Modernization. I want to begin by thanking sponsors of that study. Without sponsors we dont get to because do studies. This study was sponsored by a combination of support from general dynamics. Drs technologies and l3 as well. I want to thank them of their support. I will briefly walk through the chief of findings and recommendations of the report. Its about 80 pages. Its a pretty quick read. Theres a lot of pictures. I urge you to go read whole thing. I will hit the highlights. And then we will bring up our distinguished panel to give us the real scoop on Army Modernization, how we should think about and what we should do with it. I want to start by saying with this study weve always every time we talked about it, we had to start by saying this is not a critique of arm acquisition. This is a look at if you start with a premise that the army needs to modernize, how does it develop a strategy for doing that which it can clearly and forcefully communicate within the army, within the department of defense and with the congress in order to get the resources to actually carry that out. Thats what the focus of this study. Its less procedural and more of strategic overview. In terms ever our findings, we wanted to set the scene to say what is the state of Army Modernization today. And we came back with a finding that the armys experiencing modernization triple weigh me. Ill get more into that in a couple of minutes. The Army Modernization is below its historic level both on average and during periods of when the army is seeking to modernize. Because the army like most of the services, go through phase of modernization that represent peak and valleys. As is the case with the overall defensive budget. Theres little of relief on the way. Both in terms of the budget control act discussed heavily by senator cotton and the limits it puts on defense spending and Army Spending by implication. And in terms of the issues that the army is confronting. Such as readiness that the senator referred to. Even if the army had a robust budget for Army Modernization, the army has limited option. Because the Technology Effort has been more focused on the early stages and given the level of funding that was available, that is probably appropriate. There hasnt been a lot of Platform Development or System Development in the army budget in recent years which we could seek to modernize the army. The army was through the drawdown. Drawdown, no the army sought to minimize harm. They did a pretty good job on that. Our study is not a cry technique decision on the tough decisions made on sequestration. Its clear they dont leave the we do believeits clear they dont leave the army in a position with a ready obvious path forward. And so, work needs to be done to develop that. We have taken a crack at that. Lastly, we think theres not a consensus on priorities for Army Modernization. And well talk about why we think thats the case. Let me just talk about this idea of the triple whammy. Which we coined a little bit i think last year and has been picked up in some circles. What do we mean by that . This is not the first time this drawdown that happened because of the budget control act and sequestration and end of the wars in iraq and afghanistan. Its not first time the army drawn down. It happened in the past. We say how does the current draw down compared to previous rawdowns. Theres definitely similarities. But there are some notable differences. First difference, the first leg of the triple whammy is that this draw down is larger than previous draw downs. If you look over on the righthand column under total modernization, the draw down was 74 . This is in contract obligation dollar terms. That exceeds relatively robustly previous draw downs. The second leg of the triple whammy is where most of that drawdown came from. If you look at the procurement column on the chart, youre not seeing what im seeing, excuse me. There it is. Okay. A right hand column has total Army Modernization. 74 during this drawdown in excess of previous drawdowns by 10 to 15 . But the source of most of that excess of drawdown is really in the r d accounts. But the decline on the r d account was 52 . If you look at the first few you average them of , 23 . R d historically has been preserved during draw downs. But in this drawdowns the reduction in r d is almost twice the average of the previous two thats more than twice the average of the previous two draw downs. The last element of the triple whammy on the bottom part is the state that the army entered this draw down in. Previous draw downs, the draw down after the end of the cold war, the army had completed or within a process of completing a very substantial cycle of modernization. The big five of the 1980s to which our report title refers were basically all procured. Or were in the process of completing procurement when the last drawdown happened. However, when this drawdown went into effect, the army was coming off some regrettable program collapses, future combat system, comanche, crusader. Theres a list. I wont go into detail. You did not see the substantial build up of new systems in the army that preceded the cold war drawdown. We call that the triple whammy. You started behind. You had a drawdown larger in the past in particular, your r d accounts were drawn down much more substantially than previously. We then wanted to get a sense where Army Modernization today in context of modernization. We went back and looked at Army Modernization going back to the under world war ii. Sort of in the modern era. And we developed if you see the two dotted lines, the lower line is the historic average level of Army Modernization across that entire post world war ii period. The higher line is the average level of Army Modernization when the army was modernizing. In those up cycles when the army , was seeking to regenerate its technology you had that higher , level up and around 35 billion and the historical average about 30 billion. Thats in constant fy 2017. Today, were 5 billion below the Army Modernization, about 10 billion below the level during periods when the army was actually engaging in aggressive modernization. S that if theest army is seeking to modernize its technology today, it is going to probably require additional funding to actually make that happen. Lets talk about the issue of the priorities and in order to get funding for Army Modernization, you got to be able to go to the congress and also to the leadership of dod and say this is why we need this , funding. That means setting some priorities about what it is that needs it to be modernized. What were showing here is a list, some of the examples of modernization priorities that have been expressed in recent documents or in testimony by the army to congress. The gist of this is that every list is there are some similarities but theyre all , different. They have different points of emphasis. They take different starting points as to what theyre talking about. Aviation, as a priority is an important area for prioritization. But it doesnt convey a lot about how youre going to pursue modernization in the aviation world. We think theres a lack of clear message on priorities. Now, let me talk a little bit about the geostrategic position that was a big , focus of the senators remark. And the title of our event today on the implications of the russia challenge for the inf treaty and Army Modernization. Interestingly enough, when we started this report, it was prior to the election controversies and the attack on the election system. But pretty quickly when you look at questions of Army Modernization, the chief has testified that russia is the pacing threat. Not necessarily because we expect to go to war with russia and europe or elsewhere, but russian systems are the core systems for most of the adversaries we could contemplate attentively getting into Armed Conflict with. And so, the rapid advance, theyve invested back when they were investing heavily when oil was high, have gone into systems that are not just russian systems, but they are proliferated to others as well. Iran certainly in that group. Theyve particularly gone after an a2ad concept. The Cruise Missile technology that the senator was focused on is a big piece of that. But its about keeping the u. S. , its allies, and systems away from the defended areas that the russian systems are defending. In the case of russia, thats russian territory. And its a sophisticated layered redundant approach, long range , artillery, Cruise Missiles, radars, tanks. It is a real suite of capabilities theyve been developing and employing and sharing with others. That the u. S. Army is likely to face if it gets drawn into conflict. Particular focus on nonkinetic tape abilities like Electronic Warfare and cyber. That that they have been focused on probably more so than the United States has as weve been involved in the coin challenge in the middle east. So, im going to move now to our recommendations. And what we talked about, a new big five for the 21st century. How do you express clear priorities about what it is that the army will need to meet the invest andw do you develop a Modernization Program that delivers on those priorities. One of the tricky arguments a we make in the report its much better to talk about this in terms of capabilities than in term of platforms. The previous big five was a list so of platforms. ,it was the abrams tanks bradley, patriot, and couple of , other black hawk and the apache. Five platforms that were going to meet the threats of that day. In todays world, youre better off talking about capabilities. The reason why is platforms take depending on who you ask, 10 to 20 years, maybe more to develop. And so going to the congress in , 2017 and saying, we have an urgent problem, i want you to join me in a new Platform Development that in 20 years will give us an answer. Thats a tough case to make. If on the other hand, what you are asking for we have a , significant deficit in Electronic Warfare and we have plan to increase Electronic Warfare to meet that, you can actually show progress on that priority relatively quickly while also developing long term plan. And these are the five that we recommended i would say. We had two workshops. We talked to a lot of experts. The army will ultimately come up with its own. Theyve been working hard on that. This idea that thinking of in terms of capabilities rather than platforms, we think its very important to enlisting the support that the army is going to need to do its Modernization Program. Just wrapping up my piece here and well do the discussion, our recommendations developed a clear, articulated, focused modernization strategy. Make modernization a priority. It is on the chief list of priorities. But there is this competition with spending on personnel and spending on readiness. Those are important priorities as well. But the army has to really think hard about how to make modernization a higher priority. Focus on capabilities, not platforms. Make Army Acquisition more agile by focusing on evolutionary innovation. Being able to deliver capabilities rapidly even as you move toward longerterm type innovations along the road. Making room within your Modernization Program to address opportunities and challenges appeared then aligning Human Capital with this modernization strategy and some of our panelists, i think have , additional ideas to make this approach work. Without further ado, i will call them up to the stage. We can hear from them. Mr. Hunter thank you for joining us today. I will introduce the panel and well turn and get their thoughts. To my right is heidi hue, the former assistant secretary of the army for acquisition logistics and technology. She is currently serving as chairman of the board. For robo team america. She was formally chairman of the air force Scientific Advisory board. To her right is colonel dan roper. Hes director of National Security studies at the association of United States army. And the author of global counterinsurgency. To his right is doug bush. A former colleague of mine. From the House Arm Services Committee staff. A former National Security analyst and former army officer. Heidi, start with you, if you start us out. You obviously have thought a lot about this the strategy for Army Modernization. If you can give us your thoughts on the strategic approach that you think is most likely to be effective. Ms. Hue absolutely. I think you guys have did a great job in term of covering the eca 2011. I do want to emphasize i want to second what you have said. When i looked army budget, it decreased by 15 . But the r d and procurement funding, the rda pot decreased by 33 . So Army Modernization cant , happen when your budget is cut that significantly. During the last five years, i want to emphasize one other thing. The annual cr creates even bigger turmoil than people realize. Because if you cant get the budget october 1st, youre sitting there waiting. You cant spend. You cant start new programs. You cant wrap up production. Tremendous turmoil on programs. And during the sequestration, plus the annual cr what the army had to do was stretch out programs, restructure them, reduce the procurement quantity down to the minimum sustainable rate without breaking the multiyear contracts. We didnt start programs that were planned, or we terminated them. So there was significant turmoil within our across every single one of our portfolios. We think the declining budget environment, seconding what you said, i actually drew a pyramid. It is a pyramid chart lets , divest the old equipment. We need to save on costs. We have to reset the equipment so were ready to fight in the next contingency. We will incrementally modernize our existing platforms, we will choose carefully what new capabilities to develop to increase our mobility, lee lethality, and survivability. Well invest in our s t to enable the next generation capability. Thats our strategy in a declining budget environment. Looking ahead, it was a great dialogue this morning, i really appreciate being here. I will give you my personal perspective. Based on what i see that the threats that the army will face and what i deem the modernization effort has to focus on. We will obviously see cyberattacks and disinformation on social media. That will never stop. Well see jamming of our gps, our radar, and our communications system. Weve seen that and it will continue. What are the modernization efforts thats required . We have to ensure operation in a contested environment. That means we need assured position, navigation, and time. So we are no longer jammed and unable to operate. We need to operate beyond just ew. Ew is critical. But we need to be operating in the intersection of an integrated ew and io. Because of the agility of the threats. You dont have to be of you dont have time to be a stove pipe system anymore. And we need assured communication. The other type, you guys talked about this morning, is the tremendous proliferation of weapons system. With increased sophistication. We see the rpgs. We see much longer range missiles and rockets, Cruise Missiles, advanced theater ballistic missiles. We see an exponential growth in uavs. Performing Surveillance Reconnaissance systems, think about next generation which will perform attack. What do we need to do . Sowhat do we need to do . , i will expand upon what you talked about integrated Missile Defense. My perspective, we need a layered integrated active and passive iamd to enable Missile Defense offense. It is later in the sense we have started this program, that is for base protection against rockets, armors, missiles, uavs, Cruise Missiles. We need to continue that program, push that forward. The next layer of protection that we have is really plug and play. , which areg system legacy systems into a common , network. So the integrated battle command , system is critical. Bcs, you guys heard that. That is absolutely critical. Another layer under that umbrella thats critical is get a patriot aeisa. Active, electronically scanned array compared what we currently , have today. That will extend the target range, target resolution, and enable countermeasures. Those are the programs either we have today or we need. But we also need to add the passive capabilities. When i say that, is because, active means youre radiating. Something could jam you. Passive, youre not radiating. We need to integrate both of them together. Give us a layered integrated activepassive capacity. Then i will focus on because of the proliferation of threats, we have to increase survivability. \tantamount to what we need to focus on funding and pushing forward is integrated active , passive survivability program. To enable to us to detect, identify and countering of the threats. It needs to be integrated system because theres no single sensor , of single Counter Measure that will counter all threats. On the ground, this is you see the focus is shifting towards a n active Protection System for combat vehicles. But beyond just these two systems, we have to think about how we need to see the target further and resolve it better. This is why we need the <