Modest number of u. S. Forces fighting with iraqi troops. Well have that hearing for you to see in its entirety at 10 deln 30 a. M. Eastern tomorrow on cspan. Vice president earlier this week taking part in the wreath laying. One of several events in recognition of vearnts veterans day. Tonight well bring you another event with veterans who served hosted usskeegie airmen by the americans veterans center. Tonight at 8 00 eastern here on cspan. Next, a look at Nuclear Proliferation and security threats facing the u. S. The speaker is former assistant secretary of state for Political Military Affairs obert glucheie who served as chief negotiator during the north koreannuke clear crisis. He recently was at the university for a little more than an hourandahalf. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this the third session. This year the series is sponsored by the Johns Hopkins applied physics lab. Each year the rethinking eminar focuses on an aspect of national and international issues. Our seminar is rethinking Global Security constructs, threats, and responses. Specific topic areas that we will try to cover this year include potential threats, adversaries, and strategies the u. S. Should consider over the next few decades. Where, when, how, and should the United States engage militarily, the post World War Ii International order, u. S. Leadership, international organizations, and multilateralism, and finally, e economic, trade, and security relationships between the u. S. , the eu, and east asia. Before introducing tonights speaker, a couple of quick announcements. First, all of our seminar talks are videotaped and posted on our website. Additionally we do post bulletized notes as well as any presentation materials that our speakers provide to us. To find our website, type three words into googles, and it will show up as the first site in google. The second anannouncement is that in order to properly videotape these events we do use wireless microphones and unfortunately your pdas cell phones or anything that uses wireless directly interferes with those microphones so i ask everybody at this time to please shut off all Wireless Communications devices. Now for tonights speaker. Ambassador robert g. A. O. Glucheie is a distinguished professor at georgetown university. Previously he has served as the president of the mcarts you are foundation, the dean of the school of Foreign Service at georgetown university, ambassador at large, and special envoy for the u. S. Department of state. He dealt with threats posed by ballistic milssles and weapeds. He was the chief weamed. He 10eu6ed served as an assistant secretary of state for plitry affairs and the deputy executive chairman of the special commission overseeing the disarmment of iraq following the 1991 gulf war. For the rethinking seminar, the ambassador will discuss Nuclear Proliferation, iran and its Nuclear Program, north korea and its program, strategies to prevent proliferation, in his views on the way ahead. Please join me in giving a warm welcome. [applause] thanks. Ladies and gentlemen, i know its required for me to say this but its actually true. Im very happy to be with you tonight. Understand that you all voted with your feet and youre pretty much volunteers for this, so im grateful youre here and im happy to have the opportunity to speak with you. So the truth about my remarks tonight are that they are not exactly as advertised. But theyre close. As duncan said, i for the last five years have not been doing things related to International Security very much. I was at the Mcarthur Foundation and in that in my with here i was concerned reducing maternal mortality, improving k12 education in the United States. Biodiversity around the world. And of course we are always very busy finding those genius that is we announce every year at mcarthur. So i havent been thinking about International Security that much. So when i left mcarthur in the summer where i now am teaching a seminar in International Security and i was by necessity reading in in that area, im teaching a graduate seminar this summertime semester. And i was struck by something. The something i was struck by was Nuclear Weapons. I was struck by the fact that and if i was titling this it would be Nuclear Weapons theyre back. And i was surprised by that, frankly. I dealt that was my area of expertise when i was in government for all those decades, and i thought there was a progression downward. And now they are back. But in most interesting ways. So what i would like to do tonight if you all would bear with me, is to go through a little bit of where weve been. To get a better appreciation of where we are. Y that, i literally mean that. I would like to take you on a little horseback ride through 70 years of our thinking on Nuclear Weapons. The theories of deterns, of vulnerability, of stability, and of credibility. I dont think without this, without an appreciateation for this Historical Context we are best able to understand where we are today given the implementties for complexities for the current situation. So cut me some slack here what im asking for. Im going to do it by decade to make it more packaged as a presentation. Then naturally in e 1940s, this is a period marked by two of the words that im going to be using, vulnerability and deterrence. As you all know, this was a period in which two things came together in technological inno vasion. One was the delivery vehicle, the v2. It became clear that a Ballistic Missile will get through. I know theres a phrase that goes to bombers. But the Ballistic Missile does get through. And one could argue its still it still gets through if there are enough of them, certainly. And the second innovation was the atomic bomb. Putting these two things 19 40s what the meant to us in our thinking was a unique vulnerability which this nation had never seen before. I could develop that. Thats another talk. But it goes from the 19th century and all that we went through, and the early 20th century, the mid 20th century. Nd at that point we recognized that we had actually no way to accomplish what the strategists would call defense by denial. We had no way to deny access to the United States of america. The Ballistic Missile will get rough and what we call the one bomb would mean sortee or one launch means one city. And that was a unique vulnerability for the United States of america which had en protected by a state it could dominate to its south, a state which was friendly to its north, and oceans on either side, and a very competent navy. That setting, which made our involvement in two world wars controversial for some people, was no longer the setting in which we lived. And thats the message of the 1940s. It meant that we were without defense by denial so we are accomplishing defense by deterrence. And we had had defense by deterrence before, but it was deterrence by denial. Theres a great book deterrence before her shame right but that was deterrence by denial. By having a very substantial defense so that anybody that presumed to attack would have to overcome that defense and by a simple cost benefit analysis did not make sense. Its also the swiss theory of defense. They cant actually accomplish absolute denial but they can raise the cost. Right . This was a different kind of defense of deterrence. This is deterrence by punishment and this is conceptually a critical difference. This meant we could not accomplish denial. There was no cost there. What we could accomplish though is punishment. Its psychological concept. And we were trading an awful lot. Ships and armies and all kind of things that gave us a physical defense by denial in exchange for no ability to really deny but an ability to punish, which is supposed to act on the mind. That is to say, after were wacked to put it in the Southern Italian vernacular, the whacker can get wacked by the whackee. Nd thats what the 40s meant. Another element of all this of course is the impossibility of knowing when this kind of deterrence works. To deter e here from attacking me by telling him that i have a spider coknife and that if he attacks me, i will survive sufficiently to stab him and punish him, i am going to say im deterring duncan from this. Now, i will never know whether deterrence works because ive just deterred duncan or i havent. Its a counter factual. My proposition is that if i did not have this knife which i claim that i have, then he would attack me. But thats not true. Right . Because he doesnt attack me. So i never know. I only know when deterrence fails. So if duncan gets up and wacks me i know my deterrent failed. But i never know when it succeeds. I can claim it succeeded but i cant actually prove it. All right. Some elements of deterrence. We move into the 1950s, a decade you might call the dullest years in the terms were now talking. Its marked by words credibility and stability. We move in technological terms from the figs weapon of the 40s to the Thermo Nuclear weapon of the 50s. And orders of magnitude here, if the nag sacki weapon was close to 20 kilotons of tnt equivalent were moving to thermo Nuclear Weapons. It is 100 times greater of two mega tons. Bigger of course, too, but also smaller. 100 times greater. So if you remember those pictures of heir sheema and nag sacki everything is leveled, you see chimneys everything here and there stone thing that is survived, thats a weapon. Heir sheema maybe 12 kilotons, nag sacki maybe 18. But multiply that by 20 you dont see chimneys any more, you see a crater. A different concept in terms of levels of destruction. In addition to that of course many more ballistic milssles, submarine launched ballistic milssles. We thought and hoped and the terms weve been talking that these weapons would allow us to put out a theory of deterrence, a policy, a doctrine of massive retaliation, and with that statement of massive retaliation we could deter everything and maybe even compel some things. Over a period of years, 1950s, the truth emerged that we could absolutely compel nothing. And only really be confident of deterrence when attacked on the homeland. But other things, very hard to deal with. We wished apparently to help the fretch, certainly these Nuclear Weapons were not going to do it. We might have wished some did to do something about the russian move on hungary in 1956. These weapons had nothing to do with this. With could claim they were a deterrent against the soviet union. But remember what i said about knowing whether a deterrent is working or not. It was a proposition that it was working. But we werent sure. There was also the realization as we understood sort of the texture of deterrence that are claims for extended deterrence that we could actually extend the Nuclear Umbrella to nato to the european states to northeast northeast asia to japan and south korea and the philippines and ausesthrailia eventually, that was the proposition. But that other word comes in here. Whats the credibility of the deterrent . Would we, as our allies said not literally but figuratively. Would we trade pittsburgh for paris . Thats just the lilt ration. Thats all im going for with that. We had somebody write about tactical Nuclear Weapons as a bridge. That would be Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in order to reassure the allies that were worried that we would not engage in Strategic Nuclear war in order to protect them from a conventional invasion in europe which we could not stop with conventional forces so is the proposition went. So the weapons also brought us to a new place not only was this the deterrent, the massive retaliation, but now were deploying weapons for actual use, for warfighting the tactical Nuclear Weapons being the first for that. Then there was the concept of stability that emerged. Initially it was a very concept. You may have heard the metaphor two scorpions in a bottle. Us and the soviet union. One scorpion bites the other scorpion, the bitee bites back and theyre both dead. It doesnt pay to bite anybody in that situation so everybody is deterred. And there was this happy concept for a while. Of the the truth situation was captured in a very influential piece written called the delicate balance of terror. And then everybody began to understand that the stability now the third word the stability of the relationship begins upon the surviveability of your capacity to strike back or your second strike capability. Just about when that is sinking n to our mindset, the russians orbit this basketball sized entity, sputnik, and the wonder of putting something in space is surpassed by the horror that if they could put something in space they could put something any place on the ground in the United States. So we leave the 50s with an appreciation for a limit of Nuclear Weapons. We leave the 50s with an understanding of the difficulty of sustaining credibility of the fragility of stability. It was not a happy place to be at that point. Urge there was something important in the election call the missile gap which was very big just before the elections and completely disooch pared after the election. It was a myth in fact. So the 1960s by the way, what you should be thinking about here or holding on to in this i find the history very interesting. You may or may not. The importance is the relevance to the situation we now have in northeast asia. We have north korea, south korea, japan south asia, india and pakistan, and the middle east with israel and iran and perhaps others. All right . Be the 1960s which might called the mcle mare years, we are again dealing with conceptionly with deterrence, the credibility of deterrence, with the concepts of stability and concepts of vulnerability. Mcin a marea offers the phrase flexible response. And it actually is used in two ways at least. One is in conventional forces a more flexible response. But its also used to cover the topics were talking about which is our Nuclear Weapons establishment. Nd what he has said we need is strike capability which is not limited to a spazzmotic response that destroys the cities of the soviet union. That this is not credible to do that. What we need is something that will be more precise, that will be more limited. And he propounds the concept of second strike counter force. We had always had before that second strike counter city or counter value, which is horrifying as it is to say it out loud, meant that we were planning to incinerate roughly 50 million innocent soviet civilians. I say innocent because i dont think they ever voted for the people who were conducting the policy so we make them innocent of that policy. But 50 million was a nice round number. And all we had were round numbers. And he said this is wrong. We would in fact be better off with a more ethicalmoral posture of attacking their forces, their military, something of their industry though that has a lot of colateral damage wit 679 that became one of the first important insights of the mcin a marea era. The second strike counter force instead of counter city. It was supposed to be captain rd in the something that was born in the early 60s, 63 i think, the single integrated Operational Plan or the sigh op which would have all the targets and match targets with our weapons system soss that when they were put before the president in a critical moment mr. President were under attack and we have a launch under attack posture, just push this button here and were good. Well, that there was a problem with that. This did not match up with flexible response. It was essentially the same smazzmotic response. Eventually the sigh op sigh op was around for a good 30 years actually 40 years. It would begin to reflect a certain flexibility. But for the first 20 years it really didnt. And it really was quite spazzmotic with enormous civilian Collateral Damage in the soviet union if it were ever excuted. The second thing about flexible response second strike counter force is that it didnt take too long before the soviets came to understand that if the United States of america was expecting its forces to survive a soviet attempt to destroy them in the first strike and have residual retaliatory force which we could deploy flexible, targeting their remaining forces, their conventional forces and their industry, it was highly likely we had the capacity to do that damage to them if we struck first and that we had what strategists called a first strike capability. That is to say we could destroy their offensive forces such that they had no means to punish us to retaliate meaning they had just lost deterrence. That was a deduction of the soviets. And i would suggest to you a correct one from the mcin a marea strategy of the 60s. We dominated overwhelmingly dominated the soviet union during this period in terms of our Strategic Nuclear forces. The russians in the 60s were very unhappy. The second thing that made them unhappy is something that sort of rhymes with what happens these days. It was mcin a marea and his colleagues enthusiasm for defense. It meant that we explored the a dm. We did this with a number of what are now called ark tech turs. One was the sentinel it was called. And that evolved into the safeguard system. It was not designed to stop a full soviet attafpblgt i9 wasnt defense by denill. It was intended to stop zepts, maybe itsdz authorized launches. It was designed because the chinese might attack us.