Im going to say nothing of value. [laughter] thank you. All right, well, thank you, everyone, and welcome to im delighted that we have a packed house in particular because it is august, and while some of you are more free than you would be otherwise, which is great, some of you who would otherwise be here are not here because you are traveling. This is really a wonderful turnout for what promises to be a very timely event. Let me start by giving a couple words of introduction and the requisite thankyous. First of all, thank you to senator john hoeven for sponsoring the room, for his continued interest in our work on radical islam. There is a lot of offices that are involved with us on this work. We really appreciate being able to, in addition to our inhouse work that we do in terms of to beations and events, able to come on to the hill and be able to present the findings that we have, and also the findings of our friends. A couple words about the American Foreign policy counsel. Im the Senior Vice President at afpc. We do a lot of work in a number of geographical areas and topic areas, including transactional threats and radical islam. This is one component of what we do. Our program on islamic extremism and counterterrorism is actually broader than is represented here. This is one component of what we do. We do periodic briefings, lunchandlearns, if you will, on topics related to radical islam, where we talk about a different angle of a very complex topic underserved right currently. Right now everybody talks about the Islamic State. They talk less about alqaeda. Talk even less about other groups that sort of dont fall into that broad category. We also publish a twicemonthly ebulletin called the global islamism monitor. If youre interested, theres a signup sheet outside, free of charge, and sort of brings you that type of information every two weeks on extremist islamic ideology, trends in ideology, but also trends in terms of movements, whats happening with boko haram in nigeria, the expansion of the Islamic State in the philippines, things like that that may be outside of your purviews. Also a multimedia project. We also publish a print and Digital Multimedia project. About a month from now, well have the 2017 edition, which will be hitting the newsstands. You can already access all the chapters online at almanac. Afpc. Org. It is the First Comprehensive study of islamism as a global phenomenon as a political phenomenon globally. Our aspiration is to have it truly global where it covers all regions where it exists. Its still impressive, even though its not completely global. The idea is to take a look, sort of both geographically and topically, across various regions and activities across global movements ranging from the Islamic State to alqaeda, the taliban, and also look at where these groups are active, where the threat is increasing, decreasing, and most importantly, particularly for policymakers here in congress, why its increasing, why its decreasing, what can this tell us about whether counterterrorism policy that were pursuing, the counterterrorism policies that other governments are pursuing, are on the right track, wrong track, what can be done better . In various ways, we try hard to inform the debate about islamic extremism. So im delighted to be able to sort of to have asked, to have my offer accepted, to have my friend Katie Zimmerman come brief us on her new report. Katherine zimmerman is a Research Fellow at the American Enterprise institute, and she is the Research Manager for the critical threats project. She covers the broader salafi Jihadi Movement as well as related trends in africa. She is in particular an expert on yemen, the activities of alqaeda in north africa. Shes also, as i know from personal experience, wonderful to travel with. Weve had the opportunity to sort of do a little bit of field work together. So i can tell you, in all modesty, that katie is the best of the best to talk to us about the broad sweep of the global islamist movement, how the groups interface with one another, and what u. S. Policymakers should be thinking about as they move sort of try to navigate this topic. Im going to cede the floor to katie now. Well let her get her what we will do is we will let her give her presentation. And well have times for questions and answers. Just one sort of preliminary request if you ask a question, ask a question. And also identify where youre from, sort of what organization or what office youre from, to help us contextualize the question. With that, let me turn it over to katie. Thank you, ilon. And the American Foreign policy counsel for hosting this. Im excited to talk about this. And why we face an enormous Strategic Risk in our fight in it. T is critical today the fight against isis culminates in syria. We just heard that isis has lost significant amounts of terrain in iraq. Also in syria, that we are at 40 of raqqa has been recovered, and we are entering the final stage against the Islamic State. Weve heard this before, that were in the final stage of this fight against the Islamic State, against alqaeda in iraq, in afghanistan, yemen. And yet we still face a massive threat from these groups. Part of the reason were facing that threat is weve misdefined and misunderstood what the enemy itself is. Weve defined the enemy to be various groups that have pointed their guns at us. We have only gone after those groups that have chosen to shoot the gun, which means that as over time weve looked at this, there are groups choosing not to start shooting us. Al qaedald say that has chosen that today, which is why we are defining it as a longterm threat, something to deal with this at the end of this problem. But i think that putting off that fight puts us in a position where its harder, much more difficult, and the United States is in greater danger. The challenge, though, is even we go after alqaeda, go after the Islamic State across the world, we are still going to face a threat. Thats because these groups draw strongly on an ideology. They are both competing to be the vanguard for that Ideological Movement. And it is the movement itself which is the enemy we must fight. Now, thats challenging for policymakers. How do you fight a movement . There is nothing tangible about it except for its ideology. You cant hit a ideology with a kinetic action. They come back and say, theres nothing to strike. Theres not a leadership cell. There is not a network to disrupt. Theres not terrain to take back from a movement. And so i would say over the past 15, even longer, years, we have defined the enemy as groups, as networks, as individuals. Weve confined ourselves by our policy definitions, such that we can actually go after an enemy that weve defined and use the policy tools that weve built to go after that enemy. When you think about that, then, we arent actually fighting the salafi Jihadi Movement writ large. I would say it is much stronger today than its ever been. Its escalated in strength over the past five years in an exponential fashion. It is not going to be set back by the defeat of isis. It has the momentum and will continue to have that. So briefly looking at what this movement is, its not all of islam, its not all of sunni islam. There are sunni who are secular, sunni who practice, very devout, but present us with no threat. There is a salafi sect within a trend line within islam, and not all salafis are dangerous to us. Salafis believe they should return to the days of muhammad, but not all pursue it in a threatening manner to us. Salafism is largely accepted within islam. There are some who choose to take no action. They simply practice devoutly and sit to the side. There are political salafists using political means to pursue this end state. Even though the end state is contrary to what we would see as our own interest in the world, the fact theyve existed for decades, not actually gained majority support in any of the countries where they exist, not they have not been widely accepted by what were calling mainstream muslims today means they are a Minority Group who exist within the political sphere and who have only gained power in one instance in egypt where the only opposition, the only the only counter to the mubarak regime was the Muslim Brotherhood and there was not a massive uprising when the Muslim Brotherhood fell in egypt because there was not massive support for what the Muslim Brotherhood was representing on the fwrund. The part of the movement that becomes problematic for us is the part that pursues its end state with violence. This is the gee haw dee part. The salafi injury haw dees, jihatdis, who believe that that fight is required on all practicing muslims so this is going to be a global insurgency they are calling to. Granded jihadism has been around, act granted jihadism has been around, has been activated since the soviet war, but hasnt been the threat for decades because it has been rejecteding marginalized and society has basically imprisoned those who believe in it. So why, then, to we have a problem today with the movement . Why, then is the Ideological Movement so strong . Its strong because over the course of its existence it has actually sought one singular objective, which is to transform muslim society. It has focused on the people. It has used terrorism to cause the United States to retreat from muslim lands. It has used terrorism to weaken government. It has used terrorism to generate a sectarian war inside of iraq that creates conditions that enable the people to reach out to it. But during all that time what you see in the leadership discussions are what the Popular Support base wants. How do we get into the minds of the people. How do we convince them that this is our way. And they havent done a good job of convincing them but the requirements facing most muslims on the ground today have driven them to look for support. So the conditions on the ground, the sunni inside of syria that are facing brutal conditions, there are populations inside yemen that require assistance to fight what they see as an enemy a threat to their own survival. You can look in somalia, lib ark elsewhere, afghanistan in particular, where when these fwrupes, communities have faced threats, where theyve had where they have not had access to base exservices, where they require water or diesel fuel the groups that are providing it that are right there in the sidelines are al qaeda and isis. Thats how these groups are moving into the population. They are also providing defense. So they are fighting alongside the sunni inside sir yasm theyre fighting along the sunni in the civil war. They are fighting alongside one the falks in the civil war. They are building that relationship. And over time, they are changing how the society on the ground functions. Because through the use of force, by coming in with the military forts al qaeda brings, its been able to secure the system of justice. So we sasha rhea courts beginning to appear as the governing system on the ground inside of syria. Syria, a secular state, with a revolution that started as a secular uprising, now has significant portions of opposition controlled territory under sharia based governance. And that is because al qaeda was able to transform that revolution. It is looking to do the same thing in yemen. It is looking to do the same thing inside so mall yasm its done part of that inside afghanistan. Its doing it in mali. Thats why were seeing this group strengthening writ large. Its not the fact that people are actively looking for the ideology. Theyre accepting and tolerant of the ideology because of other requirementers in protection protection of their livelihoods and their very lives. The United States is also somewhat fall intoon al qaedas trap. Isis came onto the scene, it conducted brutal mass executions inside of iraq and syria, it declared itself a caliphate, the Islamic State and became the number one enemy for the United States. And under that, al qaeda was able to operate under a policy radar where it was able to actually focus on its core objective, which was to win the hearts and minds of the people and it has done so, and is doing so in parts of yemen. We can keep going through this. Its not attacking the United States directly. It has not conducted a directed attack against the United States since we have conducted the war against isis. That is a decision. It is not because al qaeda does not have the capabilities. Al qaedas bombmaker, ibrahim al siri, known for the underwear bomb, the printer cartridge bomb, the master mind behind the laptop bomb theyre trying to recreate. Hes alive and training others. Theres no reason to believe that al qaeda does not pursue the capability to attack us. The question is when. And yet the way that were fighting these groups is like going after the enemy. Were going after the groups. Were going after the leadership on the ground. And that has created this huge divergence. So as al qaeda is focusing on delivering protection to the people, this is playing very true inside syria. Its also playing now inside yemen. The United States has taken action against the leaders of al qaeda. And what the people see is that theyve asked for support from the United States. We have said no. Theyve asked for support and al qaeda says yes. Al qaeda moves in. An then the United States delivers bombs. And that is why there is some support now on the ground for al qaeda because its the only group that has fought in their defense. It is actively transforming what is happening on the ground. And it is a problem for the United States that were not fighting government to government but were fighting it with guns. Its a problem for the United States that we are only focused on the leadership cells because al qaeda has regenerated leadership. Im sure well kill baghdad di, f hes baghdadi if hes not already dead. Theres an idea that if you can knock one off the line another will rise in its place. The core power of the ideology, why understanding the ideology is so important but fighting it actually doesnt get us anywhere is that the ideology provides he theo military doctrine that enables these groups persist and its why if we defeat isis derek feet al qaeda, well still have a group rise up because the ideology persists and the condition that says support for the ideology persists. Weve also managed to align ourselves with bad partners. Weve convinced ourselveses that by, with, and through is the only way and the best way. And in some cases it is. But in other cases its actually creating problems on the ground. Its one of the reasons why i look at, as we watch the fight against isis particularly inside of syria, weve created a de facto alliance. With the very enemies of the sunni, the very enemies of the population within which al qaeda is recruiting. Weve aligned ourselves with the assad regime work russia, with iran against isis. And we are empowering to seize ground inside syria, to strengthen itself against isis. But in not recognizing its strengthened itself in the con thoveks syrian civil war. While we talk about a political resolution syrian conflict, we are allowing military conditions to shape what that political resolution will look like. And it wont look like the resolution that we advocated back in 2012. Guarantee that. And the sunnis see us abandoning them. So we need to be very cognizant of how were fighting this war, how we are operating on the ground what partners were choosing, what partners were not choosing, and also how the enemy is spreading. Because delivery of basic goods and services is something we can do were not designed to do it. Usaid doesnt work in insecure environment, it works behind the front lines, not in front of it. Were not designed to do that militarily either. We havent resourced our state department properly to understand what the conflict is and who the actors are and what the demands are. But we could. Ands that question not of making of nation building, because i dont think the United States should be spending its resources everywhere, but leadership. Recognizing that the conditions on the ground have got ton a point where there needs to be a political resolution that leads to a legitimate and responsive governance system. That is of course aligned with our own interests. And the United States could lead others in this fight. To deliver the governance, to recognize the role that the conditions are playing in driving support for the injury haw dee movement particularly for for the gee haw dee movement particularly for for the jihaddi movement. I think the United States is the only one capable of leading the fight. Ill leave it there and open to questions. Ilon thank you, katie, that was terrific. A lot of food for thought and ill use my prerogative as moderator to sort of ask the first question and then we can open it up. We have a mike that can sort of, just raise your hand if you want to ask a question well have somebody come around with a icrophone. My question goes back to scope, the need to define the adversary more broadly in order to understand whats possible and whats not possible. During the Campaign Season last year and into his administration, President Trump talked has talked a great deal about radical islamic terrorism. With not that much emphasis on the ideology that underpins it. At the risk of being a lit patrol vocktive, how would you redefine that terminology to more, sort of, comprehensively encomp