Recent developments in north korea most notably the february 12, 2013 nuclear test and the december 12, 2012 missile test highlight the growing threat that north korea poses to the United States, our allies and friends in the region, and the increasing dangers of severe instability on the Korean Peninsula. Given this growing threat i believe that this committee needs to take a close look at current u. S. Policy towards north korea; evaluate its effectiveness; and identify any midcourse corrections or new measures that are required to get our north korea policy right. I understand that as we convene this hearing this morning that up in new york the United NationsSecurity Council is sitting down, right now, to consider a resolution that imposes additional sanctions on north korea. This new Security Council resolution, based on a u. S. China draft, includes tough new sanctions intended to impede north koreas ability to develop further its Illicit Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programs. These sanctions include targeting the illicit activities of north korean diplomatic personnel, north korean banking relationships, illicit transfers of bulk cash, and new travel restrictions. I think that these actions are a step in the right direction and very much in keeping with the sort of approach that the Ranking Member, senator corker and i called for in the north korea nonproliferation and accountability act of 2013, which the Senate Passed on february 25 and i congratulate the administration on moving things forward so effectively at the United Nations. But i also believe that we need to do more to better determine how the United States can combine effective sanctions and military countermeasures with strong and realistic diplomacy aimed at north korea and at china, and with a clear goal of north koreas abandonment of its Nuclear Weapons program. North korea yesterday made what i consider to be an absurd threat, of a Preemptive Nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors in response to the action the United States, china, and others are seeking at the United Nations. There should be no doubt about our determination, willingness, and capability to neutralize and counter any threat that north korea may present. I do not think the regime in pyongyang wants to commit suicide, but that, as they must surely know, would be the result of any attack on the United States. But even as we assure that effective military countermeasures are in place to safeguard the United States and our allies, there should also be no doubt about our determination to work with the International Community, through peaceful diplomatic means, to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Today it is estimated that north korea has accumulated between 20 to 40 kilograms of plutonium, enough perhaps for six to eight Nuclear Weapons. It has now conducted three Nuclear Explosive tests. It has developed a modern gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Program to go along with its plutonium stockpile. And it is seeking to develop the capability to mate a Nuclear Warhead to an intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Taken together, these developments present a growing danger that north korea may well become a Small Nuclear power a scenario which, while bad enough on its own, could well have additional dangerous effects if it leads other nations in the region to reconsider their own commitments to non proliferation. Moreover, there is also the continuing danger of further conventional military provocation from north korea that results in a serious military clash between north and south, and the potential for unintended escalation that could draw in the United States and china and result in a deadly and dangerous confrontation on the peninsula. And, beyond these security concerns, there are also on going questions about human rights and the lot of the north Korean People. Security concerns may be our most important priority on the peninsula, but they are not our only priority. It has now been a little over a year since kim jung un took power amid speculation that this transition could lead to a period of instability inside the north, perhaps even leading to collapse. Yet that instability does not appear to have materialized although of course we can never be sure about the future in north korea. By all appearances, kim has asserted control over the military and strengthened party institutions. And, contrary to some media hype focused on his education in switzerland, he has not proved to be a reformer. It is unclear whether he has any objectives other than maintaining tight control of his political and economic system. Above all else, north korea clearly represents a real and growing threat to u. S. National security interests, and therefore deserves our close attention. In time, if its present course remains unaltered, north korea will pose a direct threat to the United States. Today, north korea certainly poses a growing threat to our allies and to American Forces in region. It also threatens to undermine the International Nonproliferation regime particularly, as its arsenal grows, by spreading its threat to other counties through a transfer of Nuclear Technology and materials. We know, for example, that north korea has made efforts to proliferate Nuclear Technology in the past, building a plutonium separation plant in syria which israel destroyed by bombing it before its completion, and we know that there is a long history of north koreaniranian military cooperation. I hope that this hearing, as well as a continuing dialogue with the administration on this issue, we help us explore several key questions that are critical to informing our future policy towards north korea does north korea pursue a Nuclear Weapons program as a deterrent, for defensive purposes, or does it pursue a Nuclear Program as part of a policy intended to reunify the peninsula by force . Could the current regime ever conceive of parting with its Nuclear Capability, or does it view these weapons as essential tools to deter the United States and continue its hold on power . Getting these answers right will be critical to determining if there is hope for diplomacy or if a different approach is necessary. It is also important to note the coming to power of a new south Korean Administration led by President Park at this difficult time. And i offer her my congratulations on her inauguration last week. There is no basis for successfully dealing with the north absent a Solid Foundation for policy rooted in the usrok alliance. With President Parks inauguration we have an important opportunity to consult and work closely with a close ally to chart out future course in dealing with north korea. Finally, we need to consider how recent transitions in other countries in the region including our close ally japan, as well as china may present new opportunities in building a more effective approach to dealing with pyongyang. Whatever ones views on the various policy efforts of the past two decades what has worked and what has not worked and why there can be little question that these efforts have failed to end to north Koreas Nuclear or Missile Programs, failed to reduce the threat posed by north korea to our allies, and failed to lead to greater security in the region. Certainly there are no easy answers when it comes to how to be successful when dealing with a regime like north korea. But i am hopeful that todays hearing, and the conversation we start today, may help us to get to a place where, twenty years from now, we can look back at successfully having ended north Koreas Nuclear and Missile Programs, and built greater stability and security on the peninsula and throughout the asiapacific region. Let me call on the distinguished Ranking Member, senator corker. North koreas Nuclear Weapons program, Missile Program, and proliferation activities pose a threat to the United States security interests. Policy makers have attempted to influence north koreas behavior through deterrent tools, including inducements and punitive measures. U. S. Officials have used diplomacy, a system of financial sanctions, and counterproliferation tools, including proactive interdiction activities. Despite the combination of tools, the United States has failed to persuade the north korean regime to abandon its Nuclear Weapons program. We know north korea continues to engage in a range of illicit activities to generate hard currency to support the regime. Simultaneously, the situation for the north Korean People has continued to deteriorate, with rampant human rights abuses, the continued expansion of north korean prison camps, and some analysts estimate they may hold as 200,000 prisoners. China continues to serve as north koreas primary benefactor, accounting for 60 of north korean trade. Beijing remains pyongyangs source of food and fuel. Policymakers have not been able to persuade china that the cost of beijings continued support far outweighs any benefit. It is clear we must maintain our efforts. I recognize that north korea is a complex policy conundrum and there is no Silver Bullet solution. After 20 years of unsuccessful policies by successive administrations, is logical that we ought to undertake a comprehensive review of our north korean strategy, including new tools to crack the north korean policy knot. That is why i will work with senator menendez and other members to work on the accountability act which would require undertaking the review does not require abandoning efforts, nor terminating sanctions. It necessitates we redouble efforts to think outside the box. In recent months it has become increasingly clear to me that u. S. Policymakers often pay closer attention to the non military aspects of deterrence, including efforts to weaken and debilitate the north korean regime. In particular, we often do more to expose the norths hostility toward its own citizens as a means to influence the kim regime. We should promote the flow of information, including our broadcasts. Do not mistake my interest in the nonmilitary aspect as a call to abandon the military posture security aspects of our north korean policy. I believe that a robust u. S. Nuclear deterrent is the central to u. S. Security and remains critical to maintaining our security commitments to allies in the asiapacific, including japan and south korea. Ambassador joseph will speak about our deterrent later during this hearing. I look forward to hearing from you in regarding the administrations efforts, including efforts at the Security Council on new sanctions resolutions. I look forward to hearing from you and all our expert witnesses about our capabilities to deter north korean provocations, options to elicit enhanced chinese cooperation, and opportunities to improve the lives of the north Korean People. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Our panel has put together the top Decision Makers on north korean policy from several Previous Administrations. They represent decades of experience. I can think of no better group to analyze what has worked and what has not. I expect they may hold in some cases different views in this regard, and that is only natural considering the importance of addressing north korea, and we are going to look forward to this discussion. We start off with the distinguished ambassador glyn davies. He oversees u. S. Involvement in the sixparty talks process, as well as aspects of our Security Assistance policies regarding north korea. He is a career member of the foreign service, serving previously as a permanent representative to the u. S. Atomic Energy Administration and the u. N. Office in vienna, as well as the Principal Deputy assistant secretary of state and executive secretary of the national Security Council staff. An extraordinary wealth of knowledge. We look forward to your testimony. Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me to testify today on u. S. Policy toward north korea or, as it is called, the democratic peoples republic of korea. North koreas announcement of its Third Nuclear test and its threats to conduct even more are only the latest in a long line of reminders that the Nuclear Weapons programs proliferation activities pose serious threats to u. S. National security, to Regional Security in the asiapacific, and to the global nonproliferation regime. Pyongyang continues to violate its commitments, and its human rights record is deplorable. Its people are impoverished. It pours huge sums into nuclear and Ballistic Missile programs that are forbidden by the United Nations. North koreas provocative threatening actions, meanwhile, continues to grow to take advantage of the alternatives available. The United States offered and has continued to offer pyongyang an improved relationship with the United States and integration into the International Community, provided north korea demonstrate a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address other concerns. The dprk rebuffed these offers and instead responded with a series of provocations that drew Widespread International condemnation. 60 countries criticized the december launch. The february 12 announcement of a nuclear test which was proclaimed as targeted against the United States represents an even bolder threat to National Security, stability of the regime, and the global nonproliferation regime. The International Response has been unprecedented over 80 countries condemning the test. We are working with the International Community to make clear that north Koreas Nuclear test has costly consequences. In adopting a resolution 2087 in january, the u. N. Security council pledged to take action in the event of a nuclear test. Were working hard at the United NationsSecurity Council to make good on that pledge, and, mr. Chairman, that is occurring even as we speak. Were hoping that the Council Adopts a resolution that the United States put forward, that the Security Council will deliver a strong response that further impedes the growth of north koreas Nuclear Weapons and ballistic weapons programs and its ability to engage in proliferation activities. The resolution today that we tabled builds upon, strengthens, and significantly expands the scope of the strong u. N. Sanctions already in place. The sanctions contained in this draft resolution will impede north koreas ability to proceed in developing its nuclear and Missile Programs and expand the scope of the choices the u. S. Has available to counter these and other elements. We are strengthening our cooperation with our allies, working closely with partners in the department of defense and other agencies. We will take steps necessary defend our allies, particularly the republic of korea and japan. Multilateral and National Sanctions will remain a vital component of our effort to impede the dprk and its activities. We continue to exercise National Authorities to sanction north korean entities and those that support them and facilitating programs that threaten the American People. Most recently, on january 24, the departmen