Should be derived strategically. We tend to look at strategy as linking and balancing, hence ways and means. Then we look at the results and risk. We believe that, at the end of the day, our strategy is reflected in the qdr. It is fundamentally about protecting our National Security interests. If we understand what those are and that some are more important than others, not only does this enable us to offer advice on when and how to use force, it means we can link those interests on how to allocate everincreasing means that are provided by congress. And in between the ends and the means lies the Fertile Ground of ways, and how we go about getting it all done. And how resourceful we can be in crafting those ways. The tougher we are on ourselves and how we manage a resources, the better we can conserve our ends. One of the most important ways is deterrence, which really comes in two forms. One is showing an adversary that we can deny objective. In other words, his attacks will fail. Alternatively, that we can and will impose unacceptable cost on that adversary if he is foolish enough to attack. Every bit of what i just said applies to Missile Defense. Of ouronsider this top list of National Security interest, is probably the survival of our nation. At the top of the list of threats to that interest is obviously a Massive Nuclear attack from russia. Because we prefer to use the deny objectives to a missiledefense, in situations where it has the highest probability of being successful and being productive, as you know, we have told russia and the world that we will not rely on Missile Defense for Strategic Deterrence of russia. That would simply be too hard and too expensive and too strategically destabilizing to try. Even though russians have a hard time believing us on this. It has the great virtue of actually being true. On our ability to respond massively to an attack. That has worked for a very long time. But we do have other interest around the world. Theyre what we call was wounded limited Missile Defense and are very relevant, beginning with our determination to prevent catastrophic attack on our nation. This is about ensuring that we can deny the objectives of any insecure authoritarian state that believes acquisition of deliverable weapons of mass distraction is key to the preservation of its regime. The number of states trying to achieve that capability is growing, not shrinking. Our principal current concern is north korea. Their closest in terms of capability, followed by iran. Because we are not betting on Dennis Rodman as our current deterrent against future north korean threat, we believe a robust and capable Missile Defense is our best bet to defend the United States from such an attack. It is, in my view, our number one priority. That is why the system that provides defense, like our groundbased interceptor program, are a much higher priority than others in our shrinking defense budget. We do have other global National Security interest, including strong support from our allies and partners around the world, as well as protecting american citizens around the world, including our own troops, wherever they may be present. We also pledge a good bit of interest on Regional Defense, closely cooperating with a number of key partners. In a world of declining budget, it likely will come to rely more on those partners to resource the means for their defense, as we work more closely together on the ways. We are doing just that. Let me spend a little bit more time talking about about each of these two interest taste Missile Defense priorities. Defense of the homeland and regional ballistic Missile Defense. Regarding the homeland the fact of the matter is that koreans havenorth multistage systems that can feed development of Ballistic Missile technology for longerrange ms. Ems, including icb we have to take that threat seriously. Has ahough no nation mature capability and both would face an overwhelming u. S. Response to any attack. While we would still obviously prefer to take a threat muscle out while it is still on the ground, we will not always have the luxury of doing so. Because it is our policy to stay ahead of the threat, we do not want there to be any doubt about our commitment to having a solid launch capability. So the latter piece boils down to how many missiles we can knock down versus how many the threat can launch. That simple. That is much more than a function of how many interceptors we have or silos in the ground. It is also a function of how many capability and reliability. We often say quantity and quality on its own. Quality has a quantity all its own. We only have to shoot half of the number of interceptors for an incoming warhead, then we can handle twice the number of inbound warheads. That is why were taking so much time and effort to improve the capability unreliability of our systems. In the wake of the last enhancement which flew perfectly until i watched it failed in the last two seconds. The Missile Defense agency has done a terrific job diagnosing what happened. Im a future at 14 pilot. As one of those, i know that when something is not working, you bring out the entire system. You do not stop at the first thing you find wrong and you do not stop at the first possible fix to anything you find wrong. Mda has done exactly that. They have taken their time and they have done it right. Last year, they launched an improved ce2 interceptor, not against an actual target, but simply to put it through its paces and ensure that they had actually solved the problem that they had found. It performed magnificently. Our next shot, time against the target, is coming very soon. Were doing everything we can to a chore it success. Candidly, itccess, will be a very good shot in the arm for this program. We will resume production on 14 more in progress missiles in keeping with our fly philosophy. We tend to put those in the ground by 2017, in order to increase our capacity and stay ahead of the threat. As we announced last year, with the extra, we will have 44 interceptors in alaska and at Vandenberg Air force base. We also have an Ongoing Program in work to improve the actual kill vehicle the right on top of that interceptor. The quality has a quantity all its own. It is not just about our interceptors. I would put my next nickel and sensor. Having enough and good enough sensors, to detect and discriminate a threat, saves a lot of waste in how many interceptors we send up. We have a lot going on in this area. Think to our japanese partners, we are deploying an additional radar to the nation by the end of this year to both improve our homeland and Regional Defense capabilities the same time. We are also continuing to operate a radar float, as needed in the pacific, to provide discrimination capabilities to protect the conus and white hawaii. We are planning to deploy a new longrange discriminating radar in the Pacific Region by 2020. Are continuinge to pursue various uses of space and technologies and increased integration of existing Center Capabilities across commandandcontrol Battle Management to enhance our missiledefense discrimination capabilities in the future. While your session today is primarily about Ballistic Missiles, i do not want to overlook Cruise Missiles, particularly as a regards to the homeland. If we choose not to invest in the enormous resources required to defend against massive russian attacks over the normal, why would we care about Missile Defense . Well, the element of surprise is nearly impossible. Us, we will have time to react. We cannot always say the same for a Cruise Missile attack. We are also devoting a good bit of attention to properly configuring against such an attack on the homeland. We need to continue to do so. Turning to regional Missile Defense, there has been a massive proliferation in recent years of regional plastic 1200le threats, including missiles in the last five years. There are now almost 6000 known Ballistic Missiles in the world, not counting russia and china. Within this proliferation, we have seen a number of technical advances, including liquid and solid propellants technologies and missiles that are becoming more reliable, mobile, accurate, and capable. Sunken turkish ships at sea. Many have shorter launch preparation times and smaller. Technical and operational measures to defeat Missile Defenses are also increasing. For example, several nations exercise near simultaneous salvo firing up short and Medium Range Missiles from multiple locations, to Regional Defense. Against all this, not only have we brought our own capability to bear, in which we have to point some kind of Missile Defense system intended for and shipsies, we have early capable of doing the missiledefense mission. A number of them are on station at any given moment. We are also encouraging our allies and partners to apply their own Missile Defenses and strengthen missiledefense cooperations that will result in better support. For example, in the middle east, the United States is working with a number of our partners on Missile Defense, including supporting purchases of Foreign Military sales. The uae is procuring this, and edition to their earlier purchase. Is updating its batteries. And kuwait is also purchasing pac3 batteries. The United States also has a strong missiledefense relationship with israel. Are corporation on Missile Defense has resulted in a comprehensive Missile Defense architecture. Israeli programs, the u. S. Has supported include iron dome. In conjunction with operational cooperations, they create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the israeli people from varying types of Missile Defense threats. In the asiapacific, we have a strong missiledefense posture for homeland and regional Missile Defense. The cornerstone of our security has been our strong bilateral alliances with south korea, japan, and australia. Will continue we to emphasize the importance of developing regional ballistic Missile Defense systems. We know this is a very politically sensitive topic for several of our regional allies. Progress in this area will only increase our confidence in the face of persistent north korean provocations. During last years provocation cycle, it appeared that north korea might conduct a test of a regional capable posted missile that could potentially reach u. S. Soil in guam. In response, many of you are aware, the u. S. Army did a magnificent job of deploying a fad battery to that island. Area remains, readily deployable if necessary. In the meantime, defending u. S. Soil from the threat. With the unpredictability of the regime, we may find ourselves doing more of this thing elsewhere in the region. A commitment to nato Missile Defense remains ironclad. Has demonstrated our strong support for missiledefense capabilities, either already deployed or being developed with the european adaptive approach. Our contribution to nato Missile Defense here, i would like to lay to rest the misconception that in shifting away from the original program to place ten states in europe, somehow the United States walked away with missiledefense. That is just not true and it is not doing justice to the great efforts of my predecessor, general cartwright. He realized that the threat from iran was pressing more slowly. The medium and intermediate range throughout was growing rapidly. It made great sense of the time and still does to shift to the european phase based on the sm3 missile and away from the gdi. That is what we are doing. Rather than having 10 missiles, we will eventually have 48 on the ground in europe that can vary capably counter the real regional threat. This approach, with interceptors in the european theater. We have Broken Ground on the first epaa site in romania. That will be operational in december of 2015. One week ago, we had a very successful shot that demonstrated the functionality of the short based missile. It verified its ability to launch, control, established up bank and downlink medications, and provide communication to standard missiles. The first year, capable ships will be stationed in spain. The uss donald cook is already deployed to europe. Ships, uss carney and porter, will arrive in 2015. We are committed and this program is on track. Our allies are also making significant contributions through their purchase and deployment of capable systems and support of nato missions. Let me be clear, once again. It is not the policy of the United States to build a ballistic Missile Defense system to counter russian Ballistic Missiles. Sites are designed to counter longrange listach missiles that may be launched from other nations, outside of the euro area. Forsystem is designed launches from the south. A sites are not designed for russian missiles. Russia deploys to many missiles, which are too sophisticated for the system to handle. Our sensors are not pointed in the right direction. The interceptions that we intend to employee will simply not have the velocity required to intercept russian icbms. The most helpful thing that russia and china can do is persuade north korea and iran to drop their ballistics. We do not see that happening anytime soon, unforutunately. While were on the topic, we need to keep our eyes closely. This cost usct is, 11 million. To find ourselves launched against a scud missile that is proliferating rapidly and only cost three million dollars. This could be working against us. There are three things we can do. First, we can keep the pressure on how much our own interceptors cost. It will be helpful to buy them and economic quantities, which is proving hard to do. Second, we can continue our emphasis on developing the technologies required to hit the listach missiles left of launch. Finally, there is no shame in a passive defense, such as denial, deception, and mobility. Are adversaries are doing these things and there is no reason why we cannot as well. Finally, i would like to address other misconceptions that are out there regarding ballistics. First, is the claim that our missileDefense Systems do not work. That we cannot hit the hill. We have an excellent transfer track record of properly configured systems. We are working very hard to urge ebi issues and we expect to raise the intercept of those missiles soon. Our test record using hit to kill has put this misconception to rest. Today, for our operationally configured interceptors, we are 11 for 11. Aegist, 18 for 21. Bad, but we are determined to make it better. The second misconception is that it is easy for an adversary to employ Ballistic Missile counter measures. We will do everything we can to improve our own discriminator so is the that is, challenge of employee and deploying countermeasures. If the enemy is confronting a layered defense, it may not work in terminal. To terminal countermeasures may be destroyed in the course. Test is critical to any complex weapons system. Are adversaries just do not do much. That means they cannot know how their countermeasures perform. We have had her own countermeasures program, and extensive one. We have learned how difficult it is. Spacermeasures take up and have weight considerations. Countermeasures are not as easy as they look on paper. Last, is the narrative. Missile defense needs to be successful, especially when it involves. That is a simplistic argument. No system will achieve perfection. We do notdoes fail, necessarily expect to stop every single muscle. To be sure, we will try. The affected systems we have are further developing and are intended to determine an adversary deter an adversary. Knows that there will be a significant price to pay with a Missile Launched against the United States. The worst of all worlds is that the attack is not only not effective, but you folks a nasty response from us. So, i believe our Missile Defense is on an upward trajectory. It is very healthy at the regional level, it is on a cost curve, and it is coming back into help for defense of the homeland. I give great credit to our staff and predecessors. Shooting a bullet with a bullet is not an easy technical problem to solve. It is probably easier to kill godzilla. Or maybe even well, nevermind. It is pretty hard. It is even harder to do that when youre under time pressure. Still harder when the assets are difficult to test. And heard any political turbulent environment. But we continue to make progress. We make progress in our work with international partners. We are making progress in working with four fighters and network that is flexible, survival, and affordable. In promisingesting Technology Programs to ensure that Missile Defen