Transcripts For CSPAN2 Book Discussion On Before The First S

Group. President s that have had key advisers, the kissingers, the brzezinskis, the cheneys that sort of dominate the advice in one way or another. President s that have used their cabinet. President s that rely on the National Security council or a handful of trusted adviser. So the analysis, the intelligence which has sometimes been good and sometimes catastrophic in misjudging events and how that has led us to a decision. I talk about president ial decisions in the book, whats going through the president s mind . Is there a degree of emotion . Is there Something Else thats happening . Did this catch him by surprise, or is there something beyond just the cool and cold analysis that leads to that decision . Also the strategy thats created. Before you even decided decide p onto a battlefield, i can tell you from a military generals point of view, tell me what you want me to do. You know, i was a student at the National War College as a lieutenant colonel, and we had a representative from Congress Come to speak by the name of newt gingrich. And newt said to us someday some of you will rise to higher rank, youll be generals, and your political masters are going to tell you go do this, attack this, you know, intervene here. He said, it is critical for you to ask this question, and then what . You know . Now think about iraq. We went in and the mission was to take out saddam. We did in three weeks. We stayed there for ten years. You know, okay, mr. President , saddam is gone. And then what . You know, so the same thing this afghanistan. Get alqaeda. Well, we didnt Pay Attention to the mission, and alqaeda beat feet into pakistan. Now alqaedas gone, and were standing there in the middle of afghanistan. And then what . Were still there. You know . And so if you dont see this clearly through, if the political objectives are not clear, you get into mission creep, the military doesnt understand what theyre supposed to do, we get bogged down in missions like nation building that may be unintended in some way. Theres another part of this now thats become more critical important as weve gone on. Its what i call in the book the battle of the narrative. You know, the enemy now has become very sophisticated. Look at isis, you know . Look at how they handle social media, how they dominate the media. These horrific scenes of beheadings and atrocities, near general side. That plays to a certain genocide. That play toss a certain audience. There is a battle that goes on to make the case that youre right and just. Theres a battle of the narrative that goes on that says to the American People, i want you behind me. I call this in the book the my fellow american speech. The bully pulpit. Some of us may be old enough to remember the fireside chats. Im not, way before my time, but my father told me about em. [laughter] but, you know, we have had great communicators as president , people that could make the case, president s that were willing to make the decision, then explain it to the American People as best he can to try to gape their confidence. In doing to try to gain their confidence. In doing the research for the book, i talked to a number of president ial advisers, and i just want to talk about one example. And i had talked to a cabinet member that was very close to president reagan during the reagan administration. And reagan was faced with his decision to go into granada, if you remember that. Now, the beirut bombing had just occurred and, of course, the administration was getting slammed. What were we doing in beirut, troops just sitting there . This was horrific, 240 some marines be can others that we ma reaps that we lost there marines that we lost there. And the stomach for going into a place like grenada just wasnt there. And this cabinet member or cabinet head told me the president was given the advice, mr. President , do not go into granada. This is the worst thing you could do right now. Youll never sell it to the American People, and its going to be politically damaged. And he told me the president turned around and said is there a potential for american lives to be in danger . And the Intelligence Officer that was briefing said, sir, theres some american medical students that could be at risk. He said, then the decision is clear, we go in. No if, ands and buts. My job is to explain it to the American People. But he had a clear purpose in mind, you know . However politically difficult it might be, there was a higher order that went into his Decision Making. You know, rightly or wrongly. In this case it was the risk to americans, you know . American interests, but more than that, american lives that might be at risk. This battle of the narrative now has become significant. I was doing an assessment in iraq and afghanistan for the generals out there, this was after i retired several years ago, and i was amazed to see something i didnt want see in my i didnt see in my time on active duty. There were actually staff sections that did nothing but work the narrative, the message. You know, were in a communications battle now, and its not just at the operational level, but its at the strategic level. Its not only you versus your potential adversary, its you versus the political opposition in your own country. That constantly goes on. So that communication becomes extremely necessary. Now, when the balloon goes up and weve got to commit our military, its not like you suddenly turn around and create a military. You have a military thats there. We have a military structure. What goes into making that structure . Well, during the cold war we pretty much can make some judgments. We knew what the enemy was doing, we were in an arms race. It was very expensive. Remember eisenhowers warning about the military Industrial Complex that was growing. People often quote that speech but forget the first part where he said our arms must be mighty. We were in this very expensive arms race. President eisenhower was looking at a federal budget that over 50 went to defense and National Security. Over 50 . Which means the rest had to be split up amongst other programs that were vital to our nations well being. But right now its less than 15 , and its actually going down. But what kind of military can you afford . What kind of military should you have . In an environment like this where the threats are vague, theyre hard to understand, theyre difficult to predict for our intelligence community, what do you need . I mean, where do you accept risk . This is a difficult decision for our pentagon and others. Im very critical of the process of making this decision in the book. I talk about that its not based on strategy, its usually based on political decisions. When it goes to congress to decide on which programs to fund or not to fund, its usually made on the basis of what do you make in my district . Is thats what im going to support. And so process of deciding where to take the risk, not to take the risk, what kind of military to step up and be ready, you know, remember that image of Donald Rumsfeld out there in kuwait when that soldier asked him, you know, my god, we have equipment here that cant stand up against ieds, explacive devices explosive devices. Were having to go to the junk yard and put pieces on and rumsfeld made that insensitive statement which was you go the war with the army you have. Unfortunately, its true. Now, we can adjust and adapt very quickly sometimes to what the need is, but you have to have some structure. President when the cold war really began at the end of world war ii, we decided we needed a military that could fight two wars, two major conflicts. Very expensive and engaged in a High Technology arms race with the russians and the soviet union and red china. The two wars were potentially red china and the soviet soviet union. President kennedy decided its two and a half wars, because he thought the communistinspired insurgencies around the world, the way they would engage us because nobody wants to go to nuclear war, well, now we needed this robust military created in the 60s and on into the 70s that was huge to be able to fight two and a half wars. At the end of the cold war, we said two major theaters of operation. Maybe in iran and a north korealike commitment. Right now today we could maybe do one of those in the cuts weve taken. Now, defense expensive. Id be the first one to tell you that. Affordability is a major question. We, obviously, have other parts of our society that need tending to, and we need to expend our resources on them. The big issue is where do you take the risk and judiciously apply that military force . When the decision is made to go in, beside a strategy you need another decision. What are you going tad on the ground to do on the ground . What we in the military call the operational design. Remember general petraeus said, well, were going to conduct a counterinsurgency which really means were going to rebuild afghanistan and iraq. You know, rebuilding a nation is very expensive, time consuming, takes a lot of resources and a lot of troops. And if the Political Leadership doesnt understand that, you could have us attempting to do something on the ground that the political will and the numbers of troops and the authority and the resources that are provided arent sufficient to do it. Thats what happened to us in iraq and afghanistan. That operational design has to fit the strategy. If there is no strategy, then we are going to get into the what is commonly called mission creep. You know, wars dont end the way we would like them to end as in the past where we go and seize the nations capital, defeat the enemys military forces, plant our flag, and theres a clear winner. Doesnt happen that way anymore. So how do we measure success . It could be aboard an Aircraft Carrier and declare victory and find yourself years and years still mired down in the mission that didnt get quite accomplished. So the metrics we use, how do we decide whether were winning or losing, succeeding or failing . If you dont have an operational design that fits a strategy, thats very unclear. And how do wars end . Another part of the book. Sometimes wars end in ways that create more problems. Each though theres a seeming victory even though theres a seeming victory, charlie will softens war, you know, we had a member of congress decide were going to fix the soviet union. Well give them their vietnam in afghanistan. We went into afghanistan and supported what became alqaeda, the mujahideen, and said theyll punish the soviet union, and the soviet union will be thrown out of afghanistan. What can be worse than that . Well, we ended up with the taliban and alqaeda after doing that. I was testifying for a Senate Foreign Relations Committee as we were going into iraq. I said to the committee, this is a big mistake. Its the wrong war, wrong place, wrong time. Saddam is contained, youve got a mission to get alqaeda who did us harm on 9 11, and why are we going into iraq . And i had one senator that said i dont understand you, general. What can be worse than Saddam Hussein . Well, look what we have in iraq now. You know . What do we have in iraq now . Saddam hussein was evil and bad. Can something be more evil and worse . Is were learning that lesson were learning that lesson, you know . So sometimes be careful what you wish for. The outcomes at one end could leave open a possibility of ending up in a worse situation. In the military were certainly not perfect, but i will tell you we try. We study every battle weve been in, every fight weve been in, every war weve been thrust into. We spend a lot of time on Lessons Learned. We want to understand what we did wrong, what we did right, where the threat is. We spend a lot of time trying to get it right the next time. I want you to think about this because the commitment of the military comes in two parts. Theres the military part on the ground, those boots, those troops, you know, the application of the fires and maneuver that go on. But theres a second part. Its what this book is about. Its about all the political decisions that get wrapped around that. Now, we hold dear a principle that i subscribe to and i would fight and die to protect, civilian control of the military. Thats what we need and should have in a democracy. The decision to go into war, the decision to use our military, the authority over our military should be wrested with our people and expressed through our elected representatives. Thats a principle we hold dear and, i think, is critical to our democracy. But theres an obligation that goes with that. Just like the military men and women who have to study and learn those lessons, build a career, go to school, be educated on how to prosecute at their level what goes on, where is that at the political level . Where do president s and secretaries and congressmen and women understand what they need to do . Where is the education, the Lessons Learned . Theres less and less military experience in our government can at the civilian level. So we have a mismatch. We have a mismatch in those that are required to set the strategy, the policy and the politics are not as steeped in the lessons they should learn as the military is on the ground. Theres a disconnect in many ways in how that happens. And i wrote the book just to sort of summarize this because i wanted for as much as i could inform the American People about this part of it, you can go to the book shelves in this store, and you can see the military history piece. You can pick up those books, and you can see all that is written, all the studies, all the analysis, all the history on how the fighting has gone on. You dont see many books on how the political Decision Making process went. You know, how we ended up op a battlefield on a battlefield, maybe doomed to fail right from the beginning. A flawed strategy. Well, the dominoes may fall in southeast a asia if we dont defend vietnam. You know, where we have gone in and not understood the people on the ground and the culture. Where we have gone in and not had a strategic design under which we could operate and under what the political understand what the political objectives are. So this book is about that part of it which, you know, ive seen from every side, from the battlefield all the way up to the oval office, as i say in the book. And its something we have to fix. You know, the decisions on how we spend our money, what kind of military we want, when we decide to commit it, how we build strategies and understand it, much of this has become a lost art. I say in the book where are the marshalls, where are the kennans . Where are the strategic thinkers we used to have . Weve become a reactive, transactional society. We dont understand how to look and examine as to what threatens us, where our interests are, where we should invest in and how we should react. So in summary, thats the book. That i see and right now, you know, i wrote this book a while back, obviously, by the time i got published i certainly didnt understand wed be in a situation right thousand where this could be glaringly right in front of us as we say it. But it is timely enough for us to look at this and see this process now pretty clearly in front of us. Im glad to take any questions or comments you might have too, so thank you. Yes, maam. [inaudible] going on now in the political process [inaudible] in addition to fighting for the district [inaudible] the other side says this [inaudible] absolutely, well, absolutely. I mean, it used to be that sort of thing stopped at the the wart, at our waterline. When our nation was threatened, we came together. And we found a bay to work a way to work together. We saw this in the world wars, you know, we saw this when we may have had a, you know, a Democratic Administration and a Republican Congress as we did in world war ii, and and we had mar hall who was apolitical to marshall who was apolitical to bring it together. Truman, vannedden burg, marshall, maybe different political perspectives, but certain isly saw the need to defend the United States, protect our interests, and they were able to come together. Its a poison asset atmosphere now, and that adds to the problems we have. Its another element that adds into the dysfunction in setting these sort of strategic goals. Yes, sir. Sir, as a military intellectual, might you consider leavening the political establishment by throwing your hat in the ring as a Vice President ial candidate . [applause] first question. [laughter] and second, spoken seriously and from the heart in terms of the need out there. Second, we all remember 2006 and the Biden Initiative to create three semiautonomous regions in iraq passed the senate, and then all of a sudden it was plowed under. In retrospect, might we not be heading that way or forget that. How did you see that bidengell proposal at the time, and how does it look today . Well, on the first part of your question, since my parents were married, im not eligible for political office, and so i choose not to run, you know . To be serious, i hate politics. Im apolitical. Ive given up on both Political Parties. I tried both, i didnt like either one. So thats where i come from. I mean, but on the second one, you know, this is, this is a very important question that you bring up. When i was a young second lieu tempt, my first assignment in vietnam was an adviser to the vietnamese marines. I wore their uniform, i is spoke their language. I spoke their language. I rarely saw another american. The vietnamese marines operated the entire length and breadth of the cup, and when we were in operations in areas and villages, we moved in with the people. And i mention this little slip yet in the book. I was in one village, and i was living with the village chief. And his wife had kindly prepared a meal, and it was evening, and she came to me and she said what do you want me to die for . What do you want us to die for . And i thought it was a strange question. She said, why are you here . I said, well, were going to bring democracy, free market economy, were going to make your life great. And