Twitter. Com booktv. Now on booktv, we want to introduce you to simon booker. Mr. Booker, what is your professional background . Guest well, over half a century. [inaudible] i had he always wanted me to be a so i followed in his steps when i finished school. I joined [inaudible] what year was that . Guest boy. [inaudible] 42. I finished college i stay there had a few years and then went on. Then i won a fellowship i cant get the years right. The fellowship after they took a break from the newspaper, and decided that i would join. So mr. Booker, your new book, shocking the conscious conscience what are you covering . My life. I started getting headlines when i covered the became interested. And then made it a worldwide. Where if you come up with the title shocking the conscience. Well, with the light on. My wife decided that [inaudible] and she helped me we developed. [inaudible] is it africanamerican reporter in the 40s, 50s, 60s. What was that like . Well, [inaudible] [inaudible] why do you say that . Why do you say that . Because we should have [inaudible] thats a story in itself [inaudible] the book is called shocking the conscience. Here is the cover. This is booktv on cspan2. With just a few weeks left in 2013, many publications are putting out the yearend lists of notable books. These tilingses were included in the Washington Post notable nonfiction of 2013. In brilliant blunders mistakes bay great scientist that changed our understanding of life and the universe. Astrophysicist explores how some of the most well known scientists made the discoveries. For an extended list and links to other publications, visit booktvs website. Booktv. Org. A long time familiar face to cspan viewers is on the screen here on booktv. Former new mexico governor bill richardson. Former congressman, and now author. How to sweettalk a shark. Governor richardson, where did you come up with the . Ietle. Well, i negotiate overred the years with some very bad people. The North Koreans, saddam hussein, the cubans, the sudanese, people that the u. S. Doesnt get along with. And i relieved the story of the negotiations, most of them successful on how you deal with the shark with a bad guy and how it relates to difficult negotiations at home. You know, with a spouse. When you negotiate buy a car or buy a house or a brother or sister. So its a howdo deal with people. And the essence is really you have to relate. You have to use humor. You have to connect with people. You have to know where you want to end up. You have to use decency but you also have to have a certain cultural skill. So the book is about a lot of negotiations ive had over the years as an ambassador, as a governor, as a secretary of energy. But a shark, you know, sharks are not easy to deal with. Its important that you relate to that shark to get what you want. In my case with diplomacy a political prisoner or a ceasefire or bringing peace or humanitarian work. But its a fun book because i had a very good ghost writer that worked for the daily show. Who is right back there. Its a good read. Its a fun read. And this is what im doing now. Im teaching, writing books, consulting, giving speeches. People actually are paying me to give my boring speeches. Any future for Political Office for you . Well, you never say never. Not for now. Im happy doing what im doing as a private citizen. How do you use humor when you approach the North Koreans . Well, you use humor to make the other side at ease. Most dictators are very formal. They try to intimidate you. But there are have been times where ill kid somebody about their reputation. Hey, youre known for torturing people. So ill say, where do you cut all the finger nails off for people . Where are the prisons . And they look at me and either want to kill me or laugh. And generally you make them at ease. They laugh a bit. Thats what its all about. Connecting with the other side. How to sweettalk a shark is the name of the book. Youre watching booktv on cspan2. Next examining the attack on pearl harbor. Entry to world war ii from the japanese perspective inspect is about an hour. Good evening. Thank you very much for coming. Its always a somewhat artificial situation of two people who know each other well. Husband and wife, i suppose. Fall in to the category. To do an interview in public like this, why should i ask a question that i can ask her over the breakfast table . On the other hand, one doesnt really normally discuss the Japanese Naval strategy over the breakfast table. Its as good as any opportunity to discuss it a little bit further. And one of the things that i find most interesting about the book, and revealing and possibly for many readers in this country also is that it tackles a myth about pearl harbor. And one of the myths is which was, of course, very much encouraged in the postwar period not only the japanese themselves but the American Administration is that japan had been hijacked by the militarist and the civilians really were not to blame for what happened. It it was a kind of militarist cue, and the japanese people ab and the emperor himself were really sort of duped by the militarist embarking this reckless adventure. What would you say to that particular myth . It was a very easy and convenient myth. It disengaged quite a few people who were actually responsible in reality and of course for the japanese nation as well to think that the war could have been averted was too painful a question to ask, i think. And that was sort of selfperpetuating myth. That the japanese themselves took to after the war. In your book, you also describe why its wrong to think of it in term of the civilians being duped. Because some of the civilians politicians, not least the Prime Minister so much of the time was actually foe a large extent responsible for what happened. Even though he thought it would lead to a disaster. Can you Say Something about that . Right. The fact Decision Making responsibility was shared between civilians and the military is hard to sort of imagine. Because people take it for granted that the military took over. But it was no the the case. Because the leaders actually met over 70 times in the one year up to the pacific war and discussed the alternatives and different steps to be taken, and those conferences were called liaison conferences. And it was not for anything that was called because it was function was to civilian and military strategies and policies and create sort of a unified voice. So civilian poll additions cant say they didnt really have any say. They did have equal say in the conferences. So they got along with it even though they had a great i think it happened other a course of period which they gradually them in to thinking we can say this much. Theres some kind of diplomatic breakthrough will happen and well sort of notify all the steps they were taking. And its going on. I think the military leaders have to put up a old front to preserve their face and to appease younger who are strategizing and thinking always about expanding this fear of influence and there was also an rivalry. The navy and the army were always fighting with each other for, you know, bigger budget. And i think the navy and army within themselves were very much guided in to different sympathies. So you cant really talk about the military voice as one. Thats another which is that theres always tremendous consensus on the one hand, on the surface, theres consensus. But actually behind the scenes there was tremendous rival i are. It was power bargaining. I was trying to escapes me. Theres a japanese expression for the top guys being driven by the middleranking people who were more radical. [inaudible conversations] yes. Could you explain . I think the translation would be Something Like retainers does that make sense . Does that sound . Okay. Relatively the lord complete authority and principle but actually weak and sort of driven in to a more radical position by hot heads who were in the middle. It justifies our power as well by indicting leaders as ineffective basically. So i think throughout the 30s especially in the beginning of this [inaudible] up to february, 1963, i think they were driven by a desire to innovate the japanese poetry. And also to strengthen the system. Everything was done in the name of salvaging influences that japan under tremendous economic strain and economic cannot be separated in this period. Like any other part of the world. So i think there were a hotblooded soldiers ready to mobilize perceived bit leaders who had to be appeased. There was also a state of fear about what could happen to them as well. Which is also, again, rather destroy the other myth of japan as a sort of society which on the one hand has some truth. And the other hand the authorities were often not really in control. And you mentioned the 1936 may not meaning to clear to everybody. The admiral and the general and so on were sympathetic to the young for the more conservative members of the establishment including the imperial household. They went too far. They didnt disagree with necessarily but didnt like the means. And so this was a clear case of young people in the middle rajivs ranks driving people in authority in to positions they may not wanted to be. Right. I think the fact that the emperor saw effective by the experience of the failed coup which nearly toppled him is important too. The kind in 1936 i didnt say anything. But it also speaks for the fact that he thought that [inaudible] which is in the constitution as clear as he claims. The idea [inaudible] they could have made a case if he was badly advise z and would have replaced him with his one of the brothers. One of the brothers who was younger brothers. Which was much more radical. Yes. Popular he was an army officer. What about the other which is the japanese duped by the militarist is the sort of main stream. The rightwing nationalist, which is still here is that trapped in to sort of forced in to attacking pearl harbor. They were surrounded by western colonial powers. The a, b, c, d, my country were involved in this. The americans forced their hand by the famous. Right. The abc [inaudible] a somewhat classic explanation for many of the more origins there. I think world war i complaib complained about it very much. I think it was very much on the japanese mind adds as well. The fact that the wartime government made use of that narrative gave a speech on the day of the pearl harbor attack that japan was reduck reluctantly. Who was a Prime Minister. Prime minister. Japan entered the war. Reluctantly despite all the nations past efforts of trying to achieve peace in east asia. It went hand and hand the cause of the japan nieces were taken by the sort of the effect abused. But was quite useful at the time as well. And useful to make them believe themselves they were fight forking the right cause too. I think the marriage was quite strong. Who would really want to die for the war . You want to believe that and, if you were ordinary citizens with our much [inaudible] information about the china role or about japanese imperialism, i dont think its hard to imagine how apeopling that narrative might have been. It had a kernel of truth to it. Its true, unlike nazi germany, japan was fighting the war against other imperial power. And george was one person who actually criticized the u. S. Diplomacy in retrospect and said they should have recognized japanese interests more than they did it was a little late in the game, and but you cannot one sort of can understand why it was felt they had their rights and empire just as the europeans had their empire. And so we are not triggering that and not even in the mediumterm causes of war. It had more to do with japanese ambition and earlystage our rivalries in the control of china as well that its competing against the United States as well. And this is the military mindset that perhaps this reckless war could also be wrong. And in the past we had some of these powers, like teddy roosevelt, where the japanese beat the russians as well. And they talked about the plucky japanese and soviet redish. And it could be seen as a kind of nonaddressed issue. And we americans kind of relate to that. Absolutely. The fact that this operation is also surprising. The soviets dont seem to make as much of a myth about the surprise of the stealth and sleek nature of the attack. I think that it has to do it being so dramatic and all that america was doing, when attack on its soil, it was a heavily populated japanese island. And i think that it just became part of the american psyche and the connective historical narrative in a sort of departed significant. So what does that play with john tower and amongst the others . And we did not necessarily can tell in this attack on pearl harbor. His analysis is that one of the reasons that the americans were so shocked by this event, and so outraged, the idea of infamy in such. Was that it played into this and you see it in so many western movies, the treacherous indians, the brave pioneers. And then suddenly we have these redskins screeching war cries and i think that in his analysis, i think it was part of this and that was one that is part of an explanation and it exactly that. It is the treacherous attack. Was it meant to be treacherous . Or was it a screwup . There is a huge debate about who is responsible with communicating the responsibility of this. But the fact that the deleted document didnt specify and that it was not a declaration of war. And you cannot really argue the stealth of the attack has remained in this treacherous nature and we are not being affected. The fact that he had this and could model this, it had something to do with the anomaly of it. There is something to be said about the comparison to the indians were the native american. The redskins. [applause] in movies. They have not been at the breakfast table. It speaks for the disproportionate asymmetrical nature of the welfare that was being forged. And i think thats why after 9 11 it was tempting for people to use this analogy of the attack, feeling much like pearl harbor, and we have had very under resource power to undertake this giant momentarily. So i think that that is part of it. Perhaps to carry on slightly from what we were talking about before. Another analysis is part of this, the japanese intellectuals , one particular who is not with us. Ending up with being a nationalist. His face was the hundred year war. And that pearl harbor was part of a wall or actually started in the 1860s when japan was opened up for this. And then ever since we had been fighting back against the western dominance. Is there truth to that . Well, yes, if you look at the whole history in terms of cultural crash, that is just you are attempting this spleen the political events that took place in the meantime and reduce everything to these views. Of course, these things affect ones thinking and acts as part of the mind. But we cant really say this because of the racism. Of course, we can disquiet individual beliefs and how people might have reacted to different situations and how others may have held onto certain beliefs more strongly than the others. It doesnt explain this. And i can see how it could be tempting. My role here is to be the right wing japanese nationalists. [applause] so why didnt this work we met what do they think what was the hope . Because even the mastermind of the attack on pearl harbor, the general who had been a harvard and the u. S. Embassy in washington, he knew the west very well and he was a very sophisticated man who wanted the government and in several occasions it was a very reckless thing to do. And i know that he was a gambling man and he was a vain enough to think he was the man to do it if anyone. But what do they hope to get out of that . It was a gamble. And they felt that they had been ordered into the situation and they justified it in terms of this that something diplomatic could be worked out after infecting a great deal of damage on the United States. But even though the war was being declared and they expect the american side to applaud japan like diplomatic solutions. So japan itself did not have any exit plan. Shock and awe . Right. Shock and ill tell you that japan also didnt have an exit plan there either. And it was because of Theodore Roosevelt and his intervention in peacemaking efforts, it was not a straightforward thing. Japanese almost went bankrupt. They were bailed out by a banker in new york who had escaped this in russia and was no friend of the russians. And White Russian officers who were there taken prisoner by the japanese introduced us and many of them then put two and two together and we have to keep them on our side as the conclusion. Which is why theyre used to handing over the jews to the nazis when they requested it. And i think we are getting close to question time. That last question that i have, perhaps, and i think im right in saying that in America Pearl harbor has become this mythical occasion and people think of this in world war ii and pearl harbor is not the first thing from my. No, it is not. I think that it would be the first things that come to mind, and also bombings of every major city which tend to be forgotten and not discussed. And i think that that experience is part of it. But its almost been 70 years and that sort of is a collective experience and so we have a strong attachment, including ms. , aside from the fact that its part of this. There may be another reason. And we havent really discussed it. Which is why so many japanese intellectuals, often people are not fascists or militarists applauded the attack in the the summer of 1941. Partly because they have been fighting china even though japan was liberating asia and they have been fighting china and getting deeper into what is known as the quagmire and people felt rather many people felt embarrassed, i think. By this. Especially if more people think about world war ii, they know more about the atrocities that we know about pearl harbor. So a lot of intellectuals felt that at last we are fighting this and this is the war we should have been fighting to begin with and not our fellow agents. Thats right, quite a few of them had firsthand experience and that is why we have this complex. Those are always the worst. Yes, they are. This includes people to study abroad in this issue as well. And its a bit like this, like Daniel Ortega in berkeley, california. But i think perhaps we could open it up to questions. And i will field the questions. We have a microphone set up on either side. So i call and you and please identify yourself. And you can address this with your question well start with the gentleman over here. Hello, i am from Stony Brook University and the worst dressed person here. [laughter] i have a coupl