Of real frustrations and real anger and veto threats. I dont think anybody likes it. Ive heard republicans who support the democrat side. Why does this have to be happening here and now . It is interesting to see who is blaming who. I dont think anyone is happy, this just seems to be the necessary existential context. The Defense Department tends to move ahead of the country on these things. Before run out of time, if this unusual . The chairman seem to indicate cap and frequent. Seemed to indicate that it happened frequently. To make sure that planes are flying and people have enough training. That this is an unnecessary burden put on defense spending. There is this the deal with which changes the debate entirely. We will have to leave it there this week thank you for joining [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] speakers look at the role of libyas government and the role of the u. S. To supply the government with weapons. It is an hour and a half. There are so many things we can talk about regarding libya. This particular program is going to focus on what the socalled Islamic State is up to in libya. Although it has wrongfully appropriated the word islamic and does not perform most functions of a state, im going to refer to it by the arab acronym daesh. There are other people who may call it isil or isis. I will not contradict the president of the United States who calls it isil. Daesh works for me. Charles lister is an expert on esh. He is also very knowledgeable about other substate armed groups that often practiced terrorism without coverage. He understands the complexities and he brings a strong grasp to the theory and practice of terrorism, as illustrated by his recent book on syria. There are filled out biographies in the sheet you have received. He brings that particular perspective to this panel and the other panelists have other perspectives that will be useful in forming a composite view of the problem. Fred has wide expertise in military affairs. He knows libya well. He served as attache to the consulate in libya. He understands the complexities of libyan armed groups. And the Foreign Military establishments that might be involved at some point interacting with the Libyan Government. Wafa is the charge of the affairs for libyans in washington. She is a fervent libyan patriot and was involved in libyan Civil Society efforts against the former cannot be regime gadhafi regime. She responded to her countries call by accepting senior positions in the ministries of education prior to her current assignment. Jonathan winer is secretary kerrys special emissary for libya. He was a key member of kerrys staff when john kerry was the chairman of the Senate Foreign relations committee. John kerry brought into the state department where he performed a number of jobs that might be called thankless because they were really touchy issues. He showed himself able to apply the very bottom principles the very broad principles of Foreign Policy to specific circumstances. His current assignment has been something he has been doing for 2. 5 years. It has made him very aware of the interest to libyas arab african and european neighbors, as well as the various crosscurrents in the libyan body politic. That is the order on which im going to ask our speakers to address issues for about eight minutes. Then i will ask a few questions and we may have a bit of an interchange among the members of the panel before we open it up to questions from the audience. We will start with charles lister. Charles good afternoon everyone. David, thank you very much for that kind introduction. Seeing as i have eight minutes im going to fly straight into my discussion points. I am not a libya expert per se. Im going to present more of a big picture look at how isis is operating in libya, how it got there, and what it represents as of today. Since isiss declaration of a socalled caliphate in late june 2014, isis is an organization that has since become an international movement. Libya has become its most important, secondary efforts outside of iraq. It has done so by exploiting libyas fundamental instability and political failures. It has done so by exploiting the political failures and vacuum and social divisions that have emerged in libya over the last several years. This is a model of exploiting existing divisions that isis used to its own advantage in syria and iraq. In a sense, isis aims to enter into areas where there are already expensive and intense divisions where there are existing social structures. This is exactly the same model how it entered into syria into 2013. Its the same model they exploited in the city of mosul. There is a variety of open Source Information that talks about how isis learned local dynamics. It knew all of the tribal leaders and all of their dirty histories. It knew how certain tribes were against other tribes. It knew how certain militias had a certain history may 20 or 30 years prior would you could use to your advantage. This learning the lay of the land is something isis has been very well practiced in and it was the key to its entrance into the capital of libya today. What does isis represent in libya today . Estimates in terms of its manpower very. There are between 3000 and 6000 fighters. As much as 70 of its manpower in libya is made up of nonlibyan fighters. Tunisians in particular have turned out to be a very significant recruitment tool. Been havehave become extreme a significant in syria and iraq. There is a lot of open Source Information describing how tunisians in particular have tot isil in syria and iraq bolster the presence in libya. C senior commanders have been employed deployed to libya to bolster the senior command structure. Libya is of strategic importance objectives. The organization is coming under pressure in syria and iraq. 36,000 fighters. They controlled territory along the Central Coast in libya. Operationally, isis have the capacity to reach the tunisian border. They can also go across the border into tunisia. Isil is currently love is currently led by a saudi in libya. They have increasingly been led by a leader who came from iraq to bolster leadership in libya. Isis has demonstrated a capacity for very fast growth. The estimate in november was 2000 fighters in their ranks in libya. Now, the estimate suggests about 6000. That is at least doubling of manpower under its command in the last 67 months. It operates multiple Training Camps including Training Camps for children. Clearly, it is trying to be in libya for the long haul. It began as is organization in 2014 exploiting the kind of preexisting social divisions tribal divisions, Political Divisions, to its own advantage. Im sure my esteemed libya panelists will be able to talk about this in more detail than i but in particular, it was gaddafis hometown. It was wellknown to have been in area where some gaddafi loyalists had gone back to after the fall of the gaddafi regime. It was also essentially under the control of militias prior to isils entry into the town. Isis used the fact that there were individuals and other militias accused of being loyal to gaddafi to their own advantage. Many of those individuals now fight for isis. You can use a similar analogy to talk about how isil has exploited former saddam era officials in iraq to bolster its own ranks. Those preexisting divisions and tensions, especially on a political 11 level they have , used to their own advantage. Ive already gotten a time warning. As soon as isis took over, it imposed a city charter. This is something they did in raqqa and mosul. It lays out a full approach to how civilians are expected to behave. Women are subject to many regulations and men have similar regulations to the length of their trousers. There are three prisons depending on the magnitude of your alleged crime. Behavioral police were established. Internet is now restricted only to internet cafes run by isis. The acquisition of outside information is particularly restricted unless one is able to travel outside of the city. There is little evidence of far so far to suggest that isis is earning a lot of money from oil. All of this underlines the exact same model isis has used to control through fear populations under its influence. For that reason, i would advocate that in this current phase not rushing. There is significant impetus within political discussions these days to rapidly bring the fight to isis in libya through local forces and appointment of special forces from the u. S. And france and the u. K. And various other western countries. Isis will exploit this. Local fighters need to be vetted and under a single command. We are not anywhere near that position as of now. I would advocate a let them rot strategy in the meantime. Accept the fact that people are not happy under isis control. There are people willing to be under isis control but over time, reason to meet will continue to grow. Resentment will continue to grow. This is something we have seen in syria and iraq. Time should be spent, as im sure my fellow spiegel speakers will talk about better , uniting the political structure in libya after the december 2015 agreement. Most importantly, uniting the east and west structures under the current government that was agreed to in december 2015. Unless those two forces unite, i can say with significant certainty that isis will exploit those two divisions. It will certainly try to. It will devote resources to doing so. On terms of the influx of weaponry, there is currently a u. N. Embargo. It has not done on off a lot of good. Various outsiders have been sending weapons. It is now a discussion carried out last week about finding a way out in order to send weaponry to infected, acquired armed forces on the ground. Again, i would urge caution. Until there is a unified structure and forces have been sufficiently vetted and trained and sufficiently linked up with i would western forces, hesitate to send an large influxes of weaponry. We have learned many lessons from 2011 and 2012 from syria that should be learned in a place like libya today. Im sure there is plenty more we can discuss with the q a. I hope that i have made some sense while rushing through my notes. David thank you charles. [applause] we need 30 seconds to make some technical adjustments up here. We will get the mic level up for people in the back of the room. [no audio] thank you so much. Thank you to the middle east institute for the invitation. What an introduction. Hopefully i will find something new to say. I will underscore a lot of the points that were made, and illustrate from some recent trips i have made to libya. When we look at the Islamic State, we have to understand this fusion between foreign and indigenous elements. There is a long legacy of jihadism that it is built upon. We are seeing an evolution of jihadism in libya. These intense debates between jihadists about the state, the caliphate, the acceptance of government, this is all being played out over the last 23 years. The Islamic State represents the ascendancy of one particular strain. That is not to say there are not other strains of jihadism pushing back. Theres the post2001 generation , theres the post2011 of generation that was radicalized partly by the syria war. There are keynotes for jihadism. The ice the Islamic State has tapped into these. I would argue also that when it arrived, there was an infrastructure that was already in place. Much of the Islamic State development has been this coopting of infrastructure. What was the catalyst . The syrian war was huge. Some of them just wanted to volunteer and fight. With the ascendancy of the Islamic State in syria, some of them defected over. Others came back. It was this nucleus of Islamic State and libyan fighters that came back to libya that implanted the Organization First in darna. Simultaneously, you have the weakening of the old al qaeda related groups. Was the Political Division of libya. It was absolutely fundamental in giving the space for Islamic States to insert itself. These factions were so busy fighting each other and using isis to demonize their opponents, accusing each other of supporting the Islamic State. Meanwhile, the Islamic State is growing. In tandem, you have the Islamic State investing in libya through emissaries and advisers. We heard about the leadership of the technical advisors, sharia courts, many of these are foreign. You also had the foreign fighter influx. Islamic state made a concerted effort to direct foreign fighters towards africa and in general. Dont come to syria and iraq, come to libya. Many of these fighters are the most hardened. When i was in benghazi with the libyan army forces, they said to me that the snipers and suicide bombers were all foreign, that they were facing tunisians mostly. When we look at countering those countering the Islamic State, we have to think about it on a casebycase basis. That requires a tailormade approach in all of these areas. S reputation isa well known. The key thing there is that it ran up against this barrier of an older generation of al qaeda that pushed it out. Also the tribal element. The very factionalism that allows the Islamic State to assert itself into libya is also a buffer. In benghazi, the Islamic State inserted itself into on islamist insurgency. It flipped many of the antisharia entities. It enjoyed support from those social fabrics of neighborhoods under assault. It was bolstered by foreigners coming in from abroad and by boat. , this isin stronghold where the infrastructure proves so critical. They really played a role in flipping the progadhafi tribes that were on the outs, that had faced discrimination. That is what the Islamic State has really played upon. This notion that you are the losers in the new order and we can protect you. I am not going to say that entire tribes are split. It is often a very personalized choice. It is often very localized. Some refugees told me that they have a saying better the hell of Islamic State than the paradise of this. The Islamic State appears to be moving south towards tripoli. Onyre capitalizing marginalization. The dynamics there are more financial. Networks,smuggling there are families that have had the longtime affiliation with jihaidsm. There is a large foreign component there. It gets the training out for foreign volunteers. What is their strategy right now . I would argue it is one of consolidation and disruption, to consolidate their hold and to cut off oil revenues, and to disrupt the formation of a new state. You saw this in the attacks on police training. What are the disgruntled youth that we can peel away . The key challenge is the question of partnership. Who does the west ally with . The country is divided, there is no central chain of command. The great risk that the u. S. Has is identifying local partners and militias. That could further fracture of that fracture the country and reduce incentives for reconciliation. Counterterrorism must reinforce the building of governance. There is the enormous challenges of rebuilding the police. The fight against the Islamic State should be a platform to do that. There are three options. There is western directed air. No involvement by locals. This is untenable. We know there has to be a local element. The second option is the west plus local enablers and this is fraught with risks as far as what comes next. What kind of government replaces this . Option is the most desirable, and that is the west supporting a libyan led government through a unified military effort that tackles this menace. I will leave it to the next speakers to discuss. [applause] david that was a very timely introduction for you. Wafa it might be too short. Special thanks to the middle east institute for hosting this discussion. This is a very important topic to my country. Libya is not is at a , androus turning point after we heard the analysis from the experts, i will be talking in a different aspect. I will talk about what we think is a different perspective on defeating isis in libya. Libya today is indeed an economic crisis with a severe cash shortage and desperate need of humanitarian aid. The chaos of libya threatens the nearby countries. This is the result of domestic complicated political and economics that resulted in divisions across the country. Military Technical Assistance alone will not be enough to defeat isis. Libyans will defeat terrorism only through addressing domestic drivers of instability. The u. S. And International Community should help libya with stabilization including their economy, reconciliation between armed groups, and decentralization of powers. The most Effective Response to the rise of isis in libya is the construction of an accountable libyan state with an Effective Security sector. Without an accountable libyan state, the war against extremists will be endless in libya. This is not to say that nothing can be done against isis and libya in the short term. The antiisis fight could strengthen the political process and vice versa. For instance, efforts right now by the president ial council to create a military to fight isis can both help the security situation and strengthen the political process. Moreover, Libyan Governments should be supported to resist threats from militias and help the bank and government push back against the demands and put constraints on spending on the salaries. Militias should be dismantled. They should be reintegrated on an individual basis. It is also essentia