Consider is how we can achieve permanent risk reductions, rather than continuing in the current preventive posture. Just as we have demonstrated that highly enriched uranium is not necessary for producing critical medical isotopes, and we can eliminate it from that technology cycle, can we apply the same principle to radiological sources . Not only torive further enhance security, but to reduce the size, complexity size and complexity of the overall problem. The centerpiece of this strategy is to engage in a worldwide effort to provide reliable, nonradioactive alternatives to the highest activity radioactive sources that pose the greatest risk. We will need to have the engagement and active participation from the Research Industry and medical communities, but the potential benefits removing the risk of a dirty bomb altogether are significant. Considering a range of incentives for replacement where commercially viable alternatives exist is something we are investigating. We are also collaborating with our research and Development Office to explore and assess technical improvements that could be developed and transferred for commercialization. We recognize that we may not succeed in replacing the need for all sources, for example, radioactive industrial sources such as mobile well logging and radiography sources may not have an except the bull and viable alternative. In such cases, we are collaborating with Industry Partners to develop innovative and sustainable security solutions. We have seen that other countries are willing to go above and beyond International Norms and standards for radiological security through collaboration with our programs and through commitments that have made us a Nuclear Security summit. Ive also seen domestically that takengreements have radiological security to a higher level. While we have an Important Role to play, we also encourage all other states to show the same initiative, to demonstrate leadership, and commit resources to take radiological security beyond minimum requirements. Attention andyour i am happy to answer any questions. Dr. Gowadia, we please give your testimony at this time . Good morning, chairman. I fully extend thanks for all of you that this hearing. It is a Good Opportunity to present to you and discuss with to prevent and prepare for radiological offense. I am honored to be here today to testify with my distinguished colleagues. Domestic Nuclear Detection office, we are singularly focused on the makear threat and seek to Nuclear Terrorism a prohibitively difficult undertaking for our adversaries. Enhance thend global Nuclear Detection architecture which is a framework for detecting, analyzing and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of our regulatory control. Although my office focuses on detecting materials once they are lost or stolen, we work very closely with our colleagues at the department of energy and the Nuclear Regulatory commission who are responsible for the safety and security of these materials. Our approach is based on the iad ofal tr intelligence. The first leg of the triad, intelligence and information sharing is the backbone of our detection architecture. Are crucial to the deployment of resources and operation. And bring past cases this knowledge to bear on the development of future architecture and systems. The domestic Nuclear Detection offices center enables information sharing and provides adjudication support and situational awareness. To increase the awareness of lostinsulin stores is. Ources the second leg of our triad is Law Enforcement offices and first responders. Domestic Nuclear Detection office works to ensure that they have the necessary capabilities and are well trained and ready for the mission. Since 2005, through many collaborative efforts, we have provided training for Law Enforcement personnel and first responders. Approximately 15 exercises per year while enhancing collaboration and building trusted networks. Today, the office has engage to 29 states to raise awareness of this threat. We assist our state and local partners as they develop their own programs. We work with them to build a flexible architecture that can be integrated into a unified response in the event of a credible threat. Will have of 2015, we expanded these efforts to cover all 50 states. We provide mobile detection deployment units. These are designed to supplement existing local detection and reporting capabilities, especially in support of national security. The program was instituted in 2008, and the trailers house equipment for up to 40 personnel. Will complete our hundred 50th deployment of detection units. Acquiring and deploying centers for the department of Homeland Security, the domestic Nuclear Detection office collaborates with federal research and development partners, as well as industry, academia and National Laboratories to bring the right technologies to frontline operators. Operators are always included in all of our efforts. Recently led the development of the nextgeneration handheld radioisotope detection device. These are regularly used by Law Enforcement and technical experts in the field. Identify keyly to requirements for the design of the system. Is a deviceoduct that is lightweight, easytouse, more reliable. With your support, we will continue such efforts to develop Breakthrough Technologies and offer significant improvements and enhance on national Detection Capabilities. Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to protect our nations from radiological and nuclear threats. I appreciate your interest and support for the entire Nuclear Agency enterprise. Your leadership in our collaboration will help provide a safe, secure homeland. Please proceed. Have you served in the navy . Five years of fact to duty, sir. 18 years of reserve service. Ok. That means 23 years. A navy p three aircraft commander. We did a lot of surveillance during the vietnam war. He also spent time looking for u. S. Submarines without much success. Enough,re not stupid but they were so quiet. We found them through sound. I am very proud of your service there. You are a retired captain . Yes. Omi. My son ben calls me captain, my captain. , as you work,y sailor. Thank you and good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the u. S. Nuclear regulatory commission. Radiological Source Security continues to be a top right party at the nrc. We continue to work with the 37 agreement states on domestic and a variety of initiatives. The events of september 11, two thousand one, changed the threat environment and resulted in significant strengthening of the security of radioactive sources. Immediately following 9 11, the nrc, working with other agencies, prioritized actions to enhance the security of radioactive sources. These initial actions resulted in the nrc issuing a number of advisories to communicate general threat information and recommend specific actions to enhance security and address potential threats. Once the nrc identified actions that needed to be taken, the imposeissued orders to legally binding requirements on our licensees. By thetion, as mandated Energy Policy act of 2005, the nrc convened an Interagency Task force on radiation source protection and security to evaluate and provide recommendations to the president and the congress relating to the security of radiation sources in the United States from potential terrorist threats. This task force submitted its first report to the president and congress in august 2006. The second Task Force Report was provided in august 2010 and a third report will be submitted this august. 12, 2007ing held july by the permanent subcommittee on investigations of this committee, a webbased licensing verification system was discussed. In an effort to better track transactions of radioactive material, the nrc developed a portfolio of automated tools to verify licenses and track credentials, inspections, devices and sources, and events. This portfolio includes the National Source tracking system, the web based licensing system and a licensing certification system. The nrc also ceased relying on the presumption that applications for a license were acting in good faith. Instead, we instituted a policy by which the nrc an agreement states would verify the legitimacy of act of applicants when first dealing with them. We also issued prelicensing various that includes applicant and licensing screening activities to ensure radioactive sources will be used as intended. Also has implemented a process called the integrated materials performance evaluation impep. M, or the Program Provides the nrc integratedstematic, and reliable evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective programs, and it provides an indication of areas in which the nrc and agreement states should dedicate more or management attention. Through a significant collaborative effort between the nrc and the agreement states, the agency developed a radioactive Source Security rulemaking to replace earlier orders and provide requirements to a broad set of licensees. This rulemaking was informed by insights gained to the implementation of the orders. Is ansulting rule optimized mix of performancebased and prescriptive requirements that provide the framework for a licensee to develop a Security Program for risk significant materials with measures specifically tailored to its facility. Compliance with the rule was required for an oc licensees by march 19, 2014. Licensees needd to fill compatible requirements. Y march 2016 the nrcs efforts in material security has not ended with the publication in him because and implementation of our radioactive Source Security rule. The nrc will continue to assess its programs to ensure that they promote the secure use and management of radioactive sources. This concludes my remarks, senator. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. Thanks so much. , so nice of you to join us. Testimony today discusses the challenges federal agencies face in securing sources in the United States and this depths agencies are taking to improve security. Potential vulnerability of the sources was highlighted when a truck in mexico caring a cobalt 60 source was stolen. In our report being issued, we examine two types of sources, mobile and stationary. We have found that both pose security challenges, even when licensees follow security controls. Portability, the transportation of highrisk sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supplier churn. Supply chain. Nrc orders licenses to securities orders, they do not know how to do this by specifying the robustness of locks that must be used or even alarms that must be installed in trucks carrying mobile sources. We visited mets nrcs security requirements, we found great variation in the security measures employed. Some companies only use the most basic of lots to secure of locks to secure these sources. In addition to these facts to and individuals wearing a jacket with a logo of his state. This person gained access to the truck, so detailed information about the source, and left with two accomplices only after the crew had made calls to confirm his identity. Regarding stationary sources, these typically involve manufacturing plants, storage warehouses and panoramic radiators used to sterilize food. Facilities met our security requirements, some still appeared to have vulnerabilities. An exterior had rolltop door that was open and unattended, the walls of the cage inside with the cameras were stores did not go to the ceiling. Another facility had no radiator on wheels in a loading dock that was secured with a simple padlock. In addition to the xfone her abilities, we found that some facilities secure their highrisk sources such as logging companies you do not have to comply with nrc security requirements. It is required by nrc before an employee was given on the ax unlimited access. It is intended to mitigate the risk of an insider threat, which nsa have stated that the primary threat to facilities is highrisk radiological sources. Under nrcs security control, it is left a licensee to decide whether to grant employees unescorted access, even in the case where an individual has been convicted of a violent climb a Violent Crime or making credible threats. One example, the individual had been arrested and convicted multiple times of assault, forgery, failure to appear in court, driving while intoxicated, driving with a suspended license and twice for terroristic threats. The two convictions for threats were not included in the Background Information provided by nrc to the licensee. This person was not convicted of threats against United States, but of making violent verbal threats against two individuals. Stepsport examined the agencies are taking to better secure industrial radiological sources. Both nsa in addition, at the time of our view, nrc was preparing a guide for licensees. Our reporting includes recommendations to review and consider revising the project and reexamine the cap. Thank you, i will be happy to answer any questions you might have. Thank you so much. I think we have a couple of photos here. I will ask mr. Trimble to respond to a few questions. You report included in it and number of visuals that were especially interesting. We have taken three of those photos and put them on these large charts. These present each of three to you in sequence. I want to ask you to describe the photo and a security concern that it represents. Here is the first one. What is the photo of . This is one of the sites we visited. It is a warehouse storing radiography cameras. The potential vulnerability here is the large doors openly left is obviously left open and unattended. All right. What is inside that might be of interest . These are the radiography cameras that you had the earlier picture of. Centraluse would be the location where these cameras would be stored when they are not out in the field being used. Could be two or three or maybe a couple of dozen . In this case they would be in a storage room behind a locked container. Because they were in a locked container, they are meeting security requirements. Open doornding the and the unattended nature of that door. Any idea how many of those handheld devices would be required if someone knew how to handle radioactive materials . To whatnk i would defer my colleague said was the table here. Ok. Lets look at the next photo. Please. What do we have here . This is inside one of the storage warehouses for those radiography cameras. While thereee here, is a cage locked on the door, the door and the wall next to it dont go all the way to the ceiling, which is rather an imperfect barrier. Inside of the cameras were locked in a container. Notwithstanding the vulnerability, they still meet the requirements of the nrc. Janet napolitano used to be secretary of Homeland Security as you will recall. I remember sitting here at this table talking to her about border security. Alongked about building the Mexican Border with the u. S. Defense or fences and walls. She said she does a 20 foot fence and someone would come along with a 25 foot ladder. This reminds me of that. Lets have one more photo that has been enlarged and place it on the chart. Lets have a look at that and maybe you can tell us about that photo. This is a picture of a skylight. At nine locations revisited visited, we had unsecured we identified unsecured skylights at the facility. These facilities range from warehouse storing radiography cameras to Scientific Research facilities to large panoramic you radiators large, radiators. In the nsa program or the go in on a voluntary basis and beef up security, skylights is one of the areas they were targeted terms of closing the means of ingress or securing the skylight. Where the tell us building with skylights exists . Were the devices were talking about here, worthy locked up in theyure facility echo are still meeting with nrc requirements because they would still be in a locked container inside the facility. Provides another way of getting inside the building to gain access to that container. As we all know, there are lots of containers and there are lots of containers. Some of them are not for secure and others are quite secure. Could you elaborate on that, please . I think was pointedly, looking at the trucks, some of these trucks were secured with very simple padlocks. Some at highsecurity locks and inside the darkrooms are these cameras would be stored, sometimes people would just have an army surplus container with a cable securing it to the truck, which provide a second lock required under the requirements. Some took the mission much more and use reinforced steel containers and bolted down and did much more of a job to secure those containers. Theres a great variability in the field. Let me ask the panelists to react to what mr. Trimble has said. Ptain satorious. We have a new security rule which i mentioned. We will look at that rule and see if there are things that we need to beef up. We put regulations in place that are risk informed and performancebased. You typically have a one rule itself. A onethe license is rule fits all. We let the licensees ensure they are requiring if they are complying with the rules. We provide guidance that will instruct licensees and how they can construct and operate their program in a manner that will comply with our regulatory requirements. We leave it to the licensee to put their program in place, to document a written security plan. I have had to unders