Afghanistan, you hit the kabul crud in winter. I will try to speak through that today. It is an honor to be here at csis. In many ways it is a bit of a homecoming. I see old friends of mine. I worked for over 15 years for the chairman of the csis board of trustees. He has been a tireless leader since 2000. In many ways, those 15 years that i spent help prepare me for my current job. I saw firsthand what congressional oversight can do to improve policies of the United States government. This was later reinforced when i had a great opportunity to work with who i think many people have viewed as the father of oversight. From both of them, also learned the Important Role of an independent and aggressive Inspector General. The statue in 1978 was to treat Inspector General who told the truth to power. Both of those men fully understood the role and importance of the Inspector General and improving the operations of the United States government. Those men have brought me to where i am today. It has been only seven months since i have been appointed by president obama as a special inspector for afghan reconstruction. Since then i have traveled twice to afghanistan and. Ive spoken to all the Major Players as well as many of our nations top policy makers and prestigious think tank expert is including many right here. I have learned a lot about our governments efforts there. What we have accomplished a lot we have not as well as the many challenges that still face us in that country. I have spent a great deal of time thinking about what my role is in in afghanistan. Let me take a few minutes to tell you a little bit about siga. Is a special Inspector General for afghan reconstruction. It is the only agency in the entire United States government Whose Mission is reconstruction in afghanistan. Nothing else. We are unique. We had the unique authority to examine any project by any Government Agency operating in afghanistan dealing with reconstruction. We can look at the department of defense, department of state, department of justice, at any agency in afghanistan. We have the largest oversight presence on the ground in afghanistan. We have the most aggressive program. We also have the most successful record of working with afghan Law Enforcement in prosecuting interesting individuals in afghan courts. We are a temporary agency. We go out of existence. We sunset. When reconstruction drops below 250 million dollars. We are in the billions right now. We have some very unique contacting authorities. It allows us to get the best people as quickly as we can for what i think is the most dangerous oversight job in the United States government. This also give us the responsibility and the authority in statute to leave and recommend policies to improve the afghan reconstruction effort. Accordingly, i believe it is our job to evaluate the Bigger Picture and offer direction as necessary and appropriate. Just last wednesday, bob alluded to the fact i just returned from afghanistan. Everyone there in the embassy and military is intensely focused on the difficult task of trans during security responsibilities to the afghans by and into 2014. It is fair to say the success or failure of our entire investment in afghanistan is teetering on whether these two goals can be met. I have little doubt, especially speaking to all the latest members, that the men and women responsible for taking on this challenge are acutely aware of that situation. Likewise, the newly installed hundred 13 congress have the responsibility to ensure the next stage of our 100 billion decadelong reconstruction effort is properly directed to those projects that will have the greatest support. In light of my role, and our unique mandate, i want to pose to you a set of seven fundamental questions that i believe need to be asked of every plant reconstruction project by both congress and the executive branch in order to ensure their success. Does that project or program make a clear and identifiable contribution to the National Interest or strategic objectives t . Do the afghans one of those projects . Do they need those . The third question is have those been coordinated with our allies, with the afghans, and internally with our own government. Do security conditions commit effective implementation and oversight of those projects . Do those programs and projects and have adequate safeguards to detect, it deter, and mitigate against corruption, which is endemic in afghanistan. To the afghans have the Financial Resources and Technical Capability of political will to take those programs and sustain them in the next decade ahead. Lastly, i have the implementing agencies establish meaningful unmeasurable metrics for determining success. And apply them to their own programs. To many of you, these questions seem simple. They are. What we have found in our work and what the other Inspector Generals have found is that they are often ignored by those designing and implementing our reconstruction programs. I would like to take some time to explain why i think these questions are important, discuss what our work is doing in share our plans for using these questions in the year to come. Was it the first question. Do the programs make a clear and identifiable contribution to our National Interest tha . Primary goal as to prevent afghanistan from becoming a safe haven from all al qaeda are other terrorist groups. Our central tenants to achieve this goal has been the counterinsurgency ore coin strategy. Am our work we did our work has found instances in which we construction programs have failed to achieve this intended benefits in some cases have actually resulted in a first adverse in adverse effects. We have worked on the ldcf program. They touted it as the flagship coin programming. The primary goal was to create a stable environment of longterm political and social development. However, the program had not met its primary goals of extending the legitimacy of the Afghan Government nor had brought the government closer to the people. Nor had a foster instability. My auditors found that each of the eight provinces with the most lgcd activity experienced dramatic increases in violence between 2006 and 2010. Not be isolated, it did not achieve its intended goals. Likewise, in july of last year, we issued a report on the afghan and restructure aip, which congress created. We found that five of the seven fiscal year 2011 projects were behind schedule and some of them may not achieve in the positive point affects for several years, if at all. We also are identified some instances were the projects resulted in the adverse affects, because they either created an expectation gap or lacked citizen support. Assessments to support the coin strategy in the coming years, including an audit their we will initiate on the stabilization projects. The questions that should be asked our under the afghans want it . And do they need it . Youll be surprised how often we find the answer to this question is no. Let me give you an example. A few days ago, as many of you probably saw on the press, we released an inspection report on the 7. 3 million Border Police facility. When our inspectors went to visit the site, they found it and used. Although the facility was built for 175 troopers, there were only 12 afghan personnel on site, and no one was sure among them whether the site was going to be used. Moreover, our inspectors could not even access most of the buildings, because they were locked and the Border Police personnel present did not have keys. Now there is a bit of good news. The commander general boulder, which is responsible for these projects, agreed with our recommendations to reassess the plans and determine whether Construction Contracts can be downsized, facilities eliminated, were redesigned. This is a great example of power our work can lead to tangible improvements. I am especially pleased with the continued cooperation of general bolger and his team attempting to improve efforts on reconstruction. Let me turn to another problem, which is that in our third question. That is, as the program or project been coordinated with other implemented u. S. Agencies other International Donors . The Border Police example is an example of poor coordination with the Afghan Government. Poor coordination with the u. S. Government. Strengthen the financial sectorwe found that even though the department of Homeland Security aware of the others efforts. Over visibility of cash flows. As reported, ltd. Interagency at risk of working a cross purposes and definitely not benefiting and leveraging existing relationships. The next question i posed is particularly important for as much as the agencys conditions permit and effective scheduled to end by december,u. S. And Coalition Forces have already pulled out of a number of locations in afghanistan, leading some of those places too dangerous for us or the implementing agencies to visit. Some of you may have heard of a afghanistan, which in essence the says that the military will only provide security in areas within an hour of a facility that can provide emergency care. The safe and bubble around of those medical facilities extend as far as a 20minute helicopter that falls outside these bubbles will increase. Accordingly, the number of u. S. Funded projects and programs that can be monitored and overseen by u. S. Personnel will decrease. And if we cannot get our to review a project or inspected facility and, it is highly unlikely that the agencys finding them can do either, whether an agency of the department of state, department of defense, department of justice, department of agriculture, any other of the myriad of agencies operating in afghanistan. As on our own operation and that of our colleagues and others in the lawenforcement community. Monitor the activities funded by the multibilliondollar concerns. Security restrictions are not limited to just the world bank. Just recently, one of my was beyond the golden hour, beyond the security bubble, and therefore deemed too unsafe toas a result, we are unable right worth approximately 72 million. I want to take this opportunity to personally thank the operations under the command of colonel j. R. Bass and the for the Alabama National guard, who have done wonderful work in supporting us not only in afghanistan in the north, but elsewhere in the country. The security bubble. Even in kabul, we find we cannot always get the protection we need to conduct our work. Although kabul is clearly within the bubble, the Regional Security officer has informed us that because of limited resources, it is becoming increasingly difficult to support all the requests for movement by u. S. Personnel in the kabul area. Two of my agents went into the field to inspect a potentially dangerous stretch of road as part of a criminal investigation into a contractors failure to build systems designed to prevent insurgents from placing explosives in culverts along the road. My agents were surrounded by heavilyarmed u. S. Military units, who protected them as the agents literally ran down the road from culvert to kohlberg inspecting and autographing to see if there was a coal verge protection device there and whether it was adequate. I am happy to announce that while i was in afghanistan, those agents were able to arrest with afghan participation, and the Afghan Government is charging the contractor involved in this with crimes related to the fraud committed upon the government and negligent homicide of two u. S. Personnel. We are developing alternative ways to conduct oversight in afghanistan, involving the security environment. For example, we of local nationals on our staff and not subject to the same security restrictions that American Employees are. In some cases, we may have to rely on them. Were also exploring the use of geospace imaging. These efforts are helpful, but not preferred. The gold and standard on u. S. Oversight is an employee trained to do u. S. Oversight going out there inspected the site, inspect and the records, kickingunfortunately, we may not be able to do that for very much longer in afghanistan. Ambassador cunningham and general allen for their continued expressions of support for our work. Both promise to me during my latest visit that they would ensure that our people would be able to access the same locations that their people can access. But ultimately, you can see that the question is, how far will their people be able to access . What will they be able to see . How far will they be able to go outside the kabul bubble . Many of our programs will be exposed to increased risk, and misused, especially as we continue to use direct or on budget assistance to the afghan red, and especially if we do so without opposing preconditions effective personnel. The next question i posed deals with an equally significant problem, namely, corruption. Are the reconstruction projects developed and planned to include deter, and mitigates corruption . Foranistans reputation corruption is deeprooted and widespread. I do not have to devote too much time to that. A recent survey found that 60 of the afghans believe that corruption is a major problem, and even more believe that it is a major problem on the national level. An example of some of the work we had dealing with corruption was one that our office of special projects recently reported on dealing with currency counters in the Kabul International airport to count and track both cash flows are about get a stand. Estimates of cash taken out of afghanistan in any given year are as high as 4. 5 billion. However, those purchased and installed in 2011, we found that the Afghan Government has refused to use them. Even worse, those identified by the afghan jimenez voips, or in travel freely through the airport, raising the risk of Money Laundering and other corruption. To curb corruption. The july, 2012 donors conference in tokyo led to a set of mutually agreed to principles that included incentives for the Afghan Government to combat corruption. And not enough is being done quickly enough on these principles, particularly developing specific benchmarks. It has been almost eight months since this landmark agreement, and we still have not seen any concrete benchmarks. If not now, when will we see them. I can tell you that as a result afghanistan, i will shortly be putting the agencies on notice american taxpayer need to see concrete steps in place. To ensure adequate progress to combat corruption and improve governments. If this is not done immediately, i fear we risk the loss of u. S. And International Donor supportcorruption can also undermine the sustainability of reconstruction programs. A key concern for the u. S. And other International Donors. Series of questions. Do the afghans have Financial Resources, a technical capacity and the political will to sustain the programs we are turning over to them . We have identified numerous examples of which the u. S. Created a program or build the facility without consideration as to whether the Afghan Government could sustain it. In october, 2012, for example, we reported that the Afghan Government will unlikely be able to sustain the Afghan Security facilities after the transition in 2014. We found that the Afghan NationalSecurity Forces lack personnel with Technical Skills required to operate and maintain critical facilities and the Afghan Government have phil less than 40 of authorized operation and maintenance positions. Likewise in 2010, we audited reconstruction efforts in afghanistan and we found that the Afghan Government was severely limited in its ability to operate the u. S. Completed Development Projects in the province. As a result, many projects have become dilapidated or were in disrepair, including a number of projects completed under the commanders Emergency Response program, or cerp. In regard to the program, we were particularly troubled by some statements that senior officials had told us, that they did little more than check a box in the cerp project files to indicate that the Afghan Government agreed to fund and sustain those programs. The result is a waste of u. S. Taxpayer money. By Building Infrastructure or developing programs that the afghans will never effectively used. My seventh and last question is this have the implementing agencies established real metrics for measuring success . And are they using them . Too often, we find that agencies are focused on output, not outcomes. For example, they are interested in how many teachers day of trade, how many schools built, how many kilometers of road they have built, how many culverts they have built, but not on what the result is. Is there any result from doing that . These metra give us a part of the picture, but they do not truly give us meaningful assessment of whether programs have achieved their roles. For example, in 2011, we assessed efforts