Good afternoon. I am senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, my name is amy zegart, codirector of the center for International Security and cooperation at stanford. We are delighted both institutions have come together to cohost this book event with Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson to discuss destined for war can america and china escape thucydides trap . I want to remind all of you the book is available for purchase and Graham Allison will sign a few questions at the end of the talk. You cant escape the trap of the bookstore outside. Graham allison as many of you know is director of harvards center, and dylan professor of government and founding dean of Harvards Kennedy school of government. Like legions of students, i vividly remember my first time walking into the Kennedy School for my first forum event in 1986. It was an intoxicating place where you could feel the brainpower working at the policy being changed in the room. Graham allison has been the man behind this magic for a very long time. The standard of policy relevant scholarship since he was 10 years old in 1986. He is the ultimate triple threat serving at a number of distinguished positions in academia, government and the private sector. He served as special advisor to the secretary of defense under president s reagan and assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans under president clinton. He has been a trusted advisor to seven secretaries of defense both democrat and republican. He serves on the Advisory Board of the secretary of state, secretary of defense and director of the Central Intelligence agency. He has the sole distinction of having been twice awarded the formative defenses highest civilian award, the distinguished Public Service medal, first by weinberger and again by bill parry who is here with us today. As many of you know, Graham Allison has written extensively about Nuclear Weapons, terrorism and decisionmaking. His first book, essence of decision explained to the cuban missile crisis, one of the most influential books in Political Science and has become required reading for the vast majority of Political Science students today. That is saying something. If youre a political scientist you know there have been so many articles and books about the cuban missile crisis there has even been a periodical about why we should stop writing articles and books about the cuban missile crisis. It is one of the most proud intellectual landscapes and Graham Allisons book has stood the test of time. That book has sold 450,000 copies, the tom clancy of the field. Influential books including a 2000 book called the grandmasters insights on china, the us and the world, and nuclear terrorism, the ultimate preventable catastrophe, selected as one of the hundred most notable books of the year. This book, destined for war can america and china escape thucydides trap . Is no different. I typed in bestselling Political Science books on amazon. Com and a three offers at the top were ken follett, our franken and Graham Allison. There is only one weakness in Graham Allisons illustrious career. He never saw the light as his colleague, Neil Ferguson did, to move from harvard to stanford. I am here to say it is not too late for you. We hope after your visit, it will be for a longer time. Joining him in conversation today is a smart a colleague who decided to move to california, Niall Ferguson. He is a colleague of mine, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, also a senior fellow at the center for European Studies at harvard and visiting professor at beijing. He is one of the leading economic historians, astute and widely followed political commentator and prolific author. Graham allison has sold 450 books, Niall Ferguson has written 450 books. Incredibly prolific author. Kissinger, the latest volume, a highly awarded book, civilization, the west and the rest, the ascent of money, financial history of the world, how britain made the modern world and colossus, the rise and fall of the american empire. You can find them in the sunday times and the boston globe. Before coming to stanford he was professor of history at harvard for 11 years and before that he taught at nyu and the London School of economics. He has won a number of awards and the only person i know who can say he won an International Emmy for his series the ascent of money and the award for best documentary from new York InternationalFilm Festival for his featurelength film kissinger. He was named by Time Magazine one of the most influential people in the world. I have to add in 2017 he achieved a first in the hundred year history of the Hoover Institution which was to get every single fellow interested in International Security affairs together for the first of a series of salons which has proven to provide incredibly fascinating, illuminating conversations and you are about to see why when you hear these two professors talk about Graham Allisons book. Please join me in welcoming Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson. [applause] introductions are better here than at harvard. One thing amy didnt mention is Graham Allison and i have been coauthors. We published an article on history last year arguing the president of the United States needed a council of historical advisors, this one especially, and we are not in an adversarial relationship. The book we are going to talk about is a book i watched evolve when i was at harvard and i have to congratulate you, you got the timing just right. If you arent worried now about the possibility of conflict between china and the United States, when you leave this room i guarantee that you will be. Let me begin our conversation with a quotation from the book. When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it. War between the United States and china in the decade ahead is not just possible but much more likely than currently recognized. On the historical record, war is more likely than not. I have to ask you to set up your case, assuming people who bought the book but not yet read it. Persuade us that war is more likely than not between the United States and china. Thank you for participating in this event, and the joint venture, it is a great honor and opportunity. In the 70s, couldnt possibly i wouldnt be able to do any work. Too many to do, the colleague at harvard said how do you get work done . I spent as much time in this room as i used to spend shoveling snow. In any case a great pleasure to be here, thanks for the introduction. For this group, for general audiences and younger audiences today concept that there could be a war between great powers is inconceivable. 7 decades without war, war between great powers has been consigned to the dustbin of history. It is nothing to do with the 20th century. In his previous centuries. There havent been for a long time. Any historian will recognize how silly that observation is. This period of 7 decades is anomalous, john geddess proposition is a powerful proposition. So the notion piece is the natural condition of mankind or for whatever reason our better angels have become so powerful we have become so wise or in any case war between great powers is obsolete. In the case of us and china, every day, there is noise about what is happening in this relationship, china is a trading partner, there is a near convection in the north china sea or whatever. Beneath the surface of this, then the substructure driving these events. I came upon the idea of that insight but that helped eliminate what is happening, namely a rising power that is threatening to displace a ruling power. That storyline is as old as history itself. The founder of history, thucydides, said about the conflict between athens and sparta, the great city states of classical greece, the famous line all students of International Relations have studied, he said, quote, it was the rise of athens and the fear that is instilled in sparta that made the war inevitable. He identified a dynamic in which a rising power feels bigger, stronger than a small power. The arrangements that were set in place, confining, even unfair. I can remember some of this, the ruling power looking at this, this upstart trying to upset the situation that provided the environment in which is able to grow. This dynamic between the rising power and the ruling power greatly exhausts trusts is misinterpreted by the others, if you suspect evidence and vice versa. Magnification of this understanding and similarly preaching vulnerability to the impact of external actions and events in which stopping athens or reaction, there is a cascade at the end of which is an outcome no one would have imagined. The dynamic is not the rise and ruling power, is not a good idea. The arrangements are great because they have a long period of peace and they are rich and the Government Official from time to time i have given this to people, i believe it is true, the us constructed in the aftermath of world war i 2, economic and Security Order provided for longer peace and greater prosperity than china ever saw so they should be extremely grateful and should participate in this, they say who wrote these rules and where were we when the pools were written and where the rules fare from our perspective and should they be adjusted . I should have more sway and you should be happy or grateful. This dynamic leads us to be vulnerable to events like what is happening in korea. Of what is happening in korea were happening in the relationship between the us and britain, in a way that was threatening to the tea party, british and americans would sit down and say a little pipsqueak like this could not disturb relations between two big states. Forget about it. Lets sit down and solve this problem and if we can agree on some things we will flip a coin. The relationship between the us and china, in north korea the chinese as you know very well havent participated in this conversation, you and i did, we were part of a high level postmortem with both americans and chinese, from the chinese perspectives in beijings a problem in courier is always that we are there. There would be no problem in korea if the americans were not in korea. We would solve this problem in a second. From the American Perspective the ideas that we fought a war there. 40,000 americans died there. We helped build a society there, a very successful democracy. The 13th largest market economy in the world. We are not walking away from that. We are proud of this and we should be proud. The problem is north china, you should solve this problem with the little guys. As you have written brilliantly, world war i. A good chapter in single chapter terms, the answer after the war, how did this happen . If we only knew. Still is the right answer. How could the assassination of an archduke by a serbian terrorist who nobody cares much about except the guy in vienna, he shouldnt go there. The guy that assassinates him is a serbian terrorist from a group called the black hand. If you were writing a movie wouldnt make this up. The spark that feeds the fire that burns down the whole house, it makes no sense. Did anybody want the war that they got . Know. The hungarians would like to smoosh the serbs because of the way they were behaving but as you point out, would have allowed them to do that without having a great war. One thing led to the other and by the end, everyone lost it is so startling and irrelevant as we think about china, no one in the us wants a war with china. I dont know of a Single Person who thinks that wouldnt be crazy and no one in this chamber in the ministry of defense thinks a war with the us is a good idea. War would be catastrophic. At the end of world war i, what did they care most about . Was gone. They were trying to hold together an empire. The emperor was gone. The whole regime was overthrown. The kaiser is trying to back his buddy in vienna, he is gone. The french are backing the russians for a whole generation, society never recovers and britain which has been a credit for 100 years turned into a debtor so if you had given these people a chance for a do over, nobody, not a single one would made the choice he did but they made the choices, one led to another and that is what happened. The situation nobody wants more, everybody knew the war would be nuts. Your analogy here would be the rivalry between britain and germany essential to the outbreak of that war, in this case britain in 1914 was the incumbent power, germany was the rising power is chinese today, they were heavily interdependent economically and nevertheless came with disastrous consequences. In my reading of it, it is consistent with your own history of it, they are entangled with other parties about who would not otherwise have been, bismarck in germany, he would have understood how weak the austrohungarians where. He would have never let the alliance with russia the kaiser didnt know what he was doing and began to work similarly, the british have been careful not to get too entangled with other parties on the continent and they were watching, fearful of germany, we better talk about this, we should have more relationships with the russians, the brits were worried about the russians. They thought the russians were threatening their empire in india. In the book. I should explain, gives you 16 cases, and incumbent power feeling threatened by a rising power and this is the Political Science parts. 12 other this results in conflict. I would like to talk more about the 1914 analogy which is a powerful one and i would like to get to the contemporary parallel in which a small rogue regime precipitates that. The Peloponnesian War, you might not have registered these but chinas leaders have. Could you raise your hand if you read the Peloponnesian War or part of it . Being back at oxford, let me make a shout out, you can go right now and download for free on to the Peloponnesian War and the first hundred pages will knock your socks off. I hope you like the other book too which you have to pay for. It is not downloadable for free yet but im sure someone is working on it. Watch out. The most remarkable thing for me is this is something chinas leaders referred to. Xi xinping refers to the thucydides trap, in a speech in seattle. Remind me if ive got that wrong. We heard chinese ambassadors in the United States, it may seem arcane if you are not into ancient history, it doesnt seem arcane in beijing. One question, who is smarter than issue is part and who is athens . I am not quite sure. It is not isomorphic. Next thing is the mutual colleague, the work we tried to do, ernest maywood point out when you get an analogy be careful, similar at the top of the win column, if you cant make three bullet points taken aspirin and consult a historian. These are not exactly like in fact the spartan case, people may not remember. The persians, that is what we call it rainy and is now, athens that were professional. And in the pickup game. A pretty impressive navy greeted an alliance. Whereupon a few other times in history. And Creative Energy in athens, unbelievable. Came from an event in Silicon Valley in the tech world. Whether they had been in 50 years, sophocles, euripides, philosophy, socrates. Democracy, pericles, look at the parthenon. You can find a building in california. From sparta, people are looking out saying these people are out of control every day. Crazy new things that are not comfortable to us. It was essentially seal team 6. When kids are 4 years old you check them out, they kill them. And 25 years old, they cant get married until they are 30, they are getting ready to fight people and that is when they do. Drama and history and philosophy, this seemed very threatening to the spartans. They said to the spartans, the way things are the way they are supposed to be so after the war with the persians, the athenians wanted to build back their wall to protect them from invasion from people like the spartans. You cannot have a wall. We need to discipline you and be able to march there. And build this wall. Why would they build this while . They didnt want to obey us. If you said what is the similarity between the us and china, extreme differences, from an American Perspective the International Order we helped build and provide and manage over seven decades worked very well. It involved historical terms, i give the americans high marks in many areas but from a chinese perspective, things should be adjusted and particularly in the asian arena, why is that the arbiter of events in the South China Sea . They would look up every day, there is the u. S. Navy and when there is a dispute about an isl