It would be operation and maintenance that would move it. Because as i understand it, it is moving it from one location for the to the east. So there would be some cost in rail or truck or driving, you know, transportation costs that would be out of onm costs whether that is out of the do you have any thoughts about the well, it is part of the contingencies of a dangerous world. As you saw, a lot of what we have in the overseas contingency account is onm funds. Not just for the middle east, but also for what is happening in the far east and in the Eastern Europe as well. On syria, carter said they want enough people entering the program to to send a force in to fight isil. Was that news to you . Is there any hope left for that program . [laughter] hope is not a strategy, isnt that the theme of the day . I dont know. He is not the first person who has said iraq is easy compared to syria. You know, i see little prospect of having a ground force that ray trains, that can push back against isil in the near term. It is the kurds who have made some gains in the north. I appreciate that theres somebody there, you know, willing to fight. But the kurds are not going to remove isil from syria. You know, they are doing good work, but they cant do it on their own. Thank you all. Have a good rest of your days. You too. [indistinct chatter] on this fathers day, members of congress are tweeting out their own messages. Pete olson tweets, being a dad is the best job in the world. Happy fathers day to all the dads out there. Hank johnson says, happy fathers day. Already have the best gift i could ask for, a wonderful and supportive wife. Amy of minnesota tweets, happy fathers day to my dad, who taught me to climb lifes highest mountains, which he has. And tom tiller says, happy fathers day to all fathers across north carolina. Being a dad is the greatest blessing of my life. Like many of us, first families take occasion time. And like president s and first ladies, a good read can be the perfect companion for your summer journeys. What better book than one that appears inside the personal life of every first lady in American History . First ladies, on the lives of 45 iconic american women. Inspiring stories of fascinating women who survive the scrutiny of the white house. A great summertime read. Available from Public Affairs as a hardcover or ebook. Officials from the Transportation Security Administration say that the 73 tsa employees identified in a recent internal report are not known terrorists and did not pose a threat to transportation to katie. A tsa Deputy Assistant administrator announced this news at a House Homeland Security subcommittee meeting. Other witnesses include the Inspector General, john roth. This is one hour 15 minutes. John katko the committee on Homeland Security subcommittee on transportation security will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I would like to welcome everyone to todays hearing on how tsa can improve aviation worker vetting. Since the start of the congress, my subcommittee has actively engaged and examined a number of alarming aspects related to tsa s operations, policies, and procedures. Through hearings, oversight inquiries, and legislation, weve been working to get to the bottom of these issues and raise awareness of the urgent need to fix them. Recent revelations that the tsa cleared for employment individuals with potential ties to terrorism demonstrate the dire need for improved, streamline procedures at tsa. The findings released by the department of Homeland SecurityInspector General over the last few weeks are indeed alarming. In may, the Inspector General released a report that found tsa did not have the appropriate controls in place to ensure that screening equipment has necessary Maintenance Work performed. A few weeks ago, news outlets reported test results showing its screeners failed to detect prohibitive threat items 96 percent of the time. And just last week, we learned that 73 airport employees with potential ties to terrorism were issued credentials which allow them to get access to secure areas of airports. These more recently we learned and an employee of the faa bypassing security and flying with a loaded firearm using his badge. More recently we learned of a drugtrafficking ring operating out of the airport in oakland california. All of these findings individually are concerning, and in the aggregate, well, they just shake the publics confidence and only demonstrate the leadership needed at the tsa. This committee will come excuse me, this committee will continue to lead efforts to close security loopholes and ensure the continuing safety and security of our nations aviation system. The purpose of todays hearing is to thoroughly examine the identified security gaps highlighted in the most recent i. G. Report about aviation worker vetting and find ways to improve the vetting process to improve that these probabilities are addressed and the American People can feel safe when traveling. Aviation workers are supposed to be thoroughly vetted due to their continuing access to sensitive areas of airports and the fact that they hold a position of trust within the transportation system. However as the ig report has found so clearly there are significant shortfalls in the vetting policies. For example, the i. G. Found that tsa does not have access to all the data it may need to thoroughly check an aviation workers potential ties to terrorism. However, what is even more alarming is that a memo was sent to the tsa administrator last year noting the need for Additional Information and tsa has dealt yet to resolve this gap. A year later. The report also found that airports do not match the Expiration Date of an employees credentials to the expiration of their legal Work Authorization in the United States. Again, while tsa stated they are working to resolve these issues by the end of the calendar year it raises serious concerns that this gap exists in the first place. Therefore, i have sponsored hr2750. Which i introduced last week. Along with chairman mccall and raking member rice and congressman payne to close these security gaps and ensure the safety of the transportation networks. The reality is, in this post9 11 world, that the terrorist threat is metastasizing, and we as a nation must remain responsive to any holes in the security of our transportation system. And ensure that the protocols keep pace with the ever evolving threat landscape. Improving the vetting of the aviation workers who have access to these sensitive areas of airports can help close those close another back door vulnerability at our nations airports at todays hearing have representatives from the tsa, the Inspector General himself to address how recommendations can be implemented and what tools are needed to improve the security at our airports. I look forward to hearing their testimony and having a meaningful dialogue on how we can better protect this Vital Transportation mode and keep aviation safe and secure for the American People the chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from new york, ms. Rice, for any statement she may have. Kathleen rice thank you, mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this hearing. We have an important question to answer today how can we do a better job vetting aviation workers . How can we do a better job ensuring that criminals and terrorists cannot get jobs in our airports. Clearly, if a terrorist were to penetrate an airport in that way, the results could be catastrophic. We have to assume that right now someone is time to do just that. We have to assume that we can prevent it. We have to keep working together to strengthen our security, find and close the gaps, and stay one step ahead. Tsas responsible for vetting Diverse Groups of people, from the transit worker identification Credential Program to precheck to aviation worker programs. Aviation workers themselves are a Diverse Group of people who play many different and important roles within the commercial airport environment. From the person who works at the newsstand to the mechanic who has to access to the plane itself to perform his or her duties. What these two people have in common is that they both go to work everyday beyond the checkpoints in a secure area of the airport. We have to do everything within our power to ensure that people who go to work in the secure areas are exhaustively vetted, both before employment and on a recurring basis. Last week the department of Homeland Security office of Inspector General issued a report that detailed how 73 individuals with links to terrorism were able to get jobs with airlines and airport vendors and were clear to act as secured areas. That is unacceptable. First, we should all be grateful to the Inspector General for bringing this to our attention and to know that this threat was out there to think about what could have happened should be all the motivation we need to work together, act swiftly, and do what needs to be done. That is why we are here today. Not to create a spectacle or cast blame, we are here to figure out how this happened, what we need to learn from it, and what we need to do. I also want to point out that Inspector General roth himself noted that tsas vetting process was, quote, generally effective. So that is not the problem here. As far as i understand, there seems to be two main factors. Number one, because of the current interagency watch list policy, tsa doesnt have access to databases that would capture the individuals in question and alerted tsa to their terrorism indicators. That is unacceptable and has to change. Tsa should have had access to all information about these individuals, and access to any and all information that will make their vetting process as exhaustive as possible. Number two, the report also made it clear that tsas own databases are a mess, 87,000 employee files without Social Security numbers, many with no passport number or proof of citizenship. 300 files with no full names for the employees. There is no excuse for that. It strikes me gaza as i am sure everyone, as sloppy. We strive for a Security System that is airtight and precise. In order to achieve that, our information must be airtight. Everything we do much be precise. The Inspector Generals office has issued six recommendations all of which will help to address these issues and i appreciate the fact that tsa has concurred with these implementations. I look for to hearing more about these issues today. And after this hearing, i look forward to taking up legislation that will quantify recommendations from this report and from another oig report that details the need for tsa to properly manage its airport screening equipment maintenance program. I want to thank each one of our witnesses for being here today. Im eager to hear all of your testimony and have a productive conversation about how we can do a better job vetting aviation workers how we can keep a particular, and keeping passengers safe. Mr. Chairman, i thank you again for convening this hearing, and i yield back the balance of my time. John katko thank you, ms. Rice. I know at least the chairman of the Homeland Security full committee, mr. Mccaul plans on coming here, making a statement. When he comes, we will give. Give him an opportunity to do so. I will extend the same courtesy to mr. Thompson if he shows up. With respect to other members of the committee, i want to remind you that Opening Statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses before us today. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statements will appear in our record. Somebody has well familiar to this committee and to Homeland Security as a whole is mr. Roth. Welcome back and thank you for your continuing good work, sir. Ms. Ms. Fitzmaurice from the Homeland Security committee or of tsa, excuse me, of tsa, thank you for being here. And, ms. Grover, thank you for being here, as well. Id like to hear from mr. Roth with respect to his opening statement. John roth chairman katko, Ranking Member rice and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the results of our most the airports themselves collect this information used for vetting and submit it to tsa through a contractor. Once tsa receives biographic data, it is electronically matches it against a terrorist screening database to identify individuals with potential links to terrorism. Tsa also currently bets airport workers every time it receives a watchlist update. Based upon this review the tsa may revoke a credential after quite a nation with other government agencies. We found that tsa was generally effective in identifying individuals with links to terrorism. However, we did uncover a significant weakness. At our request, the National Counterterrorism center before a data match of over 900,000 airport workers who have access to secure areas against the National Counterterrorism centers database. As a result of this match, we identified 73 individuals with terrorism related category codes within the database who also had active airport credentials. According to tsa officials current interagency policy prevents tsa from receiving all terrorismrelated codes during batting, and this lack of access to complete records resulted in tsa not discovering the issue with the 73 individuals. Tsa officials candidly recognize that not receiving these codes represents a weakness in its program, and informed us that tsa cannot guarantee that it can consistently identify all questionable individuals without receiving those categories. In 2014, the tsa administrator authorized his staff to request some of the missing category codes for vetting. However, according to an official at the dhs office of policy, tsa and dhs have yet to formalize their request to be watchlist Interagency Policy Committee in order to receive additional categories. Additionally, we found an issue with the manner in which airport workers are checked for criminal histories. The airports themselves maintain the ultimate authority to review and determine whether an individual costs criminal history contains this qualifying crimes under federal law. However, tsa did not have adequate monitoring processes in place to ensure that Airport Operators properly entered a gated these histories. Tsa officials informed us that airport officials rarely or almost never, documented the results of their criminal history reviews electronically. Without sufficient documentation, tsa cannot systematically determine whether individuals with access to secure areas of the airport are free of disqualifying criminal convictions. Moreover, under current law and fbi policy, tsa and the airports are not legally authorized to conduct recurrent vetting of criminal histories. We also found a weakness in the verification process for an individuals authorization to work in the United States. As with criminal histories, it is the Airport Operators who are required to ensure that aviation workers are authorized to work before sending their information to tsa for review. Tsa then verifies that aviation workers have lawful status. However, a review of tsa data showed that tsa has had to deny credentials for over 4,800 applicants because tsa determined that they did not prove their lawful status, even after appeal. Now this occurred despite the fact that these individuals had previously been cleared to work at the airports being a legally authorized to work. Finally, we looked at the quality of the data that is involved in worker vetting. Tsa relied on relies on airports to complete to submit complete and accurate aviation worker data; however we identified thousands of records that appear to have incomplete or inaccurate biographical information. We made six recommendations in our report. Tsa agreed to all the recommendations and provided target completion dates for corrective actions. We will followup on the implementation of these corrective actions. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to testify here today. I look forward to any questions you or other members of the committee may have. John katko thank you, mr. Roth for roth for your continued professionalism in handling these matters. We appreciate you being here today, of course, and our. Our second witness, the Deputy Assistant for analysis. Prior to her current role, ms. Fitzmaurice served as Division Director for the Checkpoint Solutions and Integrity Division within tsas office of security capabilities. In this position, she led efforts to identify, acquire, and manage stateoftheart technologies and capabilities that screen passengers at u. S. Airports. Prior to beginning her federal career, ms. Fitzmaurice held management positions at airlines reporting corporation, u. S. Airways and trans state airlines. The chair now recognizes ms. Fitzmaurice to testify. Stacey fitzmaurice good morning, chairman katko, Ranking Member rice and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the