Transcripts For CSPAN News Politics And Public Affairs 20130

Believe them. If you ask most americans do you want smaller government, they say yes. Then if you ask them to cut my particular item on the budget, they dont want to cut anything. So its not clear if they really believe in it. Based on the best data i have when writing this book lowest 10 and highest 30 . So lib tarnse if they were conscious and political, they could be a big movement. It could be a group of people that have a lot of influence in politics but they are not organized that way right now. What you might not know sunday night at 8 00 on cspan q a. The Inspector General overseeing reconstruction efforts in afghanistan said the u. S. Risks losing billions of dollars without proper oversight of the projects. Those remarks same at the same time that president karzai. This is 50 mens. Thank you very much. And thank you very much for everyone showing up this afternoon. They were very generous comments and i am honored to be here today at the stimson center, an institution named for and inspired by a man who helped to guide the nation through some of the most difficult challenges that we have ever faced. And an organization that i remember calling upon for guidance and assistance on many occasions, particularly when i was working for sam, who i had the pleasure to work with for about 17 years. I remember at the old offices, north of dupont circle, many a day talking to barry and mike and a team of experts on proliferation issues, loose nukes, chemical and biological warfare issues. So its a Great Institution and its an honor to come back here. This is only the second time ive been to your new office and its fantastic. Little did i know, two months ago approximately, when we got together and talked about this, how good stimson was. Today i realize how good they are. Two months ago when we picked this date, little did i know that it would be the week afghanistan that a certain president from a certain country would be in town. I remember conversations saying its just going to be an informal gathering, just a few of us will get together, and here i see cspan and a lot of faces a people i know both in and out of the government and so on. I knew you were good and your background, but i did not know how good you were until today. All kidding aside, its a pleasure to be here and talking about what really is a very important subject, no matter what day of the week or what week of the year it is. Henry stimson sam still has a long and illustrious career in public service, Henry Stimson did and he approached it in the same way that sam did. That is a very practical and nonpartisan manner. If secretary stimson were alive today, he would be using his trademark approach to the issue of afghanistan. He would be studying and analyzing the challenges we now face in afghanistan. He probably, if he were asked to take on the role as speaker, would not have taken it. In all seriousness, the position i was offered back in june as the special Inspector General for afghan reconstruction was both a challenge and opportunity of a lifetime and is one topic im excited to talk about, and i am excited to be here this afternoon to talk about us. The conflict in afghanistan is quite arguably our foremost Foreign Policy issue and challenge facing us today. The United States has spends more money to rebuild afghanistan than it has spent on the reconstruction of any other single nation, including germany following world war ii. We spend about 28 million every day to rebuild and reconstruct afghanistan. Nearly 90 plus billion we have already appropriated for afghanistan relief and reconstruction is designed to build and strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces, promote selfgovernment, and foster economic development. It is my job and the job of my nearly 200 auditors, investigators, inspectors, and other professional staff to make certain this money is spent wisely, effectively, efficiently, and protected from waste, fraud, and abuse. To help you understand the challenges we face and that my sister Inspector Generals face in their roles, as well as what our country faces in afghanistan, let me start by telling you a little story, a story about one of our inspections. In the far north of afghanistan, bordering tajikistan, kunduz province. It has seen an increase in insurgent activity. It is also the site of a major nato supply route. Maintaining security and safety of that province is critical to our National Security interests. In 2008, accordingly, the department of defense obligated over 70 million to construct an Afghan National Army Garrison there that would house 1800 National Afghan army troops and their advisers. This is a multibuilding garrison. It was supposed to be completed in june of 2009. In april 2010, it still was not completed. To make matters worse, the construction had been completed that had been completed had major problems. Roofs were sagging or collapsing because the contractor had used improper welding and soldering techniques. Worse yet, the site was constructed on unstable soil. Because the contractor had not adequately prepared the site and stabilize the soil and constructed proper foundation, the buildings were collapsing. They were literally sinking into the ground, causing structural failure and making them unusable. In 2010 we inspected the site. We found problems and told the Defense Department to fix it. They promised to do so. However, last year we returned and we found a site in deplorable condition. Although some structures had been fixed, the underlying problems of the collapsible soil had not. As a result, buildings had failed, buildings had sunk, holes had developed, and more facilities faced the likelihood of structural failure. We saw gaping holes in buildings because of the structural failures, so large that you could stick your arm through the side walls of the buildings. The sinkholes were so bad that the transformers and Electrical Systems used to supply power to the facilities were about to collapse. Moreover, even those facilities that did not have deficiencies were not being used for the intended purpose or were not used at all. I would like to report that the contractors responsible for this problem were held accountable, but that is not the case. Instead, we seem to be finding time and time again, for some inexplicable reason, they still lead not been able to provide test vacation for, the Defense Department released the contractor from all further obligations under the contract, including all warranties to fix all the problems and they paid the contractor in full. I tell you this story not because i think the reconstruction efforts in afghanistan will rise or fall, succeed or fail on what happens with one Army Garrison based in one small province in afghanistan. The reason im telling you this story is because it is indicative of problems that we face and we find time and time again when we do audits and inspections in afghanistan. And the problems that we have found at kunduz are indicative of larger problems and indicative of core causes of the problems we have found in afghanistan. That is what i want to talk to you about today. Excuse me. These problems, these core issues can really be boiled down to five separate but interrelated issues. First, inadequate planning. Second, poor Quality Assurance. Third, poor security. Fourth, questionable sustainability. Lastly, corruption. Lets talk about inadequate planning. We are at risk now of wasting billions of dollars if the agencies charged with implementing new programs and constructing new facility is to not first answer some basic questions. I have been in washington 30 something years. I almost fell off the stage. I came from ohio. Maybe i keep this midwestern approach to issues, sort of basic simple questions that you would ask if you were buying a house, buying a car, or trying to lecture your daughter on what school to attend. Sort of simple questions, logical questions. These questions are not being asked first are not being answered, i should say, in afghanistan. Questions such as, are these programs and buildings needed . Have you asked the afghans if they want them . Have you coordinated it with any of the other organizations working for either of the u. S. Government or the International Community . Have we designed them to meet any specific need that the afghans have . And have redesigned them in such a way that they can be sustainable in the future . Quite often we find the answers to these questions are no. For example, when we asked the government officials why they had built the garrison in kunduz and how they determine its size, location, and the way it was built, we got a blank stares. There was no planning or justification documents that could provide these answers. In fact, as we reported in 2011 and another audit, the department of defense did not have a longrange construction plan for its entire 11. 4 billion construction program. Just so you think we are picking on dod, aid is no better. As far as we can tell, they have a hard time grasping what they constructed and even where they are located. I ask you to go in our website in the next month or so and you will see an interesting audit. If the findings are what i believe they will be, we are missing a number of buildings we thought we had built in afghanistan. I dont know where they went, but maybe they were never built. The second issue that we are facing has to do with Quality Assurance. It is our job as sigar to construct oversight of the reconstruction effort, but it is also the responsibility of the agents of the implementing agencies to monitor the progress and quality of their programs, to do the Due Diligence before turning it over to the Afghan Government. Unfortunately, we are finding that agencies often fail to fully implement their Quality Assurance programs. Lets go back to the garrison. We found the Quality Assurance process was virtually nonexistent during the first nine months of. The of the most critical nine months. As a result, there was no way to verify if improper materials were substituted for the correct ones or foundations were constructed with any type of Quality Assurance. We have seen this problem in all areas in afghanistan, from Development Programs to capacitybuilding initiatives, to building and construction sites. One of the worst examples, unfortunately, that we uncovered may have resulted in a loss of American Service members. That involved a multimilliondollar program intended to protect highway culverts from improvised explosive devices. We found that no Quality Control was done. As i reported recently in a letter i sent to the commanders on the field, in an Emergency Management letter, many a the grates were missing or poorly installed, in such a way that they failed to prevent ieds from being put underneath the highways, and they resulted in the death of u. S. Coalition and afghan forces. This matter is still ongoing and has grown in scope. I have to give credit to general allen and many of the military officers who brought this to our attention, because they thought it was localized. But we have since found evidence that this may be widespread throughout the country. We dont know what the ultimate results are, but it has turned into a criminal domestication. The third problem i want to focus on past to do with security. That is a key issue we are facing. Without adequate security, construction comes to a halt. Or if it continues, it does so without unnecessary oversight. We were told the reason there had been no oversight in the first nine months at kunduz was because of the security situation there, but nobody felt it was safe enough to visit the site. This problem is not limited just to the United States. For example, we know that the world bank failed to properly monitor some of its programs, such as the afghanistan construction trust fund, because it determined that sending personnel outside kabul is too risky. As the military drawdown, we find there are fewer places we can go to safely in afghanistan to monitor projects. Just last week, some of the inspectors identified the problems at kunduz reported there were not able to travel to a number of sight because of security issues. We are working to find ways around this. It is not insurmountable, but it is difficult, because the best oversight is to send american over there who is trained in oversight to go there and kick the tires. We are trying to take that into consideration. We are hoping the Government Agencies to our contract to build these sites and create these programs are doing the same thing. This problem could grow over the years to come. The fourth problem area deals with sustainability. By this i mean, do the afghans have the financial and technical capabilities and the political will to operate and maintain the facilities and programs that reconstruction has worked on that we have done in reconstruction over the last 10 years . The numbers tell a story. The Afghan Government brings in total revenue per year of only 2 billion. It will cost approximately 4 billion just to sustain the Afghan Security force. If we bring in the rest of the Afghan Government programs, we are talking about approximately 10 billion more per year. That is a financial problem that the International Community is stepping puppy up to the plate to help the Afghan Government whip. But it is an important delta that has to be filled. And the Technical Capability of the Afghan Government is in question. We have found the Afghan Government will likely be incapable of fully maintaining facilities after the 2014 transition. That includes the infamous kunduz Army Garrison base. Moreover, the Afghan National Security Forces lack the Technical Skills needed to operate and maintain critical facilities such as the water supply, with water treatment, and Power Generation capability. Finally, there is a problem of corruption. Corruption in afghanistan is corrosive. Eating away at its reputation in the world and at the faith of the Afghan People and their leaders, government programs, and policies. According to transparency international, afghanistan is perceived as having the worst public corruption in the world, tied for last with north korea and somalia. Corruption is not just an afghan problem. Through our investigative work and audit work, we have uncovered schemes by contractors at u. S. Government officials to engage in bribery, theft, and other forms of fraud. It is too soon for us to know whether the problems at that garrison were the result of bribery or corruption. Our criminal agents are looking at that right now, but we need to a knowledgeable that corruption plays in undermining the overall reduction efforts and the credibility of u. S. And afghan efforts now and for the foreseeable future even after the anticipated drawdown of u. S. Troops in 2014. I have laid out what we see as some of the biggest problems facing reconstruction. I dont want to sound pessimistic. Im actually a very optimistic guy. Thats why i took the job. I want to talk about how we at sigar and how i think the u. S. Government will address those issues and wine sigar has a unique position to really make an impact on the problems i just identified. First of all, just so you know, sigar is the only agency in the entire United States government, made of 200 people, that has just won sole mission, to protect and promote the effectiveness of the construction in afghanistan. Everybody else has multiple nations. We only have one, and thats good, because we can focus our attention solely on that mission. Although it is a temporary agency, theres all possibility we will be around after 2014s troop drawdown, because it deals with the amount of funds obligated, so we should be there. It is the only agency that is given the authority and in part by congress to look at projects across government lines. Were not limited like the aid, Inspector General, or dod for dod. We are specifically instructed by congress to look across the government. If you do reconstruction in afghanistan, we can look at that program. We also have a unique hiring authority. In essence, everyone who works for me works at will. So i can hire and remove employees based upon specific needs and need requirements. All of our employees have to sign up for the possibility of working in afghanistan. So it is a unique crowd that we bring. We also have, as a result, the single largest oversight presence of any u. S. Government agency in afghanistan. We have 16 people on the ground right now including the largest cadre of auditors and criminal investigators. More than the fbi. Its not just our size, mandate, or unique authority that is important. It is how we and how i view our mission and how our agency sees that mission. When i joined sigar, i made it clear on the first day that you should view this as a mission and not as a job. If you see this as a job, as a place to retire in place, you should leave, because i only wanted people with fire in the belly, because we have a limited amount of time to do good in the construction in afghanistan. I have used that fire in the belly speech s