Sentiment . Guest i did not get the entire just gist referencewas making to her critics saying she is a liar, asking where she was lying. Let me turn this into a question for tomorrow. What do you expect the results to mean for her or sen. Sanders wisconsin . Look at it. Ays to one is the math and the other is the momentum and psychology. It willelegate math, not have a profound impact on the democratic race. If you look at 2008, the way the delegates were divvied up, barack obama beat Hillary Clinton by 17 points, so it was kind of a wipeout in terms of the popular vote. Delegates that year, hillary won 32 and obama got 42. So only a 10point difference in the delegate haul. I do not think Bernie Sanders is likely to win by 17 points if he does winen and the margin is smaller than that, you may only see a gain in the single digits. On top of that, Hillary Clinton has more support with the superdelegates, unbound delegates. It will not have a big impact on the delicate math, but it could have an impact on the psychology, if Bernie Sanders wins, especially if she wins by a bigger margin. And that obviously gives him a boost going into new york, helps him make the case that this is still a race. Host here is a look at the delegate totals, including superdelegates for the democrats. Hillary clinton with just over 1700. Bernie sanders with just over 1000. 2383 needed on the democratic side. On the republican side, 1237 needed. There are 42 delegates up for grabs tomorrow in wisconsin for republicans. Karen is the last call from lakeview, oregon. I live in oregon, new resident. I went to the dmv to get a voters card. I was told that you did not have vote. N up to everyone is registered to vote in the state of oregon. Registerede, you are , but i want to let people know, if you are in a state if you are an independent, or a democrat want to vote republican, you have to fill out a voter card so you can vote in the republican primary. The final thing i would like to say is, the definition of stupid or kind of dumb, is doing the same thing over and over again expecting a different result. Host thank you for the call. Craig gilbert. Registrationis no by party in wisconsin, so that effectively means there is an open primary. You can pick which primary you vote in. Obviously, you cannot vote in both. Somebody who considers them a democrat can vote in either primary, the same for someone who considers themselves a republican. And even if you are not registered, you can register at the polling place. A sizable fraction of the voters in wisconsin and up registering to vote on election day. Of the sense, regardless there is ad law, lower barrier in wisconsin that some states to those kinds of new voters, nontraditional voters, because of election day registration. It will be interesting to see what that means donald trump and on the democratic side. Host a great piece online on js. Com. Craig gilbert has covered the theonsin primary, with sentinel. We appreciate it. Live now, an event getting underway, a discussion on Maritime Corporation with australia and japan in the pacific. The senate is in session this week, the house returns next week. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] bomb spent much of his career working on southeast and u. S. Australia, including position in the asia office of the secretary of defense, policy, planning, booz allen hamilton, and bob is wellknown for his expertise on only on planning and strategic guidance, but also in Southeast Asia and oceana. Builds on growing momentum for strengthening not u. S. Japanaustralia , but to align and make more interoperable bilateral relations in asia. U. S. Japan and u. S. Australian alliance were born together, but not really in intimacy. In some ways, quite the opposite. The australian side plate is quite well. The951, they help to design alliances we know today to maximize australian interests. Largeas part of a bargain, but no point in intimacy. But that is changing after the cold war. On an operational level, it began in the clinton administration. When i was in the bush administration, we began in 2001 the trilateral security dialogue, and since then, things have accelerated from there in terms of trilateral cooperation. When andrew will present is based on his work in this area for about two decades, including contralateral response with japan, u. S. , india, in the recent tsunami, and recent work with the strong government. Work on both about sides of the aisle in the u. S. , japan, and australia. Scheer is also here to comment, give us the state of play in current u. S. Policy, not necessarily to endorse the report. We often have officials appear who politely say we are already usually polite enough to say that this is the dumbest thing i have ever heard somewhere in the middle. But it gives of context to understand what the government is doing, understand what opportunities there are, Going Forward. We will hear from and you and then bob, and then open up to questions. Andrew thank you, everyone, for coming along today. I would like to thank mike and csi has for the opportunity to spend time here. I have a lot of old friends here and it has been fantastic to be back as a visiting fellow in the past few months. Would also like to thank bob for coming along. Friend, and it a is good for you to give us your time. Finally, i want to thank folks who reviewed my paper, gave me some really good feedback, probably saved me from some errors. If there are errors left, they are mine, not theirs. I just want to pick up from where mike set things up. Starting point for this project really is the work that csis has been doing on federated defense. That the bestea way to respond to a changing, and in many ways, deteriorating International Security situation in an environment when we are all increasingly resourceconstrained is to increase our defense capabilities much better in the interests of some very substantial longterm, shared aspirations and interest in our countries. In particular, when it comes to the asiapacific, to respond to what i think is a rapidly growing series of challenges. Some of these are transnational in nature, counter piracy, responding to humanitarian disasters. The december 2004 tsunami, but there was also the japanese earthquake and tsunami disaster. There will be much more of that. Then we are also seeing, undeniably, increasing tensions in the region. In the south china sea, for example, we are seeing a more active russian posture, with russia modernizing it pacifically its fleet, bringing some capable agreement into the picture, and then you have a nuclear arms dictator in north korea, of course. Undeniably deteriorating security environment, particularly in asia, and perhaps driven by these trends, the proliferation of sophisticated Weapons Systems throughout the region. China is a big part of that, obviously. And russia, as i mentioned. But were also seeing a number of countries acquire precision missiles, for example, intelligence reconnaissance surveillance capabilities, cyber capabilities, and yes, submarines, which are starting to change the balance of power in asia and make it much more difficult or the United States and its allies to operate in the region, in the way they traditionally have. Ais challenge has quantitative dimension, in terms of the number of weapons, in the region now, and will be in the region in the future. But also a quality dimension, in that we are seeing the introduction of new capabilities that are changing the strategic landscape. These are the sorts of things i mentioned earlier. At the same time, we are all resource constrained at the moment. The size ofmeans the u. S. Navy, for example, has been falling. Other countries in the region are not spending massive amounts on defense, although australia and japan have committed to increasing spending, particularly on maritime cute ability. Generally, we are seeing a reduction in the resources. The task of managing the challenge and monitoring it is becoming greater. Gaps ind, we are seeing capability, notwithstanding the u. S. Rebalance. There are limits to resources in terms of humanitarian assistance, amphibious assets, theundersea u. S. Submarine fleet. Actually, around 2020, it will start to get smaller, not larger. And in ciber, missile, Cyber Security in general. For that reason, i chose to focus my paper on Maritime Security and how we can take the framework of federated defense and start to actualize it, in terms of real capability in the region. Then i narrowed it down to japan and australia for a few key reasons. One is the policy framework that mike mentioned, strengthening trilateral strategic corporations around that has been policy for a long time. Those countries because they are probably the United States most Capable Maritime partners in the region. When we are looking to achieve the sorts of strategic attacks on talking about in the paper, including around deterrence and the capacity to reassure allies, you need high and partners. We have to collaborate, of course, across the region with a whole range of countries, including china on a transnational part of this, but building genuine capability, you have to start with the most capable power. Bothalia and japan have themselves been shifting their defense policies in the direction of more assist on Maritime Security, and both have a stated commitment to increase their maritime capabilities. So they are already highly capable partners, and they will become, its fair to say, even more capable partners over the next 10 to 20 years. The submarine piece of this equation is the one that generates all the excitement, of course. 1000,bt, the c australias program to replace , is oneent class fleet very important opportunity to strengthen Maritime Cooperation between these three countries. The question of that. But this agenda is much broader than just the submarine piece. The last chapter of the report really is an attempt to draw out that willplan hopefully encourage officials i plan to hear from bob about this and that is to start making some of these more integrated capabilities real. A critical part to start is ournd isr and networking Intelligence Surveillance capabilities much more effectively. In particular, to build a shared picture of what is happening in the maritime environment. We know from our time in when governments share a common appreciation of the strategic environment, then we are likely to act in concerted ways in pursuit of shared interests. Ere, im talking about networking surveillance aircraft, u. S. And japanese fleet, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that our countries will be bringing into service for longrange Maritime Surveillance , and also, potentially, cooperation in radar. Our countries have some sophisticated technological skills and systems in place already. Is the undersea part of this. Undersea warfare will become increasingly important in the asiapacific. Everyone talks about submarines, but i think potentially more important is Antisubmarine Warfare. Certainly in australia, its fair to say, our asw skills have not had the attention that they used to get during the cold war. We have had other priorities. We need to start rebuilding those capabilities and australia, and here again, the networking potential, and our ability to leverage australias geography, japans strategic geography creates a web of capabilities that can take the load off of u. S. Resources, which will be increasingly stretched by this picture that i have tried to set out in the paper. When it comes to submarines, of course, this is on astral indecision. It will be a very consequential decision. Decision. Ralian it will change the force structure available to the government for decades and hints at the level of excitement around the decisionmaking. It is also a massive commercial opportunity, the largest openly available Defense Industry contract on the world market at the moment. Will,ccessful partner obviously, gain huge kudos when it comes to building advanced submarines, so the stakes are high. The point i would make their, and in the paper, and did other things i have written with mike i have been careful to say, when it comes to assessing the key capabilities that the different partners bring to the , and also things like cost and schedule and risk, and so forth. Things that should be under consideration. The point i make in the paper, and more generally, is that partnering with japan and the United States on submarines is a potential game changer at different levels. At the strategic level, it can have the effect, i believe, of more in ajapan Regional Security architecture theiran help to allay anxiety. That is a good, stabilizing thing to do. At the operational level, a fleet of interoperable submarines can certainly had more impact and can deal both with the quantitative undersea challenge that i mentioned, and the qualitative challenge, in terms of increasing capabilities in the region. Then the Defense Industry part of this is incredibly important. Efforts tojapans expand its Defense Industry, the International Dimension of that is incredibly important in terms of locking in japan to a broader Regional Security architecture. For those reasons, it is undeniable there is a church reject dimension to the summary decision and that those factors should feature in that decision. Capability, cooperation, and the summary project is a good example, an important area for in. Three countries to work i say in the paper we should start thinking about combat capability from the getgo, westridge were armies are being formulated, through the capability acquisition process. That is a way to reduce inefficiencies, reduce duplication, drive interoperability. Likewise with logistics, i cannot remember who said it, but someone said amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics. It is undeniable, when you look of,he chokepoints, in terms for example, precision guided munitions for Coalition Operations in the region, if we integrate our logistics chain, look at things like, stockpiles of munitions, mutual resupply, prepositioning, also working together on sustainment of our systems, particularly if we can move in the way of more shared systems and platforms, they would be enormous benefits there. Amphibious capability. Australia and japan are building their own amphibious capability. It is fair to say it is early days in both cases. This is where, working with the u. S. Marine corps, is so important for us, as we build that capability, and where the marine rotations in australia come into play. That is massively important, but it should be a twoway street. When you read about the shortage of strategic sealift that could constrain Amphibious Operations in the region, we should be ambitious here and should be theing at building capability to deploy u. S. Marines and their vehicles and weapons and eric wrapped off an australian platform. One of our large 27,000ton ships, or a japanese fleet, for that matter, and generating a pulled amphibious lift capability that can work in the region on problems as diverse as humanitarian response to stabilization operations, and so forth. Just a few other quick things before i wrap up and hand over to bob. Machinery has been in place for a long time, as mike mentioned. I sat in the paper, i think it needs to be updated. We have a security and defense cooperation forum, which is an analog to the trilateral strategic dialogue. I recommend that should be elevated to the deputy secretary level, to really give it more drive and cut through the three systems. I think there should be standing working groups and some of the areas ive mentioned this morning, to take forward individual initiatives in that framework. I think we also have to need to bring india in. Importantn incredibly potential partner for australia, japan, and for the United States. And we should do that at a pace that is, i think, comfortable for india. Isr,u look at areas like and a summary of warfare, india has a huge role to play, and there are some real affinities with australias geographic positioning. Also, we need to continue to engage china. U. S. So do trilateral australiachina exercises. We need to work more on hadr and counterpart received. Generally, build up habits of working in cooperation. Ultimately, that will create Greater Transparency and hopefully greater confidence. I will leave it there and handed over to bob. Bob i am very happy to be here to discuss this paper. It is not just because andrew and mike are old friends and colleagues. I would do it for that, regardless of whats in the paper. But also because i really do applaud efforts to continue to examine how we in the United States, with our friends and allies, Work Together to promote and defend our interests in the ski region of asia. This is a paper that looks to do that. It was well worth the time, even on the weekend, to take a quick look at the paper, and to give you some thoughts and impressions about that, and how that fits into the way that we think about our policy toward asia writ large. As i read the paper, there are two key premises, and i think they are worth pointing out, and all to the good. One, we in the United States, with our allies, have to be given to adapt our Longstanding Alliance system that used to be predominantly if not in some cases solely a hub and spoke system. Andrew pointed out, the federated process, systems that csis is looking at, all of this points out, while hub and spoke was the predominant nature of our relationship in asia, it cannot be the only way we look at