Plan of action with iran. And japan was obviously important as a key element in the overall regional structure. And then ultimately, as a state, it was going to be vital to implementing the agreement, especially the light water reactors. It is less obvious in the issue with Irans Nuclear program, but japan and iran have had a longstanding and uniquely positive relationship that existed prior to the uranium revolution, but also existed after the revolution, so japan is an especially important country in irans practice, and there are also a number of business and commercial relationships to be had between japan and iran, so japan is an important country both from the standpoint of the u. S. , but also the standpoint of iran going forward, so its another reason to have this discussion today and to think about incentives for maintaining compliance. We are honored to have many distinguished presenters and panelists today. Jim will introduce the first panel, but i would like to make a special mention of thanks to two of our colleagues who came all the way from tokyo to be part of this discussion. One will be in the first panel and the other will be in the second panel. Its a long way to come, so we really appreciate it, although we hope you got to see Cherry Blossoms are will before tomorrow. With that, i will get out of the way in let jim takeover. Jim thank you very much, george. And we are going to keep you involved in the first panel, so we will speak to you in a moment. Good afternoon, everyone. I am a senior associate here at the Carnegie Endowment for peace. It has been a lot of fun putting together this prologue series, because it has kind of given me free license to wander farther afield on a variety of foreignpolicy issues that directly or indirectly impact the u. S. And our alliances. We have looked at u. S. Korea relations, we have looked at south korea. We have looked at robotics issues. And now we are venturing further afield to the middle east and nuclear nonproliferation. I wanted to add up front that this is more than an academic exercise. The case we are looking at, the north korean case, is not just an example of an attempt to develop a nuclear deal in 1990 and implement it, it is a growing danger in northeast asia today and poses a lot of nonproliferation challenges and security challenges, Foreign Policy challenges with Nuclear Missile development. Clearly, our efforts to stop north korea from acquiring Nuclear Weapons have not worked. Our present case is one of the most complex and consequential nonproliferation initiatives ever attempted, and i think it really brings into question whether Nuclear Proliferation is a political issue or a technical one. There was an article that made me think about that issue, and i think it is a theme we may revisit throughout the course of this afternoon. Two of the three most complex verification challenges for the iaea have been north korea and iran, and i think the u. S. , Japan Alliance is a central asset in this process. And i think the question today is to what extent and how do we leverage this package. We have two sessions today, and i will beam moderating both. The first will discuss incentives and technical issues. Strengths and weaknesses from the japanese and u. S. Perspectives, and considers how the lessons may be applicable, or not, to the iran situation, and a look at what the head what ahead in the present day and how japan might deal with north korea in the future. Our second session, after a brief break, will be a facilitated discussion about National Interests and an examination of the u. S. And other nations strategies. At the conclusion of the second panel today, we will have a reception downstairs, so feel free to join us afterward for some networking and informal discussion of these issues. So i want to introduce our panelists. To my right, a professor at the graduate school of law in tokyo where he worked on Nuclear Disarmament and international security. He spent his career teaching, but he has been active in policy circles with professional appointments with a variety of governmental consultation groups and Atomic Energy and Nuclear Regulatory commissions. And he was a delegate to the nonproliferation treaty review conference. Dr. Robert on the far left is a distinguished professor at georgetown university. He previously served as the president of the john d and Catherine T Macarthur foundation. He began his Foreign Affairs career in 1974 and later served on the policy planning staff at the state department. He was one of the chief negotiators of north korea during the years leading up to the framework. And of course george, our own Vice President of studies here carnegie, and the leader of our policy program, who works on strategy and nonproliferation issues and is a member of the National Academy of sciences, the committee of arms control, and a number of other a copy ands. We have a great panel to dive into north korea and talk a little bit about iran as well, but let me begin. I want to start off looking at the agreement framework. Thank you very much. I would like to thank you for inviting me to washington. I asked my driver all the way from the airport to stop by, and we stopped for a moment because of a traffic jam. I enjoyed the Cherry Blossoms. I also enjoy them blooming in tokyo. Im here to talk about that the lessons from the framework with north korea and implications for iran. I took this precisely. I mostly focused on the 1990s and early 2000s, and how the agreed framework was filled and the role that japan play during the negotiation. So there is some small hint of the framework, but my time is very much limited, so i may have to go very quickly. When we discuss the success or failure of the nuclear deals, i look at the state level, the national level, and the regional level. Nonproliferation at the state level is containing Nuclear Weaponization capabilities. At least for the time being. At the state level, the security concern is, for example, north korea. From our perspective, do we really seek the collapse of the regime or regime change, or transporting the regime into a more cooperative and non transforming the regime into a more cooperative nonthreatening regime. On the security side, through the nuclear deal, we got to see a more stable, strategic environment. Please think about the situation in east asia. These four different objectives, are they really achievable . This is a very rough sketch of why the agreed framework failed on two sites. There is an obvious gap between the North Koreans and others on the goals for the deal. I think north korea failed to have a sense of security. North korea was able to trust the u. S. I think the north Korean People are suffering from a sense of insecurity. So then, north korea had a complaint about other incentives, and it is very much to do with u. S. Politics, lack of consensus, and the north korean question of providing incentives or strong support outside of the government. In i think they are reluctant to provide that. From the other perspective, the biggest problem is north koreas commitment to the d nuclear is a nation the nuclearization program. To me, there is an unclear sequence. What are the conditions for the incentives . There is a clear contrast between the north korean case and the iran case. I think there is a much better sequence between verification and incentives. Secondly, there are differences in perception among the major stakeholders. And there are loopholes in the imitation of sanctions. North korea kept exploring arms. We kept questioning the thoroughness of the chinese implementation of the other sanctions. I think im going to skip this. Threat how we see the from north korea and the differences among the major players. The difference in approaches and the differences. Japan japans talks is in fact dominated by the issue. Other than nuclear nonproliferation. Japans perception in the 1990s against north korea was mostly on the possible insurgency or terroristlike attacks by the , and alsoan troops Human Rights Violations against japanese citizens, the abduction issues. Threat was notar clear until north korea literally conducted Missile Launch tests in 1998. Because of the domestic politics which was dominated, the commitments is very much over set out by such a political priority. For northrategy, korea in particular, in the early 2000s is twofold. Achieve stability through normalization with north korea. Secondly, supporting u. S. Security action at the global scale. Someone made a reference to the potential deal between japans support of the u. S. In the iraq conflict on the solution of retribution and the abduction issue. Pursue its own strategy for the region. The normalization talks. Because ofgo well some programs on the north korean side had a failure to meet our expect patience. Our expectations. Be we expect is too much expected to much. Issue prevails throughout the process. That is unfortunate, the of this element of japans commitment to the disparity talks. Level isymaker actually public was not so much concerned about it. , the talk about the comparison between north korea and the u. N. For the Nuclear Talks to be successful, we have to and ifbout the element, you compare cases we see some differences. One, with regard to the theework of dialogue in case of north korea, the major stakeholders are included in the talks. The framework talks. That is why it was difficult to make an agreement because of the diversity of the priorities. In the case of iran, the major regional stakeholders outside of areregime, the major powers able to agree, but the outstanding question remains of how to engage the regional for a more longstanding stabilization of the region . Also, if you can pair the level of engagement in the International Market and international economy, the level of iranian commitment in the mucht, it is potentially higher than north korea. North koreas economy is turkey and a dependency on the single exporter which is china. Successfully able to provide sanctions and political incentives, that will be more successful in the case of iran than north korea. That iranl system, has a Supreme Leader, but under the Supreme Leader it is more plural than in north korea. The political equality of iran is more open to public opinion, which is expected for the economy to recover after moving sanctions. That is a strong incentive for the government to pursue nonproliferation. Can pair the level of commitment and association with the regime, in the case of north korea they are always searching to leave the regime. In the case of iran, they kept saying they are staying in the regime. They are keeping the commitment of the regime. Their intention to leave from the regime is very small. That is also a difference. Key strategy objectives, in the case of north said, arey, as i worried about survival with the regime against u. S. Pressure. Upre most likely not to give the Nuclear Option until the very end of the program. In the case of iran, the United States is not certain to threaten the survival of the regime. Their priority is not to ensure the survival, but more about seeking power in the environment. What can the u. S. japan do . What can we learn from other nuclear deals, in particular with reference to the ongoing escalation of the north Korean Nuclear crisis . Between allies, i think that we have shown key things. Closer countries need communications and security consent from both sides. The need to share a common vision. Shape the major stakeholders in the region . And the early 2000s, the Chinese Concern in north korea is not the north Korean Nuclear capabilities themselves, but more about the north korean case japanese and South Koreans to go nuclear. That Regional Security concern between allies we have to share the same objectives in the region. Also, for that, we need to reaffirm a commitment to both sides. Not only the u. S. Commitment, but what does japan need to do u. S. Strategy objectives . On the side of diplomacy, a quarter nation is 2 key things. Coordinate the hayes grier for the United Security council in which japan is a prominent member. For, working together export controls. In order to make the sanction effective, export control is key. A further key is to improve the implementation by other states, not only japan and the united. Tates, but other countries you have to provide support to Asian Countries or other states involved in trade. Finally, showing sanctions need to work is to remind stakeholders to keep the implementing sanctions. Thank you, very much. [applause] thank you. You have given us a great head start on this discussion. I would like to turn to bob gallucci. He was close to when it came about and its implementation. Prof. Gallucci thank you, james. We were in another session before coming here in which one of us said that the north korean deal looks much harder than the iran deal. Im not sure about that. I think the north korea deal was much simpler than the iran deal. I do not know if it was harder or easier, but if you look at it at the complexity, the links, the detail that the iran deal has when we started the , theiations in the spring late spring, of 1993 we had, by my recollection, very simple goals. I was told to get the North Koreans to agree to come back into the nonproliferation treaty. They had announced their attention their intentions to leave the treaty. And that given their formal notice. Second was to get them to accept political safeguards, which are npt, and for the political safeguards agreement 153 four special inspections. Youre old enough to remember 23 years ago, that phrase may resonate. They say they wanted special inspections to look at the sites. When we first met the North Koreans at the u. S. Mission, that is what was on my mind. Get them back into the npt and him to accept special inspections. What were the special inspections about . They had lied to the iea about how much plutonium they had separated. Whether it was a gram or more, when the iea did their inspections, they were able to figure out that there were more , and there was stuff to be found there. The real truth of what the North Koreans could be done could be discerned by going to the site, which the United States told the iea they should ask to see. That is how the crisis began. It is less important than the first point very limited objectives. Get them back into the npt and to accept political safeguards, including inspections. How many special inspections has the iea done . None . This was going to be hard. To talk to the North Koreans about this stuff, it was clear that we did not want the North Koreans to reprocess. Separate plutonium from their reactor they were operating. So, stopping the processing, too. They meaning washington. , no talk about enrichment. If they accepted the north south declaration on deep nuclear station on dean nuclear is learization denuc there would be no Nuclear Material on the peninsula. Too. Was rolled in briefing book is that things like we can make north korea part of the asian economic miracle. I had no idea what that meant, neither did they. I could tell them that if the South Koreans agreed, the North Koreans could visit american bases in south korea and confirm there were no Nuclear Weapons there. I also looked at me quizzically who said we wanted to do that . We disfigured that you might. There wasnt a lot going on here, but we were able to get through the new york stages of the talks to get to the geneva stages next month. There comes the breakthrough, which there is much disagreement over how it happened, but the North Koreans said they would give up their graphite reactors, all of them. That meant one operating five megawatt reactor, a 50 megawatt gas graphite reactors. Moderated by graphite. Wonderful plutonium reactors for weapons. None of them connected to the greater of mankind. Our Intelligence Community estimated it would produce 150 kilograms of plutonium each year, a enough for 30 Nuclear Weapons. By the end of the decade that would be what we would be looking at. The idea was to do something about that. All right. The North Koreans said they would give up all this stuff, if we helped them to get 2 modern water reactors like they built all over the world. Ff we went the negotiations went on for another year as the how that would happen. There is a little complexity in the frameworks about the staging. Here are three stages the first stage, the nuclear activity, the spent fuel, we liaison offices. There are things both sides do you agree moving sanctions. The second phase, they start dismantling stuff. We start delivering real nuclear equipment. Everything ise, dismantled and they have 2 operating reactors. Of the deallness was lost on washington. Notington, in my field, are decisionmakers who spend a lot. F time on Nuclear Energy what i call them, very excited, to tell the north korea will give up their reactors, i got so what . 2 big things paid you cannot give the