Conceivably, it could be done in that office or be done with stuarts proposal for usoc. There does not seem to be an interest in the state department to do that and even when i was in charge of the scrs of us, there did not seem to be retinas on the rest of the building to use it. It was something of a foreign entity in the state department. Thank you very much for good answers and mr. Deutsch is recognized. Thank you, madame chairwoman. Mr. Bowen, you say and you spoke today about facilitating greater host country butin. I would like you to speak to what that did not happen in and then you also recommended insuring security before rebuilding. While that is important, i wonder the extent to which we can actually do that and whether there is concerned that it actually prolongs the conflict and that slows the reconstruction infrastructure that meets to happen. If you could speak to both of those and ambassador, as it relates to syria if that is the sort of thing that usoco would do and thats the view that would be taken here, how when is it ever relevant when is the security situation and who deems the security situation address well enough to be able to come into these other things . Thank you. On the consultation point part of it was a shift from liberates and leave which was the prewar plan to occupy and rebuild which became the policy just over 10 years ago now. It was a significant shift from spending 2 billion 20 billion in the blink of an eye and then 60 billion over 10 years. We were planning on leaving by the end of september of 2003. Thus, there was no commitment to consultation with the plan to short stay. When we shifted to a significant infrastructure based rebuilding program, the plan evolved within and among the u. S. Contractors that were identified and was developed by the Coalition Provisional authority. It did not engage with the iraqis and up. That is their firstperson testimony to me about what happened. More importantly, it was something that was not thought of before hand, the need to consult and a commitment and its efforts to host country interest, capacity in particular. What can they do . What can they sustain . The key is ensuring sufficient security, not absolute security. It is a proportion of metric. The less secure the environment, the smaller the project for the more security in barbur, the more substantial the project you can pursue. In iraq, you have the assessments being done about security and about engagement. In the absence of usoco, those assessments were being done by our ambassador and those assessments were being done by the generals on the ground. Where are they on this proposal . Do they feel that would have benefited . To any of the generals or ambassadors who served in iraq feel that they would have benefited by having best . Yes, sir. Ambassador crocker says this would have enabled him to operate more effectively and he supports the idea of creating usoco. Operatinge u. S. Is overseas i guess we can broaden this to syria the ambassador in iraq and when the u. S. Operates elsewhere, it is the ambassador who heads the civilian efforts in the country. The commanding general then heads the defense operations. Ambassadord what crocker said. Thee would usoco fit into chain of command . Is it on par with state and dot . The mission would be discreet and welldefined and clarity will provide certainty to both the agencies and contractors. It would be somewhat wouldfema where the president would declare when the operation begins. The jurisdiction is effectuated and its mission is to oversee the relief and reconstruction activity in the affected country. Upon completion of that mission as identified by the president , he would declare it over. The reporting chain would be like reporting to the secretary of defense and secretary of state and National Security adviser. When would we ever hit that point in syria . In afghanistan, at what point with that designation have been made . In syria, we would hit it once we decided the situation was appropriate for us to go in. That is when you have the government in damascus or merging government in damascus which we know we can work with and with conditions on the ground are sufficient to permit us to go in. To make that call, you would need to have very experienced professionals on the ground, certainly on the border with syria and hopefully within syria as well to offer the expert political advice that our leaders need to make that decision that is why you need to have a core professionals devoted precisely to this type of problem. This problem is widespread around the world. Without this core of nationals, we are not able to make the decision about when there is a government we can work with . And gender be much more that goes into the discussion about when to get involved or do we always wait until there is a government we can work with . We should be involved as soon as there is a Crisis Brewing and we should put our best professionals on the ground to get a sense of what is happening. Theres been some skepticism about whether or not we need these professionals to make decisions. My experience states that these are very this is very helpful. We should have analysis before our leaders decided to go into this very serious way. Those mentioned by the before proved to be false. Thank you mr. Deutsch. One of our iraq vets will testify treated. Thank you, i think the big thing we want to know is not should be be involved in other parts of the world, but of course how do we do it better. One of the concerns i have is during this time in egypt where we have turmoil is that we will run to the exits to give aid and walk away. I think we should stay engaged with aid as they go through this time of instability. I think is also important to recognize that in iraq and again i think there were mistakes made in postwar. I think we should gone in with far more troops and had a plan when saddams statue fell. And we shouldve gotten on tv and said if you work for the Iraqi Government you should come to work tomorrow because you will have a job. Wouldved have alone prevented years of fighting erie it. Something i want to explore is what is the difference between germany and japan post world war ii and what we saw in iraq. Any kind of development of aid program can happen in a highly unstable security environment. That is a core lesson from iraq and afghanistan that you must have sufficient security before you have reconstruction Activity Development and aid. That cost us billions of dollars and too many lives. We issued a report last summer that 719 lives were lost while those individuals were engaged in reconstruction related activity. Better planning, better capacity, better integration amongst the agencies would avert the kind of abuse weve seen in iraq and better execution. Would implement effective oversight so the lost and blood in weve seen in iraq and afghanistan would be averted in afghanistan and whatever reconstruction we engage in. Think user. Thank you sir. People accepted the legitimacy of our presence in germany and japan, but in iraq that was always a question. We believe when the saddam statue fell daily have the legitimacy at that that point and was it a matter of we do not enforce laws . We briskly was that the problem . Given the complexity with our relationship with the arab world even as saddams statue came down, i believe we had a chance that we could have established legitimacy. If we get smart, we would establish law and order which we had the capacity to do. As you said, we would welcome those who were in the government to continue working. There are many fundamental mistakes that we made. Mistakes because we were not sufficiently sensitive to the culture or the location. Even had we done everything right, you rock was the rack was much more difficult than germany or japan. President roosevelt made the critical decision not to remove the emperor of japan and the emperor of japan said to the japanese people cooperate with the americans. We have no such motion ship in iraq. Youre suggesting the shouldve left Saddam Hussein as president . No, we took out tojo in japan. I understand what youre saying. I thank you for that question and as we look forward to a very important questions and we are very naive if we think we will not have to be in the situation in the next 50 hundred years. The good forward to where we are at looking forward to where we are at in a rack in afghanistan. The year to pull out of afghanistan was pulled out of a hat when the president wanted to put a date for withdrawal. I will not necessarily argue or disagree, but one of my concerns is what you look at afghanistan today, 60 of the people are under the age of 20 or some amazingly young demographic. The afghan civil society, itll are waking up in the military controls the entire country that is standing against certain taliban. This is a war that has to continue but we are on a on the eve for the victory of the people of afghanistan. When we look back on the United States when our grandkids or reading history books, it will look at this finite amount of time when there was instability in the middle east and everywhere and what did america do with its position of power and it will lead to a world of chaos, a world worth russian or chinese leadership or where america continues to be the shining city on the hill. Thank you for your testimony. Mr. Connolly of virginia is recognized. I appreciate his fingering some of the early mistakes that were catastrophic. I would argue part of the problem was our own command structure because we infused too much power for unilateral power decisions. To try to keep the country together posted vision. I enjoyed talking to you about that and i commend the book by thomas ricks which documents this in agonizing in painful detail. Mr. Bowen, you and i traveled to iraq together. We will be concise, two things that came up during that was a was that the idea that the military was going to become an aid distribution entity. Some one thing to have things to bolster the role of rebuilding communities not being seen as occupiers and invaders, but this program was had very little scrutiny and part of your report would you talk about that. The second thing is i remember when we were traveling around baghdad, the story about power plants or Water Purification plant that we built. The problem was we gave no thought to the capacity of piping and baghdad so we have this brandnew thing that we could point you and we cut a ribbon and we turn on the switch. Tens of thousands of baghdad water pipes burst. Because they were not retrofitted to handle this new capacity. That was what i was saying with 50 of absolute raised. 15 of absolute waste. Maybe because of haste or we do not have the right people on the project or have the coordination youre talking about. We talk about that aspect to it not just waste. Clearly, as our office demonstrated in extended far beyond the concept as quick hit urgent humanitarian need projects. That is a good idea and that is a weapon in the arsenal of the local commander to address hearts and mind issues and the local village level. What happened instead was we had a project like the baghdad enterprises own itch ballooned up to 38 million including the painting of a mural for 1 million. That entire project certainly that is great work if you can get it. I would deem it waste. More important, it did not advance our National Security interest locally and instead handed them and ultimately the Congress Responded by capping those projects at 1 million unless the secretary of defense approved the men that never happened. Batch be done at the pentagon. That should be done at the pentagon and carefully defined how it should be implementing and ensure training was done. On the water system, it was the largest product we did project we did in iraq. Oure documented in valuation of it, it was only operating at 20 after turnover. It is an example of what happens when you do not carefully consult and effectively oversee and ensure proper execution at the local level. It was a project beyond their means on the and as you pointed out, there is so much waste at the sustainment point. That is impossible to document. By contrast, the parallel Water Treatment project, the fourth largest project we did in iraq, was a success. It is providing fresh water to the people of the capital city of christian and because curtis didnt because sustainment is a huge issue in any future operation. Thank you, dr. Ho. We were talking about broad waste and abuse and we need to have transparency and oversight at all that and i hear that, we never find a person that is held accountable at the top. With the money that we look at spending in iraq, and close to 100 billion in afghanistan without the oversight, it just seems that is one of the reasons im here is that American People are tired of that. The reason it worked in japan and germany is we need the stink out of them and they surrendered. Nobody surrendered here. So of course if we go to a non stable government and try to rebuild, it is almost insanity or ludicrous that we do that without that clear and defined goal. Now we looking at syria to do it again. I want to ask specifically, what do you see as the role of the American Government in the middle east . Is there a different way that we can approach the middle east to bring stability to that area instead of going in there and bombing and people die and then we have to look at rebuilding . The other question is if you could take us through a scenario of how money is given to this agency and how it is tracked so that we do not get into this again . Unfortunately, i think we will be involved somewhere in the future and i would rather not see that. I would hate to see our young women and men overseas. They need to stay here and build america strong. I look forward to hearing you. You ask a big question. You ask and can provide stability in the middle east. I think it is safe to say that is beyond our means to provide stability in each and every country in the middle east. We will bankrupt ourselves if we try. We can offer environment and provide prudent relationships and that is part of oracle. Part of our goal. We can also make a significant difference, but we have to be careful before we go in and to have excellent intelligence. We have to have goals that are sufficiently limited so we can achieve them and goals that assist with the political and social of the country we are engaged. That means we have to look carefully every time before we decide to intervene. For that we need to have a serious core of professionals and leaders with wisdom and humility. Thank you. With regard to the reduction of fraud waste, we would reduce the cost of preparing and overseeing such operations by ensuring that there was effective planning that afforded our National Authority options. More important, it would not provide more information on the ground which is what occurred in iraq and afghanistan and which do not work. That coordination must move to the integration so that the there is a capacity that exists before the operation begins. It is done the work ahead of time to ensure there are controls in place so that the projects and programs succeed in that fraud waste and abuse is reduced. Ok, as i was reasoning. Eading how you get better than the United States of america . We are spending this money there and we are going back to our taxpayers and we are botheringy dollar. If they go over there, what are we doing . Key. Countability is the in chargeas no one specifically. When the wartime contractor held its hearings on afghanistan and said who is in charge of the rebuilding program, if not provide an answer. To firewn was there when fema failed. There is no one to fire now when a stabilization or reconstruction operation does not go well. It is not centralized. It is not coordinated. There is no one identified with accountability for the operation. Thank you, madam chair. The contrast of the quality and service of our brave men and women compared to the conduct is released arc. It is very disturbing. What role does the pervasive corruption in iraq play in his reconstruction effort . As of september 2012, and anticorruption effort despite the support for the fight against corruption, apparently little change or no change at all between 2003 and 2012. I would like to hear from you of whether or not that impacts the reconstruction efforts. I would also like to hear from the police program. Wasted millions of dollars to train iraqi police that baghdad to not need or want. How did that happen . Finally, how you conclude that this new agency would somehow provide the kind of money and oversight that we have a right to expect . I think the American People sees what this crumbling infrastructure in cities we do not have the resources to rebuild our own country and we waste in iraq. It is properly a source of great rage from the American People. Thank you. The corruption issue in iraq continues to limit its capacity to grow and for making progress out of the situation in which it is currently mired. Toldheap oversight entity me when i interviewed him last year that corruption has become an institution in iraq. It takes the form of money laundering. That drains the economy of its resources and keeps the majority of the population in poverty stricken circumstances. The Police Department row graham failed to succeed because of the lack of consultation with the minister of interior. When we did the audit, we met with the minister and he said to us that it was shaped and formatted in a way that do not really meet his needs. Upon the issuance of the audit, it was concluded early this year because of the lack of this late into the program, there was a consultation problem. Usoco would address the fraud, waste, and abuse issues by ensuring accountability and transparency throughout the process. Most importantly it would promote integration. If you accept that and accept the fact that our Current System is not promoting or advancing capacity, and i think reform is necessary. There is no other proposal on the table. There is no other office in place within the executive ranch that is advancing that interest. That interest is ultimately tied to our National Security architect for protecting your interest in the region and not implementing this would leave us worse off. A followup question. An audit was done in 2012. The currency options conducted by the central bank and up to 800 million was laundered money transport illegally under false pretenses. This presents the possibility that up to 40 billion was leaving the country annually because o