Perspective on the north korean policies, asianpacific securi security. Thank you very much. I am mike green Senior Vice President for asia and professor at georgetown. We had five issue papers with others for each paper on each subject from the us and china. We split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on us and chinese strategy in the asianpacific region and also us China Military issues. The next panel cover economics, global issues and politics. Scott kennedy will try that session. We had a number of participants who helped write the papers or who joined us in study groups to review the papers and this is a Representative Group with everyone involved in the key authors we will address in the panels. Buddy glaser, Senior Advisor and director of our China Project will talk about the asiapacific papers and we will ask the panelists not to summarize the papers which identify between the american issues of convergence, divergence and some recommendations. My friend from the university will present on the asianpacific strategy after bonnie and then will ship to the military relationship, david finkelstein. [inaudible] in the areas of convergence will be discussed and what we identified and analyzed in military sears. As doctor henry said, we endeavored to make these papers were based on the Us National Interest and Us National Strategy on our side and on the Chinese National and are stressed and we did these in consultation that on the asianpacific picture bonnie and i talked about how we might structured the paper and what we try to address but we were very clear about several things we had no veto over the other side, it had to be an honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that countrys perspective. We informed and talked to our government but the Us Government and Chinese Government did not review or approve these papers in their independent. We are all independent scholars and what we presented is not us or Chinese Government policy but we think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in this country. Of course there are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the United States but for each of these we had three authors on the american side, three authors on the chinese side and a group of somewhere between six15 other experts who weighed in and on the asianpacific paper for example, i think this is true on our side for the military, there was an awful lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological and functional spectrum. It was quite interesting. Between the us and chinese papers there wears a common theme. One was that we should strive to avoid becoming adversaries and that was consistent between both sites. There was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build powers of operation where we can and asianpacific issues. Many of the papers included that the United States and china need a substantive, honest and Strategic Dialogue for each side doesnt cover up its fundamental interests or concerns and presents those and goes from there to see what can be done. There are obvious strategic and structural differences the commodities papers. These are not differences that can be solved with a different six character labor on the label or a tweet or whatever you choose. They are fundamental and structural. They are historic. We spent time on the history of these issues for countries. For example, there are between the two papers on the asianpacific some different assumptions about the future orientation of the Korean Peninsula. Not just disagreement on tactics but fundamental and how we respectively review korean and where its going in the longer term. There are fundamental differences in terms of the South China Sea or the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan in the philippines. About what it means to have influence, control, the nile this is not a small issue. There were differences about how strong American Alliance should be. Very basic differences, not so much about the validity of alliances but how strong should the alliances in asia be. There were differences about what china should be doing to assert its sovereignty, not challenges over sovereignty but what china should be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. There were big differences on both sides and well talk more about what constitutes a reasonable defense capabilities. I dont think either side drew that yardstick exactly the same. There were differences about how we should think about the future structure or order of east asia. There was more enthusiasm on the chinese side about the bipolar us china arrangement, condominium to manager manage and there was much less enthusiasm on the us side but even within the two sides there was some debate and disagreement. I will let my colleagues tell you more detail on these areas and conclude for now by saying when you read the papers, i think, youll find that these are papers that stand the test of time. They are not based on todays or tomorrows news about the north korea problem or the we can talk about that. In some ways they may be a useful model about what the Strategic Dialogue would look like and how we should address each sides the mental interest and try to find ways to minimize complications but be realistic about fundamental interest is a trained interest weve unearthed. Alternate over to bonnie. Let me quickly add we printed out as many papers as we thought we would have audience and this is being fourth of july weekend and we were short about 50 short. So, this is online as well so you can get it online and check it out in chinese and in english, i think. With that, bonnie, thank you. Thanks, mike. This is a very interesting project and i would urge you all to read these papers very carefully. Its a privilege to be part of this. We have a very short period of time so im going to hit on some highlights and if there is time for q a we will go into greater detail. First, some of the convergences and divergences. Both of these papers on asianpacific security say that there is a need for a rules based order so, that is a good start. We should have rules but, of course, there are differences over not only what those roles should be but whether or not the International Community is likely to allow even welcome and sign the participation in the process of shaping the rules. So, the us paper is quite clear on that score. It says that america is not calling on china to simply sign on to the rules that have been written in the past but understands that the International Community will draw the rules of together and try to join in the process. The chinese paper is very skeptical of the us willingness to do that. It says whos rules are these, how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation, et cetera. A lot of suspicion and you find out the chinese paper in the asianpacific security that there is a lot of skepticism about us willingness to include china, even though i would underscore that the Current AdministrationPrior Administration of welcome china to be a responsible stakeholder in this rules based order and that goes back to the george w. Bush administration who coined that phrase. Secondly, as Regional Security architecture and alliances and the chinese paper very much contends that the us Alliance System is increasingly targeted china and it calls for the United States to give up that attempt to build this anti china coalition. It states that china favors an open and inclusive Security System rather than an alliance pay system but says china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. A little bit of ambiguity there so that ultimately alliances can be a part of the system but the bottom line is that the us lied Alliance System can coexist with increasingly influential china in the region if the us gives up that effort. Now, for the us, this paper doesnt betray in any way the alliances is aimed at china it talks about the allies as the basis of our regional position, it list lifts threat the allians are trying to deal with, such as, north koreas emergence in Nuclear Capabilities and terrorism and maritime complex. When i was at the rollout in may in china the chinese version of this madam talked about the concern. I think this is a difference of the us and the chinese have but whether or not the alliances should be targeted rules based order Going Forward. Third, both identify areas of concern for the much the same as you would expect. Yet north korea, taiwan, maritime issues and north korea i think the us paper claims that china doesnt recognize the new level of threat posed by the kim jongun regime and as i said here today, events have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. The United States is, i think, incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north korea. We are very upset about how us citizens are being treated and of course the most recent being the very tragic death of auto. I think the chinese recognize the danger but insist that it cant be addressed to sanctions alone and that diplomacy is needed. I do sense a gap between the two countries in terms of their assessment of the urgency. The us paper has some interesting policy regulations calling for not only more dialogue but very specifically aunt like noncombatant evacuation, interdiction of north koreas weapons proliferation, closing loopholes in the us and d sanctions and the chinese paper honestly doesnt have any of these, very specific issues of potential cooperation and i would underscore the need for discussions on Crisis Response in the event of instability in north korea and that is something that the us has tried to do with china for several administrations, as well. There are solutions that are put forward by both sides and i want to highlight again some of the convergences and divergences on a comment. Both insist on peaceful resolution of disputes avoiding military conflict. The us paper focuses much more than the chinese paper on the need to manage differences of course, we would note that weve talked about managing our differences so i think thats a common position. Both papers call for more candid Strategic Dialogue on major issues in the asianpacific region. The chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between china and the us led Alliance System. This is Something Interesting and we should recall this that there have been consideration in the past for example of a trilateral usjapan China Dialogue which was supposed to take place in june of 2009 and for various reasons did not. So, should we consider once again ways that we can offer china reassurance about our alliances engaged in trilateral dialogue. A couple of divergences between the two sides in terms of their recommendation. As mike mentioned, the chinese authors do not rule out e. G. To and they say either a g2 or through other forms of Security Cooperation china and the us need to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. I think that would be a very, very difficult thing to do and i dont know that we can establish a joint vision but certainly the us paper and i think reflecting mainstream views in the us as a g2 arrangement that the us paper says washington is not interested in any sort of condominium that applies exclusive great power relationship. Finally, the chinese paper continues to call for adhering to the component of the new type of great power relationship even though it doesnt use that phrase but it says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no competition, Mutual Respect and winwin cooperation. I think that accurately reflecting the Late Obama Administration as well as where the Trump Administration has come to after its first several months in power americans in general dont like a Bumper Sticker phrase and they continues to be an enormous discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations including the d components. We share the goal of avoiding conflict but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create spheres of influence and that could be potentially destabilizing to the region. On that area i think there is some disagreement and i look forward to focusing on that. Thanks, mike. Thank you for your leadership organizing such an event in helping us. More importantly to encourage me in the past years to work together, thinking together with sports no matter how differently its a reflection that we share the spirituality, share the vision, how the Regional Security can evolve in a way in a compatible. I would like to respond to bonnies excellent presentation. First of all, divergence and convergence is some sort of reality so getting through some very accurate reality checking and finally consent where we consider accuracy of the reality check and get back to the. [inaudible] the us has been a very positive security region and no matter how China Matters in terms of status i think china benefits from american and the very constructive and the regional conference and. Second, if we look at the potential risk where we have a collision between the two powers then what is the leading element to create or drive that, the divergence. We have to say its not a status its issue driven. Theres a lot of speculation across asia for the moment the leading challenge is that china is coming after the transition and i have to say its a fallacy. Yes, some Chinese Nationalist may see it that way so then you read a recently published book thats called everything and then china may. [inaudible] i think for most of the chinese welleducated scholars it is totally gone. I dont think it will be seen in the coming days. Yes, there is a level of hardship compared to the city years ago the us china power is such a disparity is truly significantly diminished by us. [inaudible] we dont think in the coming days such a power disparity will truly is getting on the path very, very tremendously. From a chinese perspective, yes, asianpacific area is a testing ground for us relations and a lot of interest now between the collision and we are competing on a past taking the solutions and methodologies but if we get back to centerpiece to be behind the strategy and we prefer to see the adequate and reasonable an issue driven and its not the status driven. Secondly, then we will see the asianpacific across this place is a very important testing ground as i mentioned to you. [inaudible] from a perspective that chinese methodology in the region remained largely some sort of domestic transition is not power competing base and i consider chinas dpr k policy is smart and they suffer a negative spillover in the positive dpr k. Why . Its very hard for china, very tangible and most important reason should be getting deeper into the china factor. Before china can become a successfully transformed power considered that China Remains vulnerable at large and in the region we consider it will be some sort of ways of competing to further china into very assertiveness. We consider that no matter how way we converge not just a history but its a lot of speculation in it over shadow of relations between washington and beijing and the chineseamericans will be giving to an inevitable conflict so the harvard professor just will cover a very incentive, sensational book called destined for war but we dont see it that way and we consider us china can join and creates a new molding of power relations. Conclusively, i have to say china is reports the asianpacific is a very interesting challenge for us and on the one hand we have to balance and find some sort of policy narrative and on the other hand we like to bring about some sort of new inspiring points and it is not an easy job. I have to say the most formal tasks on the chinese side is not how we can just envision the policies between us china region but how china can overcome some sort of. [inaudible] let me stop here. You contracted our papers wellin eight minutes and you fitted in three broker views. Well done. I appreciate it. Over to the military side of this panel to david speck okay, thanks. Thanks again to john for providing the leadership of the american group. Without him is the glue of the american side we wouldve been in a high state of entropy so, thanks for that and thanks to michael and scott kennedy. Three of us comprise the military and defense writing team and myself from Phil Saunders from National Defense university, all three were engaged in this and our personal and private capacities and id be remiss if i didnt state that nothing in the paper or anything i state today reflects the views of cna or any of its sponsors. If randy and phil were here they would provide the same caveats. So, as you heard, we are not supposed to summarize our papers and ours is 2526 pages long and you can take a look at it but i feel a need to at least provide it with a sense of overall assessment and the reason i feel the need to do tha