Good morning and welcome everyone in the studio as well as the audience in virtually im conscious of senior fellow at the csis on prosperity and development. Thank you for joining me today. Discuss a new book published by my long time and friend dan randy, a Senior Vice President and director of the project on Prosperity Development and holds the schreier chair here, csis. His work is oriented around u. S. Leadership in building a more democrat and prosperous world among his many other contributions. He was an architect of build act, helped contribute to the reauthorization of the Us Export Import Bank in 2018 and was an architect of prosper africa, a Government Initiative to deepen the uss and Development Engagement in. Hes been a leading on the role in future of the World Bank Group and u. S. Leadership in the multilateral system prior to csis held leadership roles at the u. S. Agency for International Development and the World Bank Group earlier in his career, he also worked commercial banking at citibank in argentina and Investment Banking at is now deutsche bank. Dans book, the american imperative reclaiming Global Leadership through soft power is the first decade. Its book in decades to look at americas nonmilitary free power through the lens of great competition, it calls for broad based economic growth, supporting Good Governance and anti corruption, long term training, differentiating our approaches in middle countries and fragile states, and stronger u. S. Leadership in the multilateral. Dan, i want to congratulate you on a great book. Its been a its been a long process and im very proud to host you today. So welcome and why dont we dive right in . Thanks, connor. Thanks for having me. Im really pleased to be doing this. This has been a long time coming, been in washington for 20 years. Ive been at access for 12. Ive watched rise of china over the last 12 years. But ive also watched the rise and the progress many developing countries. And so its not our grandparents developing world and at the same time, were in a period of Great Power Competition with. China and their sidekick, russia. And so i think that we have to offer an alternative enable an alternative because china in partnership, russia can fill voids that we leave behind. They can fill voids in vaccines. We saw this with covid. They can close the Digital Divide through weiwei and zte. They can build bridges build ports and airports. So the extent we dont want to do that, china will do that to the extent that we dont want to provide and support the development. Reliable energy such as gas. China will do that for them to the extent that we fill trade voids china will fill that as well. So at the same time, russia which is doesnt have the same kind of heft as china is a is a major disrupter, to put it mildly. Their illegal invasion of ukraine has has Global Implications and. Its in our interest to make sure that ukraine wins war. But also ukraine also is financially successful as a stable democracy and a full member of the European Union and nato. I want to come back to ukraine a little bit, but maybe lets start out with i think one of the things that strikes me about the book is there is this sort of cold war parallel. You talk a lot about how the Kennedy Administration saw a real challenge to our ability to engage in countries in the early 1960s that led to the peace corps, that led to. Using the cold war. You know, how do you kind of see this as a as a competition right now is . It analogous is it a little bit different how do you kind of where do you see the similarities and differences sort of dodged this . B and so i think the book i sort of edge up to the idea of saying this is potentially a cold war. I did an integrative interview last week where said they disagreed with me in the book because i sort of hem and haw on issue of whether its a second cold war or not. And i finished i submitted the manuscript for the book, march of 2010, february march of 2020 to the world is also since evolved. I think unfortunately in a not great way in the last 12 plus months. So i think we need to see this certainly revisiting our soft in an age of Great Power Competition. Perhaps thats a safer place. I think what i worry is if i say its a second cold war, some folks of bristle at that and sort dont want us to kind of and i think the framing of that as perhaps creates a problem but i do think that if you look at in history if you look at the emergence of the marshall that was a result of the coup in in 1948 which was sort of the dawn the cold war and was a direct response to sort of National Security concerns and Foreign Policy concerns at. The time, if you look at the reorganization of aid in the early 1961 that the foreign assistance act of 1961 it was a reaction to perceived shortcomings during sort of the the First Quarter or so of the of the cold war where. This book called the ugly america in which was published in 1958, which i think of a book thats been more influential in Foreign Policy and john kennedy bought a copy for every member of the senate. Kennedy, about 100 copies of the book and gave one to every member of the us senate. And that book caused a revolution in thinking in the United States about we ought to engage with the developing world. It caused, it brought about the reorganization of the for foreign aid. It a rejiggering of u. S. The initiative called the alliance for progress for the americas. It created the peace corps and it created the green berets. So these all things that were a direct result of the book the ugly american. I would say weve had several moments since since the 1960s at the end of the cold war, there were some rejiggering of our instruments ation to respond to the fall, the berlin wall. And then i would say after 11, there have been some some adjustments. Well, i would argue that were at a moment in this period of great competition or whatever we want to call it. If we want to call it a second cold war. And theres baggage with that that. The National Security imperative of engaging a resurgent china in a a disrupter in, russia require us to go back to the drawing board on our soft power instruments to respond to this new challenge that were finding. So i think you know as were as im listening to you, i mean, one of the things that really comes out is imperative of us using our soft tools and using them better. I mean, what do you see as the importance now for soft power and why do you think development and extension diplomacy are overlooked when the u. S. Is looking at how engages in the world . So if you believe were in an age of Great Power Competition and then most of our Great Power Competition not going to play out in beijing or moscow, its going to play out in tanzania. Its going to play out in guatemala. Its to play out in the Pacific Island states. Its going to out in central asia. Its going to play out in ukraine. These are developing countries, a series of hopes and aspirations, interests. And to the extent dont meet the hopes and aspirations these countries. Theyll take their business to china or theyll take their business to russia in some instances. And to the extent we dont in a number of different fields that are not in the nonmilitary sphere, they have the ability today because of their economic because of chinas economic heft to be able to fill voids that we leave behind. So im all for peace through strength, all for a strong u. S. Military and a strong intelligence capacity. But i believe most of this competition, not a military competition, its a nonmale entre competition. One of the things that i know has come up, you put out the book since it was published week. Youve and youve done a lot of these discussions is this idea of, you know, implicit the this discussion of uschina in the developing world and other regions is the idea that youre that you could be suggesting that they need to pick side how do you address how do you think about this interplay between the us and and what how do we have to think that how do we have to frame it when were engaging in developing countries . So in my heart id like them to pick a side, but i think in reality in most instances thats going to be very, very today. And that in the late nineties, Something Like 120 out of 200 countries, the number one trading partner was the united and about 60. The largest trading partner was, china today out of 200 or so developing countries, about 120 countries. Their trading partner is china. And were the number trading partner for about 60. So going to be very difficult to say to some country where their number one trading partner is Mainland China, you have to pick a side and stop working with Mainland China. So i think just not its not serious. So i think we need to be realistic about that. At the same time, there are things we cant just say if countries dont take sinovac vaccines, were not going to offer an alternative. Dont take chinese made ventilators if were not going to offer a ventilator, dont take chinese infrastructure or energy infrastructure. Sure. If were not going to enable long term, dont have to meet china dollar for dollar. But its just not serious for us, say, to countries that have developed beyond a certain level of development, have their own agency, their own choices today and and can have a lot more freedom of action for us to say dont the vaccines, dont take the infrastructure and dont close your Digital Divide with our way. We have to enable an alternative so let me go on that so infrastructure is one of the ways that weve seen china really ramp up its presence in developing countries through the belt and road . What do we need to do to offer a credible alternative to chinese infrastructure . My view is that to the extent that there building farm to market roads in the middle of nowhere if they want go knock themselves out and do that thats fine. Then theres some areas where we ought to be competing with on infrastructure, whether its us or through the Asian Development bank or japan or the australians or turkey or brazil. Thats fine. Then theres a subset of what might be described commanding heights, infrastructure where we just dont want them to build it, where they has a dual use, say an airport or a port or its certain kinds of Tech Technology like 5g controlling 5g. We do. We should not want Mainland China control the digital rails of the future in developing countries and the unholy trinity of huawei, zte and alipay. So thinking about digital in particular you know weve talked a lot over the years about how aid and Development Institutions did a lot to enable phone telephony in developing countries and countries leapfrogged they people never had a landline they only have a cell phone. So when youre thinking about the Digital Divide, what what do we need to do . What do you see as the opportunity on that so the us and the west helped create kind of version 1. 0 of the internet in many developing countries and was also an enabler through through a series of obscure important institutions called Development Finance institutions like the international corporation. What was then the overseas private investment corporation, the series of European Development financing institutions enable the cell phone revolution. Thats happened over the last 20 years. And theres most people in the developing world, whether its afghanistan or african countries in or southeast asia, they all have access to to cell phone telephony and. Thats changed the world for the better. What youre seeing now is this next generation of high Speed Internet net, which has accelerated because of covid. Everybody was in their basement for a year. Whether they were in rural maryland, they were in moldova or mali, and was a realization that we all needed high Speed Internet, that high Speed Internet is new electricity. And so this is this is going to happen. And so either going there, either people are going to close this new Digital Divide of high Speed Internet, either Mainland China or through yyz and alipay or some coalition or somebody else. I would strongly prefer that some coalition of somebody else requires is going to act a little bit more together. It means us working with allies like south korea, finland and sweden. It means having some sort of a strategy how were going to use development, finance, institutions it probably means having being a little bit more thoughtful in tangible how we use aid agencies to kind of prime the pump for some of this stuff. Some of this is about making sure that various stakeholders up and on bids for certain kinds infrastructure. And then my hope is to the extent that countries pick weiwei, zte and zte for socalled 5g technology is sort of the latest technology being used that we can to the extent we lose in some instances, we need to get ready for six g or the next generation so that we can supplant Mainland China because is just not in our interest because of either values, commerce and most sort of the vacuuming, vacuuming up of Data Information thats going directly to beijing thats being used for all sorts of bad purposes. So let me let me take this. You mentioned allies in your last answer. You know, your book is entitled the american imperative. And, you know, i think some some not me may look at this and say, oh, this is a little bit of an America First argument that youre trying to make here. And i think its a its know how how do you kind of what you say to that . Where do allies where how do you kind of think about the american role from that perspective in the world . Nothing significant the United States has ever done. Have we been able to do by ourselves . We have needed friends and partners to accomplish anything of anything since the cold war, confronting big challenges like hiv, aids, response ending to covid thats required sort of leading a coalition. The extent that weve been able to do that sometimes were not a great friend sometimes were a little bit of a flaky ally and friend. We need to do a better job of that. I would that one of our greatest strengths is fact that weve got a big Network Friends and allies. And so i think we need to make sure that being a good friend and a reliable stuff you learned in kindergarten. But we so we we ag we want to accomplish in sort of this responding to closing the digital right, making sure that the next were not all sitting in our basins a year, making sure that Mainland China doesnt control the imf or the secretary of the u. N. Or the commanding heights of the multilateral system, we need to work with our friends. And so this is not America First book. This is book that says we need to. This is an internationalist book that says we need to work with our friends that we have a big challenge. I think i think theres consensus in washington that we have a big problem with russia and we have a big problem with china. I dont believe theres a consensus yet in washington about what the heck to do about it. And so i wrote the book as a contribution to say heres some thoughts about some things we could do if we could respond. China and russia and. If you believe that most of our competition is not about night vision goggles and battleships and missiles, those are all really important things. As i said, i believe in peace through strength. Then we need come up with look at a variety spheres. Think about what were going to do and how were going to burden, share and in some ways development is about helping countries become wealthy enough and hopefully enough that they join the Community Free market, you know, free, free nations that are market democracies are willing to burden share on big challenge edges and also to join you know, this is a big set of words but the liberal International Order the and i dont mean liberalism thats a progressive sort of that the or the set of rules and arrangements that were set up after World War Two. We countries to develop and then become burden sharers in the system. That was set up after World War Two. The system has up after World War Two is a great thing and so i see development ultimate league if you say what my agenda is and i think what many people in washington say is help countries to have freedom of action be have own have their own agendas in world, but also to decide on their own that its in their interest, ultimately participate the existing liberal International Order, not go off with china and try and set some new, new arrangement that were not going to like. One of the things you said in the was this isnt your grandparents developing. Can you unpack that a little bit . What has chan