And china. We split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on u. S. And chinese strategy and interest in the asiapacific region, and also u. S. China military to military issues. In the next panel will cover economics, global issues and politics. Scott kennedy will share that session. We had a number of participants who helped to write the papers or joined us in study groups to review the papers so this is a representative group, claiming that anyone who is involved but some of the key authors for each of the papers were going to address in the panels. Bonnie glaser, my colleague at csis and director by China Project will talk about the asiapacific papers. Were going to ask that panelists not to summarize the papers but identify between the american and chinese papers the issues of convergence, divergence and some recommendations. My friend zhu feng were present on the asiapacific strategy issue after bonnie. Then will ship to the military relationship. David finkelstein and Zhang Tuosheng from the Chinese Foundation for International Security studies will address the areas of convergence divergence and implications of what we identified and analyzed in military spheres. As doctor hanley said, we endeavor to make these papers that would be based on the u. S. National interest and u. S. Strategy, on our side, and on the Chinese National interest and change strategy on the chinese side. We did these in consultation with each other, meaning that for example, on the asiapacific paper bonnie and i and with zhu feng and his colleagues talked about how to structure the papers of what themes we would try to address that we were clear about several things. We had no veto over the other side paper. It had to be honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that countries perspective. We informed and talked to our government by the u. S. Government and Chinese Government did not review or approve these papers. They are independent. We are all independent scholars, and so what we presented is not u. S. Are Chinese Government policy. But we think it represents a pretty goodbout how these issues argued in each country. Of course are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the United States but we had for each of these papers three authors of the american psycho three authors on the chinese side, and a group of summer between six and 15 other experts who weighed in. On the asiapacific paper, for example, and he thinks is a to a sudden for the mr. Crapo, there was an awful lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological and functional spectrum pics of quite interesting. Between u. S. And chinese papers, there was some common themes. One was that we should strive to avoid becoming adversaries. That was consistent for both sides. There was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build patterns of cooperation the twin the u. S. And china where we can on every area, military, asiapacific issues and so forth. And many of the papers concluded that the United States and china need a substantive, honest and farreaching Strategic Dialogue where each side doesnt cover up its fundamental interest or concerns and presents those and goes from there to see what can be done. There are obvious structural and strategic differences that come out of these papers. It is not differences that can be solved with a different six character label or 140 character tweet or whatever you choose. They are fundamental, structural. They are historically we spent a lot of time on the history of these issues for our countrys. For example, there are between the two papers on the asiapacific some different assumptions about the future orientation of the Korean Peninsula. Its not discriminate on tactics. There are some fundamental structural issues about the u. S. And china each of you the Korean Peninsula and where its going in the longer term. There are some fundamental differences in terms of the South China Sea on the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan and the philippines and easton South China Seas, about what it means to influence control, denial, lisa this is not small issue. It were differences about how strong american alliances should be, very basic differences. Not so much about the validity by hostile should be alliances be in asia. They were differences about what china should be doing to assert its sovereignty. Not challenges over sovereignty but what china should be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. There were big differences on both sides, i think they will say more about what constitutes a reasonable and acceptable level of defense capabilities. I dont think either side drew that yardstick exactly the same, visavis the other side. There were differences about how we should think about the future structure or order of east asia. There was more enthusiasm on the chinese side of some kind of bipolar u. S. China arrangement or condominium to manage the future of asia. There was much less enthusiasm on the u. S. Side but even within the two side there was some debate and disagreement. Im going to let my colleagues go into more detail on these areas, and just conclude for now by saying i think when you read the papers, youll find that these, papers that sort of stand the test omenot based on todays or tomorrows news about the g20 or the north korea problem, although we can talk about that. And in some ways they made a very strategic model for useful dialogue would look like and to address each side of no interest in find ways to minimize consultation cooperation but be realistic about some pretty fundamental differences that weve unearthed. So with that i will turn over to bonnie and then zhu feng to address the asiapacific paper. Let me quickly add we printed out as many papers ever thought wed have audience, this being fourth of july week. We were short about a 2 short. This is online as well and so you can get it online and check it out in chinese and english i think. So with that, bonnie, thank you. Thanks, mike. And this is a very interesting project. I would urge you all to read newspapers very carefully, and its a privilege to be part of this. We have a very short period of time, each speaker comes on discoid hit on some highlights and that if theres time for q a we can go into greater detail. First on some of the convergences and divergences. Both of the papers on asiapacific security say that there is a need for a rulesbased order to so thats a good start that we should have rules, but, of course, there are differences over not only what those rules should be but whether or not the International Community is likely to allow, even welcome chinas participation in the process of shaping the rules. So he was paper is quite clear on that score. It says that america is not calling on china, simply sign of the rosetta been written in the past but understands the International Community will draw these rules together. The chinese paper is very skeptical of the u. S. Willingness to do that here it says whose rules are these, how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation, et cetera. So a lot of suspicion and i think you find throughout the chinese paper and asiapacific security that there is a lot of skepticism about u. S. Willingness to include china. Even though i would underscore that i think the current administration, Prior Administration had welcomed china to be responsible stakeholder in this rulesbased order, and that goes back at least as far of course as the george w. Bush administration who coined that phrase. Secondly as Regional Security architecture and alliances, and the chinese paper very much contends that the u. S. Alliance system is increasingly targeting china and calls for the United States to give up that attempt to build the sort of antichina coalition. And it states china favors an open and inclusive Security System rather than alliancebased system but china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. So a little bit of ambiguity there, so whether all to make alliances can be part of the system, but it does come at the bottom line is you estimate of my system can coexist with increasingly influential china in the region is the u. S. Gives up that effort. Now, for the u. S. , this paper doesnt portray in any way the alliances as aimed at china and it talks about the allies as the basis of our regional position. It lists several threats that alliances are trying to do with such as of course north koreas emerging missile and nuclear capabilities, talks about terrorism maritime complex. A very different discussion of alliances. When i was at the rollout in may in china, the chinese version of this, madame talked about chinas concern about alliances in the Regional Security architecture. So i think this really is a difference that the u. S. And the chinese have about whether or not the alliances should be part of this rulesbased order Going Forward. Third, both identify areas of concern for the much the same as you would expect. You have north korea, taiwan maritime issues. On north korea the u. S. Paper claims china doesnt recognize the new level of threat posed by the kim jongun regime. I think as we center today, events that transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. The United States is i think incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north korea. Very upset about how u. S. Citizens are being treated and, of course, the most recent being the very tragic death of otto warmbier. So i think that the chinese paper in some ways recognizes the danger but insists the problem just cant be addressed through sanctions alone, that diplomacy is necessary. But i do since a real gap between the two countries in terms of their assessment of the urgency. The u. S. Paper has some interesting policy recommendations in this regard calling for not only more dialogue but very specifically on things like noncombatant evacuation operations, interdiction of north koreas weapons proliferation, closing loopholes in sanctions. The chinese paper honestly doesnt any of these very specific areas of potential cooperation, and i would underscore the need for discussions on Crisis Response in the event of instability in north korea and that something the u. S. Has tried to do with china for several administrations as well. There are solutions that are put forward by both sides come and want to highlight again some of the convergences and divergences and comment on them. Both insist on peaceful resolution come dispute supporting military conflict. Ws paper focuses much more than the chinese paper on the need to manage differences. Of course we would note that xi jinping does talk quite a bit about managing our differences so i think thats a common position. Both papers, canada Strategic Dialogue on major issues and asia pacific region. The chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between china and the u. S. Led alliance system. This is Something Interesting and we should recall that there has been consideration in the past for examples of a trilateral u. S. Japanchina dialogue which was supposed to take place in june 2009, for various reasons did not. So should be considered once again ways that make an offer china reassurances about alliances engage in baby trilateral dialogue . On a couple of final comments on the divergences in terms of their recommendations. As mike mentioned the chinese authors did not rule out a g2. They say either a g2 or through other forms of Security Cooperation china and u. S. Need to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. I think that would be a very, very difficult thing to do. I dont know if we can establish a joint vision that certainly the u. S. Paper and i think reflecting mainstream views in the u. S. , rule out such a g2 arrangement. The u. S. Paper says that washington is not interested in any sort of condominium that implies an exclusive great power relationship. And finally the chinese paper continues to call for adhering to the components of the new type of great power relationsh relationship. It says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and winwin cooperation. Accurately reflecting the Late Obama Administration as well as where the Trump Administration has come to after its for several months in power, that americans in general dont like a Bumper Sticker phrase, and there continues to be enormous discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations, including the components. The use shares the goal of avoiding conflict, but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create spheres of influence, and that could be potentially destabilizing to the region. So on that area i think there is some disagreement, and i look forward to okay, thanks, mike, for your leadership. [inaudible] looking for long, more importantly, and pressed me and encourage me as in the past two and half years so we are working together, thinking together to of course and then come up with reports, no matter how but its reflection, some sort we share the spirituality, share the vision, have the Regional Security can evolve in a way lets say compatible with the both sides. A couple things i like to pick up responding to bonnies actual presentation. First of all, of course divergence and convergence, some sort of reality so we need getting to some sort of very accurate reality checking. We consider some sort of accuracy of reality checking to get back to the history, so that way use history as some starting point and then we will find u. S. Has been a very positive security inquiry in the region. No matter how China Matters in terms of power, i think of longrun china benefit a lot from americas very steady and a very constructive regional ponderings. That kind of reality is a big one bearing on the chinese side. Second, i think of course if we look at the current some sort of a potential, lets say, risk where causing some sort of collision between the two powers, then whats the leading element to create or drive back the divergences then we have to say its not a status driven, its an issue driven. So yes, there is a lot of speculation across asia, for example, the moment, the leading challenge is that china is coming after the hegemonic transition. I had to say its a fallacy. Yes, some Chinese Nationalists paranoia way they see it that way, so then you read some sort of recently published book. Its called everything under then china may think some sort of china leadership very, very simply from a historical perspective. I think that for most of the chinese come well educated scholars, that kind of system is totally gone. I dont think it will be spaced out, once again, in coming days. So then we will say yes, there some sort of power shift compared to 20 years ago, 30 years ago. Chinau. S. Power, such a disparity is truly very significant, significantly diminished by u. S. Remain, have a very solid hold of power, disparity. We dont think in the coming days such a power disparity will truly is getting undercut very, very tremendously. So then from the chinese perspective, yes, asiapacific area is biggest tasting grant for use china relations. A lot of interest now is in some sort of a collision, and where competing on some sort of a path taking solutions and methodologies. If we get back to some sort of central piece to behind, to be behind the strategy, then we prefer to see tom and its also very adequate and a very reasonable, it is issue driven. Its not status driven. Secondly, then where we will see some sort of assertiveness in asiapacific, of course this place is a very important testing grant as i mentioned to have a serious examination of chinas Foreign Policy reaction or we say shuffling in coming days. But from what perspective consider chinese methodology in the region remain largely, its some sort of china domestic transition race is not the power competing base, for example, north korea issues. Consider chinas policy of dprk has been very consistently been smart. Some sort of negative spillover of china in the indecisive policy with dprk. Its hard for china, a change of policy. Most important reason should be deeper into chinas factor. So before china can become some sort of very successfully transform the power, consider chided remain vulnerable at large. So then in the region, it would be some sort of way of competing place for china, to afford china some sort of inherited assertiveness. Another point is, as we consider no matter how we do emerge our strategy and power should be its not just history. We say we are oriented. Theres a lot of speculation. Overshadow power relations between washington and pyongyang, and the chinese and americans will be just a rivalry and also getting to some sort of inevitable conflict so the harvard professor also just published hes very sensationalist book called destine for war. But we dont see it that way. We consider use china we can jointly creating some sort of new modeling of power relations. Conclusively, i have to say chinese reports in the asiapacific area is also of course a very, very interesting challenge for us. On the one hand we also have to balance for some sort of chinas traditional policy narrative. But on the other hand, we also like to bring about some sort of new inspiring point. Its not easy job. I have to say mostly important to follow path on chinese site estimate how we can just envision some sort of power stories between the u. S. China in the region, but how china can overcome some sort of our shortcomings, before china could be a real popular power in the r