Transcripts For CSPAN Natl 20240705 : vimarsana.com

Welcome. We will be brief in this introduction because you didnt come to hear me. You came for the National Security advisor Jake Sullivan. Let me just note that after his remarks, we will take a couple of questions from the press pool here and a couple of questions from the audience. If you are would like to ask a question, i think on the path by her chair, hold it up for our staff and they will collected. What brings us together as an association is our belief that americas National Security depends upon prudent restraint in Nuclear Policy and upon an active effort led by the United States to constantly reduce the risk of nuclear war and to fulfill our leap goal legal obligations to negotiate in good faith, the reduction and elimination of Nuclear Weapons. To our meeting last year, President Biden wrote that perhaps more than any other time in the cold war, we must work to reduce the risk of an arms race or nuclear escalation. Arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy continue to be the central part of safeguarding global security. I think it is a good thing that we have never had before a president with such long and intense experience in Nuclear Policy. Not as our current president. I think President Biden is fortunate in having Jake Sullivan advising him on these issues, and we are both fortunate and honored to have him here today. Please bring him a good welcome. Jake. Thank you for that very important set of introductory comments and for the kind words. I also want to think therell for bringing us all together here. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to say a few things here this morning. 60 years ago, next month, in black and white video, president kennedy addressed the nation. He was sitting behind the same resolute desk that President Biden has been sitting behind nearly every day, and i sit across from him. Nearly every day. My fellow citizens, he said, i speak you tonight in a spirit of hope. Negotiations were concluded in moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear test. After years of stop and start negotiations, years of dialogue, years of commitment and courage, establishing the Nuclear Test Ban treaty was a huge moment. Not only for own nationals 30 but for the sick already and stability of the world. As this group knows well, it was one of the steps that would slowly usher in an era of responsible armscontrol and Nuclear Deterrent measures. And where nations could compartmentalize the issues of strategic stability even if they couldnt cooperate or watch anything else. An era where adversaries could disagree and debate across every domain but could limit nuclear risk. An era where World Leaders choose transparency even during times of tension. Especially during times of tension. What is at stake is too important. That is the foundation of Nuclear Stability and security that we have depended on for decades. It is the foundation that the armscontrol association has helped to uphold across generations. Over the last two years, that has begun to erode. Today, we now stand at what we would call an Inflection Point in our new stability and security. Point that demands new strategies for achieving the same goals we have held since the cold war. Reduce the risk of Nuclear Conflict area today, i would like to lay out what we are endeavoring to do pursuit of this. I will start with the cracks in the foundation that we see. The new threats that are challenging the postcold war nuclear order. Then i will walk through how we are adapting both our Nuclear Deterrence and our armscontrol strategies to meet this moment. As weve all seen recently, the cracks in the foundation have come from russia. Last year, Russian Forces recklessly attacked and seized a region of the power plant in ukraine. The largest operational nuclear rent in europe. With little concern for the potential catastrophic option incidents. Earlier this year, president putin unlawfully suspended the russian implementation of a new start treaty that places limits on the most distraught limits and arsenal break the kind that can destroy the world many times over. Over a month later, president putin began take steps to station Tactical Nuclear weapons in belarus. And, as we all saw, putin formally announced that he will withdraw from the treaty on conventional forces in europe. This puts the final nail in the coffin that once served as the cornerstone of European Security which began to be violated years ago. Even prior to the brutal assault on ukraine, for years, we have advanced to develop it of dangerous capabilities like radiation spewing cruise missiles all while modernizing and stockpiling old capabilities that are not regulated by armscontrol agreements like theater range missiles and torpedoes. Russias actions have been dealing body blows to the postcold war new or armscontrol test framework. But it is not just russia we have to look to to consider the full scope of the contacts we find ourselves in. With respect to Nuclear Security and stability. Weve also seen a change in approach in china. By 2035, we are on track to have as many as 50 nuclear warheads. One of the largest peacetime nuclear buildups in history. Unlike russia, we are threatening to walk away from a negotiating table from the armscontrol agreement that has been relied upon for years. The prc has thus far opted not to come to the table for substantive dialogue and armscontrol. There are launch notifications, and we have not show much interest in discussions that have been made to nuclear force. Simply put, we have not yet seen a willingness from the prc to compartmentalize strategic stability from broader issues in the relationship. That as noted before has been the bedrock of Nuclear Security and strategic stability for decades. Finally, we are seeing increasing Nuclear Threats last year alone, kim jongun claimed he had the worlds most powerful nuclear arsenal. That allowed plans to ramp up everything from tactical nukes to icbms to unmanned Nuclear Weapons. There was a sweeping new policy that would allow Nuclear Weapons to be a lot first in direct violation of the Nuclear Proliferation treaty. He has tested more Ballistic Missiles than any other. In dprks history. After the previous departure from a deal that put strict limits on Nuclear Development and prevented it from obtaining a nuclear weapon, Irans Nuclear program was left unconstrained. As a result, they are enriching more uranium including with weapons grade, and they have done so with less monitoring than when it was under the strict constraints of the joint comprehensive plan of action. Taken together the cracks in our postcold War Foundation is deep. Today, we are entering a new era that demands new strategies and solutions to achieve the goals weve always had. Prevent an arms race, reduce the risk of misperception and escalation and most importantly ensure the safe and sick parity of our people and people around the world from the learned threats and the same goals. New strategy. First, to plans, and second, nuance control and Risk Reduction measures. These are two sides to the same proverbial nuclear going. Enhancing deterrent capabilities and allowing us to strengthen confidence and new armscontrol can help shape our adversarial decisions on the car capabilities. We will discuss each side of the nuclear going. I will start with a deterrent side of the coin. We will take a twopronged approach. First, we are modernizing our Nuclear Program at home. In practice, that means we are replacing each of our triad, Ballistic Missile submarines and Nuclear Capable bombers. We are updating our Nuclear Command and architecture. We are replacing aging capabilities with next generation systems. It means investing in the nuclear complex to help ensure we have a Nuclear Enterprise and a resilient base for longterm competition. I want to be clear. United states does not need to increase Nuclear Forces to outrun and successfully deter them. We have been there. We have learned the lesson. Nor, does the United States need to have a deterrent maintenance. Rather, effective deterrence means that we have a better approach, and not more approach. It means ensuring we have capacity and capability to deter, and if necessary defeat major aggression against our country, our allies and our partners. To enhance the effectiveness, we have invested in cutting edge not Nuclear Capabilities that will help sustain the military advantage for decades to come. Capabilities like conventionally armed hypersonic missiles that can reach high value targets. This includes Nuclear Capable missiles a cyberspace tool that will help United States retain advantage over every domain. Together, these modernization efforts will ensure arch turn capabilities remain secure and strong as we head into the 20 30s when the United States will need to deter two Nuclear Powers for the first time in its history. We cant go at this alone, which leads to the second prong of our strategy. Investing and strengthening our alliances abroad. That has been President Bidens overriding priority in many ways and his northstar since the very first day as president of the United States. As we work to deepen our alliances, we always remember that one of our greatest nonproliferation accomplishments has been the u. S. Extended deterrence which has reassured so many of our partners that they do not need to develop Nuclear Weapons of their own. For example, in april, the president reaffirmed our ironclad treaty, including an extended commitment. A step that created more cooperation during a potential nuclear crisis. It showed a recommitment to our shared nonproliferation objectives. Along with our nato allies, we are focused on modernizing an alliance keep the lady. Maturing broad participation in the Nuclear Deterrent to certifying our f35 aircraft to deliver modern Nuclear Gravity bombs. All of these steps from revitalizing our Nuclear Program at home to reinvigorating alliances abroad in those categories, they will be necessary in their own right, but taken together, with the same stability goals weve always had. They will show adversaries and competitors that in an arms waste with the United States, it will be counterproductive at best or worst. We will negotiate armscontrol agreements from that position of strength and confidence ive described. Those agreements are on the others of the coin which is what i would like to tell talk about next. In time, well talk about President Bidens very longstanding commitment to nonproliferation objectives and the long experience in being a leader in the space. He said, we must invent new approaches and foster new International Operation to meet changing threats. Those words only ring more true today. Under the president s leadership, we are advancing three new approaches to strengthen armscontrol and nuclear wrist bid there is wrists. We are exchanging bilateral discussions with russia and china without preconditions. Before i jump into this, let me just step back and say without preconditions, and without accountability, we will still hold Nuclear Powers accountable for reckless behavior and we will hold our adversaries accountable for upholding Nuclear Agreements. For example, we will continue to notify russia with major strategic exercises. There are preexisting Nuclear Agreements. Any response of russias new start, suspending daytoday notifications to russia that are part of this treaty. These steps will guarantee that russia does not see benefits from a treaty they refuse to abide by, and the principle of reciprocity, of key tenant of strategic armscontrol is upheld. It will also demonstrate to russia of returning to full compliance, including receiving detailed information with a pressing for officials. But by acclaiming a new start, we will it here to a central limit with russia, indicating a willingness to continually limiting Strategic Forces through 2026. We agree. It is and neither of our interest to embark on an openended competition with strategic Nuclear Forces, and we are prepared to stick to the central limits as long as russia does. Rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to manage Nuclear Risks and develop a post2026 armscontrol framework. We are prepared to enter into those discussions. Now, the type of limits the United States can agree to after this treaty expires will worse be impacted by the size and scale of the nuclear buildup. That is why we are also ready to engage china without preconditions. Competition can be managed and it will not fear into conflict. It is our hope that among the topics on the table for diplomatic discussions, beijing can include substantive engagement with nuclear issues. That could benefit the security of both of our countries and the security of the entire world. Next, the United States is willing to engage in a new multilateral armscontrol efforts. Including the security council. United states, russia, china and france. We are under no allusions that the armscontrol measure we believe it is possible, and as you know, four of the five Nuclear Powers are, with some exceptions, already d de facto committed to transparency and restraint in their Nuclear Policies imposters. The u. S. , the u. K. And france have also all demonstrated commitment repeatedly to responsible behavior. And, some of the p5 Nuclear Agreements with each other, for example, the u. S. And russia having a Ballistic Missile launch notification as i mentioned before. So did russia and china. But these agreements are limited and piecemeal. We can do more. The p5 provides an opportunity to manage nuclear risk and arms race pressures through a mix of dialogue, transparency and agreements. For example, a Missile Launch notification regime is a straightforward measure that is simply common sense. It is a risk of misperception and calculation in times of crisis, and we could potentially build more momentum towards further measures to manage nuclear wrists and arms racing. For maintaining a loop for Nuclear Weapons, to establishing a crisis communication channel among the capitals, to commit to the policy, doctrine and budgeting, to setting up guardrails for managing the interplay between nonnuclear strategic capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence, these are all areas where we could take further steps in a multilateral contacts this will help the nice states set the norms in short the values of the nuclear era. We are already making progress, including across every major multilateral body that seeks to limit nuclear or wmd risks. The nonproliferation treaty review conference. The conference on disarmament. A Bilateral Convention across all forums with results based discussions. We are ensuring we are fit for the threats we face today and tomorrow. For example, the fielding of weapons and emerging technologies that will create new and interconnected and unpredictable escalation pathways. We are working to establish new guardrails. Especially in space and cyberspace. Of course, with the advent of artificial intelligence, this entire picture becomes more complex and challenging and requires new kinds of approaches we have describing throughout the speech. The approach we are looking at takes into account technologies and tools that could include a potential conflict. Like ai enable systems. As the president says, we are making sure that we are leading not just by an example of power, but by the power of our example. That is why we have committed to conduct not conduct destructive direct antisatellite missile testing, and we are encouraging our allies and competitors to do the same. Its why we put forth principles for responsible behavior in space and principles for the use of ai in the military domain. Both of which, we are actively promoting an international forms. Let me close with this. 60 years ago, the president spoke to our nation in the spirit of hope. That is how he put it. The people the spirit of hope. Hope we could safely manage strategic competition and we could one day build a world of Nuclear Weapons and forge a future of greater peace, greater stability and greater security. Not just for americans but for everyone. Today, with new threats with nuclear foundation, i not only believe that we can find hope again, but we must. When it comes to nuclear risk, what is at stake for our people and our world is too important into consequential for our shared future not to be. We are under no illusions about the task at hand. There is hard work and likely long work needed to lay a new condition for this era. But for new deterrents and armscontrol measures, one for for this age, we can turn this into a moment of possibility. I look forward to working with all of you to do just that. Thank you for your time. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. I am heartened to hear that you remain not just open, but committed to activists in their search for solutions. I think you and you have covered so many topics that there are a lot of questions and we are going to start i think with a couple from the press. Lets go with michael. Wall street journal. When the treaty was agreed, it was assumed that 1500 Strategic Nuclear warheads will be a submission to the lifesized Russian Strategic force. Youve taken note of the chinese buildup and a growing number of experts are concluding that 1550 was necessary, and shirley something larger is required to deal with china and russia especially since there is a degree of military operation between these two powers. My question to you is, do you think the u. S. Might need to increase its arsenal behind beyond 15 50 in order to deter china and russia and give incentive to negotiate, and what would be required in terms of armscontrol with russia, changes in nuclear strategy, and dialogue with china to make it possible to stay at the current level of 1550 and perhaps go lower. As i said, we are prepared to abide by the central limits of the new start treaty, and we have indicated russia has indicated they are as well. I said in my speech that we agree with that. We agree with the russian position. I think it is important to recognize that when it comes to the issue of growing capacity above russia, the deterrent has to be comprehensive. That means that we modernize the nuclear arsenal. It means that we invest in extended deterrence in the alliances as i described. It means increasing arnon nuclear strategic capacity in ways, and putting all those together. We believe that in the current context, we have the number and type of capability today that we need, and i cant speak to every contacts and contingency way out into the future, but as things stand today, we believe we have what we need. In terms of the question on china and what it will take, look. The very first thing that is necessary is for us to get this conversation going in a real way. I believe that the prc could make a Bold Decision to engage directly with the United States in discussions of strategic stability and nuclear risk area it would be the responsible thing to do for the benefit of our two countries, and as i said, the wider world. Once in that conversation, the question of each size leverage and incentive and carrot sticks can be defined, but we have to pass the first threshold and we have not, as of yet, seen the prc be willing to engage in a conversation. We will have time for one or two questions from the audience if we keep questions brief. Writers, given russias recent actions with this rhetoric about ukraine, saber rattling rhetoric. Why do you think Vladimir Putin would be interested in discussing Nuclear Risk Management and a new start . I would point out that during the cold war are sylvia adversaries engaged in all kind of military aggression, destructive and brutal practices and engaged in armscontrol discussions with the United States. The soviet union were able to compartmentalize the issue of strategic stability as it related to the two largest Nuclear Powers from other policies that they were pursuing and other issues with the relationship between United States and russia. I cant predict what Vladimir Putin will do but there is a track record of our two countries being capable of engaging in these kinds of discussion that serves our National Interest and the broader common interest. We are available with clear eyes as i wade through the cracks russia has put in that postcold war nuclear order. It will be hard work and long work but the notion of russia being prepared in that conversation is rooted in the historical relationship of our two countries. I am teresa hitchens, yesterdays secretary austin bemoaned the fact that china has been unwilling to engage in military to military communications with activities in the south china seas all the way into space. Do you have any insights into how the administration hopes to be able to branch out because right now you have silence on the other end . China is a sovereign country and will have to make decisions to engage in military to military dialogue to manage competition responsibly and reduce conflict. We can only do what is right and responsible and rooted in our National Interest which is to say we are available for that kind of dialogue. We are available for crisis communication and strategic discussions from space, cyberspace, Nuclear Stability. That is something we say not to demand something from china or get down and beg for them to talk with us. We just say we are ready to talk when you want to talk. The rest of the world should look at this question and say what does it mean to be a responsible significant power in the world . Does it mean to be ready to engage in military to military communications where these Strategic Issues have deep and fundamental stakes for the entire world . Most countries would answer yes. I have the opportunity to spend two days in vienna and without going into the details of the conversation, this was a topic i broached with him. I thought we had a candid discussion on it and we will continue to indicate our willingness to participate in these discussions on an ongoing basis. We have received several questions from the audience, more than we could share but i will give them to you for as much time as you can give us. First, you have seen senator cotton pull out of new start as we approach the National Defense authorization act, what is your message to congress on why these efforts are counterproductive . I will send him a copy of the speech. I will not comment on any particular piece of legislation only to say that we believe remaining in the posture where we are prepared to pursue meaningful agreements. President biden knows that having worked with republicans. It was passed on a bipartisan basis with the stewardship of senator lugar. We would make an argument for a bipartisan commitment to this core tenant of our National Security strategy which is to have us engage in armscontrol arrangement and anything that would inhabit that would not be in the best National Interest. Thank you, the second question. What happened to candidate guidance of the soul Purpose Nuclear doctrine . The sole purpose of Nuclear Weapons should be to deter or respond to Nuclear Threats or its allies . When President Biden came into office he immediately directed his National Security cabinet agencies to engage in a Nuclear Posture review. That requires looking at the context on the world and taking a hard look at our own capabilities and posture at home. When he took a look at that he sat down with senator austin, he said that the review was right for this moment that we should continue to provide a deterrent and reduce the role and risk of Nuclear Weapons in the world going forward. Finally, i wanted to note that we have with this austrian ambassador one of the driving forces behind the treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which is a new element in the global, nuclear Risk Reduction equation. Does the Biden White House welcome this treaties contribution to reducing Nuclear Threats . Hi ambassador, how are you . President biden was in hiroshima, japan and he wrote at the peace memorial, he wrote about a World Without Nuclear Weapons and that is something he supported as Vice President and continues to look to the future. The basic principle, the basic thrust of efforts to work in that direction are not inconsistent with the biden administrations approach to these issues but the instrument is different than what i described in my speech. We have our policy that we are pursuing. We believe that we do need to deal with the challenges and threats that we face and confront in the National Security landscape today and requires these two elements, a Nuclear Deterrence element and in armscontrol element. I believe people to judge for themselves as to how it relates to these other treaties like you describe. I want to thank you. There are about 150 people who would like to debate things with you. We appreciate your time. We instead will pressure, debate and hector your colleagues at the white house and at the state department and defense department. As all of us appreciate, there are so many countries that made a contribution to keeping the world safer, building on a nonproliferation architecture which is under threat. It is my personal belief that we have only succeeded in putting together those pieces when the u. S. Is determined to show leadership and openness and an activist approach. We welcome your comments today. We want to ask everyone here to stay in their seats and to al