Many of our adversaries spent the decades to reshape their militaries and developing technologies to thwart americas military advantages. As well hear today, many of the technologies that made america the unparalleled Global Military power just 15 to 20 years ago, they are pro proliferating to others. Our adversaries are fielding new technologies from cyber to space in order to defeat our military advantages. At the same time, we face growing networks of violent islamic extremists that will engage us in a low conflict of technology and will for decades to come. As the Bipartisan National Defense Panel warned in future, quote, conflicts are likely to unfold more rapidly, battlefields will be more lethal. Operational sanctuary will be scares and fleeting. Conflict will be the norm in this rapidly changing environment. U. S. Military superiority is not a given. And yet since the end of the cold war a quarter century ago, the United States has maintained a similar but ever shrinking version of the military we built in the 1980s. In constant dollars we are spending the same amount on defense as we were 30 years ago. But for this money today, we are getting 35 fewer combat brigades, 5 fewer ships, 63 fewer air combat squadrons and a lot more bureaucracy and joferede head. Our forces are more capable than ever but not capable in being multiple places at once. Capacity Still Matters given the numerous contingencies we face. Our adversaries are more capable, too. Many significantly so. Our military technological advantages are eroding fast. Add that to the years of arbitrary spending cuts and see questions tration and we are now facing the problem of a erosion. At the level of strategy we are living through a pattern in american history, a period of international exertion followed by the desire to cut defense spending and retrench from the world that goes too far and we end up courting disaster and selfimposed harm done to our ability to project power and flines. That is where we are today. Relearning that underreaching can be as dangerous as overreaching, if not more so. Now more than ever, we need a Clear Strategy or strategies, to guide our actions and defense investments. Unfortunately, Senior Leaders in our government do not seem able to define the concept. When pressed for a strategy, they offer objectives and general interests and inputs and dreams and means but not a strategy. Not a description they will marshal limited means to achieve their ends. Thats how we heard and we get what we heard on tuesday the three rs. Whats worse than the National Security strategy that become a speech writing exercise to please all constituencies and tell us less than the quadrennial defense review which our witness told us last thursday has become more of a sustained explanation of the program of record. Strategy like governing is to choose. We must have priorities. We must determine what missions are more important than others. What capabilities we must have at the expense of others. And there are no shortcuts around strategy. Doing more with less is often just a rationalization for doing less. While we need more money for defense, more money spent on the wrong ways and wrong things will still fail if we think we can succeed with business as usual. We cannot. That is why defense reform is so important, not nearly as a costsaving measures although there is costs to be saved but we need to be more smarter and innovative about how we prioritize our National Security interests and how we use our military power to achieve our policy objectives and what size and shape our military must be to succeed now and in the future. The choices entailed here will not always be popular in all quarters of the defense establishment. But these are the choices we must make to ensure our military is built and postured to deter and if necessary, defeat our adversaries. That is the purpose of todays hearings and hearings in the future. And i look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. Senator reed. Mr. Reed thank you very much. And thank you. Senator reed your expertise and insights are important as we cope with the issues that the chairman laid out. Let me thank the chairman with this opportunity to take a deliberate review of the Defense Department organization, its structure, missions and essentially look forward to very creatively and thoughtfully. Former secretary of defense bob gates and a host of other experts, former officials, historians, they talked about the Defense Department and going forward. And it is worth while and to quote dr. Gates, americans are leaders regard International Crisis they are the norm. Dr. Gates also repeated his conclusion by more than four decades of Public Service that our record in predicting the future, we have never gotten it right. We must provide training that gives our forces the capabilities across the broadest possible spectrum of conflict. We heard comments from several of the last weeks panelists about the way in which our strategic guidance is crafted including the strategy and the quadrennial defense review. Among other things, our witnesses said they consume energy and resources and overtaken by Global Developments by the time they are published and i would be interested hearing comments about this process and how it can be improved. Another theme of dr. Gates testimony is the need for strong civilian leadership particularly by the secretary. While this point is selfevident, dr. Gates emphasized satisfying battlefield needs cannot be on the personal involvement of the secretary. He continued, the challenges how to institutionalize a culture and incentive culture that has longterm planning and acquisition. And several of our witnesses have stated the organization processes are outdated and i would be updated on getting insight. Given the dynamic and evolving security challenges facing our nation today and 30 years after passing goldwaternickels, how the military should be structured to carry out such task and defense guidance to make the products more lanning. And i commend the chairman for leading us in this effort. Senator reed, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to present my views on this important topic. Given the limited time, i would like to summarize my testimony by making five points. Senator mccain all witnesses complete statement will be made part of the record. Its in the context, i would say, a medical analogy. First you need a good diagnosis of the environment you are in before writing the prescription and a lot of times we like to o from the threaten virmente to talking about forces and equipment of the defense program. But as you pointed out, mr. Chairman, and senator reed, the key connecttive tissue really equipment of the defense program. But as you pointed out, mr. Chairman, and senator reed, the key connecttive tissue really s the strategy that tells us ow we are going to develop a y first point is that we are now in a period where we face threats that are growing in scale and shifting in form from those begins which we spent most of the last quarter century planning for. There are three revisionist powers in three key regions of the world, regions that president s of both parties going back decades have declared to be vital to our security. And these powers are interested in overturning in significant ways the rulesbased International Order that has benefited us and our allies and partners over an extended period of time. Aside from these powers, china, russia and iran, we also see the rise and empowerment of radical nonstate groups and entities. And in terms of the scale of the problem, we are also seeing a shift in the form of the challenges they present. Any good strategy involves developing sources of advantage that you can use to exploit your enemys weaknesses. And we have see this through advanced military technology. He chinese focusing on the tendency we have had to operate in permissive environments, areas where our operations arent contested. So developing capabilities to go after our Battle Networks and also our forward bases and large mobile platforms like Aircraft Carriers. Second if our adverse sears cant take us on directly they have gone to protracted warfare and gone to acts of aggression, little green men in the ukraine and war that iran has waged against us and paramilitary large mobile platforms like Aircraft Carriers. Second if our adverse sears cant take us on directly they have gone to protracted warfare and gone to acts of aggression, little green men in the ukraine and war that iran has waged against us and Paramilitary Forces in the form of organizations like chinas coast guard that are pushing overturning the National Order in east asia. We find the potential for aggression. Space, cyber space and the undersea where it may be difficult for us to detect acts of aggression or attribute them once we have detected them. And finally there is what is called the Second Nuclear age, which i think could be better described as a new age and strategic warfare. If you look at russian and Chinese Military writings, not only do they talk about Nuclear Weapons but new kinds of Nuclear Weapons, very low yield uclear weapons, and we consider Nuclear Weapons to be nonusable. But the role that conventional capabilities, the chinese talk about the United States global conventional Strategic Strike capabilities something that we havent thought through in detail. Theres also the issue of cyber warfare and the ability of yber weapons to hold certain targets at risk that perhaps and advancing its interests and were once reserved for Nuclear Weapons. O an array of new challenges on a greater scale have been presented to us in a different form. Now in confronting these challenges, we confront them ith the resources. S a percentage of our gross on a greater scale have been now in confronting these challenges, we confront them with the resources. As a percentage of our Gross Domestic Product our Defense Budgets are declining over time. In terms of the budget itself, we have rising personnel costs. The costs per Service Member since 9 11 in real terms has gone up over 50 . This means over time that if the budget doesnt outgrow the personnel cost growth, you have diminished resources for training, equipping, training of the force and readiness. We also find that our Capital Stock, planes, tanks and ships and guns, while more formidable than that possessed in any power in the world. It is shifting. So our emphasis on, for example, forward deploying forces to large bases, when you have adversaries that are mastering the precision warfare and target these bases with heyak rasi, they make what was once assured to our allies, a source of anxiety and lack of assurance. Finally, if theres an arms race going on between ourselves and allies and partners, its more of a disarmament race or race to the bottom. Our allies and partners particularly in europe have failed in most cases to meet the nato standard for 2 g. D. P. Deployed or invested in defense. Japan, another one of our powerful allies has said some impressive things recently and adopted some forwardlooking policies. But we have yet to see japan break through that 1 of g. D. P. Barrier. We are not just restricted to our budget in terms of how we respond to threats and the increasing scale and shifting form of the challenges we face. But in terms of the budget itself, how the budget is distributed, our Capital Stock and the ability or the willingness of our allies and partners to step up when theyre needed, i think theres a growing disconnect between the threats we face and the means we have to address them. Consequently, i think there is a need for a welldesigned strategy, one that employs our resources most effectively to maximize the effect of these limited resources. Unfortunately i think we have lost a great deal of our confidence to do strategy well. I dont think this is a military problem or a civilian problem and i dont think its a republican or democrat problem but a problem that has developed since the end of the cold war. In the 1990s when we didnt have a threat, we didnt have to focus on strategy. After 9 11, the tap was open in terms of defense spending, we didnt have to make tough choices. We are in that period again where resources are limited and perhaps diminishing, where the threats are growing and it is about time that we begin to focus on strategy. One final comment, in terms of the size and scope of our military, in terms of the forces we have and the mix of where they are positioned around the world, we have to come up with a strategy before we can make informed decisions about those kinds of issues. How are we going to deter china from advancing its revisionist aims in the far east . Is our objective to defend the first island chain . Have we made that public, made hat clear . If we have, are we going to defend it by positioning forces there in what will be called a forward defense posture. There is offshore control that we ought to limit ourselves to blockading china as a way of if we have, are we going to deterring acts of ggression. That has an enormous effect on the kinds of forces, where you position them, what we ask of our allies. You have to come up with that the kinds of forces, where you position them, what we ask of our allies. You have to come up with that strategy. And ill close with a quote from a british admiral, jackie fisher, who along with nelson is regarded by many brits as the two greatest admirals. He said members of parliament asked me what kind of a navy we need. You have to make up your mind how you are going to deter and fight. How many of us made up our minds and how many admirals have minds . Thank you, mr. Chairman. [laughter] chairman mccain, Ranking Member reed. Thank you to contribute to understand factors that shape the u. S. Military. This is a summation of the submitted testimony. Im delighted to know that this committee is looking at all aspects of military. And this is an important step in that process. Obviously, there are differing opinions on how and why the military should be postured. With russia, ukraine and syria, iran deeply involved in operations across the middle east and expanding its military portfolio, china behaving more provocatively and Nuclear Missiles to reach the United States, having the right force in sufficient quantity is critically important. Recent work i have been involved as editor of the heritage foundations u. S. Nuclear strength, how one might think sizing the u. S. Military. Instead of trying to predict where forces might be needed and what type of conflict, it looks at what history tells us about the actual use of military force. We reviewed other studies on National Defense requirements to require the bottomup review. What we found was that from the korean war onward, the United States found itself in a major war every 15, 20 years and used roughly the same sized force. Each of the nine major studies came to end strength, major platforms. In general, the historical record and the studies indicate that the u. S. Needs an active army, a navy approaching of 150 ships, air force of 1,200 aircraft fighting. This size will provide the United States to handle a major war and having sufficient capacities and respond to an emerging crisis should a major competitor try to take advantage of a perceived window of opportunity. In other words, the force enables the country to handle one major crisis while deterring competitors. This historical record spans 65 years encompassing decades of technological advancements, various geographic regions, enemy forces and Economic Conditions and shifts of political control of the executive and legislative branches of the u. S. Government. There are practical realities that override all other factors. The nature of war and where it is waged require large forces to control territory or deny such. Numbers really do matter. Sustained sustainability operations require a large base, conventional combat operations require sizeable forces to replace combat osses. Small numbers of equipped forces are inadequate to such situations and can lead to a force that is sensitive to combat losses or worn down by numerous deployments. Numbers matter in preparing for the future. When the force is small and already hardpressed to meet demands, little capacity is available for the future. If new ways are needed to maintain a competitive advantage, a portion of the force must be available for experimentation, whether by reducing current demands or enlarging the force. Instead, we continue to see further reductions in increased work load. Robert gates recently appeared before this committee as has been noted. One of his major points is the u. S. Continuously cycles to ramp up for a crisis and then cutting the force to a bare minimum once the crisis is over. People are assuming another crisis wont come along and we will have to predict when and where it will occur. Here is expense. We should continue to explore the advantages of unmanned systems, and precision guided munitions but numbers matter in war. Our current modernization path at existing levels of funding, we are likely to find ourselves with state of the art capabilities yet incapable of conducting sustained operations against a credible opponent. This outcome is troubling and something this committee should consider. To summit up, i emphasize that numbers matter. The capacity of our military is at least as important as how it is equipped. Overall sigh of the force and how much it is used appears to be independent of technology, perhaps even strategy, i