Most of which is now deployed in the eastern regions. It is a mandate that tests battle, been expanded to cover other functions. Basically supporting the value of implementation, monitoring areas where we have military equipment being moved. Reporting back that some of the subsequent date it was new the line of combat. So it was a warning in relation to a possible violation of the ceasefire. This is also to show that at times when we see division or a portion of the conflict back in europe where we hoped we would not be after the end of the cold war, we would open a new phase of cooperation, we see that border is not being sustainable as we were expecting. We are seeing conflicts. In the postcold war cities from moldova to georgia, ukraine is a larger expression of that problematic. We sit at this table around which we have to discuss differences, understand problems. And update the tools. Some of them go back to the cold war days. They need to be adapted, modernized, and adjusted to address more challenging nature of the conflict today. That is the agenda we have in the osc, and is a work in progress. Ivo daalder so our report, as professor rotfeld described, we had two reports, one that looked at ukraine, one that made recommendations to improve it. How to even do a better job, because as we concluded, the osc was critical and remains a critical part of this. The second part of the report said that we need to have a diplomatic strategy that is both immediate and longerterm based on the implementation. We said nothing can happen until then fundamental part of the conflict is resolved. What we are hearing in the longerterm, we should be looking at that. Barbara haering it seems to release the report. In 2015, the situation has become more serious, and maybe it has not been implemented, conflict has been frozen. The risk of these incidents has to radically increased. Therefore, our focus today is really to avoid an escalation of the situation caused by unintended accidents, incidents. This needs a call for a solid stable military cooperation. It meets a joint europe defending principal that we have all agreed. It makes more implication of the United States. The United States has to be at the table. This crisis over the ukraine goes beyond ukraine, beyond europe, and into the geopolitical sect to many countries. That is the immediate focus we have to take. And the long run, we have to find a strategy how to define the Security Status of countries that do not belong to an alliance. The report calls them the countries in between. There is a strategy needed that goes country by country. At issue is a particular situation. This is not enough. That is why our report asks for a comprehensive Diplomatic Initiative to rest these issues in the interest of the principles we have all agreed in the final act and in the paris charter. We should stick to it. This framework is solid. It does not have to be rewritten. It just has to be followed. Lets take the conversation to both parts of what you just talked about. Today, do you know where we are . We concluded and the one thing we agreed, 15 Panel Members including our russian colleagues, that the situation is dangerous. We need to focus on that situation in order to avoid it becoming more dangerous and more hot wars occurring. There is already one in ukraine. But more. Reflect on that. What we can do, and perhaps what the situation really demands at this point. This report is a call to diplomatic action. There is a great complacency today. When we look at the situation today, and the situation in the cold war, no one should regret the cold war. It kept half of europe with limited sovereignty with a tax on human rights. At the same time, one should recognize that todays situation might be more dangerous than the cold war. It is more dangerous because there is no agreed status quo. Everything is up for grabs. In some ways, we should be happy if it means that the people take charge. If it means that incidents can escalate because there is no clarity on the situation of each country, then that becomes very dangerous. That is why we believe in the panel that it is important to take action in the immediate shortterm, the tactical situations, where armed forces from russia and nato countries can become embroiled. We saw it when a russian fighter was shot over a sliver of turkish territory. We have been, so to speak, lucky so far that none of those incidents have really escalated. You cannot have a sound security based on luck. We do call for much more engagement, military to military , to look up how to manage those incidents. How to manage in case of escalation. If we are not lucky, what happens . There needs to be procedures in place so that events do not take control. That is how wars start. We believe that maybe there is not enough thought given to that today. There is the broader picture. The fact that during the cold war, as barbara was saying, you have neutral countries like switzerland and a different status for finland. But, a clear status. You had nato members. You also had and that was the end of the cold war. You had an arms control that extended to europe with the conference in europe. The vienna document. And on the Nuclear Front the intermediate intermittent Nuclear Force agreement. A framework for predictability and transparency that limited the risks of unexpected escalation. We see those frameworks, frankly, at risk today. There has to be hard work to engage with russia on those issues. Of course, we hear and know unfortunately the reality is in many cases you engage and you do not get the response. In our view, that is not a reason not to engage syria lets make it clear to our Public Opinion that not a reason not to engage. Lets make it clear to our Public Opinion the structures that have kept the stability and peace in europe. There, i think, one has to be aware. I am a frenchman. I can see the fragility of Public Opinion in europe. You have a combination of some extreme left and extreme right that are quite happy if the United States in a way disengages. The majority of europeans do not want that. There is a minority that is quite comfortable with that. The whole architecture is at risk. A United States that disengages faster than europe integrates, or disengages as europe integrates, and the european integration has been made possible highest relationship with the United States. If that relationship begins to fray it is connected to the crisis in europe. We have our work cut out for us. We wont find the solution if we dont work jointly, europeans and americans, on this issue. He describes the metaproblem we have. The frameworks we live with for some many years are falling apart, in part because there is a challenge to the status quo. We found that real challenge is focused in particular in that part of europe where the Security Status of countries like your own and georgia are being contested and are in some ways uncertain. There is a desire on the part of georgia to be a member of nato. There is a commitment of nato to have georgia as a member. We are not there. How does it look from georges perspective . This continued uncertainty about the Security Status of a country like georgia, the same for moldova and ukraine, with a direct military presence on your territory of russia . How does it look . Particularly how does it look in the short term as well as developments down the road . I can say that it doesnt look good is the short answer. I can talk about the four things that you can identify in georgias position when it comes to security. The four things that you can get from these reports that are relevant i may have to repeat them, but i will be brief. Theres certainly no need to change. It is not the principles. It is about one country that violates those principles. Most of the violations, the case of georgia, the occupation, threat of annexation, use of force, threat of use of force, economic sanctions, domestic affairs, we can never list every single item in relation to georgia. It is not about the principles, it is about one particular country, russia, who does not want to play by the rules. We uphold these principles not only in terms of words, but in terms of deeds. There is a principle as part of the european i keel principle for anyone who has the right. That is a fundamental principle in the onc. The istanbul declaration of European Security. We have to implement it. It is not being implemented, what is happening is that russia is getting the message that actually European Countries are backtracking on these important principles. While we might be saying that yes georgia has a right to join nato and choose their own alliance, this is not happening in reality. What is happening is that russia is preventing the integration. What is important is that there is no doubt in the positions of nato nations and positions of the capitals that georgia and ukraine in nato, if they wish, is only a matter of time. It is actually something that needs to be followed up. We have been told the doors open , but not where the door is. We have to give them the instruments for integration into nato. The second point is that we need u. S. Stewardship. You cannot overestimate the importance. You need the u. S. For the security of europe, particularly when it comes to georgia. Not only when it comes to sovereignty, but in terms of also upholding georgias quest to join nato. When the United States does not do that, the countries and between, or caught in between as one of our friends said between nato and russia, suffer. The u. S. Position is extremely important. One of the recommendations in the report of the panel is that we want to see the role of the United States be bigger in the ukrainian crisis. The u. S. Is not part of normandy. That is a strong recommendation. I want to draw your attention to the case of georgia and the United States, the discussions. The problem with the intonation discussions is the lowlevel form. We have part of the founders of those discussions, a representative of the u. N. Or do you have no highlevel engagement from the United States or russia, or from the countries. That prevents the effectiveness of that country. The final point, for georgia it is important georgia is kept on the radar of the intonation of diplomacy. They have slipped off the radar in past years. It is also part of domestic policies in georgia, but we need to remain on the radar. Not only georgia, but the conflicts must remain on the radar. Once there is a crisis, and it happened in ukraine, showing that it possesses the estimates and tools to intervene. They created a Peace Mission for ukraine. The problem with georgia is that we do not have the crisis. Because we have no crisis the conflict has slipped off of the onc agenda. There is no presents, there is no activity to resume presents. There is a feeling that the conflict has been forgotten. You have syria around the corner , the car bomb that almost exploded two weeks ago, the ongoing crisis in ukraine. These are just as important. Should we wait for something explodes for us to pay attention, or should we use this time and proactively try to move things forward . I think the problem that we always face in diplomacy is that attention is only paid when things are going badly. Not when they are going not badly. I would not say things are going well in georgia. The fundamental challenge is there and remains there. 2 things come out of this discussion that i want to spend more time on. One is the danger of the situation we face and the steps we need to take in order to reduce the danger. The second is the role of the United States. Let me start with the first one and open it up to press a little bit. Perhaps, secretarygeneral, you want to start reflecting on this . We have airplanes flying wing tip to wing tip. We have airplanes flying over the front and back of ships. A millimeter difference would have clipped a ship and fallen into the baltic sea. We have airplanes being shot down because they crossed territories in nato country. That is how wars start. What procedures, we called for procedures in the report, but what procedures in the onc question mark is there something in the onc that focuses on the day after or the moment after an accident has occurred . How do you make sure that accident does not escalate to a war that no one wants . What procedures might we put into place specifically within vienna, or outside of vienna, that you think might be able to work . We have in vienna all of the players around the table all the time. We have meetings every week on question mark is there something various issues on the agenda. One thing we can do is call everyone and start discussing what happens. We can do that without the special mechanism. We have a framework which we just call in the people and push them to discuss, exchange views, and this can result into a decision. Then we can think of more targets. Recently, in spite of all of the divisions we have made a decision that was negotiating a working group chaired by the u. S. Ambassador with the russians they all agreed in the end. It was cyber security. Measures if an attack also includes working groups, specialized working groups, to analyze incidents and dispel concerns that one country might be behind a cyber attack or something similar. It was cyber security. Measures if an attack also includes working groups, specialized working groups, to first of all, some kind of preventive code of conduct should be something one would try to invest in. In situations we should avoid behaviors that might lead to incidents. Secondly, we could think of and mechanism somewhere. There are ways to address situations of this kind. You could materialize it in the russian council, in the osc, where you could build a little bit of context for discussion. Some perimeters on how to do it. Then you could think of an investigation of Something Like an accident to avoid the problems we started seeing at the beginning of the korean crisis where the stories were very different. Trying to have a team going there, investigating, bringing it back, lowering the temperature after the incident. These are examples of tools that we believe could be useful, but there is a need for the political will to make them happen. In this divided environment, sometimes finding that is a problem. One of the tasks is to raise awareness as to the potential dangers of situations of this kind and try to garner the support that we need for us to be able to develop these mechanisms. To begin a discussion and develop these mechanisms. Anyone else want to comment on the mechanism piece and other ideas that we have . I very much agree that in crisis management, slowing down the pace of the crisis is of the essence. Those mechanism committees, anything that grinds the process looks bureaucratic, but it is good because it is bureaucratic. Before opening it to the be able to develop these mechanisms. To begin a discussion and develop these mechanisms. Floor, let me focus on the United States. We argued in the report that the absence of the United States and britain at the negotiating table in ukraine was unfortunate. We dont say it in the report, but it was the intent of those pushing it, because of the 1994 memorandum with the United States, britain, and russia signed when Nuclear Weapons were removed from ukraine. That although there was not a level security guarantee, the absence of 2 of the 4 signatories sent the wrong signal. Also because the United States has generally been a part of any discussion on the future of European Security. You heard why the u. S. , an argument for the u. S. , to take a Stronger Leadership role. Let me pose the question, that these are problems that europe needs to lead on because they are European Security problems. The United States is not and should not be uninterested in European Security, but there is a dilemma. If the United States takes the lead, the capacity of europe to do so is affected. Should we worry about that . Is it something we should be concerned about, and should we have, in some way, europe and being proactively in the lead and the u. S. In support of that when it comes to the issue of European Security . At least that is an argument one could make. Either to see how the panel reacts to that, positively or negatively. The fact that the crisis goes beyond ukraine and europe, that is why the u. S. Has to be implied as well. Actually, i prefer having the u. S. At the table openly then just have 2 tracks of trying to negotiate. I think it is better for the process and better for all of the parties concerned. Looking back at an important element that was mentioned, our report mentions 3 narratives. Although we agreed to disagree, we came to the consensus that the situation is urgent. That action is needed. And more or less consensus regarding the measures of the next steps to be taken. Having said that, i believe both sides are not interested in an open conflict. That is the basis for a diplomatic action. That is a basis for we have to start rebuilding the dialogue wherever we can. I think our panel is one of the attempts to do so. We have to continue. It is striking that during the cold war there was a complete confrontation, ideological, on all levels between the soviet union and the west. Nevertheless, we were able to achieve major agreements. Arms control for the soviet union. It was a great achievement. It would be a pity if with russia whatever misgivings one may have with this or that action of russia, if we are not able to develop a real, genuine, diplomatic process with russia. Russia remains a great power and needs to be treated with respect. It needs to be engaged. In a number of circumstances, it has been a power. Sometimes less than one would want, but it has been. On the iran sid