Partners or of leadership on what we are transitioning, too. Taliban . Where do we compromise . We have to reach these agreements as a nation, and with our allies. It goes to the other side of the table, to talk to the paula bond. That is the key for reconciliation. Another issue impacting the ability of the Afghan Security forces is the insider attack. Sometimes, people are disappointed, and say, how could this happen . How could they turn the guns against us, when we trained them . This is an important issue. As the taliban have indicated, that is their most successful tactic to undermine trust between the Afghan Security forces and international Security Forces. It is really the most effective way of destabilizing Afghan Security forces. It is key to know why it is happening. The first reason is infiltration. Of course, they purposefully infiltrates. We have low recruitment criteria. We do not have a Strong National data system to look at who is coming in. The second part is intimidation. When people are enlisting in the force, the taliban are contacting their parents and family and threatening them. When there is violence and uncertainty, and people say the security might deteriorate, it is easy to be intimidated and switch sides. Also, using uniform i see a lot of people who have been in kabul. You can easily buy an army uniform or police force uniform on the market. You can buy any uniform, if you are looking for it hard. Rage and revenge sometimes, the soldiers are personally mistreated. The last item, what they call jihad, is a complex phenomenon. I will make one last point, on the number of the troops. A lot of discussions have gone from 50,000 down to zero, but and forth. Back and forth. It is not so much the economic constraint of the United States, or the political reality. It should be a combination of all three. First, a definition of the mission. What the United States wants to accomplish in afghanistan. If the mission is clearly defined, we can consider this will take so many troops. I know that definition is a counterterrorism presence, not so much counterinsurgency, which could be carried out by afghans. The question is, who is the terrorist . It is the taliban included or not . I do not want to run over my time, but i can discuss this if there is more interest. I think we have a comprehensive picture. You mentioned for transitions. What would be the most helpful thing, in your perspective, for all or any of the particular transitions that outsiders could entertain . The most Important Role the International Community generally could play is an economic transition. That makes the political transition possible, and the security transition sustainable. For this, what is needed is working more closely to reintegrate the afghanistan into the regional economy. This includes enhancing and building more power grids. Pakistan needs power. It needs access to energy. Afghanistan needs power. If you create interdependency between these countries, especially countries that are not on friendly terms with each other, which will enhance the chances of stability to allot more more expensive projects could be pipelines and others, but at least the national grid, railroads. Fortunately, pakistan is extending its railroad into kandahar. The railroad from central asia will connect now across afghanistan, north and south. We can really rebuild afghanistan as a crossroad or roundabout of trade. That is key. Internally, improving access to capital in afghanistan by providing political incentives, in terms of political assurance, making more credit available for investment by International Companies in afghanistan, allowing Afghan Companies to have access to easier credit these are the key issues that could help afghanistan on the economic front. More importantly, a clear message about the future of afghanistan that would give the investors and everyone else a sense of confidence to come in and invest. Thank you. You mentioned, for example, with respect to pakistan, that it is important for pakistan to work with afghanistan to control crossborder incidents. The thing that pakistan, along the lines ambassador jawad just mentioned, can work in other areas, like regional economics . Are some of those things available to do . You mentioned not wanting to seem too eager. When it comes to reconciliation, i will say that pakistan has a role not because it claims to have a role, but because of demographics, because of the fact that the taliban leadership, like the mujahideen leadership in the 1990s, happen to be in pakistan. What is it pakistan can do . We can apply some pressure, some persuasion. But if the perception is that we can arm twist anybody to accept any position, that will not be possible for pakistan. This is one point. About eagerness the moment you so eagerness, there are red lights everywhere. What is pakistan trying to do . For example, i made a comment that we should not be seeking a place at the table. There is no need for us. Our role is there. But if we try to say in reconciliation, we must play a part, it is certainly going to be misinterpreted, unfortunately. We have a role, and we should play the role. I think those who want us to play the role must also understand our limitations. Because of the conflict in afghanistan, and a conflict which now involves pakistan, there are no difficulties. Earlier, here in the 1990s, with the iran conflict, here we thought if those would get resolved, there would be communication lines open between pakistan and central asia. There are many projects in turkmenistan, afghanistan, pakistan. If a gas pipeline could be done, that would be a great project. There are prospects for an alliance from central asia through afghanistan. There are Different Things that could be developed. Jim, you have spent a fair amount of time in the situation room or in the white house. The president has talks coming up with president karzai on friday. If you were back in the situation room, developing the positions that might be suggested to him, what would be the two or three points you would make, with respect to the talks . As ambassador jawad indicated, the concerns are less about security and more about uncertainty with respect to the future. I think the degree to which one can address that by laying out a future course for american engagement and for international engagement, the better. The obstacle to that, at least in part, is karzais desire to drive the hardest burden possible. Some of his objectives seem to be rather unreasonable, and even, in some cases, undesirable. This is not something that is entirely in the administrations hands. It has recently put out a statement that it is open to having no american presence at all in afghanistan, military presence, after 2014. That seems a tactic designed to indicate to karzai that he has less leverage in this negotiation then he might otherwise. Personally, i believe that it would be prudent to arrange for a fairly substantial presence, if we are able to do so. But it is important that we avoid the kind of situation we have in iraq, where we did not ask them what they thought or wanted until fairly late in the process. As a result, not only did we fail to achieve an agreement which would allow us to retain a military presence, but we also created the possibility of providing the iraqis a whole range of assistance and advisory programs through our civilian side that they did not want. As a result, we spent a lot of money and a lot of effort to create capabilities which, in the end, the iraqis did not avail themselves of. The earlier that we can come to some understanding with the afghans, difficult as it is, about what they want, and on that basis, decide what we are prepared to provide, the better. In terms of the troop presence, my view is it is a straight cost to risk ratio. The more you are prepared to pay, the more your risk. The higher risk tolerance, the less you can get away with. You cannot have low cost and low risk. If you want to thousand troops instead of 10,000 troops, you except a much higher risk you are not going to achieve objectives to set. The minimal objective is that afghanistan will not fall to a regime linked to al qaeda of. The lower you go, the higher the risk. It may be small, but it will be higher if you chose a lower number. I care for historic for my personal involvement, more about afghanistan than most americans, so i favor highcost, lowrisk. After all, i only pay 3 million. Most americans are tired of it, and will probably choose high risk, lowcost. I believe we are going to have microphones. If you will say your name and who question any member of the panel you like. I will start with harlan almond. The report that came up five years ago began, make no mistake. Nato is losing in afghanistan. Was slightly softened that to say the u. S. Is not winning. Frankly, i am much more pessimistic, particularly concerning the security transition. Barring some wild card events indiapakistan, and that is not looking particularly good, or an attack on iran, which would change the calculus it seems to me that the level of american and western forces required to support the afghan army i agree the police are in a much more difficult situation by some counts would require in excess of 50,000 people, including contractors, because the afghan army has no air support, medical support, logistics, etc. Salaries would run 4 billion a year. Who is going to pay them . The Obama Administration is not likely to cut and run. You see signs in the press to get down to a lower level. Level of 6000 is around. If that was to take place, under the Afghan Security forces operate without the support in forms of air, logistics, and pay, especially when virtually every nato country wants to get out as quickly as possible . We could see a quicker decline in western presence in 2013, rather than 2014. Would you like to discuss that first . This is a legitimate concern. In fact, our defense minister is in town today at the pentagon, discussing some of these issues. He has come with a detailed list of the enablers the Afghan National army needs, including, as you mentioned, longrange artillery and intelligence gathering capabilities. Fixedwing and rotary aircraft for transportation. We have been completely dependent for all of these things on nato and our other friends and allies. Again, a lot of these equipments are not as expensive as conducting these operations with nato in afghanistan. If there is a political will, it is doable. The same thing as far as the salaries of the Afghan National army and police. Yes, it is a significant number, considering the afghan economy. Or the withdrawal of each International Troops from afghanistan, we can sustain 80 Afghan NationalArmy Soldiers on the ground, if there is a willingness to continue with this mission. As you mentioned, to come with a more reasonable definition of success in afghanistan, which has come up to now, then diminished, what it means to succeed here in afghanistan. The end of the first row, right there. I would really like to understand a little bit better about the indian part of this triangle. We care more about pakistan, what is going on in the arm. My understanding is that the indians are very active, and it is a triangular relationship between pakistan, india, and afghanistan. If you would like, ambassador . India has been an important friend of afghanistan, a historic friend and ally. They are not only involved in enhancing the reconstruction in afghanistan they are providing scholarships for more than 1000 afghans every year into different indian universities, which is key to building Human Capital in afghanistan. Their work actually in the past few years, there was some hesitation on the part of the United States, because of the hesitancy that exists in pakistan about indias role in afghanistan, not to get india involved in the training of our Security Forces and other issues. This is diminishing more and more, i think. There is more realism indicating that, at the end of the day, india and china are both in pakistan and have a role to play in afghanistan. There will be a partnership with india, which initially was an issue, because it was thought it might antagonize pakistan. Definitely, india has a bigger role to play, provided that some of the bigger conflict that exists in our region, particularly in kashmir, are left out of this issue. At the end of the day, we think a stable afghanistan is a better friend of pakistan. A weak and unstable afghanistan will in danger pakistan as much as afghanistan. India is providing more than 2 billion of economic assistance. They are getting more interested to get involved in training of the Afghan Security forces in a professional level, like the police and others, not so much the Afghan National army, which needs to continue either through the United States or some of our nato partners, to provide the continuity of what we have started together. Do you want to say a few words . I essentially agree with the ambassador that a stable afghanistan is in the best interest of pakistan and the region. Whatever can be done to accelerate the process of stabilization must be done. As you have also mentioned earlier, he what the International Community can do, and pakistan and india can also do, is contribute to Economic Development. Whatever india is doing, pakistan simply cannot have any reservations to that. Pakistan herself is also doing. We have scholarships we offer. We have also these refugees. We would like that they should go back, but they continue to be in pakistan, more than 3 million. One aspect is the army. If the indians start training the afghan army, there are concerns. They should be understandable. They should be appreciated. Why the afghan army cannot be trained by nato, for example . One not countries like turkey, or the United States . Why do we have to have something the, where people in pakistan, some people, rightly or wrongly, say we are facing a difficult situation . That is why we have a concern. Apart from that, nothing else. Second row, over here. Hello . Mr. Jawad, my name is you are ok. Director of operations at the world bank. I like your comment that Economic Prosperity is probably the most important aspect of the transition. We are speaking about longterm schemes. In rehabilitation of countries, the world bank has taken a lead, oftentimes, in countries in latin america, eastern europe, and many others, and even in pakistan. Shortterm schemes will development. Social Development Schemes have been put into action which have a lead time for results which are very much shorter than you talk about. To what extent, in afghanistan, have those kinds of schemes and applied . To my mind, in addition to the parallel track with the long schemes, we need shorter schemes, which addresses some of the other concerns about security. Wherever there is poverty and lack of opportunity, that is an opening for the taliban to show their bid. To what extent is afghanistan focusing on shortterm Development Schemes . That is a very good point. As you know, when you implement largescale infrastructure projects, there is no community that relates to them right away. Therefore, it is more expensive to maintain them. If you build a highway, you had no communities along the road that says, this is my road. You have to create a need that the community thinks, this is my project, and this is for me, and i see myself reflected in that. The World Bank Assistance to create the Solidarity Program of rural development, which was projects designed based on the priority of the community. There was a development they are still around, these development councils. Money has been provided to them by the afghan government. But the construction and oversight is done by the community. They feel responsible to it. Those undertakings are very important. They are key. Of course, sometimes, they have their own challenges. When you work at the Community Level in a lot of these projects being implemented, sometimes, the community might tolerate the presence of the taliban on the project. The Donor Community says, how could you do this . We give you the money, and you still allow the taliban to be around this. This is a harder balance to reach. But there is absolutely the microfinance projects have been good not only for empowerment, but also for gender equality. That has been a model in afghanistan, to reach out to smaller rural communities. The back row. Thank you. I run the u. S. Indian security forum. My question is directed toward the ambassador. The first is a comment. The indoafghan Strategic Partnership was signed with mutual hesitation by both parties. Nobody rushed into it. That is when,. My question is related to the ethnic composition and the training and support of the army, which ambassador kahn objects to indias role in it. Can you comment on afghanistans role in it . I would like to talk about natos role, longer term. When the recruitment process started and the security situation was not as challenging as it is today, a lot of the people and listed from the provinces many from the south and north, and some of the leadership of the ministry of defense belong to the people of the north. In the beginning there was some imbalances and the composition and formation of the ministry of defense in the Afghan Security forces. There is a system in place and extensive efforts to recruit from the provinces of the south. Some of these efforts are successful. As you can imagine if you put yourself as chairman in afghanistan, if you enlist as an afghan, you face Different Levels of [inaudib