlets, rt, sputnik, as well as the fake news activity we saw, as well as the social media, and how those paint a complete picture that is supplemental to what we saw with the hacking in this case . I appreciate your asking, raising that, because while there has been a lot of focus on the hacking, this was actually part of a Multifaceted Campaign that the russians mounted. And of course rt, which is heavily supported by funded by the russian government, was very, very active in promoting a particular line, point of view, disparaging our system, our alleged hypocrisy about human rights, et cetera, et cetera. Whatever crack they could fissure, they could find in our tapestry, if you will, they would exploit it. So all of these other modes, whether as rt, use of social media, fake news, they exercised all of those capabilities in addition to the hacking. And of course i think the totality of that, i think, regardless of what the impact was, which we cant gauge, just the totality of that effort, not only as dni but as a citizen, i think is a grave concern. Thank you, mr. Chair. Thank you, mr. Chair, gentlemen, thank you very much. I also want to thank you and the men and women that work diligently in the Intelligence Community for the work that they do for the United States of america. Admiral rogers, you have stated twice now, youve really stressed this point, that you must be faster and more agile in your responses. And so our discussion this morning will go back to a discussion that we had in september of this last year, in front of this body, because i believe it is important that you understand the capabilities that exist out there, and are readily available to the United StatesCyber Command. This past september i asked you about a Government AccountabilityOffice Report that stated the department of defense does not have visibility of all National Guard units Cyber Capabilities because the department has not maintained a database that identifies the National Guard units cyber related Emergency Response capabilities as required by law. And i was a bit alarmed when you stated that you havent seen the report. It was a report that took about a year to compile and was presented to both this committee and the House Armed Services committee. And four months later i still have not received an answer from you. My question is for the record. As of this morning all the gao recommendations are still open from this report. So its been four months. And i would just like an update on that, if you have been able to read the report, and where is the department at in regards to tracking National GuardCyber Capabilities. Yes, maam. So first, we didnt get your question until december. But i acknowledge that you have formally asked us this. First, as u. S. Cyber command, im the operational commander. Manning, training, and eequipping is a function of services and the department. For me in my role, i track the operational readiness. I bore into that the same way i do into the operational side. How is the department tracking skills available in the reserve opponent, i would argue its the same challenge as in the active component. How do you take advantage of the breath of capability thats broader than a military occupational specialty, for example . Im the first to acknowledge, after talking to my teammates at osd and the services, i dont think we have a good answer. Ill have something in writing for you within the next week or so because i do acknowledge that we need to do that. I do appreciate that. Because how long has the United States been experiencing attacks from entities outside the United States . You can argue weve been in this cyber dynamic for over a decade. A decade. So we have taken the steps of developing Cyber Command and the capabilities that exist both in our reserves, National Guard, and active component units. And to become more faster or faster and more agile, we need to know what those capabilities are. So if you have a solution to how we can track those capabilities, we need to figure that out. Many of these units have the capability of defending networks, yet were not utilizing those capabilities, and we dont know where they exist, to be honest. Please dont take from my comment that we dont believe the role of the guard and reserve isnt important. If you look at the last 12 months, weve got two Cyber Protection teams from the guard that have been mobilized. Weve brought online in the guard and reserve National Mission teams for the first time within the last year. Its great to see how the guard and reserve are developing more and more capability. Thats a real strength for us. Absolutely. And i think well continue to see those develop, even more in the future. But we need to be able to utilize those capabilities that exist out there. So you know that many of our best soldiers in the National Guard and reserves come from the private sector. I know this from some of my own guardsmen that worked fulltime in Computer Technology and cyber technology. And you stated in september, you were trying to figure out how better to leverage the National Guard. Do you have a response for that . Have you thought of ways that we might be able to use those guard units more readily . This is a topic that in fact i just was talking to the director of guard bureau a few weeks ago to say, hey, look, this is something in 2017, i want us to sit down. Theres a couple of specific missions were the capabilities of the guard and reserve are really well optimized. I would be the first to admit the answer cant be every time well just throw the active component at this. I dont think thats an optimal approach for us to do in business. So youll see this play out for us in 2017. Weve got to work through the title 32 versus title 10 issue, whats the right role, do we put this into the Civil Authority construct . I like that because its a framework that we already have, im a big fan of lets not reinvent the wheel, how do we take advantage of the structures and authorities already in place. Thats one thing youll see some specific changes on within the department, were working through that right now on the policy side. Very good. I appreciate it. I know my time is expiring. I look forward to working with you on that, admiral rogers. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And i want to thank all of you for all your efforts today, for the amazing careers youve had. And mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I think its critically important to our nation. And i want to be clear that the purpose of todays hearing is not to debate the validity of the election, but to discuss foreign attempts to use Cyber Attacks to attack our country, including the recent russian actions intended to influence our elections. I appreciate the bipartisan effort to get our people the answers they deserve. Im grateful for the amazing efforts that our intelligence agencies put forth every single day, that every day lives are on the line to make sure that were safe and to make sure that all americans have a chance to take care of their families and go to sleep at night and not have to worry while your people are on the front lines all around the world. And i can total you on behalf of all hoosiers that when it comes down to a choice between your people or intelligence agencies and julian assange, were on your team every time. I actually find it stunning that there is even a discussion in our country about the credibility of our intelligence agencies versus mr. Assange. It is astounding to me that we would even make that comparison, when you see the stars in the cia headquarters of all the people who have lost their lives and all who have lost their lives in our agencies to keep us safe. Director clapper, how would you describe your confidence in attributing these attacks to the russian government as opposed to someone in their basement . Its very high. The government has named those responsible for the dnc hacks as apt 28 and apt 29, part of the russian intelligence infrastructure, the gru, and the fsb. Are all the actors targeted by these two entities known to the public, sir . Im sorry, sir. The question again . Are all the actors targeted by these two entities, gru, the fsb, apt 28, 29, do we know everybody . Have you told us who is involved or are there more that you cant discuss at this time . Right, i dont think i can discuss that in this forum. Okay. How far up the chain, in what you can tell us, does this go in regards to the russians . At what level were the instructions to take these actions given . Again, sir, i cant speak to that in this setting. Thank you. Do you think we are communicating clearly to our adversaries in a language that theyll understand that the costs will outweigh any gains they get if they try this again . Not only you, director, but the others, how do we best send that message, do you think . Well, certainly the sanctions that have been imposed, the expulsion of the intelligence, 35 intelligence operatives, the closure of the two facilities used for intelligence purposes, and the other sanctions that were levied does convey a message. Its open to debate whether more should be done. Im a big fan of sanctions against the russians. But thats just me. Admiral, what would you say, sir . I would agree. I mean, the challenge here is, look, we dont want i dont think its in the best interests of any of our nations to be in this confrontational approach to doing business, and weve got to figure out how do we articulate what is acceptable or not acceptable in a way that enables us to continue to move forward in a productive relationship. Thats not unique to the russians. I would argue thats a challenge for us on a whole host of actors out there. This is just a poster child for this challenge of late. I would add to that, if i may, that it certainly would be a good thing if we could find areas where our interests converge, im speaking of ours and the russians. And weve done that in the past. So just to footstomp admiral rogers point. But i think there is a threshold of behavior thats just unacceptable. And somehow that has to be conveyed. I am out of time. On behalf of all the American People, we want to thank you. You have dedicated your lives to keeping us safe. And were incredibly grateful for it. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And thank you for you and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing. I also want to thank you, general clapper, mr. Secretary, for your services. This might be your last hearing. And the men and women you lead. You know, you described in your testimony the increasing attacks were seeing, not just from russia but china and other actors, iran, north korea, their increasing capabilities. The chairmans Opening Statement pretty much stated that its his view, and i certainly share the view, that were being hit repeatedly because the benefits outweigh the costs for those who are taking these actions against us. Do you agree with that . I do. I think we all do, that this is for adversaries like ill just name north korea and iran, theres a relatively low cost acts that can cause havoc. And what i think weve seen over time is that they keep pushing the envelope, as their capabilities improve and theyre willing to exercise those capabilities. So if thats the case, and im glad theres some consensus here, youre talking about retaliating, upping the cost with all instruments of power, mr. Secretary, you mentioned retaliating in the time of our choosing, in the realm of our choosing. But it doesnt seem to be happening. We see attacks continue. So let me just gave ive an exam. Lets say iran, you mentioned them being more aggressive and risky in north korea, some kind of cyber attack. If we did something, maybe without announcing it, like the president announced the russian counteractions, but lets say we didnt announce it, lets say we did but where we essentially collapse their Financial System or something pretty dramatic, do we let them know we did it . We dont have to publicize it. Do you think thats the kind of action that would say, hey, dont do this or were going to come back and retaliate at our time, our choosing, and crush you . How come we havent done that yet . Do you think if we did Something Like that with the iranians or north koreans, would that deter them in the future . Mr. Secretary . Senator, i think youre getting right at the question of what is the what do we mean by a proportional response in some instances. Or asymmetric. Youre talking about asymmetric responses, which i fully agree with. Thats right, or in instances that are significantly serious and grave, whether a more than proportional response is required to really set that deterrence framework in place. But isnt the key question right now, that came from the chairmans Opening Statement, that you agreed with, nobody seems to be intimidated by us right now. Let me give another example. Senator inhofe asked a question early on about china. China hacked, allegedly, maybe you can confirm that, 22 million files. A lot of the sf86 files that you use for background clearances. They have mine, i was informed by the government. Very sensitive information, as you know, that they can use against intelligence operatives and military members. And senator inhofe asked the question, did we retaliate, what did we do. The answer that i heard from all of you was, well, we tried to protect people like me and im sure others whose sensitive intel information and Background Information was compromised. But i didnt hear any claim of a retaliation on a huge hack, huge, 22 million american, federal, military, intel workers got hacked by the chinese. So the president signed this statement with president xi jinping, the u. S. china security agreement. But obviously, general clapper, from your testimony, the chinese have not abided by that, have they . They have. I thought you indicated i indicated in my testimony im sorry. Im sorry, i thought you said in your testimony today that they continue to conduct Cyber Attacks. They continue to conduct cyber espionage. They have curtailed, as best we can tell, there has been a reduction, i think the private sector would agree with this, there has been some reduction in their cyber activity. And the agreement simply called for stopping such attacks for commercial gain. Did we retaliate and up the cost against china after an enormous cyber attack against our nation . We did not retaliate against an act of espionage any more than other countries necessarily retaliate against us when we conduct espionage. Isnt that answer just part of the problem, that were showing that were not going to make it costly for them to come in and steal the files of 22 million americans including many intel officers . Well, as i say, people live in glass houses need to think about throwing rocks. This was an act of espionage. You know, we and other nations conduct similar acts of espionage. If were going to punish each other for acts of he espionage, thats a different policy issue. Senator king. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Your Opening Statements are always erudite and thoughtful. But i thought todays was particularly so, you touched on all the important points that have really formed the basis for this hearing. So i want to thank you for that. Director clapper, i thinks important to put some context around some of these discussions. One of the most important things to me is that your Public Statement in october, long with jeh johnson, was prior to the election, and you were simply telling facts that you had observed. And in my experience of reading Intelligence Community communications, its one of the more unequivocal that ive seen. Youve stated here you have high confidence in those conclusions that the russians were behind it, that it was intended to interfere with our elections, and that approval wont ent to highest levels of the russian government. Have you learned anything subsequent thly that you can te us here today to contradict those findings that you publicly stated last october . No. In fact if anything what weve learned reinforces that statement of the th 7th of octo. And there was no political intention, you were simply reporting facts as you saw them . Your history is one of being nonpolitical. Absolutely. I felt particularly strongly, as did secretary johnson, that we owed it to the american electorate to let them know what we knew. Now, people in maine are skeptical, and they want to have evidence and proof. Im hearing from people, prove it. The problem, as i understand it, is the desire to provide evidence that is convincing that your conclusions are correct versus the danger of compromising National Security on sources and methods. Can you sort of articulate that . Because i think thats an important point. We have invested billions and we put peoples lives at risk to glean such information. And so if we were fulsomely expose it in such a way that would be completely persuasive to everyone, then we can just kiss