Thank you for being here today. Of the president strategies and had involvement with missiledefense. On the secretary defense of the obama administration. Yorty met the director of the missiledefense program. Tom will talk about missiledefense 2020 and next steps. Laura is a Senior Scientist in the program. Aboutso has a book missiledefense and will speak to that and a number of issues, i think. Our third panelist is a major general, retired friend, and his last posting was the director of strategy for norad and nor calm. He headed up several commands were already missile and air defense, and was director of at one point. I want to thank you for coming and those unable to be here due to a scheduling conflict. To kick is words often than we will turn to the panelists, indeed as mentioned earlier, the Trump Administration is kicking off a major review of the missiledefense policy. If we go back to the 2010 missile review conducted by the last administration, it is defensethat it placed is the number one priority for missiledefense. Our allies and partners can contribute for defense of their. Wn key assets no one else will do the job or shifted the job of defending the United States for us. Of the obamaclear administration, that are Missile System is aimed at north korea forthat is not intended roger a were china. One of the recommendations in toms report would say shift focus a little bit and include an ability to engage holistic missiles and numbers from russia and china. We will want to talk about that and any implications for stability. Clearly, we think about missiledefense today. The driving decision is north koreas continuous missile testing and missile program. The reality, while north korea ,oses a threat to United States and poses a threat today and that is likely to grow. Missile defense not the only part of the u. S. Approach to that problem, but it has to be fundamental. A lot of qualitative improvements are underway, giving credit to Missile DefenseAgency Director jim. Thats for pushing things along and for the modified kill vehicle, and the sensors as well. A lot of work underway. When the questions we want to discuss is the pace and whether is it appropriate. As we get into, the panel, whether we should be looking today to grow the system beyond our 44based ground interceptors that are deployed and that we would like ready for operations if necessary. These will be among the issues we discussed. They will be among the issues that the new admit administration will have to discuss and i think we will get a good start today. We will start with tom. High, good morning. Thank you jim and the rather panelist for joining and to think senator sullivan for coming out this morning. Im going to give an overview of the report of missiledefense 2020 and, on the basis of both the president ial directive and the nda, the administration will be looking at posture and strategy. Also, by explicit president ial direction, the relative balance between homeland and regional. Every month or so, north korea lately has been doing something new in terms of missile development. There are other new threats out there is well. I think, given the circumstances we are in, i wouldnt not be surprised to see a relative rebalancing in the near term in favor of homeland, at least relative to where we have been in recent years. We hope this report lays out a menu of options or a road mop map to how one might do that. Before you started, i would like to knowledge my coauthors who are both here. We have put a lot of work into this effort. I would like to thank many smart people in and out of government to let us bend their ear about this. Greeley whot fort kindly gave us their time. And finally to the csi s who put together some great graphics to help communicate some of this stuff. One reason we wanted to put this together, the home land Defense Security discussion is either underinformed or misinformed. To some extent, that is understandable. It is hard to know all the different kinds of kill vehicles, and all the Different Things in development. One of our secondary purposes is to serve as a compilation, a guide to the perplexed on all the complexity. Bring stuff together in one place. The problem with how this is frequently discussed, including with a lot of historical baggage, unfortunately tends to confuse the debate. Tohink in respect missiledefense in particular, the discussion is to much divided. Taking intot account the difficulty, and on the other side, folks snickering snickering. A better understanding of the past in the Current Record might have that help to modify that. First is to bring together information in one place, a reference guide of where things have been. Secondly, at a menu of options of what might be considered and look at the benefits and limits of those. Third, make some of our own findings and recommendations. I will just say the current need a range of reliability, capability, and capacity improvements relative to where we are today. Adjustmentsgetary would be in order in the fourth quarter. There has been a lot of back and , over theicy wise last 20 years or so, and in the reports, we tried to highlight and emphasize the continuity. On the one hand, the strategic continuity but also the programmatic continuity. Side, go backic and read president clintons speech in 2000 where he said he was not going to decide to display deployed national Missile Defense. Then look at the speech george w. Bush gave in 2001 given reentry. I think theres a lot of continuity there in terms of, not necessarily the exact readiness, but in terms of strategic rationality. The idea of being simply, we are completeng to accept vulnerability to certain kinds of threats. Risk unwilling to deterrence failure and aspect to different kinds of things like north korea. Appreciating the lineage and evolution of the programs is also important. Looking at the roots, for instance. Appreciate cant some of the reliability issues and silasbe ekbs today. They are still the events prototype designed put together in the 1990s under avian treat restrictions. Furthermore, we are left with little choice to embrace kill vehicles still under development in short order and put them to use. Waitingce then, we are for a true design turn on the kill vehicle. Instead of light extending the program and for ways. Extending the program in different ways. An old economy tends to get embrace. The dichotomy that regional missiledefense is good and effective, but homeland Missile Defense is bad. Extends beyond the particular systems to the mission itself. Is thatissiledefense you can take it as an argument of faith that Homeland Defense is impossible. Side ofsee the other the cheerleaders that can Technology Issues out there, dont do is just as either. What we try to do is try to be fair and candid in both directions. We criticized from both sides. There are a lot of shortcomings, but i think that the past, that you heard this morning and what you mentioned now, really is a good one. The dichotomy i because ais important lot of the past testing and development that is been taking place in the regional systems, applies to applying it forward. Let me start to walk through a little bit of this. Jim mentioned highlighting homeland missiledefense as the top priority. This was actual a general overview of xo atmospheric intercept gives taking place as an ekb. Kb it has fluctuated a lot, there was a big surge for the deployment back in 2002, but this isnt just gnb. Emphasis ofoverall green, being homeland, and blue being regional. Taking pictures, we will have all of these online for you to download them to your pleasure. I also want to put this in a historical perspective. S is, as senator byrd senator sullivan might mention, as is our modesty in the number of interceptors we are talking about. If you look at the far right, that is why 17. Compare that to the clinton administration. 250. O before that, the g pals whose job it was to after a limited threats. Before the sei phase one and that sort of thing, but in terms of the overall context, you see that modesty. I keep looking for the keyboard done here, sorry. The other context that here is the legislative environment. This past year, Congress Went back and updated the missile act which was 17 years old. First of all, we dont talk about national Missile Defense anymore and some new words. This is talking the future tense about we ought to deploy things, we have done that. I think congress has correctly gone in and updated this. There has been a lot of hyperventilating about the updates. Thinking, it says the schools cannot teach backgrounding anymore. Has sufficiently appreciated this. It is a complete sentence. It is the subjects and objects of this defense that have changed. , how itso about enforces. Applyrd limited may not in the same way we might think about it in 1999 context. At these look adjectives, and you compare them document and theres a lot of continuity. Sdio, and mba, we do see the in respect to deployment. Just within the past 10 years, as we heard about this morning, this is specifically the homeland element that we have broken out. This is the falling tree graph, those are the five depths the spending there. A 24 decline over the past decade. Going auts, here he gmd. E deeper into gnb this goes into the trend, it is pretty clear. These all kind of look like that. Through, we have a sorter on sensors and that of thing. Were going to blow through a little bit of that. View ofhow you the long interceptors, the lineage of where we are today. Fleetmitation of the tbi gb i fleet is there is a lot going on. Ptors you can see all the c1 and c2s. C2s dontely, the have the communications to the ground. The ekbs of today. To go out and get a twostage booster was never done. To get at that flexibility. That means you are not able to buy more time and fire later. You have the fire sooner. All three stages have to find that a burnout before the kill vehicle can be released. If you are operating from alaska, that is going to limit you. Mdame also moved to the three faces. For is the current roadmap going forward. Advanced robust, and is their categories. The second is the are kb. Areill talk a little bit rkv. This should have happened a decade ago and never did. Theyre not starting from scratch and are leveraging a lot of the parallel work going into other programs. The idea is to make it simpler, more modular, and have fewer points of failure. Is the kinds of reliability issues that have come up again and again. Rkving to that arcade will use the diversity in the fleet. It shows just how many different gbi fleet. N todays it will draw the seeker from the , and draw telescope upon that. It is not going to be starting up on scratch. In the advanced section, is the mo kb. That is quite a bit far behind rosen to where the plan was parried multiple kill vehicles, maybe a single booster, to compensate for some of the discrimination challenges, really improve your magazine capacity. It is pretty far out to the right in terms of that. This charge here is the centerpiece. What is going on and what the agency currently plans. We call this the skittles charge. You can taste the rainbow and kind of see a lot of muscle movements on what is happening there. The green is c one. That is the oldest kill vehicle put back into 2004. Ce two. Is the the blue is the c2 plus and the v. Anges are kb rk now, as i said, this is the best snapshot of what is going on and what is intended to go on. We would point out a couple shortfalls of what mda currently plans. One is likely to be, a big gap between things that are going to be put in place this year, the 44 by 17. After that, we are going to sit kv comes until the r around. Especially if it goes to the right. Might hurt later on. A second limitation is that, as we heard earlier, notwithstanding a recommendation in 2013, by the department of defense to go out and buy spares, thatsts wasnt done. After we get to 44, we are going to go down. Every time we test something, where going to have to pull it off the ground and that starts to add up until you get to the that into you get to the next generation. That is one of the several reasons why you are here and folks talk about the importance of capacity, instead of going down, it goes down by at least four if not more in the next couple of years. Comes online. V 2020 could be too ambitious. If that is too ambitious, thats reduction might be more important. The third limit is that, unfortunately, mda i think is planning on putting the rkv on some of the oldest boosters for cost. That might reduce some of their effectiveness. Lets talk into testing. Im sure we will have a discussion about this right now. Through in the instance of the testing budget. There is good reasons why it has gone down so much. Had to go back post 2010 and of the problems and then put it back together again. Some of this is the overall topline reduction pressure and some of it has to do with that choice. It really is the case, this is one of those instances of the mischaracterization of the testing record of gmd overall. Maybe the one exception i mentioned, that they went back and had to fix what i am you these are dumb problems. Or Something Like that. It is not high technology. One of these failures is because of the silo cover not opening. And the missile not coming out. That is the sort of thing that is not about the kill vehicle, more about the difficulty. Gotten muchmda has more forthright in articulating these failures. Sensors, no Missile Defense system is better than the sensors to tell it where to go and what to kill. We have what we call the mother of all testing charts in here that, not only goes through the ,ull 31 flight intercept tests and what became of them, failure explanations and things like that, but also what sensors were involved. See from the late 1990s on to where we are today, a pretty consistent increase as more radars are stitched in, as aegis and other things are brought in, you see a lot more of that. I think that is a good thing. There is probably a lot more to do on the center side. Probably the single most important thing that we recommend on the center side is the spacebased, probably infrared, tracking sensors. You get to that field of view, which you can not only inform form of overall, weve characterized the test record has a kind of nothing you would not expect for prototype. Sum that fits what we are,. Whats the key the key is to get out of that test been, that , thatype bin prototype. This is a quick picture of the sensors that evolved over time, over decades, that are slowly coming online. Youll see the top. Some of these highend take a look at the bottom. These are broken down by category. The last category at the bottom, the space space, that has what has gone off the cliff. This is mda spacebased budget overall. You get the idea. In terms of future options, we had a lot of uav direct of an energy, concepts that have been circulating and continue to come back. The difficulty is the budget is not there for them, we have another report last year talking about budget pressures especially. The r d value of onward. Tween 2010 and admittedly, some of its still potential, but that is the for mdasmediocrity r d. Good things going on but and relative terms we should do a lot more. Run through our recommendations, i will not read them all, thats why we gave you the book. We shouldf policy continue to have a more robust and layered Missile Defense for a variety of threats against both ballistic and Cruise Missiles. Of the mdl port explicitly. It will be interesting what i come up with. We dont talk about cruise Missile Defense just yet. In the budget side, restore home went Missile Defense to a level commensurate with being a first priority. Within the budget, prioritize theand ticket look at mlk and direct energy. Continue the current course for interceptor capacity, but look at accelerating mlk the as well. In terms of capacity, i would say continue to look at adding to the 44 in the coming years, and continuing to grow that out. Fork really has a lot of capacity. We will talk about activating the hedge that was described in that 2013 deity hedging strategy, activating the hedge, which was explicit in that report. Up for greeley is the most Cost Effective nearest Term Solution to do that. Onre is a lot of attention the east coast site possibility. Breast costs less costly approaches to that. Not want to exhaust the entire mda budget on new capital improvements. If there is a way to add capability with transportables, that is of underlay probably a more costeffective way to get added. It bit you will hear more about that. Adding thea of capability, but there might be cheaper ways to get there. In terms of sensors and tax texting casting, the space layers the most important. I will leave it there and turned over. Thank you. [applause] think you very much. Very nice presentation, terrific report. Credit to yourself and your team. You are up next. Ok. Thank you csi us, i am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this panel. There was invited because i coauthored a report last year on the event defense program, i would be happy to give you a copy if you are not able to get one. We were pretty tough on the gmd. You can probably tell by the title. We were tough with congress, the bush and obama administrations policies. I will be straightforward about that. Was to spark details, engage discussion about the role of strategic Missile Defense in our country. I believe these wellinformed conversations are essential to. S. And Global Security we cannot have a informed debate about the current value of the system without a clear assessment of it. This is critically important when the content is contentious convoluted to these longstanding debates. Since it has been almost 15 billion, the chengdu system after its inception, we thought we would take a look and see where we are , what the capability is, how we got here, and what are lessons that we could learn from that. Established on the findings of the official u. S. Government sources. We drew heavily from the gao, from the antigun Testing Office , test and evaluation. We found this system is in worse shape than most every last. We tried to look at why it ended up this way. We ended up l