And yes, the Intelligence Community assessment served as the basis for what ambassador rice said when she appeared on the sunday show. And on september 18th, when the video footage arrived from the security cameras the deputy cia director has testified it was not until september 18th, when the cia received the libyan governments assessment of video footage that showed the front of the facility with no sign of protesters that it became clear we needed to revisit our analysis. And then, after they looked at the video footage and fbi reporting from interviews of personnel on the ground in benghazi during the attacks the cia changed its assessment. And that was explained thoroughly in the bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on intelligence which did a very thorough job, congressman. Gentleman yields back, well take a quick break for ten minutes, ten seconds i just wanted to point out that the Ranking Member is actually incorrect. The august 17th memo that i referred to in my last question we have not had the opportunity to discuss with secretary clinton and how it affected her decision. And it was just classified last week. Room. Well take your calls and anymore breaks when this wraps up. But well return here to the select committee on benghazi. Welcome back, madam secretary, the chair will recognize the gentleman from illinois, mr. Roscoe. Thank you, the other side has admonished the republicans for not having a theory. Let me tell you a little bit of a theory that i have developed from my reading and research and listening today. And its this. That you initiated a policy to put the United States into libya as the secretary of state. And you overcame a number of obstacles within the administration to advocate for military action. And you were successful in doing that. Ultimately the decision was the president s as you acknowledge. But you were the prime mover. You were the one driving, even in something called the clinton doctrine. And you were concerned about image and credit which is not something unfamiliar to people in public life. But then i think something happened. And my theory is that after Moammar Gadhafis death, then i think your interest and attention waned. And i think the emails that mrs. Brooks put forth, you had an answer and that was look i got a lot of information from a lot of different places. But i think you basically gave a victory lap, sort of a Mission Accomplished quote in october 30th, 2011 in the washington post. This is what you said, very declarative. We set into motion a policy on the right side of history, on the right side of our values and Strategic Interests in the region. It has all of the feel of a victory lap. But there was a problem. And the problem, madam secretary was that there were storm clouds gathering. And the storm clouds that were gathering was a deteriorating security situation in benghazi. And you had a lot to lose if benghazi unravelled. If libya unravelled, you had had a lot to lose, based on the victories, the sunday shows, based on the favorable accolades that were coming. If it went the wrong direction it would be on you. And if it was stable and it was the right direction you were the beneficiary of that. So the question is, how is it possible that these urgent requests that came in, how did they not break through to the very upper levels of your inner circle . People who are here today, people who served you . How did those requests from two ambassadors, ambassador kretz and ambassador stevens that came in on these dates, june, july, of 2012, how did those break through . You told us they were not your job, basically, you said you were not responsible. But here is in theory. To admit the need for more security was to admit that there was a deteriorating situation. And to admit a deteriorating situation didnt fit your narrative of a successful foreign policy. Where did i get that wrong . Congressman, look, we knew that libyas transition from the brutal dictatorship of Moammar Gadhafi, which basically destroyed or undermined every institution in the country would be challenging and we planned accordingly. We worked closely with the libyan people, with our allies in europe. With our neighbors in the region to make sure we tried to get position to help the libyan people. And yes, the volatile security in libya complicated the efforts. And ill speak for myself, i absolutely did not forget about libya after Moammar Gadhafi fell. We worked together and offered a wide range of technical assistance. We were very much involved in helping them provide their first parliamentary election. That was quite an accomplishment. A lot of other countries that were postconflict did not have anything like the positive elections that libya did. In july of 2012, the Transitional Government handed over power to a new General National Congress in august. We were doing everything we could think of to help libya succeed. We tried to bolster the effectiveness of the interim government and worked very hard to get rid of the chemical weapons, worked very hard with the transitioning government in libya. And february 2014, we had assistance in destroying the last of Moammar Gadhafis weapons. We were combatting the spread of antiaircraft shoulderfired missiles because of the danger that they posed to commercial aircraft. And we were providing assistance, some of which i discussed earlier with congresswoman roby. We had humanitarian assistance. We brought people for help to europe. And to the United States. But much of awwhat we offered, despite our best efforts, we had the Prime Minister come to washington in 2012. Much of what we offered was difficult for the libyans to understand how we accepted. I stayed in close contact, both of my deputies went there. We talked with the libyan leadership frequently by phone from washington and communicated regularly. I have said with our team based in tripoli and all of this focused on trying to help stand up a new interim government. And we were making progress on demilitarization, demobilization, trying to integrate the militia fighters on libyabased weapons. It was important to recognize. I was ultimately responsibility for security, the responsibility for what happened in benghazi what does that mean when you say you took responsibility . When mr. Westmoreland asked you that question you said contracting and so forth. What does that mean . If you are responsible, what action would you have done differently. What do you own as a result so far ive heard one dismissive thing after another. It was this group, it was that group. I was not served by this. What did you do . What do you own . Well, i was just telling you some of the many related issues i was working on to try to help the libyan people. What is your responsibility to benghazi . That is my question . Well, my responsibility was to be briefed and to discuss with the Security Experts and the policy experts whether we would have a post in benghazi. Whether we would continue it. Whether we would make it permanent. And as i have said repeatedly throughout the day no one ever recommended closing the post in benghazi. No one recommended closing but you had two ambassadors that made several, several requests and here is basically what happened to their requests. They were torn up. Well, that is just not true, congressman. I know madam secretary, they didnt get through. It didnt help them. Were those responded to . Is that your testimony today . Many were responded to, there were affirmative responses you laid this on Chris Stevens, didnt you . You said earlier, he knows where to pull the levers, so arent you implying that it is his responsibility to figure out how he is supposed to be secure, because Chris Stevens knows how to pull the levers . Is that your testimony . Ambassadors are the ones who pass on security recommendations and requests. That is true throughout the world. And when he does, and theyre not responded to what is his remedy if theyre not responded to . What is his remedy if its no . As i testified earlier, he was in regular email contact with some of my closest advisers. Is that it he was in regular email contact and cable contact cables didnt get through. You created an environment, madam secretary, where the cables couldnt get through, now that is inaccurate, cables as we testified they didnt get through to you, and break into your inner circle, you cant say all of this information came in to me. And i was able to process it and yet it all stops at the Security Professionals. Well, that is not what i was saying. Congressman, that is not what i was saying. Congressman, we tried to clarify millions of cables come in. Theyre processed and sent to the appropriate offices and personnel they didnt get through. They didnt make any difference. They couldnt break into the inner circle of decisionmaking. Now, let me draw your attention in closing to testimony although gave before the House Foreign Affairs committee in january 2013. And you said some wonderful things about ambassador stevens, similar to what you said in your Opening Statement today. And they were words that were warm and inspirational. And reflecting on his bravery. But i think in light of the facts that have come out since your testimony. And i think in light of things that the committee has learned, he is even braver than you acknowledged. In january 2013, this is what you said to congress, nobody knew the dangers or the opportunities better than chris. During the first revolution and then the transition, a weak libyan government, marauding militias, even terrorist groups, a bomb exploded in his parking lot hotel. He never waivered or asked to come home or said shut it down, lets go somewhere else. Because he understood it was pivotal for america to be represented at the time. Secretary clinton, you should have added this. Chris stevens kept faith in the state department that i headed even when we broke faith with him. He accepted my invitation to work in benghazi even though he was denied the security we implored to give him. We breached our fundamental duty to mitigate his danger and secure his safety. And that of glenn dougherty, shawn smith, and woods, would that be accurate . I would not say that. I think it is a disservice for you to make that statement, congressman. And who does it disserve . Well, it is a disservice of how hard the people who are given the responsibility of making these tough security decisions the people that were disciplined, did they keep faith with Chris Stevens . No. Well, Chris Stevens was someone who had a commitment to our presence in libya there was no question. And we want to honor that there is no question. By continuing to do what we can to support the libyan peoples transition. It is very much in my view in americas interest to continue to try to do so. I yield back. The gentlemans time has expired. The chair will recognize the gentle lady from illinois, ms. Duckworth. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i want to talk a little bit more about what has been done for embassy security, personnel Diplomatic Security since then. My understanding in benghazi, there were some security improvements that were made. Could you talk about some of those . Both prior to the attacks as well as some other things you said alluded to with more ventilation in the safe rooms, some of those things . Yeah, there were a number of security improvements that were made to the facility, again, there was emphasis on trying to work on the outer walls, to try to create a more effective guard. There was an effort to try to make sure that the facility itself was hardened so that it could withstand attacks, if that came to pass. It was in a series of decisions made by the Security Professionals in november of 2011, our people in benghazi said they needed to hire additional local guards, money was approved that day. In december of that year they asked for money to buy jersey barriers. The funds were sent that week. In january of 2012, the rso, meaning a Regional Security officer requested that all personnel deploying to tripoli and benghazi for 30 days repeat the Foreign AffairsTraining Course which was soon implemented. Also in january 2012 they asked for money for sandbag, security lights, steel door upgrades, re re reinforced car barriers, later that month they were sent response equipment. In february of 2012 they requested support for a major renovation of the walls surrounding the complex, including making the walls higher, adding wire, laying barbed wire. That project was completed. In march 2012 they asked to construct two guard positions. That was completed. In april 2012 they needed help from experts and security, by may, a special team visited to handle special security and lighting. In june, 2012, following the ied incident, immediately a Regional Team was sent to enhance the position, and additional funding was approved for more guards. In july 2012 they said that they needed a minimum of three American Security officers in benghazi. From then on through july, august and september they always had three, four or five american ds agents overseeing the expansion of contingent guards on site. Those are just some of the responses, congresswoman, that were provided specifically for benghazi. Thank you. We know that short of putting people in bunkers and never allowing them outside of Embassy Compounds were going to have some sort of threat to our Diplomatic Security personnel. I mean, obviously, it was not enough. What i would like to know is in light of that what efforts have been put into provide for contingency operations, especially for known potentially volatile periods in the year. We know that september or other times will be volatile. Would you talk a little bit about what you would have done and put in place and any difficulties you may have come across in coordinating with the dod, intelligence agencies across the government. I know this is not a secure room so we cant talk about things that are rated secret. But september 11th is coming. Part of the moving the aircraft carriers nearby, are we putting aircraft on a leash, with one aircraft on a twohour leash . What are we doing . Gearing up ready to go. What is going on in light of the Lessons Learned at benghazi, and what did you personally direct to happen, especially at your level of interagency cooperation . An excellent question and really at the heart of what i hope will come out of this and the prior investigations. In december of 2014, assistant secretary star from the state department testified before the select committee that 25 of the 29 recommendations made had been completed. And a september 2013 Inspector Generals report noted that the arb recommendations were made in a way that was quickly taken seriously. And that i took charge directly of oversight for the implementation process. Here are some examples, more Diplomatic Security and dod personnel are on the ground at our facilities today. We have increased the skills and competentsy for agencies by increasing the training time in the high threat course. Weve expanded the Foreign Affairs counter threat course so that the skills are shared by not just the Diplomatic Security agents but people like Chris Stevens and shawn smith, as well. Weve also been working hard to up the interagency cooperation. The interagency security teams that you asked about earlier, congresswoman, that is a continuing commitment that we are working on. And i know because of this terrible tragedy, dod is much more focused on what needs to be thought through with respect to planning and reaction. You know, we had problems in the past with the pastor from florida, terry jones, inciting riots and protests that resulted in the deaths of people, including u. N. And others who were stationed in afghanistan. So were trying to stay in very close touch between the state department and dod. In that case, secretary gates called him and asked him please not to get involved in what he was doing because it was dangerous to our troops and our civilians. Unfortunately, he has a mind apparently of his own. We are trying to have a closer coordinated planning and response effort. With respect to your specific questions that are really within the purview of the department of defense like the deployment of certain navy vessels, air wings and the like, i think dod is trying hard to think about how particularly in north africa and the middle east they can respond because one of the claims that was made that was proven to be untrue was that dod withheld sending air support, and indeed the closest air support that would have been in any way relevant was too far away so theyre trying to think about how they better deploy and station various assets so that they can have a quicker response time. Ive not been involved intimately in this now for two years i guess more than two years, so i cant speak directly but i know that this was part of the important work that was under way when i left. You spoke about you thank you. You spoke about you making personal phone calls to ask for help from the heads of local government. And you spoke a lot about the power of the chief of the mission, the trust that you put in to these professionals that are there. So when an embassy comes under attack, especially after this benghazi attack, from this time forward do ambassadors do they need to call you to ask for help from other agencies of u. S. Government . Or do they have the ability if theres a dod if there is a cia or dod force nearby, a marine fast team, for example, does the ambassador have to come through security or do they need to call you to have you call for that . How does that work .