Okay. Without further ado, id like to get to our second panel and introduce the speakers. The theme for this panel is the sharp end of deterrence. And i think its a great follow on to the challenges of command and so let me start with the gentleman thats just right next to the podium dr. Eric setzekorn ph. D. , whos an author of arming east, deterring deterring china in the early cold war. Dr. Dr. Sets akorn is a military historian and specializes in the history. The u. S. Army in east asia after service in the u. S. Army and the Intelligence Community he received, his ph. D. From, George Washington university army, east asia. His second book he previously published, the rise and fall of an officer corps, the republic of china military. From 1942 to 1955. Dr. Shetty corners, an employee of the u. S. Federal government, has for many years at the u. S. Army center for military history. Hes also an adjunct faculty member at George Mason University and, the university of maryland global campus. Next, would be to his right, your left would be colonel l scott lingamfelter. United states army, retired. Hes the author of the book yanks and blue berets, american u. N. Peacekeepers in the middle east curling and father began his military career as a field women. Hooray yes he then served as a front military observer in the United Nations true Supervision Organization in syria, israel and southern lebanon. Sound familiar . Which the subject of his new book after 28 year military career, colonel lincoln felder served in the Virginia House of delegates from 2002 to 2018. Hes a contributor to the Washington Times and his book, desert red lake artillery and the first gulf war was also an official title in the usa book program. Colonel lincoln felder will be inducted into the next class of the u. S. Army field hall of fame. And again, last but not least to my immediate left is Lieutenant Colonel james lecture. United states army retired. His he is the of with my shield an army ranger in somalia. Colonel lecter is in is a retired u. S. Army infantry. He served for 27 years and participated in eight operational deployments, including somalia, with Task Force Ranger. He also worked at the National Policy advising the National Security council at the white house and, serving numerous tours at the cia. Colonel mcnair holds a masters degree in history and, serves on the board of directors for several veterans following the russian invasion of the ukraine, he has served a war correspondent. Again, you couldnt for a better set of three distinguished authors for our second panel. And so at this time, eric, please. Well, thank you all for coming. I think this panel deterrence is such a important word today as we grapple with the challenges that jim strategic challenges that face the United States. The u. S. Army has a major role, i think, to play in deterrence. So i hope this will be a productive hour. My work looking at the 1950s when we had a situation with a very aggressive china led by a mercurial leader. A lot of parallels to today. So my my research was really focused on what are some lessons, what are some ways that the army was to assist National Policy deter china in a way that was strategic, valuable but also done without breaking bank done while being cognizant of real challenges. For example, most of my work is on the 1950s, and when eisenhower came Office Severe challenges recruitment. Not a lot of people joining the army very much similar to today major problems with the budget again similar to today so a lot of parallels i mostly want to talk about taiwan give a little bit of a case study and my Research Taiwan very much in the news, particularly in light of ukraine and hopefully draw some Lessons Learned. I should note the disclaimer on the bottom. Im no longer an employee of the us army or the dod, but i do work for the federal government. So these views are my own personal views and any sort of official policy statement. Next slide, please. So how do you deal with china . How do you deal with an aggressive, assertive, militaristic china, which is threatening us allies, u. S. Allies who are much smaller, much smaller military forces and are not able to defend themselves. That was the question eisenhower had to face in 1953 when he became president and. One of the things he did was to korea. Korea at that time there was an ongoing conflict and basically said, how do we how do we deal with this army . What are you doing . What policies can we implement . And he out that the army actually was fairly the came Korean Military advisory group. He had built up a large korean force. This force had been trained this force an equipped us military advisors attached to korean units, not always effective on operations, but for holding the line, maintaining the front lines. The koreans have been effective given clear, simple missions. The us officers felt that this was a sustainable war program and eisenhower really picks up this example, sees whats going on in korea and says this can be replicated. This can be replicated in taiwan this can be replicated in South Vietnam in thailand, in the philippines. And so in the 1950s, we have a cluster of military advisory groups being formed in east other parts of the world as but particularly in east asia. This is a place, you know, its far from the content of the states. It can be quite expensive to ship troops out there to sustain troops out there, particularly in east asia. Eisenhower, that the army has a very, very strong role to play, to deter china by building up local forces, building up local allies to fulfill missions on their own with u. S. Support. And next slide, please. And perhaps the best example of that in taiwan. Taiwan in the 1950s, just like today, was facing a very hostile threat from prc engagements. The taiwan straits, skirmishes on some of the outlying eisenhower. There had been some some efforts made during the truman administration, but eisenhower looked at taiwan and said, this can be a case study. This can be a wonderful example where can demonstrate to our allies we stand with you. Were not going to put u. S. Troops on the ground but we are going to supply you with weapons supply of training. Were going to demonstrate a commitment to your through military assistance. And thats what we see is that the figures are absolutely staggering especially if you think of you know the size of the us army today. Taiwan in 1955 had over half a million troops out of a population of about 11 million. So absolutely very, very large military. Again fulfilling that sort of model. Eisenhower looked at in korea a. Simple mission youre not asking taiwanese to invade the mainland youre not asking taiwanese forces to to another area. Theyre going to be defensive. Theyre going to be holding the beaches, so to speak. Theyre going to be dug in. Theyre going to be have hardened, hardened logistics facilities. And part of that was if the taiwanese are holding up of this defensive posture, the us personnel are going to mainly be providing instruction and. Thats a key point, probably for deterrence. I think in our current era, how do we maintain deterrence for a long period of time . China is probably not going to go away in five or ten years. In the 1950s, they recognized that this was a perhaps generational challenge. Its not enough to train a soldier in south korea, in taiwan, because in two years, in three years, they will a civilian. You have to create an institution. You have to create an institution that is to change, that is going to adapt as decades pass, and that the majority of the u. S. Personnel assigned to taiwan, they were in schools. What we might think as gsc brand schools training officers, theyre not there was a phrase in afghanistan shoulder to shoulder. That was not the model in. The 1950s, the us 1950s saying we are not going be shoulder to shoulder with you on the beaches were going to train, were going to support you, but you are going to be they want the us allies whether they be south korean, South Vietnamese or taiwanese, you are going to be the one with the weapons. You are going to be the one deterring china and potentially fighting china. Next slide, please. And this model, i would argue, is fairly effective. And the proof of that is when you have crisis situation building an institution is great, Building Organization is wonderful. But really a crisis is when comes to shove. And in the taiwan straits in 1958, you have situation where mao zedong wants to test the us commitment. And so one of these offshore islands, a quemoy currently called kinmen, same place, just the different transliteration. The prc begins shelling it thousands of rounds, shelling this island, its only about four or five miles in and about two miles wide. Theres 30,000 taiwanese troops on it. So is kind of a a test, right . The u. S. Back out or will the us double, but because of the hard work, because the preparation, because of the investment, the u. S. And made prior to that really that that sort of tough decision doesnt have to be made because the facilities are hardened the troops are well trained military advisers on island that is American Military advisers. Yeah you were taking some casualties but were still effective. Morale is high. We plenty of ammunition. We have plenty of food. We have plenty of water. So the mag is also supplying wonderful information to american Decision Makers saying yes we dont you know we have a situation here but its not you dont need to send the aircraft carriers you dont need to have air strikes. The chinese mainland. We are fulfilling our mission. We are holding steady. We are holding firm and really the only u. S. Military unit that deploys taiwan is maybe 800 men from an air defense unit. So in this case, the investment in deterrence, the u. S. Armys hard work in the 1950s allows policymakers to take their time. They dont have to react off the cuff to threats. They can pause, they can wait for the situation to develop. And in this case, the investment proved have a good rate of return. Taiwanese they do not break pressure. Taiwanese military leaders are providing good coordination. The us military, they invest made to deter china by supplying local allies with education, with equipment with weapons had paid off. Next slide please. And thats important legacies. I mean, if we look around asiapacific today, we look at where the us has key alliances. South japan, thailandbut certainly in taiwan. And i would argue that not just helping the us with crisis situations but enduring legacies is something the us army can do. A wonderful job with. The us air force, us navy, oftentimes they have a smaller footprint. They a more limited sort, face to face contact the us army in the 1950s and later has continue to have a strong relationship with taiwan. We look some of the equipment, for example, the apache helicopters today, what are the Taiwanese Air force, a taiwanese fly, ty fly black ops, they fly apaches, they buy patriot missiles, they buy abrams tanks. So deterrence is not just about helping in the near term, but it also provides enduring legacies. And so that strategic and thats a wonderful phrase, love. Admiral radford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff during the 1950s, he said these places are strategic. Where, you know, the us army can invest money and get a high rate of return it cost 1950s prices. Not so much. Today. 225. A supplier, a taiwanese soldier, 30 500 to supply a u. S. Army soldier. So with budgets being constraint, thats another way supply. And our allies support our allies can provide a way forward. Last slide, please. So i want to highlight that this deterrence, which i were going to speak about in detail, the us army is absolutely critical asia pacific is, not just a theater for the navy and for the air force, but the army has a extremely valuable role play, extremely Important Role to play. It should be said its not not always easy. I dont want to sound too much like a pollyanna either. You know, the grass is always greener. Its challenging, right . Military Army Officers want be in command. They want to, you know, be a Battalion Commander or move up to brigade, getting people to fill these positions can be tough. And it also takes a lot of coordination. It takes a lot of coordination with allies. But also here in d. C. And i think thats why forums, like aoc can be so valuable, the us army needs to understand military advising, providing military equipment is always a very delicate process politically, and thats something that has to the army always has to keep one eye on is it works with local allies and. Ill leave it at that. Thank you very much. And look forward to your questions. Thank very much. Eric scott, please go run on up. Great. Why dont we move to next slide . First of all, i want to thank joe in particular and the and the book program and my publisher, university, kentucky, who has been so helpful to me in getting work done. Glad to see natalie here. Ive had a very rewarding career. I to say to you that being a grandfather is the best part of that as. We like to say our grandchildren are the desert of life. Next slide, please. So why this book . First, surprising. Many people are unaware that the role of of the role of the American Military and particularly our officers played in the United NationsSupervision Organization since its founding in 1948 after israel modern state into being the experience and the stories of many United Nations military observers and motors have received scant treatment frankly in the military literature and so yet these lessons that we learned very important including the inherent danger and importance and professionalism and level headedness in the face of danger, particularly when you consider that these military observers were unarmed and what was a de facto combat zone, finally, theres much to consider from our experience and adventures to inform future opportunities if they should rise next levels. So my sources are similar to what you would find from from any author. But the most important aspect of this book was the 18 testimonies from 18 former unknowns that i was able to receive in this Work Together and their story enlivens the stories of this book nowhere else. So youre to find their testimonies replicated. And i got to tell you every single officer that i can talk to essentially to me, well, ive been waiting for years for somebody to ask about this. And im very honored today to introduce to you one of those on those former marine colonel danny lindemann, who has come all the way from california, need to be at this lecture. And so i want you to welcome next slide please. So the American Association with the answer and so was was not new when i arrived in 1981, there had been senior u. S. Marines who had led on. So in their early years and americans held Important Roles in the as the chief Operations Officer and the chief of Observer Group lebanon for some time the prominence of u. S. Officers and un so added to our credibility of the 36 of us who were assigned with 257 other unarmed observers from 17 nations. Next slide, please. As you can see, we had a very diverse assem of people from different some 17 countries, 293, we had 36 from sweden, which was a nonnato country at the time 36 russians and 36 americans. And danny and i were actually damascus with the russians, and we used to joke with them, how come there are only two americans and an 18 russians here . And we would say, well, we just want to keep it even it looks like its important to know that there are there are different flavors of peacekeeping operations, that of peacekeeping in that a peace enforcing in the un charter. There are two types of peacekeeping. Chapter six, the pacific settlements dispute, and Chapter Seven threats to the breach in and aggression the former suits, peacekeeping and the latter suits Peace Enforcement, which each ever chapter is chosen. Its very, very important that we have the configuration, the mandate and the mission support. Correct from the beginning. But importantly you must also have buy in from the parties to the conflict. It is sadly convenient that as we give this lecture today, the middle east is on fire. Finally, you must a force that is welltrained and competent and excellent. In 1981, we had three major in organized operations in the levant. We had un so that was organized under chapter of the u. N. Charter that t dennis and i rved in with our colleagues there was the united Observer Force, Observer Force in,he Golan Heights. Its job was to keep the israelis and the rians at peace. There were 1280 troops in that, alonwi 66 unarmed observers. And of course, there was United Nations interim force lanon, another armed peacekeeping effort of 5931 armed troops and 88 unarmed un. So observers, 25 of whom were americans it too, was under chapter six. Why . They were all organized under chapter reveals the uns hesitation to avoid seven Peace Enforcement require even when that might been a better configuration. Next let this is a this is a picture where we were organized and spread out across the area. We ranged from beirut, the north to cairo in the to oman and jordan in the east. And syria in the northeast. And jerusalem, of course, in the central area. And also had their hands full, keeping all those things together. Next slide, please. Most of the american observers were in lebanon in 1978 prior to the