News reports about the investigation into russian interference in the 2016 election. The hearing is twoandahalf hours. I call this hearing to order. I would like to thank our witnesses today, director of National Intelligence dan coats, welcome back to your family here in the United States senate. Department of Justice Deputy attorney general rod rosenstein. Director of National Security rogers, andral mike acting director of the federal bureau of investigation, andrew mccabe, welcome. I appreciate you coming to discuss one of our most critical and publicly debated foreign intelligence tools. Title vii of the foreign Intelligence Surveillance act, commonly known as fisa, is set to expire on december 31, 2017. Title vii includes several crucial foreign intelligence collection tools, including one known primarily as section 702. Section 702 provides the capability to target foreigners who are located outside the United States, but whose Foreign Communications happen to be routed to and acquired inside the United States. Section 702 collection is exceptionally critical to protecting americans both at home and abroad. It is integral to our foreign intelligence reporting on terrorist threats, leadership plans, intentions, counter proliferation, counterintelligence, and many other issues that affect us. Subject to multiple layers of oversight and reporting requirements from the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The foreign Intelligence Surveillance court must approve procedures for each Relevant Agency before the agency can review collected information. At the end of the day, fisa collection provides our government with the foreign intelligence that our nation needs to protect americans at home and abroad, and in many cases, our allies. I understand theres an ongoing debate pitting privacy against National Security and there are arguments within the debate that has merit. As we all know, the Intelligence Communitys valuable fisa collection was thrust into the public spotlight following the illegal and unauthorized disclosures by former analyst edward snowden. As a result, the United States government and this committee we doubled its efforts to oversee fisa collection authorities, which already were subject to historical robust oversight. I also think its fair to say that some entities overreacted following snowdens disclosures and now Congress Must justify what courts repeatedly have upheld as a constitutional and lawful authority. I also think it is fair to say that nothing regarding this lawful status has changed since director clapper and attorney general holder wrote to congress in february 2012 to urge us to pass a straight reauthorization of fisa, and since the Obama Administration followed suit in september 2012. What has changed is the intensity, scale, and scope of the threats that face our nation. This is not the time to needlessly rollback and handicap our capabilities. A lot of people will use this hearing as an opportunity to talk about the committees Russian Investigation. I would like to remind everyone that 702 is one of our most effective tools against terrorism and foreign intelligence targets. I hope my colleagues and those watching this hearing realize that our constitutional obligation is to keep america and our citizens safe. The Intelligence Community needs section 702 collection to successfully carry out its mission and it is this committees obligation to ensure that the icc has the authorities and the tools it needs to keep us safe at home and abroad. I look forward to your testimony and continued efforts to maintain the integrity of this vital collection tool and i turned to the vicechairman for any comments he might have. Mr. Chairman, and thank you for hosting this hearing 702 on the very important 702 program and ways we might ensure its effectiveness. Given the panel of witnesses here, and given the recent news about Ongoing Investigations into russian interference in our 2016 elections, i have to take at least part of my time to pose some questions during my question time. Each of you here today have taken oath to defend the constitution. As leaders of the Intelligence Community, you have committed to act and provide advice and counsel in a way that is devoidd, impartial, and of political considerations. This is the essence of what makes our Intelligence Community and all the men and women who work for you so impressive. No mattert straight which Political Party is in charge. Thats y its so jarring to hear reports of white house officials , perhaps even the president himself, attempting to interfere and enlist our Intelligence Community leaders in any attempt to undermine the ongoing fbi investigation. Obviously tomorrow theres another hearing. We will be hearing from former fbi director comey. I imagine he will have something to say about the circumstances surrounding his dismissal. President ard the himself say that he was thinking about the russia investigation when he fired comey. The very individual who was overseeing that same investigation. Today we will have an opportunity to ask Deputy Attorney general rosenstein about his role in the comey firings as well. Reportsally, weve seen , some as recently as yesterday, that the president asked at least two of the leaders of our nations intelligence agencies to publicly downplay the russia investigation. The president has alleged to have also asked director coats, nci director pompeo, to intervene directly with director comey to pull back on his investigation. I will be asking director coats and admiral rodgers about those reports today. True, it wouldis be an appalling and improper use of our intelligence , an act that could erode the Publics Trust in our institutions. The ic, as ive grown to know, rides itself appropriately on its fierce independence. Any attempt by the white house or even the president himself to exploit this community as a tool for political purposes is deeply troubling. I respect all of your service to the nation. I understand that answering some of the questions the panel will post today may be difficult or uncomfortable given your positions in the administration. But this issue is of such great importance, the stakes are so high, i hope you will also consider all of our obligations to the American People, to make sure that they get the answers they deserve to sew many questions that are being asked. We may return to the subject of our hearing. I agree that the reauthorization of section 702 is terribly important. As the attacks in london, paris, manchester, melbourne, and the the goes on, all those text illustrated that terrorists continue to plot attacks that target civilians. Section 702 collects intelligence about these terrorist plots. It authorizes Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community to collect intelligence on nonu. S. Persons outside the United States, where there is reasonable suspicion that they seek to do us harm. Ive been a supporter of reauthorizing section 702 to protect americans from terrorist attacks, and im eager to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to make sure we reauthorize it before the end of this year. A reauthorization of section 702 should ensure also that there is robust oversight and restrictions to protect the privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. Those protections remain in place and if there are areas where those protections can be strengthened, we ought to look at those as well. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Sen. Burr thank you, vicechairman. Members,y for all votes are no longer scheduled for 10 30. Votes have been moved to 1 45. When this hearing adjourns, we will reconvene at 2 00 p. M. For a closed door session on section 702. I intend to start that hearing probably at 2 00. Members will be recognized for seniority for questions up to five minutes. With that, thank you for being here today. Director coats, you are recognized to give testimony. Mr. Coats thank you, mr. Chairman, members of the committee. We are pleased to be here today at your request to talk about an important and perhaps the most important piece of legislation that affects the Intelligence Community. Im here with my colleagues. I would like to take the opportunity to explain in some detail section 702. Given this is a public hearing, and hopefully the public will be watching, our efforts to provide transparency in terms of how we protect the privacy and Civil Liberties of american citizens needs to be explained. The Program Needs to be understood. As ireciate your patience talk through the value of 702 to our Intelligence Community and to keeping americans safe. Intelligence collection under section 702 has produced and continues to produce significant intelligence that is vital to protect the nation against International Terrorism, cyber threats, weapons proliferators, and other threats. At the same time, section 702 provides strong protections for the privacy and Civil Liberties of our citizens. That the horrific attacks recently occurred in europe are still at the top of my mind. I was just in europe days before the first attack in manchester, thatwed by other attacks have subsequently taken place. I was in discussion with my british colleagues through this as well as colleagues in other european nations. My sympathies go out to the victims and families of those that have received these heinous attacks, and to the incredible resilience that these communities have shown. Having just returned from europe, im reminded of why section 702 is so important to our mission of not only protecting american lives but the lives of our friends and allies around the world. Although the many successes enabled by 702 are highly classified, the purpose of the authority is to give the United StatesIntelligence Community the upper hand in trying to avert these types of attacks before they transpire. Which is why permanent reauthorization of the fisa , without further amendment, is the Intelligence Communitys top legislative priority. Based on the long history of oversight and transparency of this authority, i urge the congress to enact this legislation at the earliest possible date to get our intelligence professionals the consistency they need to maintain our capability. Let me begin by giving an example of the impact of section 702. It has been cited before but i think it is worth mentioning again. An nsa fisa section 702 collection against any mail address used by an al qaeda courier revealed communications with an individual located within the United States. The u. S. Based person was seeking advice on how to make explosives. Nsa passed this information on to the fbi, which was able to quickly identify the individual. And hisnow, zazi associates had imminent plans to detonate explosives on manhattan subway lines. And hiszi coconspirators were arrested, the Oversight Board stated in its report, without the initial and his plans,zi which came about my monitoring an overseas foreigner under section 702, the subway bombing plot might have succeeded. This is just one example of the impacts this authority has had on the icys ability to thwart plots against the united state citizens and our friends and allies overseas. Since it was enacted nearly 10 acts ago, fisa, the fisa has been subject to rigorous and constant oversight by all three branches of government. We regularly report to the intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the house and senate how we have implemented the statute. The operational value it is afforded, and the extensive measures we take to ensure the governments use of these authorities complies with the constitution and the laws of the United States. Over the past few years, we have engaged in an unprecedented amount of public transparency on the use of these authorities. Transparencyst of and because this is a public hearing, allow me to provide an overview of the framework for section 702 and the reasons why the congress amended fisa in 2008. I will then briefly address why 702 needs to be reauthorized and finally i will discuss oversight and compliance and how we are conjuring ensuring and continuing to ensure the rights of u. S. Citizens, writes that need to be protected. I want to stress three things as a backdrop to Everything Else my colleagues and i are presenting today. As i mentioned at the outset, collections under 702 has produced and continues to produce intelligence that is vital to protect the nation against International Terrorism and other threats. Secondly, there are important legal limitations found within section 702, and let me note four of these limitations. First, the authorities granted under 702 may only be used to target foreign persons located abroad for foreign intelligence purposes. Secondly, they may not be used to target u. S. Persons anywhere in the world. Third, they may not be used to target anyone located inside the United States regardless of their nationality. Fourth, they may not be used to target a foreign person when the intent is to acquire the communications of a u. S. Person with whom a foreign person is communicating. This is generally referred to as the prohibition against reverse targeting. The third item i would like to stress is that we are committed to ensuring the intelligence ismunitys use of 702 consistent with the law and the protection of the privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. In the nearly 10 years since congress enacted the faa, there have been no instances of intentional violations of section 702. I would like to repeat that. In the nearly 10 years since congress enacted the amendments to the freedom act, the act that established fisa, there have been no instances of intentional violations of section 702. Backdrop, points as a let me turn to a discussion of why it became necessary for congress to enact section 702. I do this so the American Public can better understand the basis for this law. The foreign intelligence and surveillance act was passed in 1978, creating a way for the federal government to obtain court orders for electronic surveillance of suspected spies, terrorists, and foreign diplomats inside the United States. When originally and acting fisa, congress decided that collection against targets located abroad would generally be outside of their regime. That decision reflected the fact that people in the United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, while foreigners located abroad are not. Congress accomplished this in large part by defining electronic surveillance based on the technology of the time. In the 1970s, overseas communication were predominantly carried by satellite. Fisa as passed in 1978 did not require a court order for the collection of these overseas satellite communications. Intercepted aa satellite communication of a foreign terrorist abroad, no court order was required. However, by 2008, technology had changed considerably. The first u. S. Based email services were being used by people all over the world. The overseas communications that in 1978 were typically carried by satellite were now being carried by fiberoptic cables, often running through the United States. To continue the same example, if in 2008 a foreign terrorist was communicating by using a u. S. Based email service, a tradition of fisa court order was required to compel a u. S. Based company to help with that collection. Under traditional fisa, a court order can only be obtained on an individual basis by demonstrating to a federal judge that there is probable cause to believe the target of the proposed surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. This would become an ever more difficult and resource intensive process. Therefore, due to these changes in technology, the same resource intensive Legal Process was being used to conduct surveillance on terrorists abroad who are not protected by the Fourth Amendment as was being used to conduct surveillance on u. S. Persons inside the United States who are protected by the Fourth Amendment. In 2008 and702 renewing it in 2012, both times with significant bipartisan support, congress corrected this anomaly, restoring the balance of protections established by the original statute. Although i will not go into great detail regarding the legal iamework for section 702, will simply note a few key items. First, the statute requires annual certifications by the attorney general and the director of National Intelligence regarding the categories of foreign intelligence that the Intelligence Community will acquire. Second, the statute requires targetin