University of central arkansas. Finally to my far right last and harming this, is Lieutenant Colonel karen she is a strategic Intelligence Officer with experience ranging from the tactical to the strategic level. With that, let me turn the floor over to colonel hoy who will introduce the program. Thank you very much for hosting us today. Good morning to everybody. I will explain a little bit about where we come from and why we are sitting on this table. What led to this. First of all, we are five or six students from the u. S. Army war college. The six students were already moving to its new assignment in europe so that he could not be here. So we are actually five of six. We are in the u. S. Army war college but we are in a special program called the call are the carlyle scholars program. We do the curriculum in four months instead of 89 months. So we have got more time to do research, to do engagements with think tanks or the state department. We started in october 2014. I will not go through all the steps in this slide, but we started in october 2014 to study into russia. And the relationship between europe and russia. And it linked into several other programs we were doing already at the u. S. Army war college. Over time we had meetings with experts from think tanks and universities and from the state department as well. And those meetings were to confirm and improve and refine our ideas or our understanding of the russian system. So that is what we did over time. So the wargame was a month ago but prior to that we had many meetings in washington with tanks to discuss our view of what we thought the russian system was like. We use what we called operational design. It is a way to frame the environment to frame the problem and frame the approach to the system. We started with first understanding the problem. So we looked into puins grand strategy. And we used ways and means to define that and we looked for tensions within the current russian system and fractures in the system as well. For the environment, we used visualization of the russian bear and the russian bear with his own dna and moving through. He uses gears that controls the bear. So that is what we used to frame the environment. And then we framed some approaches. Some of those approaches are in on how to influence the russian system. In those approaches led to the wargame we did in april. Once wed completed the process of design in collaboration with a Different Organization you saw on the charge, we thought it would be good to take this designed and tested as close as we could to a random field experience. In that case that would be a wargame. What you see in the slide in front of us is how we laid that. When we looked at the strategic documents, we talked a great deal about strengthening our alliance with europe. The question was then, given that, how should the u. S. Then consider its policy towards russia . How should that impacted . We met with several folks along the way in building the net assessment. And we then took those engagements and invited people to come to carlyle to produce a pate in this wargame. We divided into a russia team and the u. S. Team and then we had the control group. And the way the wargame worked, we started out in a large Group Plenary session. We presented our assessment of the russian system, what we understood u. S. Policy toward russia to be. And that we let the russia and the u. S. Team go to the breakout rooms and refine or confirm what had just been presented to build what would be their baseline for Going Forward. In each case, we told if you are the russia team consider yourself advises to president putin. We walked back into the Plenary Session. Each side had an opportunity to brief the other. And then they had a chance for clarification, questions of clarification from one side to the other. Once they had baselined their policy going into the game, we then provided what we would call a strategic scenario that each side would have to deal with. What we found was that there was not a lot of movement from the way we had designed the russian system or the way we presented u. S. Policy. We felt we had a good baseline. After they came into the Plenary Session of pretty good refinement. So we started with the first scenario. The two teams went to the breakout room. They would confirm the policy they had was valid. And what changes they needed to make and what was going to be there strategic approach Going Forward given this scenario. They went they then came into the larger group than briefed each other. Once i would briefed the other side would brief and they would be allowed to provide a counter argument back and forth. And the white cell would ask clarifications. We then issue the next inject. And then the white cell would go through a debriefing process. What did they hear that was feasible and not feasible . How did they understand what they had heard. We presented that process through five different injects. This should say scenarios. These were the scenarios we wanted to see a secure and stable and prosperous europe. We had to suspend reality and say if we could if youre could be Energy Independent from russia, what would that look like and how would both sides react russian mark the second one more possible and more urgent as expansion of the ukrainian conflict, beyond the line of control if it was an expansion. In other regions of interest and in a strategic miscalculation. The third world was uncontrollable nationalism. We characterized to use of nationalism as a weaponization of nationalism. What happens when he loses control of that nationalism . How would both sides react . The fourth was not meant to be a coup but effectively the way we structure that was Vladimir Putin is no longer in power. How did the u. S. Interpret it . And what would they advise to now. And how to go forward with it . The final turn, getting beyond crisis was less a 70 a strategic scenario as much as it was what does each side want to see from the other . These are the four key considerations. The first 1 compete with russia sounds counterintuitive. We talk a lot about cooperate where we can. What we found is that on each side the u. S. Would look for corporation. And the russian side would come in competitively. We had one participant say with that we were in an environment where we are competitive. We should compete. Cooperate when you can cooperate. While you think that order would come through cooperation in this case, the competition has got to be resolved first. The second one was clearly articulating the position toward russia, Eastern Europe and the ukraine. When the u. S. Team would debrief, we found that there was a little bit of ambiguity toward each of those different players. And that was one of the other pieces that needed to come out. The policy had to be clear in regard to each. The third challenge was a consistent, from the white cell was the u. S. Teams lack of a good information policy or information strategy. And then the last bullet with two election cycles coming up in the u. S. And with russia in 2018, clearly that timeline needs to be leveraged. We need to look at what needs going to be crimea 2017. So while we dont by no means attempt to influence u. S. Election but whatever policy is built it has to survive our own natural election and be implemented by a new administration Going Forward and stepping into russian cycle on the russian side. With this ill pass off to dr. Jim mcnaughton, one of the observers of the u. S. Tomorrow. Of the u. S. Team. Dr. Mcnaughton thank you, joe. I had the opportunity to be a note taker setting in and listening to u. S. Teams discussions over the two days of the war game. I just want to start with two general observations and look forward to questions and discussion after our introductory remarks here. My observations really on point one and point two you see on the screen here. Having watched a mix of people try to come up with the u. S. Policy or what the policy would be with some of these hypothetical situations, it was very interesting to find out really they were confronting a sea change in u. S. Policy. It was clear to them that something had changed in the international environment. The tough part was figuring out what to do about that. They realized last two decades at least our relations with russia in general based on the concept we would encourage russia to become a normal country within European Security architecture, European Community and that russia would be encouraged to play by the rules and u. S. Could treat them as they treat any other Regional Power around the world. After the seizure of crimea and when conflict erupted in Eastern Ukraine it become clear that set of assumptions was no longer valid. Everyone could see that sea change. Hard part between players trying to formulate in this academic environment what should u. S. Policy be, figure out how to compete with russia. Its very difficult to jettison those set of assumptions and long range policies the u. S. Work with for many, many years. We considered alternative futures within the war game. It became clear for the next several years, the u. S. Would have to be would have to manage strategic competition with russia rather than treat russia as another normal country in the environment. Second general observations i would like to start with, its easy to say the United States needs to articulate a position towards russia and Eastern Europe and ukraine. Theres severe challenges we discovered. Joe is absolutely correct that the u. S. Team ended up being more reactive than proactive as it struggled to balance several major sets of consideration ss. The United States policy is not developed simply in washington d. C. We must take into account nato allies and other partners in the region. A great deal of consensus building and discussions before a policy can be, in fact clearly stated by our leaders. Where we have challenges develop policy consensus, the lack of knowledge how russia is going to respond. As we, we could send armaments lethal equipment to kraenz. To the ukrainians. At each step lacked understanding of the russian system felt comfortable if we do this, pretty sure russia will do that. That really muddied the water as well, made it difficult to achieve consensus. Clearly areas everyone agreed on we really electronically want to continue to cooperate with russia. In areas such as the discussions over the Iranian Nuclear program. This is something quite important for very valid reasons that we need russian cooperation to continue. How do we manage strategic competition while maintain areas of cooperation with russia. Took a lot of time. Oftentimes the result is quite messy when it was time to go into the Plenary Session and say, okay, u. S. Team, what have you come up with as far as the policy. That was one of our great challenges. Turn to our colleague talk a little bit what he saw observing russian team. Lay thanks, jim. As alluded to i was an analyst none of us were participants during the war game. We facilitated, observed, took notes. A unique Vantage Point i would dare say without predispositions, weve been doing this since october. I start with a couple general comments. We can speak a little bit more fidelity, granularity from the period. On hold during twoday war game russia was able to operate with strategic flexibility, a good bit more options available. Russian team had more options, less constrained international norms, laws, alliances. For instance, during one of the turns, armor and troops on the border, cast as defensive move posture rather than what it was was an overtly aggressive move which leads me to second point. Russia operates with far more informational operations campaign. Their io remarked as one participants as more less weaponized propaganda. Oftentimes russia was able to spend a particular narrative that the west could not easily counter. If they did attempt to counter lead time to gather facts and figures for a more truthful message. That gave again leading to the first point quite a bit more flexibility and how they reacted. Russia no desire respond to ukraine. Over the twoday war game escalate and deescalate at will. Provide a good bit of leveraging to the west rather than argue reducing economic sanctions or moving troops or forces around as they willed. Again, speak a little more fidelity during q a period with that ill pass over to karen and offer more insights. I was also on the red time with chris. I have their two key things. First competitive attitude Decision Making u. S. And nato policies within the region. The russia team sought strategic flexibility, if you will, not through the development of clear longterm policy but instead through the creation of what they call tools. Designed to seize opportunities as they arise. Russian team saw longterm strategy as ineffective complex strategic environment they are operating in. Why spend time developing this strategy that we may never use. Lets spend efforts on tools that allow us strategic flexibility and also surprise. Those tools were frozen conflicts, bilateral agreements, back door economic deals and the development of proxy forces which weve seen in use recently. One player summed up russias intentions succinctly. We used this quote quite often. He said the russia team played to win while the u. S. Played not to lose. So diplomatic posturing had , little impact on russian behavior throughout the game. As they tried to determine the best way to characterize president putin, is he a longterm strategist, tactician, what is he . They decided putin more a chess player. He studies the board and improvises as needed. Hence the need for tools longterm strategy. The second observation was russian team decisionmaking process was driven mostly by the desire to maintain power. Second, the return of russian preimminence. In every discussion, decision made desire to maintain perpetuate, and presented the system was evident. While the team is confident that putin would be in power or as president for years to come, they always considered that position when making decisions. They didnt want to jeopardize elections. That came up in their discussions. We had this election cycle coming up in sync with u. S. Elections. Lets not do anything that would put president putin at risk. Finally the team made sure win destiny that team use russian propaganda to make sure that the perception within the russian population was one that makes you are russian greatness was on the rise. Putin machine was returning russia to its rightful place on the global landscape. Also, of course, to undermine u. S. And nato actions in the region. With that ill turn it back over to you. Thank you, karen. During the war game i the facilitator for team white. We could see them come back from small rooms and presenting new policy or reactions. Already been said but some Key Takeaways i took from there and my team as well. My team consisted of western and Eastern European fellows. Western and Eastern European International Fellows. Sometimes european, how you say that, look on the situation. So partly repeating, u. S. Team came back. They were kind of struggling with how to deal with a situation, because they were always reactive and defensive. They wanted to play within the International Rules. They were always waiting for the other side, what would happen and struggling with their position all the time. Whereas the russians could play more savvy and cunning and more proactive and on the offensive. They would say well try something new and look what happens. So that was a big difference between the two sides. We all agree where it comes from. But its just an observation. Second takeaway, everybody talks about nato all the time. Not everybody. But we should have a united nato on this, have consensus. The question is when were ever going to get that. Thats 28 countries on one line. Thats what we saw in the game. Maybe it is more it is wiser to just address a couple of countries within nato and create a coalition of the willing. Those willing probably depending on the subject 22, 24 of the 28 countries. Thats maybe all you need. Thats one of the takeaway as well from the war game looking from team white. Really interesting exercise. We would love to know more about your net assessment something that needs to be widely done about russia. Personally over the last three weeks ive spent more than half of the time in various scenario exercises. Four of them actually. One of them conducted by joint force looking out to changes in human geography, engineering technology, and world order looking out to 2035, looking at implications for joint force. I see steve out there. He was there four days with me a few weeks ago. Ive also spent a couple of exercises for the National IntelligenceCouncil Global trends publication looking out again to year 2035. And then last friday, over at the german marshall fund, in a more neutral exercise, thinking about russia. And part of the fun for me is i always get to play russia. [laughter] i think some of the notes that we concur on is theres greater flexibility in the means and mechanisms, the timing in which russian can act. There is constantly number one concern is regime preservation. It starts there. I think its important to think about ukrainian conflict. Today in those terms as well there is a big domestic political aspect to them. One area there has been a lot of disagreement about looking in the near term is whether russia is looking to expand the conflict in ukraine. Im interested to hear in your game, russia is not. That is my personal conclusion but i think it is a pretty contentious issue. And we might talk about it more. I did have an opportunity to read through your report thats come out. We will have a link and copy of this on our website. The report about what the presentation is based upon. A couple of things id like to hear a little bit more from you before we turn the floor over to the audience. In the executive summary, notice that u. S. And russia systems are inherently competitive especially regarding russias near an