I was asked to talk about interactions with the chinese on a government to government issue on strategy and doctrine. I will come to that in a moment. A number of those points li bin started with on Nuclear Terminology was very interesting in terms of security and safety, that is common for a number of languages working on Threat Reduction programs where they dont distinguish between Nuclear Safety and nuclear security, so it is a common problem around the world we have had to confront and i welcome the attention to the significant differences different approaches to terminology can bring and need to be teased out through discussion and debate, they have taken a lot of criticism, in the past several years focusing on a Nuclear Glossary and people said this is a time wasting exercise. Point to the importance of the threshold matter of gaining an understanding of the similarities and differences and uses of technology, and the deep and serious discussion, Nuclear Doctrine and strategy. I want to give a shout out at the beginning to li bin for highlighting this point and also the Chinese Government, took the lead in the glossary project, driving it forward over the last couple years. It is as i said both the threshold you pass to get to more serious discussions, and we have those discussions and that is very important. The main topic regarding interactions with the chinese on nuclear policies, the 2010 Nuclear Posture past the Government Community to pursue highlevel Bilateral Dialogue with china and russia aimed at fostering more stable resilience and transparent relationships. What does that mean . Strategic stability of the term we use a lot but one that is difficult to decline and particularly when talking about the china and asia pacific, those particular environments. During the cold war, the sermon the term stability for mutually assured destruction, the motion that the incentive to assure nuclear use by suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. This characterization of strategic stability is illsuited and too narrow to capture dynamics between the United States and china today. In todays world strategic stability must account for more than the balance of Nuclear Weapons and include other capabilities that can affect cyberweapons and strike and intensive and several of these. Strategic stability, the nonmilitary elements on the Us China Relationship with cooperation and competition, and economics. It must be taken into account, bringing that to our attention this morning. The discussion on strategic stability must account for the relationship between the us and china different from what the relationship between the ussr and the United States during the cold war, what strategic stability between the us and china means and some ongoing process that involves us and chinese experts in and out of government and government policymaker i can tell you what strategic stability is not about in the context, we do not seek in these discussions to gain detailed insight into the operational location of Chinas Nuclear forces. We would like to have a conversation about Nuclear Policy in boston and contribute to predictability and stability by preventing strategic postures that foster empathy and uncertainty. Similarly, strategic stability is not a substitute for broad strategic discussions that address the full range of issues where our interests overlap. And the Nuclear Posture to underpin, bilateral discussions by reducing inadvertent escalation, misperception or calculation. In particular during times of tension or crisis. The common understanding of strategic stability, important because it will help across the full range of Strategic Issues and provide better understanding of chinas threat perception and play by Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Security strategy. I would say we have a more urgent issue to address because of chinas longterm and comprehensive military modernization which is Nuclear Forces. For that reason we are very into intensifying our discussions in this regard, intensify substantive dig down deep on some of these topics. A few settings in these discussions, and Strategic Security dialogue, maritime, cyber and Missile Defense policy. In addition, the dialogue addresses many of these issues, proliferation and disarmament matters. On may 12th, very much looking forward to those discussions. I will say a word on the process at the outset talking about the block project. And the Nuclear Doctrine, looking to do that in two ways. And National Academies and science, National Academy of science through committee on arms control and the chinese scientist groups, rich discussions of this matter, we would like to expand it to include all members of p5 from the direction of scientist communities, some did not. There was complexity to be worked out but we see a role for the scientist to scientist discussion, so valuable in the us china realm over many years, and expand to the whole. We are interested in p5 discussions per se on Nuclear Doctrine and strategies that get to a more intense level of sophisticated accomplish up to this point, for the coming year of work in 2016. I will wrap up the discussion. Thank you. That was a fascinating discussion of the us approach. Linton brooks. Full disclosure. I am not a china expert. I am a Nuclear Policy expert desperately working to gain a minor in us chinese strategic relations. I am not going to comment directly on the accuracy of li bins characterization but i will point out one thing, it is an important article. An important article, the greatest of respect to rose, it is not clear to the outside to the outside observer that the breadth of discussion in li bins 10 minute presentation is matched by the depth and quality of the discussion in the official dialogue. A number of us look forward to the time when we can have our 2 governments begin that dialogue. Academic discussions, li bin and i are involved in some of these, some of the things rose mentioned about the National Academy of science are a substitute. We ought not to miss place the fact that we need some time to have indepth discussion so that we can understand each other because china, unlike other members of the p5, has a quite different conceptual basis, to Nuclear Policy as we have been suggesting. Some of you will say why did we spent time talking about terms . Terms matter. Let me give you a concrete example. Security, safety. The National Security administration, it was our goal. Willing to share a lot of us knowledge to improve the security of Chinese Nuclear weapons. A variety of reasons those dialogues didnt happen but we would have been ready as we have been ready and have shared knowledge of security of Nuclear Weapons. Anybody suggested that we share Safety Information about Nuclear Weapons, people would have first spoken about the Atomic Energy act and security clearance, the enormously important distinction doesnt exist in the chinese language is important. Dont undervalue the linguistic aspects. I would push back on one thing li bin said. I think his intellectual discussion of deterrence was interesting and thoughtful and largely irrelevant. It is a fact of the last 70 years. The risk of conflict in nuclear arms states that they dont have conventional attacks and nuclear arms states. And the Nuclear Capability to deter response is theoretically interesting, but not practical. The historical evidence is nonproliferation willing to attack vietnam and china and britain, china and the United States and korea is not a Nuclear Armed state. I dont know that this deterrence components distinction is quite as important as it might seem. The second thing where i would push back, then what li bin had time to say, this question of strategic sensibility. In the article, it suggested chinese scholars are coming to use the us traditional definition of strategic stability. That has not been my experience. Quite to the contrary, the narrow definition rose pointed out one of the dangers with strategic stability risks assimilating to overall foreign policy, taking on narrower definition, focusing on prevention of nuclear war, it is unclear that the chinese see the strategic stability thinking in the United States build up between equals is relevant to a discussion of clean air. This is an important thing. The terms for strategic stability has outlived its usefulness of dialogue with china and we ought to have a dialogue for strategic stability, is not worth the effort to work on that term but alternate views are possible. One of the things stressed in the article and stressed in the presentation is a question of transparency. Transparency got hijacked by an erroneous belief that this administration and the Previous Administration wanted to know what time they are there and can i make sure my gps starting coordinates are correct, that was never for either of the last two administrations, what we wanted to understand is what the article is about, power to the chinese how do they think about Nuclear Weapons . I want to invite your attention to an important thing in the article that suggests that sometimes transparency comes through the press, chinese get asked questions for the press. We dont an authoritative way. Our press is somewhat chaotic huge for this purpose on the other hand, the more responsive by government desires, pay a lot of attention to what the Chinese Government puts out publicly, and look at transparency. And a lot of areas, transparency would actually help us, with all of the reaction. The idea of being inferior in science and technology is a serious challenge. And quite naturally causes china to investigate lots of things. And with technical lagging, and the chinese buildups, and if you had more transparency, where transparency might help, chinas investment for strategic deterrence, whose relationship with the pla Strategic Rocket forces, not clear at least to me. Their actual purpose of the program is not, at least to me, a discussion of how you think of that. For transparency as for how we think about the regional world. In talking about the arms race, i want to make a point, the discussions about arms race look at the United States and another country. What they fail to account for is unique extended deterrence role of the United States, that leads many of us to believe second to none is an important policy, and importance between 1500 and 1000 has any meaning in a largescale war but because it may have meaning to some of our allies in whether or not we are reliable. I would urge my chinese colleagues as i have in other forums, seeking to prevent hegemony is not the same thing as seeking hegemony. The traditional position of the United States for most of the last 30 years has not been to seek superiority or hegemony. It has been to seek some kind of equivalence. We changed the buzzword by administration but the idea is to make sure particularly our allies are not under any illusion that we are an unreliable why are we on the fence . We have jointly locked ourselves into a corner where we will get the worst of both worlds. Chinese reaction in the belief we have deployed missiles that threaten chinese horses forces without the events that would be particularly useful for that. It does seem to me that some of the ideas that we have suggested for discussion with the russians on Missile Defense are entirely suitable to china, to have this rich government level dialogue that i am advocating. But nothing i say should suggest that this isnt a very valuable and important article. And that you should look at it, or how we can find ways to have a discussion, the understanding of concepts is the first level. That is the important strategic discussion to have. Some of us have been working on that for a while and some of us will continue to. Thank you very much. It is pretty clear that you have a minor in us china Strategic Study so i recommend you begin looking at it the major because you are pretty close. I would like to ask questions of each of the presenters to get intellectual juices flowing to be brief and open it up and hopefully have a little more for that. Given what you argue in the article do you believe us and chinese news are converging . Clearly they understand the arguments you make in the article, do you think the communication gap, and if so why do you think asking purely for personal view, the Chinese Government and pla, so reluctant to having this dialogue, for six years, i was in every possible, almost every possible highlevel meeting, supersmall meetings, meetings we dont admit existed and very difficult to have a serious discussion about nuclear issues. Why is that . Your personal view . It would be great to hear a little bit more how the administration thinks about Missile Defense in the us china context because in the headlines these days especially with the us are okay decision to begin the deployment and, Linton Brooks, tell us why you think strategic stability is not the right focus for the us China Dialogue assume it ever happens in that format . When i was involved in these discussions we talk about arms race stability as components of strategic stability. Is it that those are the wrong concept . Is it that Us China Relationship isnt up to the point of having those conversations . I want to draw you out a little bit about what aspects of strategic ability you dont think are the right things . And what is the right conversation . You talked about transparency a little bit, the chinese are very reluctant to have a conversation about transparency related to capability so where should we take a transparency conversation given those constraints . Why dont we start with li bin. I believe very much like to see dialogue between two countries. To my colleague many times if they want to trend their experts for Nuclear Dialogue we like to pretend to have them, but we have not seen that yet. I dont think this is because the position of our two countries are so much different. That is not the main problem. We see china and the United States with no consensus. In the United States some people like to see a dialogue. Some people tried to stop that. Me and some others to us visa to come to the United States and have dialogue but some other people try to do that. In china. Some people like to have dialogue. Others say look, they always want to know what we think about. They never tell us what they think about. We should stay away from that. In some countries we need minimal level consistency, that is most important. I would like to make a larger comment about the us china context because it is the kind of discussion i would like to have and Linton Brooks was a student commenting that if we were to build a Missile Defense system to undermine Nuclear Deterrence, putting a bad system, limited capabilities to deal with Regional Defense mission against regional threats and stress again the capability is extremely limited but we need to be able to make the case more clearly and i think that does include some convincing measures to convey that different to our chinese colleagues but when i think about the conversation we need to have about Missile Defenses it is in the context of the proliferation of intermediate range Ballistic Missiles in eurasia. We have been grappling with this matter with the Russian Federation, their violation of intermediate range Nuclear Forces treaty, total bilateral ban on midrange systems from 500 to 5500 km and we believe the russians have tested a capable range. This is a problem the russians say themselves is across eurasia and has been put about as public rationale for why they go down this road and Vladimir Putin himself spoke about this when he went to crimea in august 2014, he talked about the general problem of intermediate range missile proliferation being a problem the russians are grappling with. Yes, we are grappling with a similar problem, a limited intermediate range missile threat and we have chosen to respond to that limited threat from iran from north korea by ballistic Missile Defense