I look forward to working with my friends in the senate to get that reform bill enacted into law. In closing i look forward for hearing from our witnesses regarding these important issues and i would like to recognize Ranking Member defazio for an opening statement. Thank you, mr. Chairman and thanks for holding this hearing today. I certainly agree with you about the extraordinary importance on the performance of the population of the east coast on the United States on the use of this corridor on a daily basis. In terms of the number of people that use it and the contribution to the economy and what happens when that corridor goes down and i also agree that this committee does have a longterm commitment to amtrak and other infrastructure needs of the United States. Unfortunately, that is not shared by your republican colleagues on the transportation, housing, urban development subcommittee. In fact, on the day of the accident, they cut a 251 million, is it . Or 290 million from the Capital Budget of amtrak. The Capital Budget goes to things like positive train control. It also goes to things like the 140yearold tunnel if that collapses or becomes unusable, the system will totally be out of use for an indefinite period of time or many of the 100yearold bridges that need repair or replacement along that line. Any cuts to the budget of amtrak which has a 21 billion, a 21 billion backlog on Critical Infrastructure investments and maintenances investments and things that do include positive train control and do include bridgeses and bridge safety and do include signal systems and other things that are so outmoded and i dont think theyre using vacuum tubes and theyre sort of before that era. This is not ok. And to further reduce that budget is going to jeopardize minimally the operation of this corridor or even worse, cause an accident directly with the tunnel collapse or bridge collapse or failure of the signal system. We cant point to this accident and say it was directly caused by a lack of investment. Thats true. We still dont know what happened and were looking forward to the ntsb, but we do know that the ntsb first in 1969 proposed that we should move forward with positive train control and we have something called the most wanted list in 1990 and the First Edition of the most wanted list said we needed positive train control and since that time quite a number of people have died in preventable accidents around the country because of the lack of positive train control. Yes. Human error. Thats what positive train control is designed to prevent. Human error. We still dont know if it was a mechanical malfunction. Its a relatively knew train set, but we dont know yet. The point is ptc could prevent accidents like this. It could have prevented many other accidents over the last two decades since it was first recommended by ntsb and we need to move forward with all due dispatch in installing that system on Commuter Railroads and passenger or other Passenger Railroads or the entire amtrak system or on those required critical Freight Lines and particularly those carrying hass douse materials and broken areas. Im pleased we are here today to try and understand better what caused this accident and what to do to prevent it in the future and i dont think well get to a definitive point, but for me the bottom line is we can no longer ignore a 21 billion backlog. We cant ignore were running trains over 100yearold bridges of dubious stability. We cant ignore that were running trains through 140yearold tunnels that need total rehabilitation. We cant any longer ignore the fact that we have signalization systems that are, you know prevacuum tube era that are trying to link into more modern, sophisticated systems. So there is much to be done, and i wish that all our colleagues in congress shared our commitment to infrastructure investment. With that, mr. Chairman, i yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, gentlemen and they will now recognize the subcommittee chairman on railroads, pipelines. Thank you and good morning. First, let me thank you for holding this hearing and obviously, very important. I also want to thank the Ranking Member capuano for quickly going up to philadelphia and really surveying the situation and it was important to understand specifically some of the things that were happening, but let mee me let me talk a little bit about my frustration. We went up there to immediately assess the situation. Individual was already making definitive statements and now three weeks later while we had a brand new locomotive we cant confirm whether or not there was a malfunction with that locomotive and even though ntsb made definitive statements still cannot defend whether or not there was an operator error, cannot identify whether or nots there was an engineer that bypassed the system. The engineer has been working with ntsb, but still cannot verify that the cell phone that was in use whether it was texting or using Cell Phone Service during that time. Its my understanding the engineer has given his password and we still cant identify whether or not there was an issue. The ntsb came out and made an immediate statement a couple of hours after the accident and three weeks later is unable to identify any of these issues around it. I think this committee expects answers. I think these families are owed answers. I think the American Public is looking to make sure that rail safe across our entire nation. Were also looking for solutions. Im looking forward to seeing ptc implemented in a very, very quick manner and i ask that you take a look at this emergency proclamation that was put out, emergency order that was put out by fra. My concern is a year and a half ago when we had metro north, one of the worst accidents this country has ever seen and almost the exact same emergency order was put out a year and a half ago saying ptc was important and that we still dont have ptc on that area of track either. Now a new emergency order saying we will have amtrak on the northeast corridor by the end of the year. Obviously, we have concerns. We are looking for solutions. I think the families deserve to hear what those solutions are and more importantly, those solutions are put into place. With that, i yield back. We recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, mr. Capuano. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Welcome to the members of the board. Im looking forward to your testimony testimony. We want answers and more than anything else, they need to be right and not just speculation. I also want to comment that i know many people along the northeast corridor and particularly those in philadelphia, my friend congressman brady and my friend are watching this closely and they want answers, as well and theyll be keeping a close eye on this. I guess im looking forward to the specific lessons we learned and also the lessons that congress has learned and what should our priorities be. We talk a good game, are we going to fund this or are we not going to fund this . Ptc is not new and not limited just to amtrak. Positive train control issued across the country of every rail line in this country. Are we going to require it or are we not . Everybody here knows we dont want to talk about it and there are proposals floating around congress to delay it even further and we all understand the realities of the costs involved and those are questions we need ask in a serious basis how much responsibility will we as a member of Congress Take on our shoulders the next time an accident happens and we look in the mirror. Have we done everything we can reasonably do . Reasonably do to prevent it, and i think im not looking for scapegoat scapegoats. I am looking for answers as we all are, and i have full faith that the ntsb along with the fra and amtrak will find those answers and again, i want them quickly, but more importantly, i want them right. I appreciate you being here i appreciate the chairman calling this hearing very much. I yield back. Thank you. With that, i would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. Thank you for being here today. First, the honorable Christopher Hart is the chairman of the National Transportation safety board board. Next, joseph boardman, the president and chief executive offer of amtrak, next miss sarah feinberg, for federal Railroad Administration and just been nominated and congratulations as you go through that process. Good luck. The brotherhood of local employ nears and Train Derailment. I ask that our witnesses full statements be included in the record and without objection, so ordered since your complete written testimony will be in the record ill ask you to keep it to five minutes, your statement and with that well start with mr. Hart, please proceed. Thank you and good morning. Chairman schuster and Ranking Member defazio and members of the committee, thank you for inviting the ntsb to appear before you today. Can you pull your my closer the ntsb determined that seconds before the derailment, the train was traveling at 106 miles an hour. Emergency braking was applied but the train slowed to only 102 miles and hour before the data recording ended. Sadly, eight people were killed and more than 200 people were injured. On behalf of the ntsb, i would like to offer my sincerest condolences to those who lost loved ones and our thoughts remain with those who are still recovering from their injuries. Briefly, air is who will explore include track recorder, mechanical signals, operations human performance, survival factors and medical. At i can report to you today. We know a properly installed and functional positive train control or ptc would have prevented this accident. Ptc is technology that is designed to prevent overspeed derailments as well as train to train collisions and they worked protection zones and proceeding through misaligned switches. The accident we have investigated have shown us that we need technology that can step in when humans fail due to distraction, medical conditions or other factors. As a result, the ntsb has called for Train Control Technology for decades as was mentioned since 1969. Present law requires implementation of ptc by the end of this year and seven years after the mandate was signed by congress into law. We know most railroads will not comply with this law. Those railroads that have made the difficult decisions and the safety enhancement should be commented for this leadership. It much have a trance parents accounting of the steps that have been taken to meet a new deadline. Regulators and policymakers need that information to make important policy decisions and the traveling public deserves that accountability. Rail car crash worthiness is another area that well investigate. As you can see from the picture, the survival space in the first Passenger Car was severely com from myselfed. We will fully document and analyze the damage to this car and other cars and make recommendations that the ntsb determines are necessary to improve crash worthiness and improve on recommendations in this area. We have received full cooperation from the crew and their interviews and followup conversations. As you know, we are evaluating the engineers cell phone records to coordinate the timing and voice activity with the accident time line. This process involves reviewing the time stamps from the phone records which are from different time zones with data from other information, such as the locomotive event recorder and the outward facing camera and Radio Communications and surveil surveillance video. When we have clarity on this time line we will release this information to you and to the public. Additionally, the ntsb has called for inward and outward facing video and with audio recordings on trains. Since amtrak uses outward facing cameras at the time of this accident. These cameras can provide critical information with the ntsb as we work to determine ways to prevent future accidents. In this case the engineer states that he has no memory of the events leading up to the derailment and video can fill in those gaps. Im encouraged by amtraks announcement that they intend to stall inward facing cameras and we install audio recordings, as well. We look forward to learning more about the amtrak initiative and i hope they proceed with both inward facing cameras and locomotive audio recorders throughout the fleet. As i stated, we have much work ahead of us and i will keep you informed as this investigation proceeds and im available to answer your questions. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Hart. With that, mr. Boardman, please proceed. Mr. Boardman thank you. Im going to start this morning by offering my heartfelt regret for the recent derailment at frankfurt junction. It was amtraks train on our railroad and were responsible for the incident and its consequences. I regret it deeply, and based on the conversations ive had over the last three weeks that sentiment is shared by everyone in our company. Everything weve done since the accident has been driven by a sincere hope that we can do something, however small, to mitigate the suffering and loss that everyone endured as a result of this terrible accident. Weve been greatly helped in that effort by the people of philadelphia and i would like to thank all of them, but particularly mayor nutter and the staff of the hospitals thank you for everything you did on behalf of the passengers and employees. I should also take this opportunity to know that we want to do everything to support the visa the ntsbs investigation. Ill refrain from addressing matters that are still under investigation. Well be working closely with both the ntsb and the regulators and the fra to ensure that we address the root causes of this accident and to you, ladies and gentlemen of the committee and to our passengers and employees. We run a safe railroad and safety will continue to be our top priority. The northeast corridor in particular has an excellent Safety Record and this is so shocking because it is so unexpected. In no other place in the country is the comparable volume moved. The last fatal accident on the northeast corridor occurred 28 years ago. The northeast corridors Safety Systems are the best in the country. We operate a layered signal system that provides it with multiple levels of protection. There is an alert that engineers are awake. There is an automatic cab control system to prevent train collisions and stop the train if the crews fail to acknowledge or comply with signals and theres the enforcement system, amtrak thats amtraks positive train control system. To stop trains that engineers have failed to comply with authorized speed limits. At points between washington and new york were trained to exceed 125 miles an hour. Its installed in the amtrak that operate the northeast cor door and should be to apply in december 31, 2015. This stops people responsible for Safe Movement of the trains. We operate an oversight and coaching system from the crews. Our engineers and conductors are required to pass an extensive fraapproved Training Program and to develop a high level of familiarity with the route. Probably millions of train movements negotiated a curve at frankfurt junction safely since amtrak took over the northeast cor door in 1976. The system works because generally speaking weve put together a series of layered nets each guarding the previous layer. We rely on these systems where we have not been able to completely eliminate the risk of human error. There is alsz a rick of a gap in the most tightly woven net. The train 188 derailment revealed one such hole in the safety net and in the weeks since the derailment people have asked a seemingly simple question. Why didnt the track have some kind of safety feature involved to force the engineer to slow the train . This is the right question to ask and ill address it directly while providing you a necessary Background Information to understand the answer. In 1990 an ak track train derailed on a sharp curve in back based station in boston and collided with an oncoming mbta train. It failed to slow before the curve. Shortly thereafter industry operator reviewed the nec and other places where the approach speed of a train was greater at which the speed might derail in the curve. If an engineer failed to slow down. At those points we modified the system by installing a code if an engineer a code change point to force engineers to slow down. The southbound tracks at frankfurt junction were one such place. The derailment speed at frankfurt junction is 98 miles an hour. It approached that curve at 80 miles an hour while the southbound train approaches at 110 miles an hour. So in short, when a train approaches from one direction, but doesnt slow down theres no risk of derailment, but if a train comes from the other direction and doesnt slow down for whatever reason there, is a risk of derailment. We, therefore, apply the modification to the southbound tracks so the trains approaching from the north at spees of 110 would receive the signal indication from the cab just before the curve forcing them to slow at 45 miles an hour so that they can pass through the curve sifly at 85 miles an hour. They didnt have the same protectionic stalled because the approach speed was 80 miles an hour which was slow enough that a train could round the curve at that speed without derailing if the engineer failed to slow down. At that time, the notion that an engineer might actually accelerate into the northbound curve was not a circumstance we anticipated and thus, we didnt mitigate for. It was a reasonable decision reached by reasonable experts under reasonable circumstances and since this and similar change points were installed in 1991, the application of this policy successfully prevented overspeed derailments throughout the northeast corridor for about 25 years. That clearly changed on may 12th. The proper response now is for us to figure out what happened and to narrow or eliminate the gap so that this accident cannot happen again. The full implementation of ptc later this year will be a major step forward in this regard until it is full ney service and were working now to implement the measures called for in the emergency order to ensure the safety of the trains and passen