Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of our witnesses. Thank you for your extraordinary gestures to come back to this committee over and over again both in public and private to work on this most important question that the Foreign Relations committee and Congress Takes up, the question of when to commit u. S. Personnel into war. I remain as frustrated as many of my colleagues over this question over definitions. Every different member of the administration that we talk to seems to have a slightly different interpretation of what these words mean and i cant blame them. As secretary carter said, there is no historical operational definition of these words. I think the lack of consistency has hampered our efforts to get on the same page together. If we resort to just an understanding that these words mean something less than what happened in iraq and afghanistan, that really is no limitation at all. I am barely a lawyer. I practiced for four years, but i remember the concept of statues being voided because of the vagueness. I fear this would suffer that same problem if we were not able to get a consistent understanding of what those terms mean. I want to ask, one point of clarification on a piece of this terminology. That is back to you, secretary carter. I was pleased by the language in the draft from the administration defining associated forces, including this limitation that it would be restricted to organizations that were actively engaged in fights against the United States. I just want to clarify, you said in your testimony it would be limited to associated forces thats where actively engaged against the United States but the language actually says engaged in hostilities against the United States or our partners. As to the the question of boko haram, if it is covered under this. So long as they are engaged in hostilities against the coalition partner, isnt it true that this authorization would give the United States the ability, subject to the other restrictions in the authorization, to engage in hostilities against that organization . I think you are reading it right. Given that reading, let me ask again, would boko haram, pledging allegiance to isis, be covered if the country in which they were engaging in hostilities was a partner to the United States. Defense secretary carter i cant give you a legal answer but i can give you a commonsense answer. This is a an aumf that focuses on isis. We have authorities already alluded to in the 2001, which also cover other situations, including some that might involve boko haram that allows us to take action to protect ourselves in that case. But this is focused on isil and the associated forces there. When they engage in operations against us or our Coalition Partners, that can be interpreted but has not yet been interpreted to cover other groups like boko haram. Just to be clear, under the 2001 authorities, this is important to me, because we have to protect ourselves, there are authorities under the 2001 also that could extend to boko haram depending on their behavior and the kinds of actions we need to take to protect ourselves. These are always in my experience, and again, im not a lawyer, just observing this as secretary of defense, our councils try to interpret the law and such a way that we are acting lawfully and consistent with the intent of the legislation and are able to take actions to protect ourselves. Sometimes they get to those determinations when a particular instance arises. I think it is important when we have this this is the last point i will make to err on the side of caution of flexibility. I think someone said earlier that this language could allow an awful lot. The how part of the provision. It does. The president , if youre hearing Different Things, the thing i would listen to is what the president says. He said he does not foresee and this language does not authorize the kind of thing that iraq and afghanistan represented. And he gave examples of the kind of campaign that we intend to wage, which secretary kerry noted earlier. Ones in which we are enabling a force which provides the lasting victory against isil. That is our approach because that is the right approach to get a lasting victory against isil. But i think in my role and the chairmans role, some latitude there in the language is appreciated because we need to be able to do what we need to do to protect ourselves. This encompasses the campaign against isil as we now foresee it and one can reasonably foresee it. That is essential because we need to win this campaign. A minute remaining. There has been a lot of talk about sending consistent, bipartisan messages to our enemies. I agree. I did not think there has been Much Division on the message that we have been sending to crisis. We stand united that we should take this fight to them. In the last few days there has been significant division on the message were sending to iran. An exceptional, i would argue unprecedented, letter from 47 of our colleagues to the ayatollah himself, that many of us believe has the effect and intent of undermining the authority of the president. Secretary kerry, you are here before us, this is a subject of great debate within the senate today. What do you believe are the ramifications of this letter . What do you believe is your interpretation of the facts of that letter, that state that any agreement signed by the United States expires as soon as another president is sworn in . Share with us your thoughts on whether this is helpful or hurtful to our efforts to try to divorce iran from any future nuclear ambition. Secretary of state kerry my reaction to the letter was utter disbelief. During my 29 years here in the senate, i have never heard of, nor even heard of it being proposed, anything comparable to this. If i had, i can guarantee that no matter who was president or what the issue was, i would have certainly rejected it. I think nobody is questioning anybodys right to dissent. Any senator can go to the floor any day and raise any of the questions that were raised in that. But to write to the leaders right in the middle of negotiation, particularly the leader they have criticized other people for even engaging with or writing to, to write and suggest that they are going to give a constitutional lesson which by the way, was absolutely incorrect, is quite stunning. This letter ignores more than two centuries of precedence in the conduct of american foreignpolicy. Formal treaties obviously require the advice and consent of the senate. That is in the constitution. But the vast majority of International Arrangements and agreements do not. Around the world today, we have all kinds of executive agreements that we deal with. Protection of our troops, the recent agreement with afghanistan, any number of noncontroversial and broadly supported Foreign Policy bills. The executive agreement is a necessary tool used by president s from both parties used for centuries, literally. It is recognized and accepted by congress from the earliest period of american history. With respect to the talks, we have been clear from the beginning. We are not negotiating a legally binding plan. We are negotiating a plan that will have a capacity for enforcement. We dont even have diplomatic relations with iran right now. The senators letter erroneously asserts this is a legally binding plan. It is incorrect when it says that congress can actually modify the terms of an agreement at any time. That is flat wrong. They do not have the right to modify an agreement reached, executive to executive, between leaders of the country. Could another president come in with another attitude . No president , if this agreement meets its task and does what it is supposed to do, in conjunction with china, russia france, germany, Great Britain all of whom are going to sign or not sign off, i would like to see the next president of this country say this is good, turn around and nullify it on behalf of the United States. That is not going to happen. I have to tell you, knowing what we know about this, this risks undermining the confidence that foreign governments in thousands of important agreements, committed to between the United States and other countries. It purports to tell the world that if you want confidence in your dealings with america, you have to negotiate with 535 members of congress. That is both untrue and profoundly a bad suggestion to make. That aside from the legalities this letter also raises question of judgment and policy. We know that there are people in iran opposed to any negotiation. We know that a comprehensive solution is not going to happen if irans leaders are not willing to make hard choices about their nuclear program. We know that a Nuclear Armed iran is unacceptable. Mr. Secretary, i know that is a wellwritten speech this is not a speech. This is about the impact of this irresponsible letter. That letter does not have Legal Authority. I think you have to ask, what people are trying to accomplish. The author of the letter says he does not want the agreement to be made and he thinks that before the judgment is made, it is a mistake. Im asked by one senator what the impact is and i am laying out what the impact is. Im sorry if people do not want to hear it. Five minutes and 26 seconds later, i would say that i did not sign the letter and i am very disappointed that you have gone back back on your statement that any agreement must pass muster with congress. The way we pass muster is we vote. I think all of us are very disappointed with the veto threat and the stiff arming that is taking place. Let me just senator gardner. You have the right to vote any day. Secretary carter, secretary kerry, general dempsey, i want to thank you all for testifying today. This issue of authorizing military force is one of the most serious issues congress can consider. I am concerned about perhaps mixed messages from the administration regarding the isil threat. On march 3, general austin stated that isis is losing its fight against us yet only a week earlier, on february 26, director clapper said the organization remains a formidable and brutal threat and is increasing its influence. The threat from isil is real and requires a carefully coordinated strategy to ensure its complete destruction. I look forward to hearing how we can ensure its bipartisan success. I want to understand the details and to fully know that youre not unnecessarily restraining or restricting our ability to win. Secretary carter, in your remarks, you say that, i cannot tell you that our mission to defeat isil be completed in three years, the sunset clause proposed by the president is a sensible provision. You heard the senators all talk about this. If the aumf is not authorized, in three years, the president can continue to use the authorities . That is correct. That is the legal interpretation of the 2001 aumf. The stated intent of the president is to revisit the 2001 aumf after this one as well. He has said that and that is a totally different subject. In your verbal comments, you stated that, what a shame it would be to have a safe haven. And i believe you are referring to the geographic limitations. Could the three year time limitation be interpreted as a safe haven as well . Defense secretary carter it certainly shouldnt be. It has not by anyone involved in drafting the aumf. It is, as i said, it is not a number or time period derived from our thinking about the campaign. It is derived from the constitution and the election cycle. It is for sure the that in our system that there will be a new president in three years. It is for sure that he or she will have had one year to get themselves on their feet. Therefore, it foresees and leaves latitude for this to be revisited. That is something i respect as a consequence of our political system. It is not the consequence of a battlefield dynamic or campaign we are waging. Obviously, we hope to wrap it up as soon as possible. But i specifically said i cannot tell you it will be over in three years. We have had testimony from others who have talked about the ability to go for three years, that we would not be able to defeat in three years but what we would be able to do in three years is it the right time . Should there be no time limit . Defense secretary carter the number three has to do with our political system, not the defeat of isis. I respect the people who do not want a sunset, but i think the logic of three years derives from our political system. There is no foreseeing how long it will take to defeat isil, any more than you can begin any campaign and know when it will end. Secretary carter, you said in your comments that enduring, i believe it was in response to senator cardin, that enduring is not afghanistan and iraq. Could you give a clearer definition than the term enduring . Defense secretary carter the president , when he explained the provision which describes how the campaign is authorized to be waged, explained that he was not, he was not saying, and this was very sensible to me enumerating the things that we could do. He was setting a limit, which is the language of enduring offense of ground operations, to mean Something Like iraq and afghanistan. Not foreseen in our campaign not asking for 34. He also gave some illustrations. Just to go back. I am sorry to interrupt. That is the definition that is the best we can get on enduring, not afghanistan and iraq . It make sense to me not to try to enumerate everything we may find it necessary to do in the course of this campaign. Just to go back. I am sorry to interrupt. That is the definition that is the best we can get on enduring, not afghanistan and iraq . It make sense to me not to try to enumerate everything we may find it necessary to do in the course of this campaign. Instead, the text sets an outer limit. It does not try to enumerate everything. The president s language did illustrate some things and secretary kerry cited them, but it does not try to say everything we might have to do. That is a good sensible thing for a military campaign. Two more questions. Secretary kerry, in response to senator rubio, you said i believe that several of the middle east counterparts that you have been talking to, you have shared with them details or some details of the negotiations with iran. Am i misunderstanding your response . Secretary of state kerry we shared with them an outline. We havent shared with them actually, we briefed them. We had our team go down and brief them. Are those the same details that we have been briefed on . Secretary of state kerry you have been getting it much more in depth. Thank you. To general dempsey, talking about the peshmerga. In terms of percentage, if you look at the isf overall, the fights undertaken against isil what weight of effort would you say that the peshmerga or others fighting in the region are currently pursuing against isil . General dempsey the early successes were largely through peshmerga. Thats will evolve over time, but they had been carrying the majority of the effort so far. Are they carrying out a third . Three quarters, 90 . General dempsey the early effort to blunt isils momentum were with the peshmerga. Reports in the news and other places state that peshmerga have only been getting 10 of the arms rigid through baghdad. Is that correct . I dont have the percentage. I can take it for the record. There was friction early on with the government of iraq to provide weapons to peshmerga but we have managed our way through that. Right now, you confidence that it has been settled or resolved . General dempsey im confident we have broken through the initial fiction, but it does not mean it will not recur. Thank you mr. Chairman and thank you secretary kerry and secretary carter and general dempsey for being here. I was very pleased when the administration sent over language for the aumf. I supported the aumf that passed out of this committee in the last congress because i think as you all said, it is very important for our men and women who might be putting themselves at risk in the fight against isil to know that they have the support of congress. I think it is very important for the American Public to know, to hear this debate, and know congress is supporting whatever actions that we take. With respect to that, one of the places where i think i would have issue with the language that was sent over by the administration is with respect to the reporting on the ongoing actions. As you all know the language in the aumf that the administration sent over said the President Shall report to congress at least once every six months on specific actions taken pursuant to this operation. In looking at the aumf that passed the committee in december, the reporting requirements are much more robust and much more comprehensive. It requests reporting every 60 days and it also requests a comprehensive strategy report that would be clear to congress and therefore to the American People the specific political and dramatic objectives of the United States in the region. It asks for a clearly defined military objective and the list goes on. While i appreciate there might be concern about the level of detail requested, it still seems to me that there is a benefit from providing additional detail about the mission and more frequent periodic reporting. I think that is important not just for congress, i think there are also some benefits to the operation, because it makes it very clear in writing, at some level, what the plan is. I was always taught, a plan is not a plan unless you have written it down somewhere, unless you have got something that you can refer to. Can i ask you secretary kerry to respond to that and perhaps secretary carter and general dempsey might want to as well . Secretary of state kerry first of all, believe me, the plan is reduced to writing and the president reviews it and there is an enormous amount of analysis that goes into this. You are right that it needs to be specific. But i think there needs to be a a balance between the effort put into reporting and fighting the war and getting the job done. I have asked the state department to do a review of all the reports we have to do and the numbers of people and hours that are put into reports that frankly, dont often get thoroughly read and digested. I think there is a briefing the process, that in my memory here, works pretty well. Six month, when you think of it, is a fair amount of time. It is not so much time in the course of this in terms of the review process that it does not do th