Spinning off like particles, but having an unfortunately galvanizing force for economic and political and social instability in many more parts of the world. Thank you. [applause] thank you very much, professor shelley. We now from the carnegie endowment, they have a central subject of the book is the role of corruption, how corruption is an enabler, facilitator, and you cannot really understand transnational crime without paying attention to the broader issue of corruption. You have been studying corruption in detail in india and elsewhere. What are your reactions to some of those points that professor shelley raises . Sure. Thanks, everyone, for coming. I first want to thank moises for asking me to comment on this wonderful book, you know . The book is about terrorism, organized crime of which i know nothing about, and only under generous definition do i know anything about corruption, so thank you for including me. I want to make a couple of points on the question that you raised about the link with corruption. Before i do that, let me just Say Something quickly about the book which is that this is an incredible read. It was kind of overwhelming when i was reviewing the manuscript this week how much material is packed into these pages. There were three things that i really enjoyed about this. One is the meticulous research. By my count some of the chapters individually have more than 250 footnotes themselves, so a tremendous amount of work which has gone into this on a wide range of subjects. The second is, i think, one of the most important narratives that louise has presented is this idea that the nexus between criminality and terrorism is not just a problem that one can constrict to weak and or poorly governed states. There is often an interaction with the legitimate economy and well functioning states that we need to Pay Attention to. And as you rightly said, theres a tendency sometimes for those of us in the west to think this is a problem which doesnt involve our systems. And you make a very persuasive case that it does, whether its our Financial System or Information Technology systems and so on. The second the third thing i liked about this book is her focus on, as she put it, the business of terrorism. That she provides an Industrial Organization of terrorism if you think of it as an economist, and it reminded me a lot of this fabulous study on the siciliano mafia where theyre treated as a firm and talks about the way in which its structured and tries to vertically integrate its operation to take advantage of certain business opportunities. So congratulations to you on all of that. Let me now throw out a couple of points, some of these are questions about corruption. You make a strong case in the book which i think seems totally right on the money which is that corruption is both a facilitator as well as an underlying cause of both crime and terrorism. But it struck me that its actually much more comply catted complicated that even that, because corruption also can impede the response to crime and terrorism we care about. So when you talk about the eight deadliest terrorist attacks of the 2000s, one of those was the attacks which took place in mumbai, which many of us remember watching those famous images of the hotel going up in flames. And i remember when i was in india doing field work, i was struck by some of the investigative reports that came out of that, why the response of Law Enforcement was so poor. Part of it had to do because of corruption in the procurement processes for bulletproof vests which actually werent bulletproof. And so it was a sham order for vests that were not of sufficient quality, and Police Actually felt like they didnt want to put their lives as risk because they didnt have proper gear. So thats a new element, i think, of the story which makes this dirty entanglement even more complicated. The we second is how we think at measurement of corruption. And you make the point that when we get to definitions of corruption, things are quite squishy, which i agree. We tend to go with the very standard definition of corruption being, you know, the abuse of Public Office for private gain, and thats not always help 68. And were helpful. And were stymied by the fact that theres no definition or measure. I think weve actually made some headway here, and its a matter of thinking outside the box and scaling up some of these out of the box ways of thinking. Just to mention a few that academics have come up with in recent years, there is the famous measure looking at unpaid diplomatic parking tickets in new york city by diplomats at the u. N. , right . Theres no enforcement, you never have to pay, so why is it that the most corrupt countries rack up more tickets than anybody else, right . Sweden has very few tickets, and the ones they do get, they pay right away. The second is actually physically measuring corruption in the ground. So theres been some very interesting work by economists who have gone around the world and looked at highways being built and roads being built and taken engineers and dug down to see what the quality of a road is. One could actually scale up, perhaps our aid agencies should be doing. Now, there are lots of caveats that only apply to one measure, but its a real measure, its not a perceptionbased measure. This last interesting measurement, as you mentioned the Illicit Trade in antiquity. So some very interesting work which has been done looking at the amount of exports of antiquities from countries where those products derive and the imports from those countries which are mainly in the west. Now, those two dont often match up, and you can look at the mismatch between importing and exporting countries to figure out what that difference is and dig deeper into those. So i think there are a number of interesting ways that we can track both corruption and crime incidents, but its just we havent gotten our act together, those of us who work with agencies who could fund and support that kind of work. Let me make two final points on the kind of so what, what do we do about this. One reason on the one hand, your book is quite depressing because a lot of these entanglements are so complicated, and one of the measures that we often fall back on is transparency. That if we shed sunlight, right, which we often think is the best kiss infectant disinfectant, we can bring a lot of these dirty entanglements out into the open. While transparency may be a worthy cause to pursue on its own merits, its not always the panacea we hope it will be. And part of my work looking at politicians and Political Parties who engage in corrupt activities in india which is, granted, one case but i think there are many other cases which are very similar is that its not as if common man or the common voter doesnt have information about the corrupt or illicit activities of these politicians. In many cases theyre voting for them or supporting them precisely on those grounds. So in other words, its not an information failure which is creating this suboptimal outcome or this accountability failure. Its really a governance failure which means that the solution to that is much, much harder. So i think we need to be careful about how much transparency is going to get us in some of these cases. The final point is one about priorities, that the dirty entanglements bring in so many different sectors, attributes, issues. If i were a policymaker thinking about how to tackle this, i would really feel like i want to throw up my hands, because i i wouldnt know where to start. And i think there are two potential negative outcomes i see. One is that we maybe overplay our hands and engage in threat inflation. So when pakistan really hit the news over the last ten years, theres a lot of attention put on madrassas and how they can be conveyor belts for terrorism. Yet theres actually been a lot of work to say that was totally overblown, that less than 1 of schools in pakistan are actually madrassas, that theyve been increasing over time, theyve actually been increasing not been increasing in term obviously their share of the overall education system, both public, private and madrassas have been kind of moving at the same pace. So, you know, are we at danger, at risk of overplaying our hand by seeing all of these linkages . And the second is an issue about mission creep, that if we justify attacking corruption or inefficiencies in procurement or in permitting or in licensing, are we going to create more problems for ourselves . So, you know, i was thinking about this again coming back to the pakistan example is weve justified a lot of our civilian assistance to pakistan on the basis of security objectives, whether its nuclear weapons, whether its terrorism, whether its crime. But then we expect our civilian aid to help us deliver on some of those outcomes when really we should be conditioning perhaps security aid on security outcomes and civilian aid on more civilian outcomes. So if we go to the mat on everything saying this has a security dimension, this has a security dimension, one could make the case that, you know, the world banks doing business as a National Security dimension, are we at risk maybe of misaligning what we want to get out of this and the way in which we talk about these in policy circles . So those are just some thoughts and some questions for you overall on the corruption front. But thank you so much for this opportunity. Great. Very good questions. Would you like to give it a shot, a quick answer about things . I think to look at the unidimensional aspect of corruption on the ground is needed, but its just part of a larger issue that we need to be talking about which is right with [inaudible] who has been such a presence in thinking about global issues financially. What were also looking at in terms of corruption is the Massive Movement of funds outside of many of these countries. Just as before we came here we were talking about remittances and how much are actually going on. But we dont have an idea of how much resources sometimes we do, but not in its totality of how much has left much of the developing world. And i think that thats a very central element of corruption that deserves much more attention, because its one of the things that is most undermining development. While remittances may be helping promote them or having a countervailing force with money leaving, with incredibly corrupt leadership in much of the world. Thank you. Your questions and comments, please. Just tell us who you are and if you have an institution affiliation, please recognize im from bangladesh, and over many years im teaching in the madrassas and in the islamic schools. I have a question. You stated about nonstate a actors nonstate actors, they are the elements we should always watch out for, and i agree with you on that point. What about the state actors aiding the nonstate actors . As an example, i give you two. In mumbai, the people who did the massacre, they all came from pakistan, we know, and it has been proven. What can you do about that . Talk about Osama Bin Laden had been living in a containment area surrounded by many military installations and intelligence installation, and you think nobody knew about that . So [inaudible] the middle east and african countries also, they are the state actors which are facilitating the nonstate actors, and one of the things that we really forget is its not only bad money, it is also Charity Money which is allowed in islam like 2. 5 of [inaudible] as a charity in good faith. Where the money goes, we dont know. Hadiha can be hunted person, and all around the world [inaudible] where does the money go . We tried to do research on this in our country, and we could not locate we could locate where 70 of money dose, but beyond that, we could not locate where the money quos. So this is the thing i request you comment on. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. In come pressing my remarks on this incredibly complex book, i did not talk about the relationship between the state and nonstate actors, but that is certainly present. In fact, the example that you gave of the mumbai bombings and the relationship between the state and the terrorists is in the book. And there are many, many other examples of this. And thats part of what i think of in discussing this corruption, is that its not just a financial corruption, but its a corruption of the functions of the state. Because in many of the societies and parking lots of the world parts of the world, it is not just the state cooperating with terrorists, its the state cooperating or being coopted by transnational criminals, drug traffickers and others. And thats one of the factors that is undermining the state and undermining the credibility of the state with many people in the world. And i think there are many topics that need to be explored. I do mention in the book about the requirement of the believing muslims to contribute their contributions. But im not in a position to contribute to that research that youre doing, but i think thats very important for many people to be understanding and following the money trails. Would you like to [inaudible] no, i think louise, let me ask you the following. Its quite obvious, i think, and you make a persuasive case in the book that terrorists fund their operations through their illicit activities, the smuggling and all kinds of criminal activities. The terrorists get the money from illicit deals, its obvious. What is less obvious is why should illicit traffickers that are in it not are in it in the money. As you yourself said, they are business people. And if you are running a business organization, you dont want to amplify your risks by getting entangled with terrorists. You have enough having to play cat and mouse with the authorities and the police and the drug Law Enforcement and Drug Enforcement organizationings. So why organizationings. So why if you are running a criminal cartel, why would you get entangled with criminals . That would not be a very Smart Business decision. Well, thank you for bringing up this point, because its part of what i discuss in the first part of the book, is how the nature of crime and terrorism has changed and why criminals and terrorists cooperate now more than they did in the past. In the days of the mafia like what you were talking about in your reference to diego gambeta, the mafia grew along with the italian state after world war ii because it got contracts from the state. It didnt just make money doing Drug Trafficking and extortion, it got a lot of state contracts. And it was not in its interest to collaborate with terrorists. But now many of the transnational organizations, criminal organizations are operating in states that dont really have the capacity to provide them contracts, that have the capacity to control them. And so they are happy to engage with terrorists because its good for business. And terrorists that in the postcold war era have less support from states than in the past, have become much more dependent on criminal activity to support their activities. And its very interesting, if youre reading a lot of the bios of foreign fighters who are joining isis, how many of them have criminal activities and criminal records in their past. So theres a convergence of these two phenomena which is very much a change in the nature of the state, where transnational crime groups are based and what is the state capacity. As ron was talking about, because of corruption to deal with these organizations. Thank you. Sir. Hi. My name is [inaudible] thank you for the picture that you drew on the business of terrorism. I would just like to address the matter of foreign fighters thats working today with isis, of course. They seem to not really fall under any category. Like, theyre not motivated by theyre not living under corrupt governments, etc. , so i really have my question basically is, and some dont even have criminal records. My question is what really motivates those people . Is it always ideology in terms of globalization, of course . Is it always ideologies, or is it Something Else . Thank you. I think its a very complex issue, and it deserves much more study. But part of it is thatmany of the youth, as i mentioned some of them who are living in western europe are youth who find themselves because some of them are children of immigrants to be youth without futures, that they dont find themselves having the same opportunity structures as people who are from nonimmigrant families. And this is an enormous source of frustration to them. But as the article in the New York Times was talking about today on tunisia, tunisia still, like many societies in north africa, has enormous problems of corruption, and that is galvanizing youth who are seeing through prop began ca that this propaganda that this Islamic State of isis is supposed to be less corrupt. And theres also some of the same element of what has galvanized Youth Engagement with terrorism before, is that they are seeking to resolve some inadequacies that they have had in their personal lives, and this is what some of this extremely successful recruitment is based on. Its to fulfill some internal needs, and thats why i talk about this of a marketing that youre not just recruiting anybody to do this kind of video and recruitment, but individuals who know how to do this sort of psychological outreach. Sir. [inaudible conversations] id like to come back to the definitional issue and see if either of you have Something Better than the standard one. But im interested in whether in your research as you see these issues play out you think there are some kind of ideal types of corruption, syndromes of corruption. Michael johnson talks about the difference between the way they play out in an authoritarian society versus one in which theres tribal or pluralistic competition, and then you mentioned the democratic Financial Systems. Whether its important that we identify very different types in order to get at what the causal structure would be and the solutions. What may work in one type may not work so well in another type. Thank you. I think thats very important. I think that all corruption is not the same. But i think one of the very serious mistakes that we made in going into afghanistan was to perceive that corruption is normal in that society and that people will then be, you know, tolerant of high levels of corruption and government administration. And i