Im jim byron president ceo of the Richard Nixon foundation. 50 years ago tomorrow, after four years of delegate on and off again negotiations and military actions by the Nixon Administration, secretary of state William Rogers signed the paris peace accords for the United States. What was not on and off again and was in fact very consistent, was the approach that president nixon took in leading his administrations attempts to leverage great power rivalries and competition for americas benefit. The overriding objective of which was to end the war in vietnam. To discuss nixons grand strategy for ending the war in vietnam, im pleased to welcome pier assal, the Dwight E Stanford chair in American Foreign relations at San Diego State university. Neil ferguson milbank family senior fellow at the hoover institution. Rana mitter professor of the history and politics of modern China University of oxford. My colleague mark up grove, president and ceo of the lbj foundation in austin, texas, will moderate this discussion. And i turn it over now to mark. Thanks so much, jim and welcome. Neal, peer runner for what i know will be a very enlightening discussion on president nixons grand strategy to end the war in vietnam and the Peace Agreement that came into play 50 years ago tomorrow. But but i should remind our audience that you can get into this discussion as well by tweeting your questions to at Nixon Foundation, or if youre so inclined, emailing them to info at Nixon Foundation dot org. So gentlemen, lets start with before we get into the Nixon Administration, what was going on in vietnam and the world. Prior to nixon taking office in january. Of 1969. Lets start with you. How would you characterize the situation in vietnam leading up to the nixon presidency in 1969 . I think that one of the elements that that that americans looking at the war in vietnam tend to forget is that fundamentally whatever is going on in vietnam, by the time nixon becomes president is is is is a civil war that the this this the civil war breaks out in 1945 as as as the communists attempt to assert their jurisdiction over all of the vietnamese ghobadi. And then and then it gets kind of dramatically escalated and intensified an internal rationalize owing to, to, to, to the cold war. The french will attempt to recolonize. Starting in late 45, 46 and essentially at that point, the french war becomes kind of juxtaposed over this. This ongoing vietnamese civil war. And then, as we know, the french eventually lead the americans come in. But but that that that that civil war is is ongoing. So. So we have a kind of a 30 year civil war that unfolds in vietnam as the french, then the americans. Johnson and then. And then and then and then. Nixon become involved in in in in in all of this. So so when when when nixons elected to the presidency. I mean, fundamentally, again, for the vietnamese, it doesnt really change anything. Of course, it raises concerns in hanoi because because the North Vietnamese have been understanding of the kind of man nixon is it it kind of elevates optimism somewhat in in in saigon. But but it really remains to be seen how nixon will kind of change dynamics among vietnamese themselves and between northern and southern vietnam. Neal, how would you put American Perspective during the same period . Whats happening here in america . Well, of course, pierre is right. The United States, in a way, becomes the air on witting air of a french project of of recolonization. And its important to recognize that the Mission Creep was quite gradual. No one could one could say it even begun under eisenhower. It certainly was going on under John F Kennedy. But it was Lyndon Johnson who allowed the american commitment to South Vietnam to escalate massively. And i think its important to understand that this was one of the greatest failures of of American Foreign policy making, a failure partly of process. Johnson was not a great strategist. He was a great domestic political operator. But when he took the tactics that had made him master of the senate and applied them to Foreign Policy, the results were pretty bad. He was, of course, aided and abetted by an incredibly talented National Security team. And so this was a failure in many ways, made in harvard and and thats important to bear in mind that Richard Nixon inherits a mess made by two previous democrats administer nations, but a mess that that gets half a million american soldiers embroiled in a huge ground war, that they are struggling not to lose. That is the strong impression that the American Public has by 1968. Its the destruction of johnsons own ambitions. It rules out a second term for him. It is the dominant issue of domestic politics in 1968, although, of course, there were many other burning issues at that time, not least about race relations. Its hard for us today. We can keep telling ourselves that the country is terribly divided today, that we have appalling polarization and yet when you go back and look at the atmosphere, 1968, when leading figures were being assassinated and the violence in cities and on campuses was much worse than anything weve seen in recent times. You realize that that really was an extraordinary time of upheaval in american politics. And i think ill add a couple more points. It cant be understood. Viewed separately from the cold war, the grand ancestor and global struggle between the United States and the soviet union. Although theres this legacy of decolonizing. The real story here is that the soviet is ignoring North Vietnam more, hoping to succeed where they had not succeeded in korea, they had not managed to gain total control of the korean peninsula. But here in vietnam, there seemed a better shot of achieving total communist control of all of of vietnam than perhaps all of indochina. Because its worth saying from the outset, the we talk about a vietnam war, but cambodia and laos were soon to be drawn into the conflict. And i think none of this makes sense until one realizes that the United States by 1968 was discovering the limits of its power. If that paradigm seem unlimited, when John F Kennedy was sworn in by 1968, the limits were all too clear, partly in economic terms, but more in terms of what american domestic consent forces could take and what it clearly could not take already by 1968 was the nexus. Three efforts to win the war in vietnam. And thats thats the mess that Richard Nixon inherited. Ill ill pause there. But let me just ask a follow up question. What is Lyndon Johnsons principal failure in his strategy in vietnam to that point . Well, i think it was Henry Kissinger who became nixons National Security advisor who who got this right at the time, criticizing johnson in his role as Nelson Rockefellers close advisor. Johnson tended to think in terms of of boxing, and he would throw punches. But the throwing of punches, whether it was air power or of ground forces, was not well coordinated. This was kissingers critique with the diplomats like moves that johnson made. Kissinger wrote a in Foreign Affairs article about the war in vietnam shortly before he discovered he was going to be nixons National Security adviser. This was quite embarrassing. He wanted to try and avoid the article being published, but it was too late. And the article reads extremely well today, not surprisingly, because kissinger had been to vietnam several times in the midsixties, had been tangentially involved in johnsons peacemaking efforts. And its in that article that kissinger sets out the near impossibility of a victory and sketches out how he imagines it might be possible to salvage what came to be known as peace with honor. And im struck as i revisit that essay and then think about the subsequent events by how how consistent kissinger was. He certainly had no illusions going into the white house in 1969 that this war could somehow be won. From the outset, he understood his role as being to extricate the United States from an unwinnable war against a guerilla enemy that had ultimately time on its side and the motivation of its people on its on its side. And i think the critique of johnson stands up well to if i used to teach a course at harvard, perhaps rana, when he moves there, can create something similar. And one of the classes in that course focused on the decision to escalate the johnson took after his election victory of 1964. And its a fascinating case study in strategic disaster because the argue ments for escalation are so constrained by Lyndon Johnsons domestic political priorities that the u. S. Escalates enough to get completely bogged down with a massive land army. I mean, just reflect on how much bigger this was than any deployments in iraq or afghanistan deploys this vast force, and yet does not do enough to win, doesnt even have a clear vision of what victory looks like. So it is i think it is a case study in strategic failure. And the failure was Lyndon Johnsons. I think one has to understand in any discussion like this that Richard Nixon inherits is an almost unsalvageable failure from his predecessor and a lot of subsequent discussion forgets that until one almost fuels reading. Oh, i dont know. Christopher hitchens at his most polemical that it was Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger that started the the vietnam war. Theyre hard task was to try to extricate the United States from its biggest strategic blunder. And i want to underline how hard that task was. The notion that one hears sometimes from the armchairs of academia that there was an easy way out. I think we must be very skeptical about you run a lets pan out to the world. What is happening in the world just prior to nixon taking the white house in 69. Thanks, mark. Well, you know, weve had such a lot laid out there for us that youre giving the Bigger Picture is quite the quite the challenge. I would start to answer that question by first focusing in on the country, which of course, very soon would be at the center of attention for Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. And that, of course, is china. And i think its an understanding china and its part as a part of that global triangular relationship with the soviet union and with the United States, that we have to understand the wider context or what happens eventually. In 1973, with the paris peace accords. But 1969 is setting the ground for that. So first of all, i think its worth remembering that this is a period when the cold war is in a very, very unstable environment. Sometimes with those three legs, if you want to call it that, the peoples republic of china, the soviet union and the United States of america. We might think of it as a tripod, but if so, its a tripod where the third leg, if thats what china is, is slightly different, linked to the others and slightly unstable. And i think thats not necessarily a bad analogy for why this period is so difficult. And its important because actually the ill stop the tripod analogy at this stage. I want to take it take it too far. But in terms of the chinese desire to try and remake its position in the world, a lot of whats going on, both at home and abroad shape that question of how the cold war develops. Actually, really for the remaining 20 years of its existence into the 1980s. So first, just one domestic thing about china before i widen out for a minute or two into into the world again. And that is that this is a period of the utmost turmoil. It is the cultural revolution. The cultural revolution has kicked off in 1966. Its at its height between 66 and the beginning of 69. The red guard period, the one that, of course, has become, you know, an icon and millions of photographs. Mao standing at the center of Tiananmen Square in central beijing and fervent young men and women waving little red books while wearing green uniforms. And from the Foreign Policy point of view, this made this an absolutely hopeless time to try and have a sensible conversation. So i think we have to accept a great deal of what neil said in terms of lbj and his shortcomings. But we should remember that there was one important element when he was looking to try and make a list when his state department was trying to have sensible conversations with the chinese, the opportunities to do that were very heavily limited by the fact that half the time the Foreign Ministry in beijing was being surrounded by 17 year olds who were basically throwing paint bombs and demanding the place be burned to the ground, which may makes the writing of diplomatic telegrams a little more challenging than it might necessarily be in more normal, more normal times. But that didnt mean that china wasnt looking at the world around it and working out how vietnam fit it in. And one thing you have to remember is that china was an immensely important actor in terms of the way in which the vietnamese civil war, which has told us about, unfolded. It was a civil war, of course, but a civil war that lived in the world of the cold war. And in this particular case, as you know, great historians, this period, professor chang gi comes to mind with his book on the china the vietnam wars is that it moves to a period in which the actor doing containment to tell me almost always associate of course with the United States is not the americans in this case, but the chinese. They want to contain the vietnamese. They want to contain the vietnamese revolution. And they are more and more worried that the turn of the vietnamese is towards the enemy. From chinas point of view, which of course is the soviet union. Recall that, of course, just a few years previously in 1960, you have the final open split between the soviet and the communist chinese, which of course had been brewing up ever since the the death of stalin and the rise of khrushchev. But by the time you get to the mid to late 1960s, 1969, remember, is the year when china and the soviet union pretty much nearly went to war. They went to war. Nearly went to war over the jindo islands and the ossuary river. And there was certainly a fear on the chinese side that this might well turn nuclear. So there were a whole variety of constraints that mean that china at this stage really, really needs to orient its Foreign Policy towards speaking towards the americans. And i wont go further than that now, because i know were going to move towards the 1970s little later on. But let me just which i go get run out. Im just going to add one or two other things that also add a little further context in terms of this liminal period of the very late sixties. Before we go into the early seventies. First is to remind ourselves actually about indochina. He has just talked about vietnam. Hell talk more about the region later, im sure, and neal, i think actually just mentioned cambodia as well in that context. This is the year when the revolution is blowing up that will finally within a few months in 1970, throw prince sihanouk kings out of off the throne and essentially put for a very short period a proamerican khmer republic in power under law. No, initially. Now, this is also a reorientation of policy which actually gladdens hearts in beijing, because by this stage, supporting cambodian movements that are not going to follow the vietnamese and therefore soviet line is very important to them. And you see the seeds there of what they do just a few years later, perhaps the most unforgivable action committed by the prc and by the United States in different ways, which is support of the genocidal khmer rouge and whatever else you say about the vietnamese a little later on, they did put a stop to that particular ugly disaster. One of the relevant final one might explanation here, and then ill stop. But it does relate also very much to nixon and kissinger and their global view, at least of asia. And that is, of course, whats happening in india at this time, because were only about a year and a half from the conflict that comes the Bangladesh Liberation war. At this point, pakistan is still one country with two parts in the region. These india is undergoing a whole variety of internal troubles that will eventually, in the midseventies to the emergency period. But at this point, the real crisis is an international one. Its one about whether or not east pakistan is going to break off. We know, of course, eventually that it does. And as many people know, not least as they read the great work of gary bass, for instance, that the question of how the pakistan the pakistan india war and the bangladeshi nation war is going to be dovetailed with the pakistani role in nixon and kissingers approach to china and how that will also be seen in beijing becomes part of the complexity that makes the asian arena a very, very complicated one. Not just if youre looking from washington or moscow, but also if youre looking on from beijing in the middle of t