Ok folks. Good afternoon. My name is john hammering. I am very pleased to have you all come, today. We will have a wonderful afternoon together. I look forward to this important conference. But i just say we have a little safety announcement for everyone. If we do have an incident where i have to ask you to get up and leave and follow me, the exits are right behind me. There are three doors. The stairs that take us to the street are closest to this door right here. We will no downstairs and meet across at National Geographic and get some ice cream or something. Just follow me if we need to do something. I need to give a bit of background for this project so that you understand what you are going to hear. This is a remarkably important thing because of the context of where we work. Ago, may, chairwoman fu ying, chairwoman of the Foreign Relations committee for the Peoples Congress came to me and said we think that the time is right for a serious study done by chinese think tank scholars and american think tank scholars to look at the future of this chinau. S. Ip, the relationship. Is meant to be very broadly scaled. It was not just one think tank working with another think tank, this was supposed to be a very broadly scaled inquiry which is part of the reason why you see the strangest publication you will ever see in a think tank, because it represents the collective work of about seven or eight institutions that came together on this project as we donated scholars and worked on it, together. This was a project that we began, last summer before the president ial election. We did not have any idea who was going to be elected. Iswere looking to say what the future of this relationship, independent of a particular outcome of the election . Important,t is more today because we are at a stage where we need to be thinking about the fundamentals of this relationship. I think that is what comes through. There are two sets of parallel papers. This is the publication our chinese friends produced for their papers and this is the publication of the american papers. They are parallel. To be ae not meant study in unison singing. It was meant to be a case of singing in harmony and can we together look at these questions anything,garcoating being very objective, can we look to see what should guide this relationship Going Forward . I think both sets of papers really come to the same endpoint. This is a enormously important relationship. How america and china will Work Together over the next 20 years, or years, will fundamentally shape the wellbeing of the human community. We have to figure out how we will Work Together. It could go badly if we dont Work Together because there are so many forces in both of our respective countries that are pulling us in the wrong direction. So many forces that could pull us into a path where we are going to have a difficult conflicted, contentious relationship. We have to be active in managing this relationship with the spirit of candor. We have serious differences. Away from being honest and vocal with each other about those differences, but we also have to be constructive to find solutions. Not only for the wellbeing of our country and china, but for the wellbeing of the rest of humanity. We are going to explore this, today. I am delighted that all of you would take your afternoon to join us. We will start right in and let me ask dr. Michael green who will be the moderator for this first session to take it from here. Thank you for coming. [applause] dr. Green thank you very much. I am the Senior Vice President and a professor at georgetown. We had five issue papers with authors for each paper or papers of each subject from the u. S. And china. We split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on u. S. And chinese strategy and interests in the asiapacific region and also u. S. China military issues. The next panel will cover economics, global issues and politics. Scott kennedy will chair that session. We had a number of participants who helped to write the papers or joined us in study groups to review the papers. This is a representative group. Some of the key authors for each of the papers we are going to address in the panels. And director of our china power project will talk about the asiapacific papers. We will ask the panelists not to summarize the papers but to notify the issues of convergence , divergence and some. Ecommendations my friend will present on the asiapacific issue after donnie after bonnie. David finkelstein and from the Chinese Foundation for International Security studies will address the areas of convergence, divergence and implication of what we wentified in military spears endeavored to make these papers that would be based on the u. S. Natural National Interest and strategy on our side and on the chinese National Interest and chinese strategy on the chinese side. We did these in consultation with each other. Bonnie and i and they talked about what keith teams we would try to address what key things we would try to address. It had to be an honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that countrys perspective. We informed and talked to our governments, but the u. S. Government and Chinese Government did not review or approved these papers. They are independent. Scholars. Independent what we presented is not u. S. Or Chinese Government policy. We do think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in each country. There are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the United States. The american on side, three authors on the chinese side and a group between six and 15 other experts who weighed in. On the asiapacific paper, and a think this was true on our paper, there was a lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological spectrum. Between the u. S. And chinese papers, there were some common themes. One was that we should strive to be to avoid becoming adversaries. That was consistent for both sides. There was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build patterns of cooperation between the u. S. And china on every area. Many of the papers concluded that the United States and china need a honest and farreaching Strategic Dialogue where each side does not cover up its fundamental interest or concerns and presents those and goes from there, to see what can be done. There are obvious structural differences. These are not differences that can be solved with a different six character label or 120 character tweet or whatever you choose. They are fundamental and structured. They are historic. We spent a lot of time on the history of these issues. For example, there are between the two papers on asiapacific, some different assumptions about the future orientation of the Korean Peninsula. It is not just disagreements on tactics, there are fundamental issues about the u. S. And china view the peninsula and where it is going in the longterm. There are some fundamental differences in terms of the South China Sea on the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan and the philippines. About what it means to have influence, control. There were differences about how strong american alliances should be. Very basic differences. How strong should u. S. Alliances be in asia . There were differences about what china should be doing to assert its sovereignty. What it be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. There were differences on both ades on what constitutes reasonable and acceptable level of defense capability. I dont think either side true that yardstick the same. There were differences about how we should think about the future order of east asia. There was more enthusiasm on the chinese side about some kind of arrangement to manage the future of asia. There was less in two zs them on the u. S. Side. Even within the two sides, there was debate and disagreement. I will let my colleagues go into more detail on these areas and conclude for now by saying when you read the papers, you will find that these are papers that stand the test of time. They are not based on todays or tomorrows news or the korean problem. In some ways, they may be a to try to find ways to minimize complication and be realistic about fundamental differences that we have unearthed. With that, i will turn it over to bonnie. We printed out as many papers as we thought would have audience. We were short by about 50 . This is online as well. You can get it online and check it out in chinese and english. Ms. Glaser thank you, mike. This is a very interesting project and i would urge you all to read these papers very carefully. It is a privilege to be part of this. Ofhave a very short period time, each speaker. I will hit on some highlights. Andome of the convergences divergences, both of these papers on asiapacific security says there is a need for a rulesbased order. That is a good start. We should have rules. Of course there are differences over what those rules should be, but whether or not the International Community is likely to allow or welcome chinas participation in the process of shaping the rules. The u. S. Is quite clear on that. It says it is not calling on china to simply sign on to rules that have been written in the past but that the International Community will write these rules up together and that china will be involved. The chinese paper is very skeptical of the u. S. Willingness to do that. How can these rules be defined in light of the changing situations, etc. A lot of suspicion. The chineseoughout paper that there was a lot of skepticism about u. S. Willingness to include china even know i would underscore that i think the current administration, prior administrations have welcomed china to be a responsible stakeholder in this rulesbased order and that goes back as far as the george w. Bush administration, who coined that phrase. Muchhinese paper very contends that the u. S. Alliance system is increasingly targeting china and it calls for the United States to give up that attempt to build this sort of antichina coalition. Favors anthat china open and inclusive Security System rather than alliancebased system, but says china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. There,e bit of ambiguity whether ultimately alliances can be part of the system, but the bottom line is that the u. S. Led withnce system can coexist an increasingly influential china in the region, if the u. S. Gives up that effort. For the u. S. , this paper does in anyy any way way, the alliances as aimed at china. It talks about the alliances as the basis for our regional position. It lists several threats that our alliances are trying to deal with such as north koreas emerging Nuclear Capabilities and maritime conflicts. A very good a very different discussion of alliances. Talk to witt about chinas concern about alliances in Regional Security and architecture. I think this is the difference that the u. S. And the chinese have about whether alliances should be part of this rulesbased order. Concern. Tify areas of you got north korea, taiwan, maritime issues. Paperth korea, the u. S. States that china does not recognize the new level of threat presented by the regime and a think as we sit here, events that have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. The United States is incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north korea. Very upset about how u. S. Citizens are being treated. The most recent being the very tragic death of otto warbier. Warmbier. Recognizesnas paper the threat but acknowledges that sanctions cannot be used alone, that diplomacy is needed. Had somepaper interesting policy recommendations in this regard, calling for not only more dialogue, but very specifically on things like knocking back evacuation operations, interdiction of north koreas weapons proliferation. The chinese paper does not have any of these very specific areas of contextual cooperation. I would underscore the need for discussions on Crisis Response in the event of instability in north korea. That is something the u. S. Has tried to do with china for several administrations. There are solutions put forward by both sides and i want to highlight some of the convergences and divergences. Both insist on peaceful resolution of disputes, avoiding military conflict. The u. S. Paper focuses much more than the chinese paper on the need to manage differences. I think that is a common position. Both papers called for more candid discussion on Strategic Dialogue. The chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between china and the u. S. Led alliance system. This is interesting and we should recall that there has been consideration in the past for examples of a trilateral japan u. S. China dialogue which was supposed to take place in 2009. Waysd we consider again, that we can offer china reassurances about our alliance is engaged in trouble out trilateral dialogue. A couple final comments on the differences between the two sides in terms of the recommendation. As mike mentioned, the chinese authors do not rule out a g2. They see they say either a g2 or other forms of security cooperation, china and the u. S. Needs to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. I think that would be a very difficult thing to do. I dont know if we can establish a joint vision, but certainly the u. S. Paper and i think reflecting mainstream views in the u. S. , ruling out such an arraignment. The u. S. Paper says that washington is not interested in any sort of condominium that implies an exclusive great power relationship. The chinese paper continues to call for a hearing to the components of the new type of great power relationship. It says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, Mutual Respect and winwin cooperation. Accurately reflects the way Obama Administration as well as where the Trump Administration has come to after its first several months of power. Americans in general dont like a Bumper Sticker phrase, and there continues to be a norm is discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations, including the components. The u. S. Shares the goal of avoiding conflict, but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create spears of influence spheres of influence and that could be the stabilizing destabilizing to the region. Thank you for your leadership. It impressedtly, me and encouraged me to our we are working together and with reports,her reflection it is a of a shared spirituality, shared vision on how the regional ready can evolve in a way that is compatible with both sides. A couple things i would like to pick up in responding to bonnies presentation. Divergence and convergence. Ofting through some sort very accurate reality checking. We like consider some sort of accuracy or reality checking to so thatk to the history we use it as some sort of interesting study point. This is been a very positive security inquiry in the region. Matters, iow china think in the long run, china benefits a lot from a very steady and constructive regional ponderings. That kind of reality is a bigger one, bearing on the chinese side. I think if we look at the for causing some sort of collision between the three powers, what is the element to create or drive back into virgins then we have to say itis not a status, it is is not status driven, it is issue driven. For the moment, the leading challenge is that china is coming after the transition. It is a fallacy. Chinese nationalists may see it that way. Maybe you can read some sort of recently published book. Simply from a historical , i think that for scholars, ithinese is totally gone. There is some sort of power shift compared to 20 years ago, 30 years ago. China says such a disparity is truly significant. But the u. S. Has a very solid hold of power. We dont think in the coming disparityyour power is getting undercut tremendously. Perspective,ese thereiapacific area is are a lot of interests in some sort of collision and we are competing on some sort of a path taking solution and pathtaking solutions and methodologies. Ofwe get to some sort central pace it to be behind the strategy, then we prefer to see it is also adequate and reasonable and issuedriven. It is not status driven. Of chinese some sort [indiscernible] important is very testing ground to have a serious examination of chinas fall it. Foreign policy redirection chinese methodology in the region remains largely some sort of china domestic transition, not a power computing base. For example, [indiscernible] china consideration of dprk has been consistent and smart. It is very hard for china, a policy, reason into chinas [indiscernible] before china can become some sort of very successfully transform the power, China Remains runnable at large. It would be some sort of way of computing place for china some sort of inherent assertiveness. Is, as weint consider, no matter how we diverge our strategy and , its not just history oriented. There is a lot of speculation overshadowing power relations between washington and beijing. Many believe the chinese and americans will be rival ring and getting into some in evitable conflict. They sensationalist book called destined for war. We can jointly create some sort of new modeling of power relations. I have to seek chinese reports in the is a veryic area interesting challenge for us. On the one hand, we have to balance [indiscernible] some sort of chinas traditional policy narrative. On the other hand, we like to bring about some sort of new, aspiring points. It is not an e. G. Job its not an easy job. Its not how we can just poweron some sort of storage in the region, but how ofna can overcome some so