Citizens are truly influenced. Get it straight from the source on cspan, unfiltered, unbiased word for word from the Nations Capital to wherever you are, because if the opinion that matters the most is your own. This is what democracy looks like. Cspan, powered by cable. Announcer assistant secretary of state for intelligence and Research DiscussesForeign Surveillance and intelligence gathering and its impact on u. S. Diplomacy abroad during an event hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. Section 702 allows the government to conduct targeted surveillance of nonu. S. Section 702 allows the government to conduct targeted surveillance of nonu. S. Persons located outside the United States. When it was reauthorized in 2017 congress concluded a sunset provision, and as a result of that these authorities are set to expire at the end of this year, unless Congress Reauthorizes its use. Todays discussion is going to highlight this one aspect of 702, which is the ways in which the administration uses it to aid the diplomatic efforts of the u. S. And its partners and allies. In the weeks to come we plan to , have additional programs on 702 looking at both the value of 702 in other contexts but also looking at the discussions underway about ways to reform 702 to increase the publics confidence in its appropriate use. Today we are honored to host brett holmgren, assistant secretary of the bureau of intelligence and research at the u. S. State department. Assistant secretary holmgren has served in this role since 2021. Prior to that he served for 14 years in key leadership positions in the Intelligence Community, at the white house, and at the department of defense. During president Obamas Administration he served on the National SecurityCouncil Staff as special assistant to the president and senior director for intelligence programs. Following some opening remarks, assistant secretary holmgren will be joined by our very own glenn gerstell, nonresident Senior Advisor here at csis in the interNational Security program, for a fireside chat. Prior to joining csis, glenn served as a general counsel for the National Security agency and Central Security service from 20152020. Prior to that he practiced law for almost 40 years at the International Law firm of milbank. Before turning it over to assistant secretary holmgren i want to note that we will be taking audience questions at the end of the program. If youre in the room you have the qr code up there. Or if youre watching this online, you can find the form by clicking the submit questions button on the csis event page and you will be directed to the question form. And with that, please help me welcome assistant secretary brett holmgren. [applause] [applause] suzanne, thank you for that kind introduction and thank you for your many years of public service. And to my good friend, glenn gerstell, thank you for helping to organize this event. And the truth is for those of you who know glenn, hes a real expert on these issues. He ought to be the one you hang from today, but i will do my best. I also want to thank csis for hosting todays event, and for decades csis has been at the forefront of providing Cutting Edge Research and solutions to some of the most complex and consequential policy issues of our time. And they conduct the work in an objective nonpartisan manner that resonates with those of us in the Intelligence Community who are guided and share the same principles. So its only fitting todays discussion is taking place at csis and its an honor to be here. Since the founding of our republic intelligence has advanced the American Interest in the world. During the revolutionary war general George Washington relied on intelligence to inform battlefield maneuvers and strategy. During the Civil War Union forces established the First Organization to produce formal intelligence assessments, and in world war ii the legendary bill donovan, head of the office of Strategic Services, established the research and Analysis Branch, the predecessor to the state Departments Bureau of intelligence and research, or inr, to identify vulnerabilities of the axis powers. For 77 years inr, the organization i am proud to lead, has been able to carry on the legacy of providing u. S. Diplomats with Strategic Insights because we are able to rely on access to intelligence collected and produced by other agencies. Like many of the 18 u. S. Intelligence agencies, inr is a consumer not a producer or a collector of intelligence. But today inr and the state department that we serve is at risk of losing access to one of the most important streams of intelligence on which we rely if section 702 of the foreign intelligence or visit act is not renewed. As you know this all will expire on december 31, and Less Congress takes action to reauthorize it. My colleague Senate Intelligence committee and at the department of justice have already made a strong case for reauthorizing section 702 to protect the United States from foreign threats come from terrorists and cyber attacks, espionage and weapons of mass destruction. I share the sentiments. 702 has been vital to countering these and other National Security threats. But i worry the public discussion on 702 does far has not fully addressed how 702 enables other instruments of u. S. Power, including diplomacy. Simply put, the 702 program doesnt just help defend and protect u. S. Interests, it is essential to advancing and promoting u. S. Interest in the world. So today i want to discuss about of 702 to inr and state department, provide examples of how 702 information has enabled use diplomacy, and describe the safeguards we have in place to protect privacy and Civil Liberties. Now before describing a section 702 supports u. S. Diplomacy, support or its import i what section of the two doesnt does not permit. First, 7 a to focus solely on forms threats. It allows designated elements of the Intelligence Community to compel u. S. Electronic Communication Service providers to share the data of nonu. S. Persons located outside the United States who have defined types of foreign intelligence information. Second, 702 does not permit the targeting of u. S. Persons or anyone located in the United States. Also prohibit socalled reverse targeting, meaning the ic cannot target the communications of a nonu. S. Persons abroad if the ultimate person, purpose is to collect on u. S. Person or so located in the United States. Now, while 702 explicitly prohibits targeting u. S. Persons, like many of the forms of intelligence collection, the ice he times obtained the communications of u. S. Persons incidentally while collecting against a foreign target. And inr when he is person stayed appears in Intelligence Report that we receive, this can happen when foreign targets communicate with or about americans. That data is massed in the report to protect the individuals privacy. As a consumer of Intelligence Reporting, inr does not have access to the raw underlying intelligence. And inr officer needs the request the identity of that use person commits a a complaint process we follow to demonstrate and document a valid need to know. And the overall number of unmasked u. S. Persons are provided to the public annually as part of the dnis annual statistical transparency report. Third, 702 is not a bulk Collection Program. Its a targeted tailored Collection Program focused on individual foreign targets located outside the United States for communicating about specific topics of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has reviewed and approved. So i do hope this provides some context for the scope of the 702 program. Throughout my career and National Security weather at the cia, the pentagon or the white house, ive had a firsthand perspective on how section 702 supports the Intelligence Community, the war fighter and the policymaker. But i admit until june at the state department about 20 months ago i was unaware of the Critical Role that 702 plays in supporting u. S. Foreign policy. So let me share a few observations that underscored the importance of 702 for the state department. In inr it is hard to overstate the centrality of 702 collection to providing the secretary of state and u. S. Diplomats with objective, timely intelligence analysis and information. From assessments on russia, china, iran and north korea, foreign influence and Cyber Threats come 702 reporting provides our analyst with unique insights, that when combined with other sources of information, make our policymakers better informed about the issues so they can make better decisions. In 2022 a loan and loan and a large percentage of inrs finished analytic products included 702 reporting, oftentimes 702 data was a most valuable source underpinning these assessments. As one my managers put it, inr would not be able to fill its mandate to use intelligence to empower diplomacy without 702 derived reporting. Another way that inr and the state department have benefited from 702 is by sharing downgraded or classified intelligence with partners and ellis, a critical tool to strengthen u. S. Leverage at the negotiating table, expose this information come for galvanized partners and allies. U. S. Diplomats abroad routinely rely on 702 data for formal the marshes come to pass threat information, or to gauge counterparts on sensitive matters. Last committee of the request by u. S. Diplomats, diplomats that inr process downgrade or classified whistlers for 702 information. Finally come section 702 has helped the state Department Monitor and evaluate russian atrocities in ukraine and take actions to hold them accountable. As the Deputy Attorney general testified last month, section 702 has helped uncover gruesome atrocities committed by russia in ukraine, including the murder of noncombatants, the forced relocation of children from russian occupied ukraine, to the Russian Federation as well as the dissension of refugees fleeing violence by russian personnel. This and other information have helped u. S. Government to galvanized galvanize accountability efforts related to ukraine by confidently and accurately speaking to the American People and the International Community about russias atrocities. So whether its providing u. S. Diplomats with strategic intelligence assessment, downgrading or declassifying intelligence to share with foreign partners or taking action against those who commit atrocities, 702 is invaluable to the departments diplomatic efforts. While i hope this general overview is useful, those of us and National Security also understand that you preserve the tool the government must do a better job demonstrating its value to the congress and the American People. And thats why we have worked closely with our ic counterparts in recent weeks to classify new realworld examples that i am pleased to share with you today. Let me start with an example regarding treaty monitoring and compliance. Without 702 collection the state departments ability told nations accountable for adhering to International Obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction would be significantly degraded. For example, 702 information was a critical input and provided some of the most meaningful reporting in the classified portion of the 2023 annual report on compliance with the chemical weapons convention. When it comes to defending human rights which President Biden has called the fundamental challenge of our time section 702 has helped state Department Shine a light on those who seek to silence dissent and opposition. In 2021, information derived from section 702 enabled u. S. Diplomats to demarche a middle eastern country over its efforts to monitor and track dissidents abroad as well as dissident writer in the United States. In another example section 702 data helped expose effort by foreign powers including the prc to coerce nations to oppose International Responses to human rights violations. This reporting enabled u. S. Diplomats to assist countries from coercion and influence from these actors. And find 702 reporting has allowed the state department and other agencies to notify partners and allies about illicit north korean activities. In 2022 section 702 section 702 data was vital in enabling as to warn the International Community, the private sector and the public about efforts by the dprk to deploy Information Technology workers to commit fraud against the global industry, including against u. S. Businesses to generate revenue for its nuclear program. So in sum, 702 has been a key enabler for use diplomacy. Heres the thing. Americas diplomats are not going to stop engaging with the world if they lose access to a key string of intelligence like a 702. They will advocating for u. S. Interests come serving american citizens abroad, and working to build a more free, prosperous, and secure world. But make no mistake, a future without 702 or a much diminished 702 program, will have significant costs for u. S. Diplomacy. Having said all that, we appreciate the power and potential for abuse of 702 authorities without proper safeguards and controls. Critics are right to question whether the program has the appropriate oversight and privacy measures in place given mistakes in the past. Effective oversight by congress and questions and Civil Liberties advocates have helped highlight the need for many of the recent reforms undertaken by doj and the ic. Now as i said at the outset, the state department is only a consumer of intelligence derived from 702 collection of semicult at doj and office of the director of National Intelligence our best place to address potential reform to the program. However, i do want to describe the state department on the internal safeguards and compliance measures. And here is worth expanding on inrs role as a consumer of 702 picks its many ic agencies in fact, occupy a similar role. As an agency without any operational authorities tied to the 702 program, inr as a said before does not have access to an evaluated rolf i minimize 702 data. Period. Moreover, since we cant access the data, we cant perform targeted queries on it. Inr and most agencies are not just prohibited from accessing raw 702 director data, email exchanges, call transcript, chat records et cetera come we dont have the capability to access it even if we wanted to. In fact, when authorized and Trained Personnel at a small number of agencies, National Security agency, cia, fbi, the National National encounters an agency, have access to subsets of 702 data. Instead at inr our offices only receive access to disseminated, serialized reporting that contains 702 data. So what does this refer to . It means the rod david has been reviewed for valid intelligence information by authorized personnel at the Collection Agency, sanitized of u. S. Person information and then formally published in a report thats made available to the product Intelligence Community who are cleared for that information. Once the report is published, oftentimes by the nsa, inr analysts can then use to inform their own strategic assessments or to support policymakers. Like other agencies inr nevertheless, has a robust internal complaints and oversight mechanism for intelligence programs like 702. First we have department of state guidelines for intelligence activities approved by the attorney general which among other things govern how inr retains and uses any information concerning u. S. Persons. Second, we have established control processes and procedures for inr analysts to submit requests to unmask the identity of a u. S. Person in a report derived from 702 data if the analyst can demonstrate a valid need to know. For example, if they named u. S. Person state Department Employee in a 702 report is a target of a physical threat, and inr analyst may request to unmask the persons identity so the bureau of Diplomatic Security can take appropriate acti