[ chatter] matthew olson, first of all welcome to all of you. Matthew olson is cofounder of iron that cyber security, previously serving as the National Security council center, where he reported to president obama on counterterrorism opportunities. Generalously served counsel and essay focusing on surveillance, law, and cyber security. Under the bush administration, he served as National Security division, doj. Mr. Olsen served as special counsel director of the fbi and special prosecutor for more than a decade. He is a graduate of the university of virginia and harvard law school. A robert m gates senior fellow for new american security, widely published in areas of surveillance,ity, counterterrorism, law, and policy. He was previously an attorney at International Law firm. He has worked on National Security policy at Rand Corporation and the 9 11 Public Discourse prompts it discourse profit. Klein served as a law clerk for Justice Scalia and is a graduate of Northwestern University and columbia law school. Codirects the Brennan Center for justice, liberty, and National Security program, New York University school of law. She served as counsel to russell feingold, chairman of the constitution subcommittee on the Senate Judiciary committee. Gotein served as a Trial Committee in the Civil Division of the department of justice. She graduated from yale law school. Elizabeth collins is serving her second term as board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. Previously she was an attorney at two International Law firms and served as the republican chief counsel for Supreme Court nominations for Senate Judiciary aommittee mrs. Collins was council on legal policy at doj where she provided advice and counsel related to National Security and other issues. Mrs. Collins is a graduate of the university of chicago and harvard law school. We will proceed from my left to my right. Mr. Olsen it is an honor to be here this morning. Let me put the bottom line upfront, as former director of the National Counterterrorism center, i can attest to the fact that 702 has significantly contributed to our ability to prevent terrorist attacks around the world. This is consistent with the testimony you have heard from earlier. Ists similarly as former general counsel at an essay and former Justice Department official, i worked to ensure that we implement section 702 to protect the Civil Liberties of americans. I will make a few brief remarks and will focus those remarks on three points, all addressing how section 702 has worked in practice. First the operational value of 702. As this committee is where we face a persistent and adaptive threat from al qaeda and isis and other groups. Isis has claimed credit for 40 terrorist attacks outside of its caliphate in syria and iraq. The potential to communicate with isis enters provides a Critical Role in mobilizing extremists toward violence. To combat this front, our ability to conduct surveillance under 702 has proven. Our best opportunity to identify and stop these attacks before they occur is through good intelligence. That is often derived through surveillance authorities such as 702. I relied on a daily basis on intelligence collected under 702 in our morning briefings. Analysts often reported that a critical piece of information came from 702. He Civil LibertiesOversight Board identified 30 specific cases where section 702 was the initial catalyst that uncovered previously unknown terrorist plots. In more than 100 cases where 702 led to the arrest of individuals on terrorism related charges. This is an extraordinary record in the past few years. When congress amended fisa in 2008, congress established an unprecedented oversight regime for 702. Under this regime, all three branches of government exercise authority to ensure that the government is properly using this authority. This oversight has been strengthened through both conventional and executive branch action. This rigorous oversight regime reflects the careful balance that congress struck in 2008 to ensure that the effectiveness of this authority and protection of Civil Liberties. In my experience the statute has been effective in doing both. Your third point is that calls for major reforms are not warranted. We have heard about the incidental collection issue. A person targeted for surveillance under 702 speaks on the phone or sense any mail and is often communicating with someone in the u. S. Some have raised concern about this collection. Usebility to obtain and these communication has been proven vital to the disruption of plots and arrest of al qaeda operatives in the u. S. Of a specific cases are an example of this. Congress should resist calls to restrict its ability to require and acquire and use such information. Second involves our ability to search 702 with identifiers such as names and email addresses. These queries are essential means for analysts to identify intelligence that would not ordinarily be accessible. One of their very first steps is to check databases for potential connections to terrorists. Ofa person is suspected gearing towards violence, the fbi can move quickly to identify communications that the government already lawfully collected to find vital clues. I believe this approach reflects an enduring lesson from the 9 11 attacks, the imperative for the government to effectively integrate and use the relevant information it will in its databases it holds in its databases to connect the dots. Some are imposing probable cause in my view this would undermine the ability of intelligent analysts to move quickly and identify information at the early stage of an investigation. Such data would be beyond their reach. The authority of congress as established under section 702 plays an indispensable role of and theng the nation, government has demonstrated it can collect vital intelligence in a way that protects the Civil Liberties of americans. Thank you. Klein members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. In a recent report, coauthors section 702ded that is a valuable intelligence tool that should be reauthorized for the existing Statutory Authority intact. We also propose enhancements to oversight, transparency, and privacy. The public should know that section 702 is already subject to rigorous oversight from all three branches of government. Few Government Programs receive such scrutiny. It is always worth considering what more we can do to strengthen public trust in intelligence programs. This is just a privacy issue, it is important for National Security. Programs that lack public support will not be publicly sustainable in the long term. The challenge is to do this without diminishing 702s effectiveness as an intelligence tool. There are three areas of opportunity. First is to strengthen key institutions that oversee 702, including the fisa court. The secondary is greater transparency, how 702 affect americans, how agents query 702 information and how the information how the government uses this information in the criminal justice system. The third is to strengthen accountability for those that report to ensure that the classified material is handled responsibility and never used for inappropriate, including political purposes. I would like to mention one thing i hope this process will avoid. One of the 9 11 commissions key messages is that intelligence commissions should be able to connect the dots between intelligence. I worked in 2004 during the process that led to the creation of the dni. I know that congress and the Intelligence Committee have moved heaven and earth to break down still place in the it would be unfortunate to reverse course on that progress now. We should not create new obstacles that would prevent agencies from connecting the dots and stopping terrorist attacks. Im happy to provide any detail in q a. Ranking members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. Congress goal when it passed the fisa amendments act was to get our government powerful tools against foreign threats. The government has used the authority to monitor suspected terrorists overseas and interrupt their plots. That is exactly as it should be. We are here today because of the other things that section 702 has been interpreted to allow. The government is not simply monitoring Foreign Terrorists or foreign powers. Instead it is scanning the content of almost all of the International Communications that flow into and out of the u. S. , and acquiring hundreds of millions of communications each year, including a large although still unknown number of Americans Communications. In addition, despite being required to minimize the retention and use of americans data, the government keeps the data for years and routinely searches it for information to use against information in ordinary criminal cases. In the current rules allow the fbi to read americans emails and listen to their phone calls without any factual predicate to suggest wrongdoing, let alone a warrant. I cant believe this is what congress had in mind when it passed section 702. Inviting the law, congress entrusted the branch with significant discretion. Congress allowed the targeting of any foreigner overseas, trusting the government to focus its efforts on those who pose a threat to our interests. Congress lifted to the executive branch and fisa court to fashion specific minimization rules. I dont mean to imply that this trust was misplaced. We have seen no evidence of intentional misuse. What we have seen is mission creep, so that a law designed to protect against foreign threats has become a source of more with access to american that and tool for domestic law enforcement. This is contrary not only to fisas original intent but to americans expectations and trust that congress will protect their privacy and freedom. There are several reforms that could shore up protections for americans while preserving the core of section 702, the governments ability to collect the communication of suspected terrorists without a warrant, even when those communications transit through the u. S. Ill touch on three of the key reforms. First congress should narrow the scope of surveillance by requiring the government to have a reasonable leave at the target that the target is someone with targeting. This would be an nterminal determination. No fisa court approval. This would provide critical production not just to look inviting lawabiding foreigners, but americans. When the government can target any foreigner overseas, that allows the massive collection of americans and their friends and relatives abroad. Those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling, and potentially abuse. This reform is vital for the u. S. Tech industry, the governments ability to target any foreigner overseas is one reason the european courts have invalidated data sharing agreements between u. S. And european countries. That is why 30 Major Tech Companies including google, microsoft, and facebook signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of section 702 surveillance. Second, Congress General part of the government to obtain a warrant before acquiring section 702 data. Contrary to what mr. Evans said earlier, restrictions on searches of lawfully acquired Digital Information or the constitutional norm. Even when the government has a warrant to seize digital data in a case, it cannot run a different search of that data for Different Reasons without obtaining another warrant. It certainly should not have that freedom when it contains the data without obtains that data without a warrant. Third, congress should codify the end of about collection. This has no process in the statute and scant basis in legislative history. It is a small section of 702 surveillance. If the privacy concerns it raises are uniquely significant. This is a case where the risks outweigh the benefits. The basic changes will not only go far to protect american privacy, but what better align the statute with the goals it is meant to serve. I look forward to taking your questions. Collins members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. In myide this testimony capacity as an individual board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board, and independent executive Branch Agency charged with providing advice and oversight with respect to counterterrorism actions. Our five to 2014, member bipartisan board conducted an extensive examination of the 702 program. In july 2014 we issued a unanimous report concluding that ,eception 702 program statutorily authorized, and at its core, constitutional. We set forth the legislative function graham, the implementing procedures that govern the operation of the program, and the extensive oversight structures that accompanies the program. 10also unanimously voted out policybased recommendations, each of which has been implemented or is in the process of being implemented, and none of which requires legislation. My oral and written testimony draws heavily from the board report which continues to be a valuable resource for assessing the program. The board conducted a legal and policy analysis of the section 702 program. We unanimously concluded that the program has a limited scope. It does not authorize or result in bulk collection. Instead it authorizes the government only to engage in targeted collection of telephone and Internet Communications of nonus persons located abroad who are likely to communicate information about Court Approved foreign intelligence topics with the compelled assistance of providers. Although u. S. Persons may not be and are not targeted, u. S. Person information may be incidentally collected. And that aspect of the program was a core focus of our intention, leading to keep recommendations on minimization procedures and transparency. We also weighed the value and privacy implications of using u. S. Person identifiers to query 702 data. These queries are consistent Intelligence Community to connect the dots, but also raised significant privacy implications. We made recommendations designed to address those implications. The board focused on the judicially approved targeting and minimization procedures governing the operation of the program. We noted the special protections afforded to u. S. Persons and made recommendations designed to titans are aspects of the procedure. Tighten certain aspects of the procedure. We consider the oversight that accompanies the 702 program. Oversight occurs in all three branches of government and can only be described as rigorous. Although we identified no excesses of deliberate abuse, there is always the possibility of human or technological error, as with any complex program. And robust oversight is essential. As a legal matter we unanimously concluded the program is statutorily authorized and is constitutional. Although certain features of the program push it close to the limits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. We raised and addressed concerns about incidental u. S. Person collection, and the use of u. S. Person identifiers as query terms. The board also spent significant time understanding the value of section 702. It has helped the u. S. Learn more about the membership, leadership structure, priorities , tactics, and plans of International Terrorist organizations. It has enabled the discovery of reversely unknown terrorist operatives as well as the locations and movements of suspects already known to the government. It has led to the discovery of previously unknown terrorist plots against the u. S. And foreign countries, and handling the disruption of those plots. Overall we came to appreciate the flexibility that 702 affords the executive branch while still in the framework of judicial approval and oversight. The boards report and recommendations are consistent with what has been called a clean reauthorization of section 702. We made serious recommendations, each of which we thought necessary to enhance privacy and Civil Liberties protections, but none of which required legislation. Each of these recommendations has been or is being implemented. I personally view 702 as being a vital tool against terrorism and think the framework provides the necessary protection to ensure our American Values are not compromised. I look forward to answering your questions. Sen. Grassley let me start with a question for all of you. To some extent, some of you touched on this you heard me mention earlier some suggesting that the government should have to get judicial approval, or a warrant before searching lawfully collected 702 information using u. S. Person information. You all come from different perspectives and you will have different backgrounds. I would like each of you to answer the question, is there any legal or constitutional reason why we should require judicial approval of a warrant before section 702 collection can be searched anyway s ear